What Makes A Tax Extension Valid?

 

You file an extension on April 15th for your personal tax return.

Is the extension valid if you wind up owing money but entered zero (-0-) on line 6?

What if you entered a balance due on line 6 but entered zero (-0-) on line 7?

A couple of things come immediately to mind:

(1)  There are clients – numerous clients – who have no intention of fully paying their taxes by April 15^th. The best the CPA can do is get them to pay something - anything - to take the pressure off the tax due (plus interest and penalties) when they finally file. I have heard the scold many times over the decades: the tax should be fully paid-in by April 15; the extension is for time to file not time to pay; yada yada. This is not a classroom, folks. This is real life, and I cannot control people. I think that I do some good just by nudging clients closer to compliance with the tax law.

(2)  Are you trying to get me sued? What if I (i) enter a number on line 4 but (ii) file the extension with no payment due (line 6)? Will the IRS bounce the extension? This is where procedural consistency is critical. I need high confidence in how the IRS will process this extension.

Let’s look at Karp.

The Karps wanted the IRS to apply a 2016 tax overpayment (of $336,558) to a later tax year.

Problem: The Karps were not diligent about filing tax returns on time. They were counting on that huge overpayment/carryover to keep them out of trouble. While true, there are ways this can blow up.

The IRS told the Karps that the 2016 overpayment could not be applied to 2017 because they filed the 2016 return in April 2021.

COMMENT: That’s how it blows up: you have to get that return in within 3 years (plus the extension, if you obtained one). The 2016 return was due April 15, 2017. Three more years is April 15, 2020. The IRS did not receive the return until April 2021 - a year late.

The Karps responded with proof that the IRS received their 2016 return on October 15, 2020.

COMMENT: Good! That is why practitioners recommend certified mail (which is becoming a dinosaur as we move to electronic filing) with proof of mailing.

FURTHER: We are not told whether the Karps actually waited until the last day for filing or were instead impacted by IRS closures during COVID.

The IRS backed down when presented proof. The IRS refunded $154,720 and credited the remaining 2016 overpayment to 2022.

The IRS then changed its mind.

Huh?

The IRS argued that the 2016 extension was invalid.

Because it was invalid, there was no extension until October 15, 2017.

Which means that the 2016 return filed October 15, 2020 was outside the three-year window (without the extension, that date was now April 15, 2020). The IRS wanted its $154,720 back. Oh, the IRS also reversed the portion of the overpayment that was credited to 2022.

“No soup for you” snarled the IRS.

Let’s catch our breath.

First, what was the IRS’ reasoning to blow up the 2016 extension?

The IRS looked at Form 4868 and saw zero (-0-) on both lines 5 and 6.

Mind you, the Karps had a sizeable overpayment from 2015 to 2016 (in fact, the Karps had reported sizeable overpayments for years). There was enough there to pay a subsequent year’s tax and send the Karps a refund check for 2016.

The IRS was relying on a Tax Court case (Crocker) where the taxpayer did not appear to even try to estimate the tax due on the extension. When finally filed, the return showed significant additional income and tax (because: of course). The Court agreed with the IRS that the extension was void. The return was late. Penalties. Interest. Brussels sprouts and lima beans. It was catastrophic.

Second, how was the IRS to know?

The 2015 return had not been received or processed by the time the 2016 extension arrived. Maybe - if the Karps ever got around to filing a tax return on time - the IRS might have had a clue of knowing what they intended for 2016.

While I disagree, I do have some sympathy for the IRS.

First, the Court noted that the Karps had a track record of (a) huge overpayments that (b) they repetitively applied to the following tax year.

COMMENT: I personally think this was THE factor that saved the Karps here.

The Karps looked at that overpayment and said: we do not owe anything for 2016. They then put zeros all over that Form 4868. Technically, they should have put (1) estimated gross tax on line 4; (2) the overpayment on line 5: and the (resulting) negative amount on line 6. The Karps did not do that, explaining that they mistakenly thought that the tax estimate was the amount they would be required to pay upon filing. The Court considered it a ministerial error, and they had conflated gross tax with net tax.

The Court also pointed out – devastatingly, I think – that the IRS initially accepted the 2016 return, including the extension as filed. That is why the IRS now wanted the refund check back.

Second, the Court noted that the IRS was put in a tough spot, as it did not have a 2015 return when processing the 2016 extension.

While it was easy for the Court to point out that the Karps had applied their prior overpayments, the IRS could not automatically predict that they would do so again. This dance was getting close to: heads you win, tails I lose for the IRS.

The Court pointed out that the Karps were still within procedural guardrails. They pushed it, but they got it done within three years.

Technically correct, but not an optimal real-world approach to tax filing.

The Court ordered summary judgement for the Karps and instructed both sides to sort the dollars involved and report the results back to for judgement.

I point out that this was not a Tax Court case. It was heard in the Court of Federal Claims, which hears civil claims against the federal government. While specialized (cases against the U.S. government), it is not the same specialization as the Tax Court (which hears only tax cases).

The cynical part of me wonders if the verdict would have been the same had the case gone to Tax Court. The Karps had an advantage: many cases go to Tax Court because one does not need to pay the tax before bring suit in Tax Court. Here, the Karps had already paid the tax (hence the huge overpayment), so filing outside the Tax Court was an option.

Our case this time was Karp v United States, U.S. Court of Federal Claims, No. 23-926, filed May 21, 2026.

Fish Bites Section 1239 Trap

 

Let’s talk about how a business purchase transaction can blow up.

The pepper in this stew is that the seller and buyer have different tax goals:

• The buyer wants to deduct as much as possible. In general, this means that the other side (the seller) will be recognizing ordinary income to offset those ordinary deductions.

• The seller wants as much capital gains as possible. In general, this means that the other side (the buyer) may have to amortize or depreciate assets over time rather than deducting them immediately.

M&A tax planning at heart comes down to the above tension.

Sometimes reading M&A cases can be difficult: numerous entities, mind-numbing detail, this move, that move, everyone come down and bust a move. Let’s take one case that caught my attention. As we have (sometimes) done before, we will modify the names to make the story easier to follow.

In 1996 Vernon started a one-man technology company in Kansas City. By 2004 it was one of the largest network security companies in the nation.

Let’s call his company Harry.

Vernon wanted cash for his troubles and travails. He would keep majority control of the company, but he would also have cash for little things - like expensive cars and multiple houses. I am with Vernon here.

Petunia was looking to invest in Harry.

Dial-in the tension between the seller and the buyer. Here is what they came up with

• Vernon owned 100% of Harry, an S corporation.
• Vernon transferred 100% of his stock in Harry to Hermione, a newly-formed S corporation.

COMMENT: There is a problem here: S corporations generally have to be owned by individuals, estates and certain trusts. A corporation cannot own an S corporation, except for …

• Harry immediately elected to be a Qualified Subchapter S Subsidiary (QSSS), an exception to that corporation-owning-an-S thing. Hermione owned Harry and it was all okay.

• Petunia dropped $10.5 million into Hermione in exchange for 43% of newly-issued preferred stock.

COMMENT: The money is now in play. The issue is getting it out to Vernon.

• We have a problem with Hermione. First, an S corporation must have only one class of stock, and Hermione now had two: common and preferred. Second, a QSSS can have only one shareholder: a parent who owns 100% of the QSSS stock. Hermione now had two shareholders. No surprise …

• Hermione’s S election blew up.

COMMENT: This was intentional. Harry was deemed to have transferred its interest in Hermione to a new corporation in exchange for 57% of the new stock. Petunia was deemed to have transferred $10.5 million for the remaining 43% interest. We will call the new corporation Ron.

COMMENT: There is a Code section (Section 351) that normally prevents incorporations from being taxable. There are ways to make it taxable, but most planners stay far away from them. One way? Pay money back to an incorporator (in this case, Harry via Hermione). The geek term for this money is “boot.”

• Ron paid $9.7 million in boot to Harry/Hermione upon reincorporation.

COMMENT: There you go: the planners deliberately sprung the trap. I do not recall ever doing this in my career. Why did they do it? To move the money to Vernon, of course, but also to have a chance at capital gains treatment by rinsing it through a Section 351 transaction.

• Let’s take stock of where we are.

a.     Petunia wanted ordinary deductions. She now has it in the way of amortization and depreciation. She put money into Hermione/Ron – and that money was buying assets; tangible, intangible, whatever. Petunia never bought stock.

b.    Vernon wanted capital gains. The easiest way would have been to sell Harry/Hermione stock, but Petunia wasn’t interested. All this ambulation was to mimic the sale of stock.

I admit: the tax work up to this point is clever.

But someone overlooked this interloper:

26 U.S. Code § 1239 - Gain from sale of depreciable property between certain related taxpayers

(a) Treatment of gain as ordinary income

In the case of a sale or exchange of property, directly or indirectly, between related persons, any gain recognized to the transferor shall be treated as ordinary income if such property is, in the hands of the transferee, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167.

The idea here is simple: Congress did not want related parties to depreciate assets and then sell them to a related party to start the depreciation over again.

Tax being tax, the words have a loaded meaning. For example, does “depreciation” under Section 167 include amortization, which is the equivalent of depreciation but for intangible assets? “Related persons” also has multiple definitions, depending upon where you are in the Code.

Let’s continue.

Remember that we are dealing with a technology consulting company in Kansas City. This is a not a manufacturing plant in Pennsylvania with all kinds of real estate and machinery and equipment. Most of what Petunia bought for $10.5 million was intangible assets, amortizable under Section 197 over 15 years.

At which point I presume the tax planners stopped, reasoning that Section 197 is not Section 167 and therefore Section 1239 was not an issue.

Except for Reg 1.197-2(g)(8):

Also, an amortizable Section 197 intangible is section 1245 property and Section 1239 applies to any gain recognized upon its sale or exchange between related persons (as defined in Section 1239(b)).”

Buried deep, but there it is. Section 1239 slipped its first noose on the transaction.

But were the parties related? Could Harry/Hermione/Ron avoid the second noose?

Here is Section 267(f):

Think of Section 1563 as applying to consolidated corporations (where corporations own other corporations). Section 267 addresses individuals owning corporations (what we would call brother-sisters). Section 267 is taking a consolidation definition and changing it for brother-sisters. It is changing the definition to make it less stringent.

Section 1239 wants related parties, and Section 267 says you have related with more than 50% common ownership.

Vernon owned 100% of Harry and 100% of Hermione. He also owned 57% of Ron.

Yep, related.

Section 1239 applied.

Vernon got ordinary income, not capital gain, treatment on the $9-plus million dollars.

Petunia got her ordinary deductions - over time and not right away.

It is very tough to accommodate both sides.

But Vernon did get his $9-plus million dollars.

Our case this time, modified a spot for ease of writing and readability, was Fish v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2013 - 270.