Section 643 and MSTs

 

I came across the following recently on LinkedIn:

 

The line of tax code that 99% of CPAs can’t understand for some reason.

And because they don’t understand this they make their clients tax planning convoluted and unnecessary.

26 U.S. Code § 643

(3) Capital gains and losses
Gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets shall be excluded to the extent that such gains are allocated to corpus and are not (A) paid, credited, or required to be distributed to any beneficiary during the taxable year, or (B) paid, permanently set aside, or to be used for the purposes specified in section 642(c). 

Stop, just stop.

There is a lot of nonsense going around on social media concerning something called - among other things – a “nongrantor, irrevocable, complex, discretionary, spendthrift trust.”

I just call it a “643 trust.” It is probably unfair as Section 643 has its legitimate place in the Code, but I simply cannot repetitively spray multisyllabic spittle when referring to these.

They have many forms, but one thing is key: Section 643. I met last year with someone who was hawking these things but was unable to find a CPA with his elevated mastery of the tax Code.

Uh huh. Elevator is down the hall, pal.

Let’s walk through these trusts.

The tax Code has numerous sections. Go to Chapter 1 Subchapter J and you will find sections dealing with trusts. You will note that they all have numbers between 641 and 692.

Section 643 is between 641 and 692. We are in the right place.

Trust taxation is not the easiest thing to understand. There are weird concepts. Then there are uncommon terms, such as:

 

·       The grantor – the person who transfers assets to the trust.

·       The income beneficiary – the person entitled to income distributions.

·       The residuary beneficiary – the person entitled to the remainder of the trust when the income beneficiaries are done.

·        Irrevocable trust – a trust where the grantor cannot amend or end the trust after its creation.

·       Complex trust – a trust that can accumulate (that is, retain) its profit.

·       Trustee – the person managing trust assets for the benefit of trust beneficiaries. A trustee is required to act in the best interest of the beneficiaries.

·       Discretionary trust – a trust allowing a trustee the power to decide how and when to distribute assets (including income) to beneficiaries.

Believe it or not, there are also several definitions of income, such as:

 

·       Fiduciary accounting income – income as defined by the trust instrument and state law.

·       Distributable net income – the maximum income available to the trustee for distribution to beneficiaries.

·       Taxable income – income as defined by the tax Code.

And - yes - you can get different answers depending on which definition of income you are looking at.

Why is that?

One reason is possible tension between different beneficiary classes. Say that you create a trust for your son and daughter as income beneficiaries. Upon their death, the remaining trust assets (called corpus) goes to the grandkids, who are the residuary beneficiaries. Your kids may want something to be considered income, as they are entitled to income distributions. The grandkids may prefer something not be considered income, as that something would not be distributed and thereby remain in the trust until eventual distribution to them.

What are common friction points between income and residuary beneficiaries? Here are two repetitive ones: capital gains and depreciation.

For example, one may consider depreciation as a reserve to replace deteriorating physical assets. In that case, it makes sense to allocate depreciation to the residuary beneficiaries, as the assets will eventually go to them. Then again, accountants routinely include depreciation as a current period expense. In that case, depreciation should go to the income beneficiaries along with other current period expenses.

Back to our multisyllabic spittle trust (MST).

Look at Section 643(b):

    26 U.S. Code § 643 - Definitions applicable to subparts A, B, C, and D

(b) Income.

For purposes of this subpart and subparts B, C, and D, the term "income", when not preceded by the words "taxable", "distributable net", "undistributed net", or "gross", means the amount of income of the estate or trust for the taxable year determined under the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local law. Items of gross income constituting extraordinary dividends or taxable stock dividends which the fiduciary, acting in good faith, determines to be allocable to corpus under the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local law shall not be considered income.  

What is this Section trying to do?

Looks like it is trying to define “income” and failing rather badly at it.

Look at the last sentence:

… which the fiduciary, acting in good faith, … shall not be considered income.”

Hmmmmm.

But read the first sentence:

… when not preceded by the words “taxable ….”

Seems to me that last sentence could be the solution to the Riemann Hypothesis and it would not matter once you put the word “taxable” in front of “income.”

Let’s move on to Section 643(a):

Distributable net income.

For purposes of this part, the term “distributable net means, with respect to any taxable year, the taxable income of the estate or trust computed with the following modifications —  

(3) Capital gains and losses         

Gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets shall be excluded to the extent that such gains are allocated to corpus and are not (A) paid, credited, or required to be distributed to any beneficiary during the taxable year, or (B) paid, permanently set aside, or to be used for the purposes specified in section 642(c).  

(4) Extraordinary dividends and taxable stock dividends  

… there shall be excluded those items of gross income constituting extraordinary dividends or taxable stock dividends which the fiduciary, acting in good faith, does not pay or credit to any beneficiary by reason of his determination that such dividends are allocable to corpus under the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local law.

I see the words “shall be excluded.”

I see the extraordinary dividends and taxable stock dividends from Section 643(b). And there is new wording about gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets. Is it possible …?

I also see the words “Distributable net income” at the top.

Let’s go back to our definitions of trust income.

Section 643(a) addresses distributable net income. Think of DNI as Mint Chocolate Chip.

Section 643(b) addresses taxable income. Think of TI as Cookies and Cream.

Mint Chocolate Chip is not Cookies and Cream.

Maybe capital gains are excludable from DNI. Maybe they are not. Either way, that conundrum has nothing to do with capital gains being excludable from taxable income.

The IRS is quite aware of the game being played.

Here is AM 2023-006:

 

One is dancing on the slippery beveled edge of a possible tax shelter.

Just leave these trusts alone. If I could make income nontaxable by running it through a string-a-bunch-of-words-together trust, I would have done so years ago. I might have even retired by now.

The IRS Goes Rounds With Cohan

 

The decision begins with the IRS seeking taxes of $805,149, $1,145,104, $1,161,864, and $831,771 for years 2013 through 2016. The penalties were unsurprisingly also enormous.

I want to know what happened here.

The taxpayer was Mohammad Nasser Aboui, and he was the sole shareholder of an S corporation called HPPO. He owned several used vehicle lots, and in 2009 he put them into HPPO as its initial corporate capitalization.

It sounds like a tough business:

·       Most of HPPO customers had bad credit.

·       Many did not have a checking account and instead paid HPPO in cash.

·       HPPO financed between 90% and 95% of its sales.

·       Customers repaid their loans less than 10% of the time.

·       HPPO repossessed approximately 25% of the cars it sold within 3 or 4 months.

·       HPPO had quite the barter system going with its mechanics: the mechanic would work on HPPO cars in exchange for rent of HPPO’s garage space.

Around 2014 Aboui decided to close the business. There were serious family health issues and HPPO was not making any money.

The IRS started its audit in September 2015.

HPPO’s accountant was ill at the time and later died.

To its credit, the IRS waited.

More than 3 years later HPPO engaged another accountant to represent the audit.

The second accountant made immediate mistakes, such as getting HPPO’s accounting method wrong when dealing with the IRS Revenue Agent (RA).

COMMENT: More specifically, the accountant told the RA that HPPO used the overall cash basis of accounting. HPPO did not. In fact, it could not because inventory was a material income-producing factor.

The RA wanted HPPO’s books and records, including access to its accounting software. HPPO could provide much but not the software. Its software license expired when it left the vehicle business in 2018.

This is a nightmare.

HPPO did eventually reactivate the software, but it was too late to help with the RA.

The RA – being told by the second accountant that HPPO used the cash basis of accounting – decided to use bank statements to reconstruct gross income.

BTW HPPO wound up dismissing the second accountant.

The results were odd: HPPO had reported more sales for 2013 through 2015 – nearly $3.25 million - than was deposited at the bank.

The pattern reversed in 2016 when HPPO deposited approximately $539 grand more than it reported in sales.

COMMENT: I have an idea what happened.

The RA also saw following bad debt expense:

          2013             $1,069,739

          2014             $ 668,537

          2015             $ 902,967

          2016             $ 436,738    

Here is something about the cash basis of accounting: you cannot have bad debt expense. It makes sense when you remember that gross income is reported as monies are deposited. Bad debts are receivables that are never collected, meaning there is nothing to deposit. One never leaves home plate.

So, the RA disallowed the bad debt expense entirely.

I am pretty sure about my earlier hunch.

The RA also determined that HPPO had distributed the following monies to Aboui, one way or another:

          2013             $2,476,301

          2014             $1,704,329

          2015             $1,406,893

2016             $1,934,033

There were other issues too.

Off they went to Tax Court.

Remember what I said about reactivating the accounting software license? Aboui now presented thousands of pages to document cost of sales and other expenses. The Court encouraged the IRS to accept and review the new records.

The IRS said, “nah, we’re good.”

COMMENT: Strike one.

The Court started its opinion with HPPO’s sales.

The RA stated to the Court that HPPO used the overall cash basis of accounting.

Don’t think so, said the Court. The Court saw HPPO using the accrual basis of accounting for sales and the cash basis of accounting for everything else.

COMMENT: This is referred to as a hybrid method: a pinch of this, a sprinkle of that. If one is consistent – and the results are not misleading – a hybrid is an acceptable method of accounting.

The Court asked Treasury why it thought that HPPO used the cash basis of accounting.

Treasury replied that it had never said that.

The Court pointed out that the RA had said that she understood HPPO to be a cash basis taxpayer. To be fair, that is what the second accountant had told her.

Nope, never used the cash method insisted Treasury.

COMMENT: An explanation is in order here. Treasury Department attorneys take over when the matter goes to Court. Perhaps the attorneys meant “direct” Treasury. The RA – while working for the IRS which itself is part of the Treasury – would then be “indirect” Treasury. I am only speculating, as this unforced error makes no sense. Clearly it bothered the Court.

Strike two.

The Court then reasoned why HPPO was reporting more sales than it deposited in the bank: it was reporting the total vehicle sale price in revenues at the time of sale. That also explained the bad debt expense: HPPO financed most of its sales and most of those loans went sour.

But why the reversal in 2016?

Aboui explained to the Court that by 2016 he was closing the vehicle business. He would have slowed and eventually stopped selling cars, with the result that he would be depositing more in the bank than he currently sold.

The Court decided that HPPO had correctly recorded its sales for the years at issue.

Next came the cost of vehicles sold.

This accounting was complicated because so much cash was running through the business. Sometimes cash was used to immediately pay expenses without first being deposited into a bank account – NOT a recommended accounting practice.

The RA had also identified certain debits to HPPO’s bank account that were either distributions or otherwise nondeductible.

The Court could find no evidence that those identified debits had been deducted on the tax returns.

The RA – and by extension, the … Treasury – was losing credibility.

Aboui meanwhile provided extensive documentation of HPPO’s expenses at trial. Some of these were records the Court had asked the IRS to accept and review – and which the IRS passed on.

Here is the Court:

Petitioners provided extensive documentation at trial to substantiate the COGS and business expenses. Mr. Aboui testified that HPPO was unprofitable. Given the record in its entirety, we find that petitioners have substantiated HPPO’s COGS and business expenses as reported on HPPO’s returns for each year at issue, except for meal and entertainment expenses of …..”

COMMENT: Strike three.

The Court went to the bad debts.

Mr. Aboui credibly testified that he was unable to repossess approximately 250 cars during the years at issue. The loss of these cars adequately substantiates the amount of HPPO’s bad debt deductions for the years at issue under the Cohan rule.”

The Court went to the distributions.

Respondent determined that petitioners failed to report approximately $7.5 million in taxable distributions from HPPO during the years at issue.”

COMMENT: Remember that HPPO is an S corporation, and Aboui would be able to withdraw his invested capital – plus any business income he had paid taxes on personally but left in the business – without further tax. This amount is Aboui’s “basis” in his S corporation stock.

Here is the Court:

Respondent argues that petitioners have not established Mr. Aboui’s basis in HPPO during the years at issue. We disagree and that the record and Mr. Aboui’s credible testimony provides sufficient evidence for us to reasonably estimate his basis under the Cohan rule.”

The IRS won a partial victory with the distributions. The Court thought Aboui’s basis in HPPO was approximately $5.1 million.

The IRS had wanted zero basis.

The effect was to reduce the excess distributions to $$2.4 million ($7.5 minus $5.1).

Still, it was a rare win for the IRS.

Excess distributions are taxable. Aboui had taxable distributions of $2.4 million. Yes, it is a lot, but it is also a lot less than the IRS wanted.

COMMENT: The nerd part of me wonders how the Court arrived at an estimate of $5.1 million for Aboui’s basis. Unfortunately, there is no further explanation on this point.

Oh, one more thing from the Court:

… we hold that petitioners are not liable for any penalties.”

While not contained within the four corners of this decision, I am curious why the Court repetitively went to the Cohan rule. I have followed this literature for years, and this result is not normal. Courts generally expect a business to maintain an accounting system that produces reliable numbers. Yes, every now and then there may be a leak in the numbers, and the court may use Cohan to plug said leak. That is not what we have here, though. This boat was sinking.

Perhaps Aboui presented his case well.

Mr. Aboui was incredibly forthright in his testimony.”

And perhaps the IRS should not have argued that an RA – an IRS employee – is not the IRS.

Our case this time was Aboui and Mizani v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2024-106.

An IRS Employee And Unreported Income

 

You may have heard that Congress is tightening the 1099 reporting requirements for third party payment entities such as PayPal and Venmo. The ultimate goal is to report cumulative payments exceeding $600. Because of implementation issues, the IRS has adjusted this threshold to $5,000 for 2024.

Many, I suspect, will be caught by surprise.

Receiving a 1099-K does not necessarily mean that you have taxable income. It does mean that you were paid by one of the reporting organizations, and that payment will be presumed business-related. This is of concern with Venmo, for example, as a common use is payment of group-incurred personal expenses, such as the cost of dining out. Venmo will request one to identify a transaction as business or personal, using that as the criterion for IRS reporting  

What you cannot do, however, is ignore the matter. This IRS matching is wholly computerized; the notice does not pass by human eyes before being mailed. In fact, the first time the IRS reviews the notice is when you (or your tax preparer) respond to it. Ignore the notice however and you may wind up in Collections, wondering what happened.

The IRS adjusted the 2004 and 2005 returns for Andrea Orellana.

The IRS had spotted unreported income from eBay. Orellana had reported no eBay sales, so the computer match was easy.

There was a problem, though: Orellana worked for the IRS as a revenue officer.

COMMENT: A revenue officer is primarily concerned with Collections. A revenue agent, on the other hand, is the person who audits you.

Someone working at the IRS is expected to know and comply with his/her tax reporting obligations. As a revenue officer, she should have known about 1099-Ks and computer matching.

It started as a criminal tax investigation.

Way to give the benefit of the doubt there, IRS.

There were issues with identifying the cost of the items sold, so the criminal case was closed and a civil case opened in its place.

The agent requested and obtained copies of bank statements and some PayPal records. A best guess analysis indicated that over $36 thousand had been omitted over the two years.

Orellana was having none of this. She requested that the case be forwarded to Appeals.

Orellana hired an attorney. She was advised to document as many expenses as possible. The IRS meanwhile subpoenaed PayPal for relevant records.

Orellana did prepare a summary of expenses. She did not include much in the way of documentation, however.

The agent meanwhile was matching records from PayPal to her bank deposits. This proved an unexpected challenge, as there were numerous duplicates and Orellana had multiple accounts under different names with PayPal.

The agent also needed Orellana’s help with the expenses. She was selling dresses and shoes and makeup and the like. It was difficult to identify which purchases were for personal use and which were for sale on eBay.

Orellana walked out of the meeting with the agent.

COMMENT: I would think this a fireable offense if one works for the IRS.

This placed the agent in a tough spot. Without Orellana’s assistance, the best she could do was assume that all purchases were for personal use.

Off they went to Tax Court.

Orellana introduced a chart of deposits under dispute. She did not try to trace deposits to specific bank accounts nor did she try to explain – with one exception - why certain deposits were nontaxable.

Her chart of expenses was no better. She explained that any documents she used to prepare the chart had been lost.

Orellana maintained that she was not in business and that any eBay activity was akin to a garage sale. No one makes a “profit” from a garage sale, as nothing is sold for more than its purchase price.

The IRS pointed out that many items she bought were marketed as “new." Some still had tags attached.

Orellana explained that she liked to shop. In addition, she had health issues affecting her weight, so she always had stuff to sell.

As for “new”: just a marketing gimmick, she explained.

I always advertise as new only because you can get a better price for that.” 

… I document them as new if it appears new.”

Alright then.

If she can show that there was no profit, then there is no tax due.

Orellana submitted records of purchases from PayPal.

… but they could not be connected or traced to her.

She used a PayPal debit card.

The agent worked with that. She separated charges between those clearly business and those clearly personal. She requested Orellana’s help for those in between. We already know how that turned out.

How about receipts?

She testified that she purchased personal items and never kept receipts.

That would be ridiculous, unheard of. Unless there was some really bizarre reason why I keep a receipt, there were no receipts.”

The IRS spotted her expenses that were clearly business. They were not enough to create a loss. Orellana had unreported income.

And the Court wanted to know why an IRS Revenue Officer would have unreported income.

Frankly, so would I.

Petitioner testified that she ‘had prepared 1040s since she was 16’ and that she ‘would ‘never look at the instructions.’”

Good grief.

The IRS also asked for an accuracy penalty.

The Court agreed.

Our case this time was Orellana v Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2010-51.