Divorced Parents And A Dependent Child

 It is one of my least favorite issues in tax practice.

Who is entitled to a dependent?

Granted, there is no longer a dependency exemption available, but there are other tax items, such as the child tax credit, that require a dependent.

The issue can go off-the-rails if the parents are (a) divorced and (b) combative.

It occurs when both parents claim the same child for the same year.

One of the parents is going to lose the dependency, of course, but how the Code determines which one may surprise you.

The Code wants to know which is the custodial parent – that is, which parent did the child live with for the majority of the year. Granted, in some cases the answer may be razor close, but most of the time there is a clear answer.

The Code anticipates that the custodial parent will claim the child.

What if the noncustodial parent provides most of the child’s support?

The Code (for the most part) does not care.

How does the noncustodial parent get to claim the child?

If the parents get along, then there is no issue. Everyone follows the rules and there is no tax controversy.

If the parents do not get along and both claim the same child, the IRS is going to get involved. It will want to know: who is the custodial parent?

But the divorce decree says ….

You might be surprised how little the IRS cares about that divorce decree.

What it is interested in is whether a certain form was filed with the noncustodial parent’s return: Form 8332.

This form has to be signed by the custodial parent. If the parents do not get along, you can see the problem.

What happens if the noncustodial parent does not attach this form and both parents claim the child?

Let’s take a look at the DeMar case.

The divorce decree said that Mr Demar (Dad) was to claim the son in odd-numbered years. Dad claimed the son for 2015.

Mrs DeMar (Mom) also claimed the son.

The IRS came in. There (of course) was no Form 8332. The IRS could care less what that divorce decree had to say, so off to Tax Court they went.

Dad is going to lose this all day every day, except ….

Would you believe that – before the Tax Court hearing – Mom signed Form 8332?  

That doesn’t happen much.

There is a proposed Regulation on this point:

A noncustodial parent may submit a copy of the written declaration to the IRS during an examination to substantiate a claim to a dependency exemption for the child.

Did that save Dad?

Let’s keep reading:

A copy of a written declaration attached to an amended return, or provided during an examination, will not meet the requirement of this paragraph … if the custodial parent … has not filed an amended return to remove that claim to a dependency exemption for the child.

So one can file the 8832 late but one also has to prove that the other parent amended his/her return to remove the dependency for the child.

Guess what?

Mom did not amend her return.

Dad lost.

The IRS did not care about that divorce decree and the odd-numbered year.

I get it. The IRS has no intention of playing family court, so it established mechanical rules for the dependency. The average person focuses on the divorce decree – understandably – but the IRS does not.  Procedure is everything in this area.

Our case this time was DeMar v Commissioner T.C. Memo 2019-91.

When Is Divorce A Tax-Deductible Theft?

 

I am reading a case involving tax consequences from a divorce.

More specifically, the (ex) wife trying to deduct $2.5 million as a theft loss.

That is a little different.

He and she got married in 1987. Husband (Bruno) lifted a successful career in the financial sector, and by 2005 was earning over $2 million annually.

There was an affair.

There was a divorce.

The Court ordered an equitable distribution of marital properties.

That did not seem to impress Bruno, who transferred no marital properties. The court held him in contempt, ordered him to pay interest and yada yada yada.

QUESTION: Can’t a court place someone in jail for contempt?

It appeared that the Court had enough of Bruno, and in 2010 the Court transferred real estate to the (ex) wife, with instructions to sell, keep the first $300 grand and transfer the balance to an escrow account. The property sold for $1.9 million. Th (ex) wife kept all the money, placing nothing in escrow.

Yep, the Court held her in contempt.

By now I am thinking that the contempt of this court is clearly meaningless.

In 2015 our esteemed Bruno filed for bankruptcy. He claimed he was down to his last $2,500.

Which raised the question of where all the money went.

In 2016 the (ex) wife filed suit against Bruno’s new wife and several companies that he, she or both owned.

Methinks we found where the monies went.

She filed a claim against the bankruptcy estate for $3.5 million.

Apparently, there was something to the (ex) wife’s claim, as the bankruptcy trustee filed suit against the new wife, against Bruno’s mother, the Bruno companies previously mentioned and some poor guy Bruno talked to while walking his dog around the neighborhood.

That case was settled in 2019.

Let’s be honest: there is really no likeable character in this story.

The (ex) wife amended her 2015 tax return to report a $2.5 million theft.

That – not surprisingly – created a net operating loss that went springing across tax years like kids at a pre-COVID McDonald’s Playland.

The IRS caught the amended return and said: No way. No theft. No loss. Get outta here.

And that is how we got to the Tax Court.

Establishing the existence of a deductible theft can be tricky in tax law. Yes, one always has the question of what was stolen, how much was it worth and all that. Tax law introduces an additional requirement:

·      One must establish the year in which the loss was sustained.

The blade is in Reg 1.165-1(d):

However, if in the year of discovery there exists a claim for reimbursement to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery, no portion of the loss with respect to which reimbursement may be received is sustained  .. until the taxable year in which it can be ascertained with reasonable certainty whether or not such reimbursement will be received.”

It is not the “what” that will trip you up; it is the “when.”

There of course some Court guidance over the years, such as:

·      The evaluation should not be made “through the eyes of the ‘incorrigible’ optimist,” or

·      … the “mere possibility or the bare hope of a future development permitting recovery does not bar the deduction of a loss clearly sustained.”

Yep. That is like telling a baseball player to step to the plate against Jacob deGrom and “just swing the bat.”

Thanks for the advice there, pal.

And the Court decided against the (ex) wife.

No one believed Bruno when he filed bankruptcy in 2015 and claimed he was worth only $2,500. The trustee filed suit; the (ex) wife filed suit. Lawsuits were everywhere.

The Court stated that the (ex) wife may well have a theft loss. What she did not have was a theft loss in 2015.

Our case this time for the home gamers was Bruno v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2020-156.

A Puff Piece

 

Although we do not condone her inconsistency, we find it is merely puffery in an attempt to obtain new employment and of no significance here.”

There is a word one rarely sees in tax cases: puffery.

Puffery is an exaggeration. It approaches a lie but stops short, and presumably no “reasonable” person would believe what is being said or take it literally. The distinction matters if one’s puffery can be used against them as a statement of fact.

Let’s look at the Robinson case.

Mr Robinson had a lawn care business. Beverly Robinson had a job at Georgia Pacific, but in 2007 she started working at the lawn care business. She did the billing. She was also listed on the business checking account, but she never wrote checks.

She must have been the face of the business through, as for 2007 through 2009 most of the Forms 1099 to the business were sent in her name.

In 2010 the marriage went south. Mr Robinson moved out, and Beverly’s dad chipped-in to pay the mortgage on her house. Needless to say, she was not working at the company with all that going on.

In 2011 they filed a joint tax return for 2010. The return showed tax due of approximately $43 grand. She must have separated hard from the business, as no Forms 1099 were issued to her; all the Forms 1099 were issued to him.

COMMENT: I do not understand filing a joint tax return with someone you are likely to divorce. In Beverly’s defense, though, she did not realize that she had an option. They hired a tax preparer (likely because of the business), but the preparer never explained that the option to file separately existed.

In 2011 she was telling the IRS that they could not pay the 2010 tax debt. She also asked about innocent spouse status.

In 2012 they file a joint 2011 tax return. She was working again at another Georgia Pacific facility and had tax withholdings. The IRS took her withholdings and applied them to the 2010 tax year.

COMMENT: That is how it works.

In 2013 Beverly needed to find a new job. She uploaded her resume on a jobseeker website. She listed her Georgia Pacific gig. She also listed Robinson Lawn Care and embellished her duties, especially glossing over the fact that she no longer worked there.

In 2013 Mr Robinson somehow forced his way back into her house. She called the police and was told that they could not evict him since the two were still married.

In October, 2013 she filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.

About time. The year before Mr Robinson had fathered a child with another woman. In 2013 he started paying her child support.

The divorce became final in 2014. Mr Robinson agreed to assume the 2010 tax due.

Riiiight.

In 2015 she files for innocent spouse because of that 2010 tax debt and the IRS continuing to take her refunds.

The IRS turned down her request.

One of the requirements is that the tax liability for which the spouse is seeking relief belong to the “nonrequesting” spouse. In this case, the nonrequesting spouse was Mr Robinson.

He testified that he had moved out of the house in 2013. Oh, he also remembered Beverly working in the business in 2010.

Not good.

The IRS looked at certain Florida registrations that showed her name through 2014.

They also pointed out that she was a signatory on the business checking account.

Then they looked at her resume on that jobseeker website.

The Court was having none of it.

As for Mr Robinson:

Throughout the trial Mr. Robinson’s testimony was relatively inconsistent, and we give it little value.”

As for the registrations:

Although petitioner is listed as the registered owner of Robinson Lawn Care from December 1998 to December 2014, we find the reason for her filing the fictitious name--that her former husband worked during the day--is a sufficient explanation for why she is listed instead of Mr. Robinson. Moreover, she did not sign any State filings in 2010 or thereafter.

As for the checking account:

Similarly we find that petitioner’s name on the business account is not persuasive support for respondent’s position as Mr. Robinson had control of that account and she never wrote checks on it.

The Court pointed out that none of the 2010 Forms 1099 were made out to her, in clear contrast to prior tax years.

We saw above the Court’s comment on her puffery.

It was clear who the Court believed – and did not believe.

The Court decided that she was entitled to innocent spouse relief.

She cut it close, though.

Our case this time was Beverly Robinson v Commissioner of Internal Revenue T.C. Memo 2020-134.

Can Creditors Reach The Retirement Account Of A Divorced Spouse?

Let’s say that you divorce. Let say that retirement savings are unequal between you and your ex-spouse. As part of the settlement you receive a portion of your spouse’s 401(k) under a “QDRO” order.

COMMENT: A QDRO is a way to get around the rule prohibiting alienation or assignment of benefits under a qualified retirement plan. I generally think of QDROs as arising from divorce, but they could also go to a child or other dependent of the plan participant.

Your QDRO has (almost) the same restrictions as any other retirement savings. As far as you or I are concerned, it IS a retirement account.

You file for bankruptcy.

Can your creditors reach the QDRO?

Sometimes I scratch my head over bankruptcy decisions. The reason is that bankruptcy – while having tax consequences – is its own area of law. If the law part pulls a bit more weight than the tax part, then the tax consequence may be nonintuitive.

Let’s segue to an inherited IRA for a moment. Someone passes away and his/her IRA goes to you. What happens to it in your bankruptcy?

The Supreme Court addressed this in Clark, where the Court had to address the definition of “retirement funds” otherwise protected from creditors in bankruptcy.

The Court said there were three critical differences between a plain-old IRA and an inherited IRA:

(1)  The holder of an inherited IRA can never add to the account.

(2)  The holder of an inherited IRA must draw money virtually immediately. There is no waiting until one reaches or nears retirement.

(3)  The holder of an inherited IRA can drain the account at any time – and without a penalty.

The Court observed that:

Nothing about the inherited IRA’s legal characteristics would prevent (or even discourage) the individual from using the entire balance of the account on a vacation home or sports car immediately after bankruptcy proceedings are complete.”

The Court continued that – to qualify under bankruptcy – it is not sufficient that monies be inside an IRA. Those monies must also rise to the level of “retirement funds,” and – since the inheritor could empty the account at a moment’s notice - the Court was simply not seeing that with inherited IRAs.

I get it.

Let’s switch out the inherited IRA and substitute a QDRO. With a QDRO, the alternate payee steps into the shoes of the plan participant.

The Eighth Circuit steps in and applies the 3-factor test of Clark to the QDRO. Let’s walk through it:

(1)  The alternate payee cannot add to a QDRO.

(2)  The alternate payee does not have to start immediate withdrawals – unless of required age.

(3)  The alternate payee cannot – unless of required age - immediately empty the account and buy that vacation home or sports car.

By my account, the QDRO fails the first test but passes the next two. Since there are three tests and the QDRO passes two, I expect the QDRO to be “retirement funds” as bankruptcy law uses the term.

And I would be wrong.

The Eighth Circuit notes that tests 2 and 3 do not apply to a QDRO. The Court then concludes that the QDRO has only one test, and the QDRO fails that.

The Eighth Circuit explains that Clark:

… clearly suggests that the exemption is limited to individuals who create and contribute funds into the retirement account.”

It is not clear to me, but there you have it – at least if you live in the Eighth Circuit.

No bankruptcy protection for you.

Our case this time for the home gamers was In re Lerbakken.

Deducting a Divorce

I am looking at two points on a case:

(1)  The IRS wanted $1,760,709; and

(2)  The only issue before the Court was a deduction for legal and professional fees.

That is one serious legal bill.

The taxpayer was a hedge fund manager. The firm had three partners who provided investment advisory services to several funds. For this they received 1.5% of assets under management as well as 20% of the profits (that is, the “carry”). The firm decided to defer payment of the investment and performance fees from a particular fund for 2006, 2007 and 2008.

2008 brought us the Great Recession and taxpayer’s spouse filing for divorce.

By 2009 the firm was liquidating.

The divorce was granted in 2011.

Between the date of filing and the date the divorce was granted, taxpayer received over $47 million in partnership distributions from the firm.

You know that point came up during divorce negotiations.

To be fair, not all of the $47 million can be at play. Seems to me the only reachable part would be the amount “accrued” as of the date of divorce filing.

He hired lawyers. He hired a valuation expert.

Turns out that approximately $4.7 million of the $47 million represented deferred compensation and was therefore a marital asset. That put the marital estate at slightly over $15 million.

Upon division, the former spouse received a Florida house and over $6.6 million in cash.

He in turn paid approximately $3 million in professional fees. Seems expensive, but they helped keep over $42 million out of the marital estate.

He deducted the $3 million.

Which the IRS bounced.

What do you think is going on here?

The issue is whether the professional fees are business related (in which case they are deductible) or personal (in which case they are not). Taxpayer argued that the fees were deductible because he was defending a claim against his distributions and deferred compensation from the hedge fund. He was a virtual poster boy for a business purpose.

He has a point.

The IRS fired back: except for her marriage to taxpayer, the spouse would have no claim to the deferred compensation. Her claim stemmed entirely because of her marriage to him. The cause of those professional fees was the marriage, which is about as personal as an event can be. The tax Code does not allow for the deduction of personal expenses.

The IRS has a point.

The tax doctrine the IRS argued is called origin-of-the-claim. It has many permutations, but the point is to identify what caused the mess in the first place. If the cause was business or income-producing, you may have a deduction. If the cause was personal, well, thanks for playing.

But a divorce can have a business component. For example, there is a tax case involving control over a dividend-paying corporation; there is another where the soon-to-be-ex kept interfering in the business. In those cases, the fees were deductible, as there was enough linkage to the business activity.

The Court looked, but it could not find similar linkage in this case.

In the divorce action at issue, petitioner was neither pursuing alimony from Ms [ ] nor resisting an attempt to interfere with his ongoing business activities.

Petitioner has not established that Ms [ ] claim related to the winding down of [the hedge fund]. Nor has petitioner established that the fees he incurred were “ordinary and necessary” to his trade or business.

While the hedge fund fueled the cash flow, the divorce action did not otherwise involve the fund. There was no challenge to his interest in the fund; he was not defending against improper interference in fund operations; there was no showing that her action led to his winding down of the fund.

Finding no business link, the Court determined that the origin of the claim was personal.

Meaning no deduction for the professional fees.

NOTE: While this case did not involve alimony, let us point out that the taxation of alimony is changing in 2019. For many years, alimony – as long as the magic tax words were in the agreement – was deductible by the payor and taxable to the recipient. It has been that way for my entire professional career, but that is changing. Beginning in 2019, only grandfathered alimony agreements will be deductible/taxable, with “grandfathered” meaning the alimony agreement was in place by December 31, 2018.

Mind you, this does not mean that there will be no alimony for new divorces. What it does mean is that one will not get a deduction for paying alimony if one divorces in 2019 or later. Conversely, one will not be taxed upon receiving alimony if one divorces in 2019 or later.

The Congressional committee reports accompanying the tax change noted that alimony is frequently paid from a higher-income to a lower -income taxpayer, resulting in a net loss to the Treasury. Changing the tax treatment would allow the Treasury to claw back to the payor’s higher tax rate. Possible, but I suspect it more likely that alimony payments will eventually decrease by approximately 35% - the maximum federal tax rate – as folks adjust to the new law.

Our case this time was Sky M Lucas v Commissioner.

A Divorce Decree And Past Taxes

Let’s say that a couple divorces. The divorce decree stipulates that liability for previous federal taxes will be split 50:50. They had always filed jointly The IRS audits one or more of those earlier years and assesses additional taxes.

Question: what is each spouse’s liability?

Your first thought might be 50:50, as that is what the divorce decree says.

Our protagonists this time would find out.

Mae Asad and Sam Akel filed joint returns for 2008 and 2009. The IRS audited those years, looking at rental losses. They disallowed the losses and assessed over $30,000 in taxes and penalties.

Mae filed for innocent spouse.

Later Sam filed for innocent spouse.

NOTE: Filing for innocent spouse status means that a spouse (probably an ex-spouse, but I had a client who was still married) has been assessed taxes for which he/she does not believe he/she is responsible. The classic case is the stay-at-home spouse, the other self-employed spouse, and the stay-at-home has no participation in or knowledge of the other’s business. Think Carmela Soprano.

The IRS bounced both requests for innocent spouse.

Both ex-spouses filed with the Tax Court.

Before the hearing, the IRS conceded that Mae was responsible for 28% of the 2008 tax and 41% of the 2009 tax. Sam of course was responsible for the balance.

Seems to me that Sam might not like this deal.

I do not know how, but Mae agreed to a 50:50 split. She did not have to, mind you.

The courts have been consistent that a divorce decree is not binding on the IRS, as the IRS is not party to the divorce.  A joint return means that both spouses are liable, and the IRS can go after one … or both, to the extent the IRS desires. The decree may provide for a former spouse to seek restitution against the other, but it has no impact on the IRS.

The Court accepted the IRS previous concession to Mae of 28% and 41%. It did not have to observe the divorce decree and it did not.

Then the Court reviewed the penalties of over $5,000.

But there had been a fatal flaw,

You see, Mae and Sam had filed pro se with the Tax Court. Pro se means one is going in without professional representation (not exactly correct, but close enough). It happens with small tax cases. The paperwork to get to Court and the procedural rules once there are more lenient for small cases.

Sam and Mae had not included the penalty in their petition to the Court.

The Court did not have authority to review the penalties.

But it did provide us a clear example of the downside to representing oneself pro se.

You Got Repossessed And The Bank Says You Have HOW MUCH Income?

I ran into a cancellation-of-debt issue recently.

You may know that – should the bank or finance company cancel or agree to reduce your debt – you will receive a Form 1099. The tax Code considers forgiveness of debt to be taxable income, as your “wealth” has increased - supposedly by an amount equal to the debt forgiven. There are exceptions to recognizing income if you are insolvent, file for bankruptcy and several other situations.

Let me give you a situation here at galactic headquarters:

Married couple. Husband is a doctor. Husband buys a boat. He puts both the boat and the promissory note in the wife’s name, presumably in case something happens and he gets sued. They divorce. It is understood that he will keep the boat and make the bank payment. He does not. The boat is repossessed and then sold for nickels on the dollar. Wife (who was never taken off the note) receives a Form 1099-C. She has cancellation-of-debt income, which is bad enough. To make it worse, income is inflated as the bank appears to have sold the boat at a fire-sale price.

Our client is – of course – the wife.

The person who signs on the note receives the 1099 and reports any cancellation-of-debt income. If the debt “belongs” to your spouse and not to you, you better have your name removed from the debt before you get out of divorce court. The IRS argues that – if you receive a 1099 that “belongs” to your ex-spouse - you should seek restitution by repetitioning the court. This makes it a divorce and not a tax issue. The IRS is not interested in a divorce issue.

It all sounds fine until real life.

The wife received a $100,000-plus Form 1099-C from that boat.

Let’s reflect on how she there:

(1)  The wife doesn’t have a boat and never did. Hubby wanted a boat. She signed on the note to keep hubby happy.

(2)  The wife’s divorce attorney forgot to get that note out of her name. Alternatively, the attorney could have seen to it that wife also wound up with the boat.

(3)  For whatever reason, husband let the boat be repossessed.

(4)  The bank issued a Form 1099-C to the wife. The income amount was simple math: the debt less whatever the bank received for the boat.

Let’s introduce real life:

• What if the bank makes a mistake?
• What if the bank virtually gives the boat away?

The IRS has traditionally been quite inflexible when it comes to these 1099s. If the bank reports a number, the IRS will run with it.

You can see the recipe for tragedy.

Fortunately, the IRS pressed too far with the 2009 Martin case.

In 1999 Martin bought a Toyota 4-Runner. He financed over $12 thousand, but stopped making payments when the loan amount was about $6,700. The Toyota was repossessed. He received a Form 1099-C for the $6,700.

… which meant that the bank received zero … zip… zilch… on the sale of the 4-Runner.

Doesn’t make sense, does it?

The IRS did not care. Go back to the lender and have them change the 1099, they said.

COMMENT: Sure. I am certain the lender will jump right on this.

Martin did care. He told the Court that the Toyota was worth roughly what he owed on it when repossessed, and that the 1099-C was incorrect.

Enter Code section 6201(d):

(d) Required reasonable verification of information returns In any court proceeding, if a taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect to any item of income reported on an information return filed with the Secretary under subpart B or C of part III of subchapter A of chapter 61 by a third party and the taxpayer has fully cooperated with the Secretary (including providing, within a reasonable period of time, access to and inspection of all witnesses, information, and documents within the control of the taxpayer as reasonably requested by the Secretary), the Secretary shall have the burden of producing reasonable and probative information concerning such deficiency in addition to such information return. 

Normally, the IRS has the advantage in a tax controversy and the taxpayer has the burden of proof. 

Code section 6201(d) provides that – if you can assert a reasonable dispute with respect to an item of income reported on an information return (such as a 1099-C), you can shift the burden of proof back to the IRS.

The Tax Court decided that Martin had shifted the burden of proof. The 4-Runner had to be worth something. The ball was back in the IRS’ court.

Granted, Martin was low-hanging fruit, as the bank reported no proceeds. The IRS should have known better than to take this case to court, but they did and we now have a way to challenge an erroneous 1099-C.  

In our wife’s case, I am thinking of getting a soft appraisal on the value of the boat when repossessed. If it is materially different from the bank’s calculation (which I expect), I am considering a Section 6201(d) challenge.

Why? Because my client should not have to report excess income if the bank gave the boat away. That was a bank decision, not hers. She had every reasonable expectation that the bank would demand and receive fair market value upon sale. Their failure to do so should not be my client’s problem. 

Which will be like poking the IRS bear.

But she has received a questionable $100,000-plus Form 1099-C. That bear is already chasing her.

Spouses Owning Businesses, Divorce And Taxes

A fundamental concept in taxation is that an “accession to wealth” represents taxable income, unless the Code says otherwise.

There are limits on this, of course, otherwise you would be immediately taxed when your mutual fund or house went up in value. The Code will (usually) want to see a triggering event, such as a sale, exchange or disposition by other means. You don’t pay tax on your stock gain, for example, until you sell the stock.

But the concept also creates problems. For example, consider the recent development of crowdfunding. You have an idea for the next great breakfast sandwich, and you reach out on the internet for money to get the idea going. You have accession to wealth, but is the money taxable to you? The tax consequence can get very murky very quickly. For example:

·        If you provide investors with breakfast sandwiches, there is an argument that you sold sandwiches.

·        If investors instead receive ownership (say shares of stock), we would sidestep that sale-of-sandwiches thing, but you might have an issue with securities laws.

·        If investors receive nothing, one could argue that the monies were a gift. The closer you get to detached generosity without expectation of economic gain, the better the argument.

Let's next consider accession to wealth in a divorce context. Here is Code Section 1041:

(a) General rule. No gain or loss shall be recognized on a transfer of property from an individual to (or in trust for the benefit of)—

(1) a spouse, or

(2) a former spouse, but only if the transfer is incident to the divorce.

(c) Incident to divorce. For purposes of subsection (a)(2), a transfer of property is incident to the divorce if such transfer— 

(1) occurs within 1 year after the date on which the marriage ceases, or

(2) is related to the cessation of the marriage.

Believe it or not, the general definition of income could trigger when marital assets are divided upon divorce. That makes little sense, of course, so Section 1041 provides an escape clause.

Question: how much time do you have to separate the marital assets?

The first answer provided in (c)(1) is one year. It is immediately followed by (c)(2) which (appears to) expand the answer to any period as long as the asset transfer is related to the cessation of marriage. That is a bit open-ended, so the tax Regulations interpret (c)(2) as up to six years.

The Belots started a dance school in New Jersey in 1989. The wife was the dancer and creative force, while the husband attended to the business side. Eventually they had several dance studios, a corporation to manage them and a partnership to own the real estate. They did well. While owned 100% by the spouses, the husband and wife were not necessarily 50:50 owners in each entity.

They started divorce action in 2006,and adjusted their ownership in each entity to 50:50. The divorce was finalized in January, 2007.

There is a reason they got divorced. Tired of her ex-husband's participation, Ms. Belot bought-out his share in 2008 for $1,580,000.

Mr. Belot took the position that this was not taxable under Section 1041. The IRS took the opposite position and billed him almost $240,000 in tax and penalties.

Off to Tax Court they went.

The IRS argued that each and every transaction had to come under the umbrella of Section 1041. There was no question that the first transaction qualified, but the second transaction – cashing-out Mr. Belot entirely – did not because it represented an event arising after the divorce. The second settlement represented a business contingency and was not related to the divorce decree.

The IRS was following a hyper-technical interpretation of its Regulations.

The problem is that the Code does not say "pursuant to the divorce decree." It instead says "related to the cessation of marriage." The divorce decree is arguably the most vivid expression of such cessation, but it is not the only one. The Belots were clearly still dividing marital assets owned at the time of divorce.

The Court decided in favor of the Belots.

Why did the IRS even pursue this?

The IRS was enforcing the everything-is-taxable position, unless excluded by the Code somewhere. 

Losing An Alimony Tax Deduction

There are certain tax topics that repeat – weekly, monthly, ceaselessly and without end. One such is the tax issues surrounding divorce. I have often wondered why this happens, as divorce is surely one of the most lawyered life events an average person can experience. I will often skip divorce tax cases, as I am just tired of the topic.

But a recent one caught my eye.

The spouses were trying to work something out between them. It was clear to me that they solicited no tax advice, as they plunged off the bridge without checking the depth of the water below.

John and Beatrix were married. They legally separated in 2008 and divorced in 2013. In the interim John agreed to make 48 monthly maintenance payments of $2,289. There was a clause stipulating that payments were to be taxable to her and deductible by him, and the payments were to cease upon her remarriage or death.

John found himself unemployed. His payments were to begin in 2010. Presumably concerned about his financial situation, he and Beatrix agreed in 2009 to transfer his IRA worth $38,913.

John did not deduct the IRA as an alimony payment on his 2009 tax return.

Why not? Because Beatrix was to start withdrawing $2,289 monthly from the IRA the following year, presumably until the $38,913 was exhausted. It made more sense to John that those monthly payments would trigger the alimony.

There is some rhyme or reason to his thinking.

It appears his finances improved, as in 2010 he was able to directly pay Beatrix $6,920.  

In 2010 he deducted $27,468 ($2,289 times 12) as alimony.

The IRS disallowed all but $6,920.

Off to Tax Court they went.

There are four key statutory requirements before any payment can be deductible as alimony:

(1)  The payment must be required under a divorce or separation decree.

(2) The decree cannot say that the payments are not deductible/taxable.

(3)  The two individuals cannot be members of the same household.

(4) There cannot be any requirement to continue the payments after the death of the payee spouse.

It is amazing how often someone will fail one of these. A common story is one spouse beginning payments before the court issues the order, or a spouse paying more than the court order. Do that and the payment is not “required.” Another story is presuming that the payment is deductible because the decree says that it is. The IRS does not consider itself bound because one included such language in the decree.

Then there are the softer, non-key requirements.

For example, only cash payments will qualify as alimony.

If you think about this one for a moment, it makes sense. The Code already allows spouses to transfer property in a divorce without triggering tax (Code section 1041). This allows spouses to transfer the house, for example, as well as retirement benefits under a QDRO order. The Code views these transactions as property settlements – meaning the ex-spouses are simply dividing into separate ownership what they previously owned together.

COMMENT: It is highly debatable whether John’s IRA is “cash.”  Granted, there may be cash in the IRA, but that not is not the same as saying the IRA is cash or a cash equivalent. It would make more sense to say that it is the equivalent of stocks or mutual funds. This would make it property, not cash.

Let’s next go back to rule (4) above. A way to rephrase that rule is that the payee spouse cannot be enriched after death. Obviously, if maintenance payments were to continue after death, then the payee-spouse’s estate would be enriched. That is not allowed.

In our situation, Beatrix now owned an IRA. Granted, the expectation may have been that she would outlive any balance in the IRA, but that expectation is not controlling. If she passed away, the balance in the IRA would be hers to transfer pursuant to her beneficiary designation.

She was enriched. She had something that continued past her (albeit hypothetical) death.

Another issue was whether John should get credit for IRA withdrawals by Beatrix in 2010. Why?  John transferred the IRA to her in 2009. The account was no longer his. It was hers, and he could no longer piggyback on anything the IRA did. If he was going to deduct anything, he would have had to deduct it in 2009.

Which, by the way, he could not because of rule (1): it was not required under the decree. The decree called for payments beginning in 2010, not in 2009.

The Tax Court decided that John had a 2010 alimony deduction for $6,920, the amount he paid Beatrix directly.

Why did John do it this way? 

If John was less than 59 1/2, so he could not get into his IRA without penalty.  He could QDRO, but that is just a property settlement. John wanted an alimony deduction. If he kept the IRA, he would have income on the withdrawal and a deduction for the alimony. That is a push - except for the 10% penalty on the early withdrawal. John was in a tough spot.

Then again, maybe he didn't think of tax matters at all.