Income And Cancellation of Indebtedness

 

I am reading a case about cancellation of indebtedness income. 

Let’s take a moment to discuss the concept of income in the tax Code. 

The 16^th amendment, passed in 1913 and authorizing a federal income tax, reads as follows: 

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

Needless to say, the definition of “incomes, from whatever source” became immediately contentious. 

Ask a tax practitioner for a definition of income, and it is likely that he/she will respond with “an accession to wealth.” 

That phrase comes from a 1955 Supreme Court case (Commissioner v Glenshaw Glass) which included the following: 

Here, we have instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." 

I am seeing three conditions, of which “accession to wealth” is but one. 

Let’s circle back to indebtedness and income.

Can one have income by borrowing money? 

Unless there is something extraordinarily odd about the loan, I would say “no.” The reason is that any increase in wealth (by receipt of the loan proceeds) is immediately offset by the requirement to repay the loan. 

Let’s say you buy a house. You take out a mortgage. 

What if you are in financial distress and mail the keys back to the mortgage company? 

Granted, the house secures the debt, but surrendering the house does not automatically release the debt. It however will likely result in your receiving the following 1099:

Like any 1099, there is a presumption of income. In this instance, there has been an exchange in the ownership of the house. There is another way to say this: the tax Code sees a sale of the property. 

It seems odd that tax sees potential income here. It is unlikely to happen if the surrendered asset is one’s principal residence, as one would have access to the $250,000/$500,000 gain exclusion. It could happen if the surrendered asset is rental or investment property, though. 

What about the debt on the property? 

Tax considers that a separate transaction. 

When the debt is discharged, the IRS has yet another form: 

Yes, it gets confusing. The system works much better when the two steps happen concurrently – such as in a short sale. In that case, it is common to skip the 1099-A altogether and just issue the 1099-C. 

NOTE: There is a twist in the straw depending upon whether the debt is recourse or nonrecourse. Believe it or not, there are about a dozen states where you can buy your principal residence with nonrecourse debt. You will not be surprised to learn that California is one of them. The upside is that you can return the keys to the bank and no longer be responsible for the mortgage. The downside is this policy was a major contributor to the burst of the housing bubble in the late aughts.

It is common for the 1099-C to be issued three years after the 1099-A. Why? The Code requires the reporting of cancellation of indebtedness on or before an “identifiable event” happens. 

An identifiable event in turn is defined as: 

1.  bankruptcy
2.  expiration of statute of limitations for collection
3.  cancellation of debt that renders it unenforceable in a receivership, foreclosure, or similar proceeding
4.  creditor's election of foreclosure remedies that statutorily bars recovery
5.  cancelation of debt due to probate proceedings
6.  creditor's discharge pursuant to an agreement
7.  discharge of indebtedness pursuant to a decision by the creditor, or the application of a defined policy of the creditor, to discontinue collection activity and discharge debt
8.  in specific cases, the expiration of a non-payment testing period [presumption of 36 months of no payment to the creditor]    

The three years is number (8). 

The income type we are discussing with the 1099-C is cancellation of indebtedness income. As discussed, just borrowing money does not create income. Whereas your assets may go up (you have cash from the loan or bought something with the cash), that amount is offset by the loan itself. The scales are balanced, and there is no accession to income. 

However, cancel the debt. 

The scale is no longer balanced. 

Meaning you have potential income. 

But the Code allows for exceptions. Here is Section 108: 

                (a) Exclusion from gross income

(1) In general Gross income does not include any amount which (but for this subsection) would be includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in whole or in part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if—

(A) the discharge occurs in a title 11 case,

(B) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent,

(C) the indebtedness discharged is qualified farm indebtedness,

(D) in the case of a taxpayer other than a C corporation, the indebtedness discharged is qualified real property business indebtedness, or

(E) the indebtedness discharged is qualified principal residence indebtedness which is discharged—

(i) before January 1, 2026, or

(ii) subject to an arrangement that is entered into and evidenced in writing before January 1, 2026. 

The common ones are (a)(1)(A) for bankruptcy and (a)(1)B) for insolvency. 

Bankruptcy is self-explanatory. 

Solvency is not self-explanatory. You can think of insolvency as being bankrupt but not filing for formal bankruptcy. You owe more than you own. Let’s call the difference between the two the “hole.” To the extent that that cancelled debt is less than the “hole,” there is no cancellation of indebtedness income. Once the cancelled debt equals the “hole,” the exclusion ends. At that point, your net worth is zero (-0-). Technically the next dollar is an “accession to wealth” and therefore income. 

In our case this week Ilana Jivago borrowed from Citibank. She defaulted and was eventually foreclosed on in 2009. Citibank sent her a 1099-C. Jivago argued that it was nontaxable because it was qualified principal residence indebtedness per (a)(1)(E) above. 

Qualified principal residence indebtedness is defined as:         

Indebtedness incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving any qualified residence of the taxpayer.

The Court looked at photographs of and admired the renovations she made in 2005 and 2006. The Court noted that Jivago did not use an interior designer, and she did much of the work herself.

The problem is that 2005 and 2006 were before she borrowed from Citibank. 

Easy win for the IRS.

Our case this time was Jivago v Commissioner, Docket No. 5411-21.

A Foreclosure And A Mortgage Interest Deduction

I am looking at a case involving mortgage interest. While I get the issue, I think the taxpayers got hosed.

I am going to streamline the details so we can follow the key points.

The Howlands had two mortgages on their house.

The first mortgage started with Countrywide and eventually wound up with Bank of New York Mellon.

The second mortgage started with Haven Trust Bank and wound up with CenterState Bank.

The house was foreclosed in 2016. It sold for $594,000.

The Howlands owed the following when the house was sold:

            Mellon        CenterState

        Principal      $     $377,060

        Interest     $100,607

        Interest & other    $247,046

The Howlands deducted mortgage interest of $103,498 on their 2016 joint tax return.

Neither bank, however, issued a Form 1098 for mortgage interest.

Allow for a little computer matching (or nonmatching in this case), and the IRS disallowed any interest deduction and assessed penalties to boot.

This story partially happened during the Great Recession of the late aughts. That is when we learned of “too big to fail,” of “ninja” loans and of banks playing musical chairs to survive. Good luck guessing where a given loan would wind up when the music stopped. Perhaps a taxpayer borrowed from someone (let’s call them “A”). A was acquired by B, which was later merged into C and yada, yada, yada. The data platforms between A and B were incompatible, meaning there was a one-way data transfer. The odds that someone years later – especially after the yada, yada, yada - could get back to A were astronomical.

While not clarified in the opinion, I suspect that is what happened here. CenterState Bank was not going to issue a 1098 because it could/would not time travel to determine if their interest calculations were correct. In the absence of such assurance, they were not going to issue a 1098. Or perhaps they were lazy and problem-solving outside a comfortable, numbing rote was a request beyond the pale. I prefer to believe the former reason.

But there was a problem: under the terms of the second mortgage, payments were to be applied first to interest.

COMMENT: Seems to me the Howlands paid interest of some amount.

Let’s focus in on that second mortgage. The money available to repay the second mortgage (after satisfaction of the first mortgage) would have been:

$594,000 – 247,046 = $346,954

There should also have been some interest embedded in the first mortgage, but let’s ignore that for now.

There is $347 grand to pay $377 grand of debt and $100 grand of back interest.

The IRS argued there was not enough money left to cover the principal, much less the interest. That is why the bank did not issue a 1098.

But we know that interest was to be paid first, per the loan agreement.

The Tax Court had to decide.

You know who was not in Court to testify? 

CenterState Bank – the second mortgage holder - that’s who.

Here is the Court:

The record before us is silent as to how CenterState applied the funds received and whether petitioners owe any remaining principal balance. These facts (if favorable) could support a finding that petitioners in fact paid home mortgage interest ….”

True.

However, statements in briefs do not constitute evidence.”

Again, true, but why say it?

Petitioners bear the burden of proof and must show, by a preponderance of evidence, that they are entitled to a home mortgage interest deduction ….”

Oh, oh.

... we conclude that petitioners have failed to meet their burden.”

Sheeshh.

I am not certain what more the Howlands could have done. They were at the mercy of the bank, and the new bank that took the payoff was not the same as the old bank that originated the loan. 

The Tax Court did strike down the penalties. Small consolation, but it was something.

Our case this time was Howland v Commissioner, TC Memo 2022-60.

The Income Awakens

Despite the chatter of politicians, we are not soon filing income taxes on the back of a postcard. A major reason is the calculation of income itself. There can be reasonable dispute in calculating income, even for ordinary taxpayers and far removed from the rarified realms of the ultra-wealthy or the multinationals.    

How? Easy. Say you have a rental duplex. What depreciation period should you use for the property: 15 years? 25? 35? No depreciation at all? Something else?

And sometimes the reason is because the taxpayer knows just enough tax law to be dangerous.

Let’s talk about a fact pattern you do not see every day. Someone sells a principal residence – you know, a house with its $500,000 tax exclusion. There is a twist: they sell the house on a land contract. They collect on the contract for a few years, and then the buyer defaults. The house comes back.  

How would you calculate their income from a real estate deal gone bad?

You can anticipate it has something to do with that $500,000 exclusion.

Marvin DeBough bought a house on 80 acres of land. He bought it back in the 1960s for $25,000. In 2006 he sold it for $1.4 million. He sold it on a land contract.

COMMENT: A land contract means that the seller is playing bank. The buyer has a mortgage, but the mortgage is to the seller. To secure the mortgage, the seller retains the deed to the property, and the buyer does not receive the deed until the mortgage is paid off. This is in contrast to a regular mortgage, where the buyer receives the deed but the deed is subject to the mortgage. The reason that sellers like land contracts is because it is easier to foreclose in the event of nonpayment.

 

 DeBough had a gain of $657,796.

OBSERVATION: I know: $1.4 million minus $25,000 is not $657,796. Almost all of the difference was a step-up in basis when his wife passed away.  

DeBough excluded $500,000 of gain, as it was his principal residence. That resulted in taxable gain of $157,796. He was to receive $1.4 million. As a percentage, 11.27 cents on every dollar he receives ($157,796 divided by $1,400,000) would be taxable gain.

He received $505,000. Multiply that by 11.27% and he reported $56,920 as gain.

In 2009 the buyers defaulted and the property returned to DeBough. It cost him $3,723 in fees to reacquire the property. He then held on to the property.

What is DeBough’s income?

Here is his calculation:

Original gain		157,796
Reported to-date		(56,920)
Cost of foreclosure		(3,723)
		97,153

I don’t think so, said the IRS. Here is their calculation:

Cash received		505,000
Reported to-date		(56,920)
		448,080

DeBough was outraged. He wanted to know what the IRS had done with his $500,000 exclusion.

The IRS trotted out Section 1038(e):

         (e)  Principal residences.

If-

(1) subsection (a) applies to a reacquisition of real property with respect to the sale of which gain was not recognized under section 121 (relating to gain on sale of principal residence); and

(2)  within 1 year after the date of the reacquisition of such property by the seller, such property is resold by him,

then, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, subsections (b) , (c) , and (d) of this section shall not apply to the reacquisition of such property and, for purposes of applying section 121 , the resale of such property shall be treated as a part of the transaction constituting the original sale of such property.

DeBough was not happy about that “I year after the date of the reacquisition” language. However, he pointed out, it does not technically say that the $500,000 is NOT AVAILABLE if the property is NOT SOLD WITHIN ONE YEAR.

I give him credit. He is a lawyer by temperament, apparently.  DeBough could find actionable language on the back of a baseball card.

It was an uphill climb. Still, others have pulled it off, so maybe he had a chance.

The Court observed that there is no explanation in the legislative history why Congress limited the exclusion to sellers who resell within one year of reacquisition. Still, it seemed clear that Congress did in fact limit the exclusion, so the “why” was going to have to wait for another day.

DeBough lost his case. He owed tax.

And the Court was right. The general rule – when the property returned to DeBough – is that every dollar DeBough received was taxable income, reduced by any gain previously taxed and limited to the overall gain from the sale. DeBough was back to where he was before, except that he received $505,000 in the interim. The IRS wanted its cut of the $505,000.

Yes, Congress put an exception in there should the property be resold within one year. The offset – although unspoken – is that the seller can claim the $500,000 exclusion, but he/she claims it on the first sale, not the second. One cannot keep claiming the $500,000 over and over again on the same property.

Since Debough did not sell within one year, he will claim the $500,000 when he sells the property a second time.

When you look at it that way, he is not out anything. He will have his day, but that day has to wait until he sells the property again.

And there is an example of tax law. Congress put in an exception to a rule, but even the Court cannot tell you what Congress was thinking.