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Showing posts with label debt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label debt. Show all posts

Monday, January 13, 2025

Government Forces Sale to Cover Partner’s Tax Debt

 I was reading a case recently that bothered me. It involves something that – fortunately – I rarely see in practice.

Here is the Code section:

§ 7403 - Action to enforce lien or to subject property to payment of tax

(a) Filing. In any case where there has been a refusal or neglect to pay any tax, or to discharge any liability in respect thereof, whether or not levy has been made, the Attorney General or his delegate, at the request of the Secretary, may direct a civil action to be filed in a district court of the United States to enforce the lien of the United States under this title with respect to such tax or liability or to subject any property, of whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax or liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence, any acceleration of payment under section 6166(g) shall be treated as a neglect to pay tax.

(b) Parties. All persons having liens upon or claiming any interest in the property involved in such action shall be made parties thereto.

(c) Adjudication and decree. The court shall, after the parties have been duly notified of the action, proceed to adjudicate all matters involved therein and finally determine the merits of all claims to and liens upon the property, and, in all cases where a claim or interest of the United States therein is established, may decree a sale of such property, by the proper officer of the court, and a distribution of the proceeds of such sale according to the findings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties and of the United States. If the property is sold to satisfy a first lien held by the United States, the United States may bid at the sale such sum, not exceeding the amount of such lien with expenses of sale, as the Secretary directs.

(d) Receivership. In any such proceeding, at the instance of the United States, the court may appoint a receiver to enforce the lien, or, upon certification by the Secretary during the pendency of such proceedings that it is in the public interest, may appoint a receiver with all the powers of a receiver in equity.

And here is where you leave your tax CPA and hire a tax attorney.

Section 7403 permits a court to authorize the sale of property when a delinquent person owns property with a nondelinquent person. The IRS cannot do this on its own power, however; it must first go to district court and obtain approval.

To be fair, one is deep into the IRS Collection machinery before Section 7403 is even an issue. I would be screaming at you – and likely fired you as a client – long before we got here, unless bad fortune was involved. If there was bad fortune, we likely would be submitting an offer in compromise.

The heavyweight case in this area is United States v Rodgers. Rodgers was a Texas gambler who died, leaving a $900,000 tax debt. He (well, now his estate) and his wife owned their home. Under Texas law the surviving spouse had a lifetime right to live in the home. The government of course wanted its money.

The case went all the way to the Supreme Court, which identified four issues before the government could force any sale to collect taxes.

 (1) Statutory authority

Does the taxpayer have any “right, title or interest” to the property in question?

 

In Rodgers, yes. The deceased had the same rights to the entire home as did the widow.

 

The type of ownership can have a drastic effect on the government’s ability to reach the asset. A tenancy by the entirety, for example, might result in a different answer from a tenancy in common (which we will see below). 

            (2) Constitutional authority

This goes back to eminent domain. The government is not an ordinary creditor in this situation; rather it is exercising the prerogatives of a sovereign. Think of the government as a super creditor.

            (3) Practical undercompensation

Think actuarial calculations. For example, one could think that a 50/50 split of marital assets is fair. However, the value of a life estate to a surviving spouse aged fifty can be up to 95% of the home’s sales price. The spread between 95% and 50% is referred to as “practical undercompensation.”

            (4) Four-factor balancing test

             (a)  Will a non-sale prejudice the government?

   (b) Does the spouse have a legally recognized expectation of the house not being sold?

   (c)  Will the spouse suffer prejudice from practical undercompensation and dislocation costs?

   (d)  What are the relative characters and values of the two ownership interests?

Subsequent application of Rodgers focuses on these four factors.

Let’s move on to Driscoll.

Thomas Driscoll was a dentist. He owned a dental practice with Dr Vockroth. Together they also owned the building in which the dental practice was located.

Common enough.

Dr Driscoll became substantially delinquent with his tax obligations.

In April 2023, the government filed a motion for forced sale of both the practice and the building.

Meanwhile. Dr V had no tax issues. He may have made the mistake of partnering with someone who did, but that was the extent of his culpability.

The government – to its credit – allowed additional time to sell both assets.

But there were issues: trying to sell a dental practice in a small town and a building housing said practice in said small town. Let’s just say there was limited interest in buying either.

The government now wanted a forced sale.

Let’s go through the Rodgers four factors:

One

The Court decided Dr V could not show that the government would not be prejudiced by going after 50% rather than 100% of the practice and building.

Yes, the double negative is a bit difficult to follow.

This was a practice in a small town. It was going to be tough enough to sell without trying to sell half rather than the whole.

         The court decided that factor one weighed in favor of a sale.

         Two

Was Dr V as a tenant in common subject to a forced sale?

Here is the Court discussing the real estate:

This conclusion is also supported by the fact that, unlike tenants by the entirety or joint tenants, tenants in common enjoy no protections from forced sales or partition actions.”

Tough to be a tenant in common in New Jersey.

The court decided factor two weighed in favor of a sale.

Three

 Was there prejudice to Dr V in terms of personal dislocation of costs and undercompensation of interest?

Here is the Court:

 Dr Vockroth asserts that he will be ‘forced to lay off all of [his] employees,’ and that he will ‘no longer be able to see [his]  patients.'”

OK, Dr V may be laying it on thick, but that does not mean there is no truth here. Relocating a practice costs money. There are – for example - additional electrical and plumbing needs before a building can house a dental practice. Patients may not follow. Employees may not follow. The court is playing cavalierly with other people’s lives.

Here is the court in its best Frasier Crane voice:

 Furthermore, even if Dr Vockroth is negatively affected by the LLC in some way, this is not an undue prejudice of a magnitude to prevent a forced sale. It is axiomatic that LLCs and partnerships change, fail, dissolve and are bought and sold with regularity. Partners die or sell their shares The reality is simply part of being in business, and Dr. Vockroth is not exempt from this fact, especially when he fails to offer any reliable evidence to support his contentions.”

What is Dr V to do: poll his patients and employees to see whether they would follow? Oh, that will go swimmingly.

BTW the sale of a dental practice will certainly include a noncompete, meaning that Dr V could not open a dental practice within so many miles of the existing practice. Well, he could, but he would be sued.

One would think a judge would know that.

Four

  The relative character and value of the property owned by the two owners.

There was not much play here as both doctors owned 50%.

The court decided that the government could foreclose on both the practice and the real estate.

Technically right, but lousy law. Consider this menacement from Rodgers:

We do emphasize, however, that the limited discretion accorded by § 7403 should be exercised rigorously and sparingly, keeping in mind the Government's paramount interest in prompt and certain collection of delinquent taxes.

Section 7403 is not taxpayer friendly.

Our case this time was United States v Driscoll, 2025 BL 2655, D.N.J. No. 3:18-cv-11762, 1/6/25.


Monday, December 30, 2024

The IRS Goes Rounds With Cohan

 

The decision begins with the IRS seeking taxes of $805,149, $1,145,104, $1,161,864, and $831,771 for years 2013 through 2016. The penalties were unsurprisingly also enormous.

I want to know what happened here.

The taxpayer was Mohammad Nasser Aboui, and he was the sole shareholder of an S corporation called HPPO. He owned several used vehicle lots, and in 2009 he put them into HPPO as its initial corporate capitalization.

It sounds like a tough business:

·       Most of HPPO customers had bad credit.

·       Many did not have a checking account and instead paid HPPO in cash.

·       HPPO financed between 90% and 95% of its sales.

·       Customers repaid their loans less than 10% of the time.

·       HPPO repossessed approximately 25% of the cars it sold within 3 or 4 months.

·       HPPO had quite the barter system going with its mechanics: the mechanic would work on HPPO cars in exchange for rent of HPPO’s garage space.

Around 2014 Aboui decided to close the business. There were serious family health issues and HPPO was not making any money.

The IRS started its audit in September 2015.

HPPO’s accountant was ill at the time and later died.

To its credit, the IRS waited.

More than 3 years later HPPO engaged another accountant to represent the audit.

The second accountant made immediate mistakes, such as getting HPPO’s accounting method wrong when dealing with the IRS Revenue Agent (RA).

COMMENT: More specifically, the accountant told the RA that HPPO used the overall cash basis of accounting. HPPO did not. In fact, it could not because inventory was a material income-producing factor.

The RA wanted HPPO’s books and records, including access to its accounting software. HPPO could provide much but not the software. Its software license expired when it left the vehicle business in 2018.

This is a nightmare.

HPPO did eventually reactivate the software, but it was too late to help with the RA.

The RA – being told by the second accountant that HPPO used the cash basis of accounting – decided to use bank statements to reconstruct gross income.

BTW HPPO wound up dismissing the second accountant.

The results were odd: HPPO had reported more sales for 2013 through 2015 – nearly $3.25 million - than was deposited at the bank.

The pattern reversed in 2016 when HPPO deposited approximately $539 grand more than it reported in sales.

COMMENT: I have an idea what happened.

The RA also saw following bad debt expense:

          2013             $1,069,739

          2014             $ 668,537

          2015             $ 902,967

          2016             $ 436,738    

Here is something about the cash basis of accounting: you cannot have bad debt expense. It makes sense when you remember that gross income is reported as monies are deposited. Bad debts are receivables that are never collected, meaning there is nothing to deposit. One never leaves home plate.

So, the RA disallowed the bad debt expense entirely.

I am pretty sure about my earlier hunch.

The RA also determined that HPPO had distributed the following monies to Aboui, one way or another:

          2013             $2,476,301

          2014             $1,704,329

          2015             $1,406,893

2016             $1,934,033

There were other issues too.

Off they went to Tax Court.

Remember what I said about reactivating the accounting software license? Aboui now presented thousands of pages to document cost of sales and other expenses. The Court encouraged the IRS to accept and review the new records.

The IRS said, “nah, we’re good.”

COMMENT: Strike one.

The Court started its opinion with HPPO’s sales.

The RA stated to the Court that HPPO used the overall cash basis of accounting.

Don’t think so, said the Court. The Court saw HPPO using the accrual basis of accounting for sales and the cash basis of accounting for everything else.

COMMENT: This is referred to as a hybrid method: a pinch of this, a sprinkle of that. If one is consistent – and the results are not misleading – a hybrid is an acceptable method of accounting.

The Court asked Treasury why it thought that HPPO used the cash basis of accounting.

Treasury replied that it had never said that.

The Court pointed out that the RA had said that she understood HPPO to be a cash basis taxpayer. To be fair, that is what the second accountant had told her.

Nope, never used the cash method insisted Treasury.

COMMENT: An explanation is in order here. Treasury Department attorneys take over when the matter goes to Court. Perhaps the attorneys meant “direct” Treasury. The RA – while working for the IRS which itself is part of the Treasury – would then be “indirect” Treasury. I am only speculating, as this unforced error makes no sense. Clearly it bothered the Court.

Strike two.

The Court then reasoned why HPPO was reporting more sales than it deposited in the bank: it was reporting the total vehicle sale price in revenues at the time of sale. That also explained the bad debt expense: HPPO financed most of its sales and most of those loans went sour.

But why the reversal in 2016?

Aboui explained to the Court that by 2016 he was closing the vehicle business. He would have slowed and eventually stopped selling cars, with the result that he would be depositing more in the bank than he currently sold.

The Court decided that HPPO had correctly recorded its sales for the years at issue.

Next came the cost of vehicles sold.

This accounting was complicated because so much cash was running through the business. Sometimes cash was used to immediately pay expenses without first being deposited into a bank account – NOT a recommended accounting practice.

The RA had also identified certain debits to HPPO’s bank account that were either distributions or otherwise nondeductible.

The Court could find no evidence that those identified debits had been deducted on the tax returns.

The RA – and by extension, the … Treasury – was losing credibility.

Aboui meanwhile provided extensive documentation of HPPO’s expenses at trial. Some of these were records the Court had asked the IRS to accept and review – and which the IRS passed on.

Here is the Court:

Petitioners provided extensive documentation at trial to substantiate the COGS and business expenses. Mr. Aboui testified that HPPO was unprofitable. Given the record in its entirety, we find that petitioners have substantiated HPPO’s COGS and business expenses as reported on HPPO’s returns for each year at issue, except for meal and entertainment expenses of …..”

COMMENT: Strike three.

The Court went to the bad debts.

Mr. Aboui credibly testified that he was unable to repossess approximately 250 cars during the years at issue. The loss of these cars adequately substantiates the amount of HPPO’s bad debt deductions for the years at issue under the Cohan rule.”

The Court went to the distributions.

Respondent determined that petitioners failed to report approximately $7.5 million in taxable distributions from HPPO during the years at issue.”

COMMENT: Remember that HPPO is an S corporation, and Aboui would be able to withdraw his invested capital – plus any business income he had paid taxes on personally but left in the business – without further tax. This amount is Aboui’s “basis” in his S corporation stock.

Here is the Court:

Respondent argues that petitioners have not established Mr. Aboui’s basis in HPPO during the years at issue. We disagree and that the record and Mr. Aboui’s credible testimony provides sufficient evidence for us to reasonably estimate his basis under the Cohan rule.”

The IRS won a partial victory with the distributions. The Court thought Aboui’s basis in HPPO was approximately $5.1 million.

The IRS had wanted zero basis.

The effect was to reduce the excess distributions to $$2.4 million ($7.5 minus $5.1).

Still, it was a rare win for the IRS.

Excess distributions are taxable. Aboui had taxable distributions of $2.4 million. Yes, it is a lot, but it is also a lot less than the IRS wanted.

COMMENT: The nerd part of me wonders how the Court arrived at an estimate of $5.1 million for Aboui’s basis. Unfortunately, there is no further explanation on this point.

Oh, one more thing from the Court:

… we hold that petitioners are not liable for any penalties.”

While not contained within the four corners of this decision, I am curious why the Court repetitively went to the Cohan rule. I have followed this literature for years, and this result is not normal. Courts generally expect a business to maintain an accounting system that produces reliable numbers. Yes, every now and then there may be a leak in the numbers, and the court may use Cohan to plug said leak. That is not what we have here, though. This boat was sinking.

Perhaps Aboui presented his case well.

Mr. Aboui was incredibly forthright in his testimony.”

And perhaps the IRS should not have argued that an RA – an IRS employee – is not the IRS.

Our case this time was Aboui and Mizani v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2024-106.

Sunday, May 19, 2024

Income And Cancellation of Indebtedness

 

I am reading a case about cancellation of indebtedness income. 

Let’s take a moment to discuss the concept of income in the tax Code. 

The 16th amendment, passed in 1913 and authorizing a federal income tax, reads as follows: 

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

Needless to say, the definition of “incomes, from whatever source” became immediately contentious. 

Ask a tax practitioner for a definition of income, and it is likely that he/she will respond with “an accession to wealth.” 

That phrase comes from a 1955 Supreme Court case (Commissioner v Glenshaw Glass) which included the following: 


Here, we have instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." 

I am seeing three conditions, of which “accession to wealth” is but one. 

Let’s circle back to indebtedness and income.

Can one have income by borrowing money? 

Unless there is something extraordinarily odd about the loan, I would say “no.” The reason is that any increase in wealth (by receipt of the loan proceeds) is immediately offset by the requirement to repay the loan. 

Let’s say you buy a house. You take out a mortgage. 

What if you are in financial distress and mail the keys back to the mortgage company? 

Granted, the house secures the debt, but surrendering the house does not automatically release the debt. It however will likely result in your receiving the following 1099:

Like any 1099, there is a presumption of income. In this instance, there has been an exchange in the ownership of the house. There is another way to say this: the tax Code sees a sale of the property. 

It seems odd that tax sees potential income here. It is unlikely to happen if the surrendered asset is one’s principal residence, as one would have access to the $250,000/$500,000 gain exclusion. It could happen if the surrendered asset is rental or investment property, though. 

What about the debt on the property? 

Tax considers that a separate transaction. 

When the debt is discharged, the IRS has yet another form: 

Yes, it gets confusing. The system works much better when the two steps happen concurrently – such as in a short sale. In that case, it is common to skip the 1099-A altogether and just issue the 1099-C. 

NOTE: There is a twist in the straw depending upon whether the debt is recourse or nonrecourse. Believe it or not, there are about a dozen states where you can buy your principal residence with nonrecourse debt. You will not be surprised to learn that California is one of them. The upside is that you can return the keys to the bank and no longer be responsible for the mortgage. The downside is this policy was a major contributor to the burst of the housing bubble in the late aughts.

It is common for the 1099-C to be issued three years after the 1099-A. Why? The Code requires the reporting of cancellation of indebtedness on or before an “identifiable event” happens. 

An identifiable event in turn is defined as: 

  1.  bankruptcy
  2.  expiration of statute of limitations for collection
  3.  cancellation of debt that renders it unenforceable in a receivership, foreclosure, or similar proceeding
  4.  creditor's election of foreclosure remedies that statutorily bars recovery
  5.  cancelation of debt due to probate proceedings
  6.  creditor's discharge pursuant to an agreement
  7.  discharge of indebtedness pursuant to a decision by the creditor, or the application of a defined policy of the creditor, to discontinue collection activity and discharge debt
  8.  in specific cases, the expiration of a non-payment testing period [presumption of 36 months of no payment to the creditor]    

The three years is number (8). 

The income type we are discussing with the 1099-C is cancellation of indebtedness income. As discussed, just borrowing money does not create income. Whereas your assets may go up (you have cash from the loan or bought something with the cash), that amount is offset by the loan itself. The scales are balanced, and there is no accession to income. 

However, cancel the debt. 

The scale is no longer balanced. 

Meaning you have potential income. 

But the Code allows for exceptions. Here is Section 108: 

                (a) Exclusion from gross income

(1) In general Gross income does not include any amount which (but for this subsection) would be includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in whole or in part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if—

(A) the discharge occurs in a title 11 case,

(B) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent,

(C) the indebtedness discharged is qualified farm indebtedness,

(D) in the case of a taxpayer other than a C corporation, the indebtedness discharged is qualified real property business indebtedness, or

(E) the indebtedness discharged is qualified principal residence indebtedness which is discharged—

(i) before January 1, 2026, or

(ii) subject to an arrangement that is entered into and evidenced in writing before January 1, 2026. 

The common ones are (a)(1)(A) for bankruptcy and (a)(1)B) for insolvency. 

Bankruptcy is self-explanatory. 

Solvency is not self-explanatory. You can think of insolvency as being bankrupt but not filing for formal bankruptcy. You owe more than you own. Let’s call the difference between the two the “hole.” To the extent that that cancelled debt is less than the “hole,” there is no cancellation of indebtedness income. Once the cancelled debt equals the “hole,” the exclusion ends. At that point, your net worth is zero (-0-). Technically the next dollar is an “accession to wealth” and therefore income. 

In our case this week Ilana Jivago borrowed from Citibank. She defaulted and was eventually foreclosed on in 2009. Citibank sent her a 1099-C. Jivago argued that it was nontaxable because it was qualified principal residence indebtedness per (a)(1)(E) above. 

Qualified principal residence indebtedness is defined as:         

Indebtedness incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving any qualified residence of the taxpayer.

The Court looked at photographs of and admired the renovations she made in 2005 and 2006. The Court noted that Jivago did not use an interior designer, and she did much of the work herself.

The problem is that 2005 and 2006 were before she borrowed from Citibank. 

Easy win for the IRS.

Our case this time was Jivago v Commissioner, Docket No. 5411-21.

Monday, July 17, 2023

Income And Cancellation of Bank Debt

 

There is a basic presumption in the tax Code that any accession to “wealth” is income. It isn’t much of a leap for the tax Code to then say that all income is taxable unless otherwise excluded.

Let’s next look at “wealth.” I propose a working definition as follows:

          Assets (A) = Liabilities (L) + Wealth (W)

A little algebra shows the following:

          A – L = W

Here is spiff on the above: do you have wealth if your liabilities go down?

Let’s look at the Katrina White case.

Katrina started a business in 2015. She took out a business loan for $15,000. She leased space for her business, signing a three-year lease.

The business did not work out. The family lent her $8 grand, but there was no way to save it. She had repaid the bank less than a grand when her remaining debt of $14,433 was discharged. The bank sent her a 1099, of course, as all American life events can apparently be reduced to a 1099.

Katrina never made a payment on the lease. Since rent was late for more than two months, the entire lease became due and payable. That fiasco totaled $21,700.

 She filed her return.

The IRS said she left out income of $14,433.

How?

Let’s go through it.

Katrina said that her wealth (that is, A – L = W) was as follows when the business failed:                 

Real property

28,500

Personal property

3,560

32,060

Student loans

5,294

Utilities

961

Utilities, estimated

2,500

Furniture loan

1,120

Judgements

8,128

Bank loan

14,433

Lease breach

21,700

Family loan

7,800

61,936

Net wealth

(29,876)

The IRS wasn’t buying this. They argued that:

·      The estimated utilities were a no go.

·      The family loan wasn’t really a “loan.”

·      While we are at it, the lease breach wasn’t really a loan, as the landlord had no intention of enforcing the debt.

The IRS math was as follows:

Real property

28,500

Personal property

3,560

32,060

Student loans

5,294

Utilities

961

Furniture loan

1,120

Judgements

8,128

Bank loan

14,433

29,936

Net wealth

2,124

The matter went to Tax Court.

The Court pointed out the obvious: Katrina signed a valid and binding lease contract. Perhaps the landlord decided that there was nothing there to pursue, but it cannot be argued that she had an enforceable debt.

The Court saw the following:

Real property

28,500

Personal property

3,560

32,060

Student loans

5,294

Utilities

961

Furniture loan

1,120

Judgements

8,128

Bank loan

14,433

Lease breach

21,700

51,636

Net wealth

(19,576)

Let’s recap our numbers:

Wealth per Katrina was          ($29,876)

Wealth per the IRS was              $2,124

Wealth per the Court was        ($19,576)

Remember what we said at the beginning, that all income is taxable unless there is an exception?  Well, there is an exception for cancellation of debt. Several, in fact, but today we are concerned with only one: insolvency. The Code says that one does not have income to the extent that one is insolvent.

What is insolvency?

Go back to the formula: A – L = W.

To the extent that “W” is negative, one is insolvent. Another way of saying it is that one has more debts than assets.

So, who showed negative “W”?

Well, Katrina did. So did the Court.

Katrina was insolvent. That was an exception to cancellation of indebtedness income. Katrina did not have taxable income. The IRS lost.

Our case this time was Katrina White v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2023.-77.