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Showing posts with label divorce. Show all posts
Showing posts with label divorce. Show all posts

Monday, February 23, 2026

Failing To Update A Plan Beneficiary Designation

 

Technically it is not a tax case, but it is so tax-adjacent it might as well be.

Let’s talk about beneficiaries on a retirement account – and, more specifically, an employer-sponsored retirement account.

Carl Kleinfeldt participated in the Packaging Corporation of America (PCA) Thrift Plan for Hourly Employees. In 2006 he designated his (then) wife – Dena Langdon – as his primary beneficiary.

Kleinfeldt and Langdon divorced in 2022. The divorce included a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO). A QDRO is a court order authorizing distribution to the nonparticipating (ex) spouse. The PCA Benefits Center distributed to Langdon as directed.

However, even after the QDRO there is one more step: has the ex-spouse been formally removed as beneficiary?

Kleinfeldt faxed a request to the Benefits Center to remove Langdon from both his health and life insurance as well as his retirement plan. The Benefits Center updated her status on the retirement account to “ex-spouse.” Mind you, this was not the same as removing her as a beneficiary altogether.

Why not?

There were written plan procedures to follow. Kleinfeldt’s fax was a good start but was not quite enough.

You can guess that Kleinfeldt died.

You know that Langdon wanted that retirement money.

You also know the matter went to court.

And we are in legal weeds immediately.

We are talking here about an employer-sponsored plan, which (almost always) makes the plan subject to ERISA.

ERISA in turn uses a “substantial compliance” doctrine when reviewing actions required under a plan document. It is what it sounds like: if you miss a minor clerical step, the law presumes that responsible parties know what was meant and are expected to act accordingly.

The Kleinfeldt Estate argued the substantial compliance doctrine with a white-knuckle grip.

The Court observed that substantial compliance has two steps:

  1.  Was there intent to make the change?
  2.  Was the attempt to make the change similar (in all material aspects) to the proper procedures required by the plan?

There was no argument about the first test: the fax was clear evidence that Kleinfeldt intended to remove Langdon as a beneficiary.

On to the second test.

The plan documents wanted Kleinfeldt to either (1) call the Benefits Center or (2) update his beneficiary designation online.

The plan documents nowhere stated that he could update beneficiaries by fax.

The Court did not consider this a minor clerical step.

Kleinfeldt did not follow the rules.

Meaning that Langdon won.

And fair had nothing to do with it.

Our case this time was Packaging Corporation of America Thrift Plan v Langdon, No 25-1859 (7th Cir. Feb. 2, 2026)

Monday, December 16, 2024

An Accounting Firm Gets Sued


I just saw that Baker Tilly has acquired Seiler LLP, a CPA firm located in San Francisco and practicing for well over half a century.

There is nothing unusual here. Many older CPAs are looking to retire. In some cases, the firm may have planned for transition and brought in, developed, and retained a pipeline of ownership-interested younger CPAs.  The older CPAs retire, the younger CPAs step up and the firm continues.

In other cases, there is no such pipeline, and the older CPA’s exit plan is a sale to another firm.

The matter caught my eye because a client is suing Seiler for negligence. The matter is still in court. I thought the grounds for negligence was … different.

It is not our usual brew of java, but let’s talk about it.

It starts with a married couple: Eric Freidenrich and Amy Macartney. They hired Seiler to prepare their 2019 joint tax return. The return was filed in December 2020.

COMMENT: You may be thinking that the return was filed late (that is, after October 15) and penalties and interest would be due. That is not true here, as the return showed an overpayment of almost $450 grand. There normally will be no interest and penalties on refund-due returns, as penalties and refunds normally apply only when balances are due the IRS. The risk to a refund return is waiting too long to file a return. Remember, the statute of limitations on filing is three years. Wait past those three years and you will lose your refund.

For some reason, Eric and Amy did not use a home address on their return. They instead used their financial advisor’s address, a practice they had followed for years.

Now, a couple of things happened after 2019 and during 2020 before Seiler filed the return:

·       Eric and Amy divorced.

·       The financial advisor moved.

On first blush, I would be concerned about the divorce. A CPA (or his/her firm) should think long and hard about representing a divorcing couple. The reason is simple: which one of the two is the client? Representing both can create a conflict of interest, and a CPA is supposed to maintain independence and avoid such conflicts. Failure to do so can result in a hearing before a State Board of Accountancy.

The refund arrived in April 2022.

The two had signed their separation agreement in June 2021.

The separation agreement included language that Eric would be responsible for additional taxes due during the term of marriage, but - to be fair - he would also be entitled to any refunds.

Amy did not know that the IRS refund got held up. The couple’s routine was to deposit in the couple’s Fidelity account, and the separation agreement had Amy receiving 60% of the Fidelity account.

The refund was almost $450 grand, and 60% of that – approximately $270 grand – would have gone to Amy.

She was not amused.

I would not be either.

She sued Seiler for negligence.

Notice that she did not sue her ex-husband.

Where is the negligence?

Seiler – as a firm – knew that that advisor had moved. It should have used the new address.

Did the tax team – a subset of Seiler – also know that the advisor had moved? Information moves well enough in a CPA firm, but it would be false to say that it moves flawlessly. It is possible that the tax department did not know, but Amy is suing Seiler, not the tax department.

Seiler (or rather, their attorney) tried to get the motion dismissed.

And there is a quick lesson here about torts. Torts are civil law. Think of torts as suing someone. You bring suit, not the government. It is conduct between private parties.

The idea behind a tort is to restore the injured party (as much as possible in the circumstance) to where he/she would have been had the other party not acted or failed to act. A goal of tort law is to see the world as it could have been, not as the world is now.

Well, under that description Amy would have received 60% of the IRS refund. Seiler injured her. Her ex did not injure her, as he stated in the divorce decree that he would keep any tax refunds relating to the marriage term.

The Court therefore saw reason for tort action and would not grant summary motion for dismissal.

What does this mean? It means that the Court will hear the case against Seiler for negligence.

As a tax CPA, it bothers me that I could get my firm sued for something I did not even know. That said, I get it. The firm knew. However, Eric and Amy saw the address on the return. Their attorneys would also have seen the address. Do we know if the financial advisor timely filed a change of address with the IRS? Seiler might not be the only party with some measure of fault. 


Sunday, May 2, 2021

Divorced Parents And A Dependent Child

 It is one of my least favorite issues in tax practice.

Who is entitled to a dependent?

Granted, there is no longer a dependency exemption available, but there are other tax items, such as the child tax credit, that require a dependent.

The issue can go off-the-rails if the parents are (a) divorced and (b) combative.

It occurs when both parents claim the same child for the same year.

One of the parents is going to lose the dependency, of course, but how the Code determines which one may surprise you.

The Code wants to know which is the custodial parent – that is, which parent did the child live with for the majority of the year. Granted, in some cases the answer may be razor close, but most of the time there is a clear answer.

The Code anticipates that the custodial parent will claim the child.

What if the noncustodial parent provides most of the child’s support?

The Code (for the most part) does not care.

How does the noncustodial parent get to claim the child?

If the parents get along, then there is no issue. Everyone follows the rules and there is no tax controversy.

If the parents do not get along and both claim the same child, the IRS is going to get involved. It will want to know: who is the custodial parent?

But the divorce decree says ….

You might be surprised how little the IRS cares about that divorce decree.

What it is interested in is whether a certain form was filed with the noncustodial parent’s return: Form 8332.


This form has to be signed by the custodial parent. If the parents do not get along, you can see the problem.

What happens if the noncustodial parent does not attach this form and both parents claim the child?

Let’s take a look at the DeMar case.

The divorce decree said that Mr Demar (Dad) was to claim the son in odd-numbered years. Dad claimed the son for 2015.

Mrs DeMar (Mom) also claimed the son.

The IRS came in. There (of course) was no Form 8332. The IRS could care less what that divorce decree had to say, so off to Tax Court they went.

Dad is going to lose this all day every day, except ….

Would you believe that – before the Tax Court hearing – Mom signed Form 8332?  

That doesn’t happen much.

There is a proposed Regulation on this point:

A noncustodial parent may submit a copy of the written declaration to the IRS during an examination to substantiate a claim to a dependency exemption for the child.

Did that save Dad?

Let’s keep reading:

A copy of a written declaration attached to an amended return, or provided during an examination, will not meet the requirement of this paragraph … if the custodial parent … has not filed an amended return to remove that claim to a dependency exemption for the child.

So one can file the 8832 late but one also has to prove that the other parent amended his/her return to remove the dependency for the child.

Guess what?

Mom did not amend her return.

Dad lost.

The IRS did not care about that divorce decree and the odd-numbered year.

I get it. The IRS has no intention of playing family court, so it established mechanical rules for the dependency. The average person focuses on the divorce decree – understandably – but the IRS does not.  Procedure is everything in this area.

Our case this time was DeMar v Commissioner T.C. Memo 2019-91.


Tuesday, March 23, 2021

When Is Divorce A Tax-Deductible Theft?

 

I am reading a case involving tax consequences from a divorce.

More specifically, the (ex) wife trying to deduct $2.5 million as a theft loss.

That is a little different.

He and she got married in 1987. Husband (Bruno) lifted a successful career in the financial sector, and by 2005 was earning over $2 million annually.

There was an affair.

There was a divorce.

The Court ordered an equitable distribution of marital properties.

That did not seem to impress Bruno, who transferred no marital properties. The court held him in contempt, ordered him to pay interest and yada yada yada.

QUESTION: Can’t a court place someone in jail for contempt?

It appeared that the Court had enough of Bruno, and in 2010 the Court transferred real estate to the (ex) wife, with instructions to sell, keep the first $300 grand and transfer the balance to an escrow account. The property sold for $1.9 million. Th (ex) wife kept all the money, placing nothing in escrow.

Yep, the Court held her in contempt.

By now I am thinking that the contempt of this court is clearly meaningless.

In 2015 our esteemed Bruno filed for bankruptcy. He claimed he was down to his last $2,500.

Which raised the question of where all the money went.

In 2016 the (ex) wife filed suit against Bruno’s new wife and several companies that he, she or both owned.

Methinks we found where the monies went.

She filed a claim against the bankruptcy estate for $3.5 million.

Apparently, there was something to the (ex) wife’s claim, as the bankruptcy trustee filed suit against the new wife, against Bruno’s mother, the Bruno companies previously mentioned and some poor guy Bruno talked to while walking his dog around the neighborhood.

That case was settled in 2019.

Let’s be honest: there is really no likeable character in this story.

The (ex) wife amended her 2015 tax return to report a $2.5 million theft.

That – not surprisingly – created a net operating loss that went springing across tax years like kids at a pre-COVID McDonald’s Playland.

The IRS caught the amended return and said: No way. No theft. No loss. Get outta here.

And that is how we got to the Tax Court.

Establishing the existence of a deductible theft can be tricky in tax law. Yes, one always has the question of what was stolen, how much was it worth and all that. Tax law introduces an additional requirement:

·      One must establish the year in which the loss was sustained.

The blade is in Reg 1.165-1(d):

However, if in the year of discovery there exists a claim for reimbursement to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery, no portion of the loss with respect to which reimbursement may be received is sustained  .. until the taxable year in which it can be ascertained with reasonable certainty whether or not such reimbursement will be received.”

It is not the “what” that will trip you up; it is the “when.”

There of course some Court guidance over the years, such as:

·      The evaluation should not be made “through the eyes of the ‘incorrigible’ optimist,” or

·      … the “mere possibility or the bare hope of a future development permitting recovery does not bar the deduction of a loss clearly sustained.”

Yep. That is like telling a baseball player to step to the plate against Jacob deGrom and “just swing the bat.”

Thanks for the advice there, pal.

And the Court decided against the (ex) wife.

No one believed Bruno when he filed bankruptcy in 2015 and claimed he was worth only $2,500. The trustee filed suit; the (ex) wife filed suit. Lawsuits were everywhere.

The Court stated that the (ex) wife may well have a theft loss. What she did not have was a theft loss in 2015.

Our case this time for the home gamers was Bruno v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2020-156.

Sunday, November 8, 2020

A Puff Piece

 

Although we do not condone her inconsistency, we find it is merely puffery in an attempt to obtain new employment and of no significance here.”

There is a word one rarely sees in tax cases: puffery.

Puffery is an exaggeration. It approaches a lie but stops short, and presumably no “reasonable” person would believe what is being said or take it literally. The distinction matters if one’s puffery can be used against them as a statement of fact.

Let’s look at the Robinson case.

Mr Robinson had a lawn care business. Beverly Robinson had a job at Georgia Pacific, but in 2007 she started working at the lawn care business. She did the billing. She was also listed on the business checking account, but she never wrote checks.

She must have been the face of the business through, as for 2007 through 2009 most of the Forms 1099 to the business were sent in her name.

In 2010 the marriage went south. Mr Robinson moved out, and Beverly’s dad chipped-in to pay the mortgage on her house. Needless to say, she was not working at the company with all that going on.

In 2011 they filed a joint tax return for 2010. The return showed tax due of approximately $43 grand. She must have separated hard from the business, as no Forms 1099 were issued to her; all the Forms 1099 were issued to him.

COMMENT: I do not understand filing a joint tax return with someone you are likely to divorce. In Beverly’s defense, though, she did not realize that she had an option. They hired a tax preparer (likely because of the business), but the preparer never explained that the option to file separately existed.

In 2011 she was telling the IRS that they could not pay the 2010 tax debt. She also asked about innocent spouse status.

In 2012 they file a joint 2011 tax return. She was working again at another Georgia Pacific facility and had tax withholdings. The IRS took her withholdings and applied them to the 2010 tax year.

COMMENT: That is how it works.

In 2013 Beverly needed to find a new job. She uploaded her resume on a jobseeker website. She listed her Georgia Pacific gig. She also listed Robinson Lawn Care and embellished her duties, especially glossing over the fact that she no longer worked there.

In 2013 Mr Robinson somehow forced his way back into her house. She called the police and was told that they could not evict him since the two were still married.

In October, 2013 she filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.

About time. The year before Mr Robinson had fathered a child with another woman. In 2013 he started paying her child support.

The divorce became final in 2014. Mr Robinson agreed to assume the 2010 tax due.

Riiiight.

In 2015 she files for innocent spouse because of that 2010 tax debt and the IRS continuing to take her refunds.

The IRS turned down her request.

One of the requirements is that the tax liability for which the spouse is seeking relief belong to the “nonrequesting” spouse. In this case, the nonrequesting spouse was Mr Robinson.

He testified that he had moved out of the house in 2013. Oh, he also remembered Beverly working in the business in 2010.

Not good.

The IRS looked at certain Florida registrations that showed her name through 2014.

They also pointed out that she was a signatory on the business checking account.

Then they looked at her resume on that jobseeker website.

The Court was having none of it.

As for Mr Robinson:

Throughout the trial Mr. Robinson’s testimony was relatively inconsistent, and we give it little value.”

As for the registrations:

Although petitioner is listed as the registered owner of Robinson Lawn Care from December 1998 to December 2014, we find the reason for her filing the fictitious name--that her former husband worked during the day--is a sufficient explanation for why she is listed instead of Mr. Robinson. Moreover, she did not sign any State filings in 2010 or thereafter.

As for the checking account:

Similarly we find that petitioner’s name on the business account is not persuasive support for respondent’s position as Mr. Robinson had control of that account and she never wrote checks on it.

The Court pointed out that none of the 2010 Forms 1099 were made out to her, in clear contrast to prior tax years.

We saw above the Court’s comment on her puffery.

It was clear who the Court believed – and did not believe.

The Court decided that she was entitled to innocent spouse relief.

She cut it close, though.

Our case this time was Beverly Robinson v Commissioner of Internal Revenue T.C. Memo 2020-134.

Sunday, November 11, 2018

Can Creditors Reach The Retirement Account Of A Divorced Spouse?


Let’s say that you divorce. Let say that retirement savings are unequal between you and your ex-spouse. As part of the settlement you receive a portion of your spouse’s 401(k) under a “QDRO” order.
COMMENT: A QDRO is a way to get around the rule prohibiting alienation or assignment of benefits under a qualified retirement plan. I generally think of QDROs as arising from divorce, but they could also go to a child or other dependent of the plan participant.
Your QDRO has (almost) the same restrictions as any other retirement savings. As far as you or I are concerned, it IS a retirement account.

You file for bankruptcy.

Can your creditors reach the QDRO?

Sometimes I scratch my head over bankruptcy decisions. The reason is that bankruptcy – while having tax consequences – is its own area of law. If the law part pulls a bit more weight than the tax part, then the tax consequence may be nonintuitive.

Let’s segue to an inherited IRA for a moment. Someone passes away and his/her IRA goes to you. What happens to it in your bankruptcy?

The Supreme Court addressed this in Clark, where the Court had to address the definition of “retirement funds” otherwise protected from creditors in bankruptcy.

The Court said there were three critical differences between a plain-old IRA and an inherited IRA:

(1)  The holder of an inherited IRA can never add to the account.
(2)  The holder of an inherited IRA must draw money virtually immediately. There is no waiting until one reaches or nears retirement.
(3)  The holder of an inherited IRA can drain the account at any time – and without a penalty.

The Court observed that:
Nothing about the inherited IRA’s legal characteristics would prevent (or even discourage) the individual from using the entire balance of the account on a vacation home or sports car immediately after bankruptcy proceedings are complete.”
The Court continued that – to qualify under bankruptcy – it is not sufficient that monies be inside an IRA. Those monies must also rise to the level of “retirement funds,” and – since the inheritor could empty the account at a moment’s notice - the Court was simply not seeing that with inherited IRAs.

I get it.

Let’s switch out the inherited IRA and substitute a QDRO. With a QDRO, the alternate payee steps into the shoes of the plan participant.

The Eighth Circuit steps in and applies the 3-factor test of Clark to the QDRO. Let’s walk through it:

(1)  The alternate payee cannot add to a QDRO.
(2)  The alternate payee does not have to start immediate withdrawals – unless of required age.
(3)  The alternate payee cannot – unless of required age - immediately empty the account and buy that vacation home or sports car.

By my account, the QDRO fails the first test but passes the next two. Since there are three tests and the QDRO passes two, I expect the QDRO to be “retirement funds” as bankruptcy law uses the term.

And I would be wrong.

The Eighth Circuit notes that tests 2 and 3 do not apply to a QDRO. The Court then concludes that the QDRO has only one test, and the QDRO fails that.

The Eighth Circuit explains that Clark:
… clearly suggests that the exemption is limited to individuals who create and contribute funds into the retirement account.”
It is not clear to me, but there you have it – at least if you live in the Eighth Circuit.

No bankruptcy protection for you.

Our case this time for the home gamers was In re Lerbakken.


Saturday, June 16, 2018

Deducting a Divorce

I am looking at two points on a case:

(1)  The IRS wanted $1,760,709; and

(2)  The only issue before the Court was a deduction for legal and professional fees.
That is one serious legal bill.

The taxpayer was a hedge fund manager. The firm had three partners who provided investment advisory services to several funds. For this they received 1.5% of assets under management as well as 20% of the profits (that is, the “carry”). The firm decided to defer payment of the investment and performance fees from a particular fund for 2006, 2007 and 2008.

2008 brought us the Great Recession and taxpayer’s spouse filing for divorce.

By 2009 the firm was liquidating.

The divorce was granted in 2011.

Between the date of filing and the date the divorce was granted, taxpayer received over $47 million in partnership distributions from the firm.

You know that point came up during divorce negotiations.

To be fair, not all of the $47 million can be at play. Seems to me the only reachable part would be the amount “accrued” as of the date of divorce filing.

He hired lawyers. He hired a valuation expert.

Turns out that approximately $4.7 million of the $47 million represented deferred compensation and was therefore a marital asset. That put the marital estate at slightly over $15 million.

Upon division, the former spouse received a Florida house and over $6.6 million in cash.

He in turn paid approximately $3 million in professional fees. Seems expensive, but they helped keep over $42 million out of the marital estate.

He deducted the $3 million.

Which the IRS bounced.

What do you think is going on here?
The issue is whether the professional fees are business related (in which case they are deductible) or personal (in which case they are not). Taxpayer argued that the fees were deductible because he was defending a claim against his distributions and deferred compensation from the hedge fund. He was a virtual poster boy for a business purpose.
He has a point.
The IRS fired back: except for her marriage to taxpayer, the spouse would have no claim to the deferred compensation. Her claim stemmed entirely because of her marriage to him. The cause of those professional fees was the marriage, which is about as personal as an event can be. The tax Code does not allow for the deduction of personal expenses.
The IRS has a point.
The tax doctrine the IRS argued is called origin-of-the-claim. It has many permutations, but the point is to identify what caused the mess in the first place. If the cause was business or income-producing, you may have a deduction. If the cause was personal, well, thanks for playing.
But a divorce can have a business component. For example, there is a tax case involving control over a dividend-paying corporation; there is another where the soon-to-be-ex kept interfering in the business. In those cases, the fees were deductible, as there was enough linkage to the business activity.
The Court looked, but it could not find similar linkage in this case.
In the divorce action at issue, petitioner was neither pursuing alimony from Ms [ ] nor resisting an attempt to interfere with his ongoing business activities.
Petitioner has not established that Ms [ ] claim related to the winding down of [the hedge fund]. Nor has petitioner established that the fees he incurred were “ordinary and necessary” to his trade or business.
While the hedge fund fueled the cash flow, the divorce action did not otherwise involve the fund. There was no challenge to his interest in the fund; he was not defending against improper interference in fund operations; there was no showing that her action led to his winding down of the fund.

Finding no business link, the Court determined that the origin of the claim was personal.

Meaning no deduction for the professional fees.
NOTE: While this case did not involve alimony, let us point out that the taxation of alimony is changing in 2019. For many years, alimony – as long as the magic tax words were in the agreement – was deductible by the payor and taxable to the recipient. It has been that way for my entire professional career, but that is changing. Beginning in 2019, only grandfathered alimony agreements will be deductible/taxable, with “grandfathered” meaning the alimony agreement was in place by December 31, 2018.
Mind you, this does not mean that there will be no alimony for new divorces. What it does mean is that one will not get a deduction for paying alimony if one divorces in 2019 or later. Conversely, one will not be taxed upon receiving alimony if one divorces in 2019 or later.
The Congressional committee reports accompanying the tax change noted that alimony is frequently paid from a higher-income to a lower -income taxpayer, resulting in a net loss to the Treasury. Changing the tax treatment would allow the Treasury to claw back to the payor’s higher tax rate. Possible, but I suspect it more likely that alimony payments will eventually decrease by approximately 35% - the maximum federal tax rate – as folks adjust to the new law.
Our case this time was Sky M Lucas v Commissioner.