A Psychiatrist, Chauffer, Physician, Peace Officer, Pheasant Hunter

 

He said that his patients often called him a psychiatrist, chauffer, physician, peace officer, or even a pheasant hunter.”

He is David Laudon, a chiropractor in Minnesota and the subject of one of the more entertaining Tax Court opinions of the last decade. Laudon, however, reached too far for too long, and he was about to learn about snapback.

Back to the Court:

But not a ghostbuster. The Commissioner rhetorically asserted that some of Laudon’s trips might have made more sense if he was claiming to be a ghostbuster. Laudon then disclaimed any employment as a ghostbuster. In his reply brief the Commissioner conceded that Laudon was not ‘employed or under contract to perform work as a ghostbuster during the tax years at issue in this case.’”

Methinks Laudon missed the joke.

How did Laudon get to court?

Easy: he was audited for years 2007 through 2009.

His records were … colorful, humorous, inadequate.

Laudon did not keep records of his income in any decipherable form.”

The IRS did a reconstruction of his business income by analyzing his bank accounts. The rule of thumb is straightforward: all deposits are income unless one can prove otherwise. A common otherwise is when a taxpayer transfers money between accounts.

Laudon contends that the Commissioner failed to classify certain deposits as nontaxable, including insurance payments for damage to several vehicles, one of which was involved in a ‘high speed police chase’ with a man ‘high on meth and cocaine.’”

There is something you do not see every day. The other thing the Court did not see was “any evidence” that the deposits were what and as Laudon described.

We therefore accept the Commissioner’s reconstruction of income.”

On to deductions.

He treats some of his patients in his home and claims to use roughly half of his house – the basement and half of the garage – for business.”

This could be a problem. Rember that an office in home deduction requires exclusive business use of the space. He claimed a lot of space, ratcheting the pressure on “exclusive.”

Like many chiropractic offices, Laudon’s has beds, tables, and a waiting area. But unlike most, his also comes equipped with a Wii, Xbox 360, big-screen TVs and, for a time, a working hair salon.”

Hair salon? What kind of chiropractic office is this?

I see that Laudon represented himself at Tax Court. I would also guess that he represented himself during the audit. Why do I say that?

We particularly disbelieve his claim that the Xbox, Wii, big-screen TVs and other electronics in his basement were used exclusively for chiropractic purposes since this claim conflicts with his much more plausible admission to the IRS examiner during audit that his daughter and his girlfriend’s son would play these video games while he was on the phone.”

There is an example of why I almost never have a client meet or speak directly with the IRS – I cannot control the exchange.

Laudon was deducting between 40,000 and 60,000 miles per year for business purposes.

.. for example, driving to a ‘schizophrenic’ patient who was – on more than one occasion – ‘running scared of demons’ down a rural Minnesota highway .…”

That last part should be incorporated into a folk or country song. I can almost hear the melody.

Laudon apparently had a penchant for adult beverages.

Laudon claimed to have driven hundreds of miles per day – sometimes without a valid license ….”

I’ll bite. What happened to his license?

Even his testimony about multiple entries in the logs where he wrote “DUI” was not credible: He claimed that these were not references to being stopped by the police while under the influence, or driving while his license was suspended .…”

Then what were they?

They “instead were his misspellings of a patient named: 'Dewey' - a supposed patient of his.'"

This is starting to read like a sit com script. I am waiting for the reference to tiger blood.

But he had a mileage log, right? Did that count for anything?

Laudon had a mileage log, but it fails to meet section 274(d)’s standards. The … entry, for example, describes his purpose as ‘travel to and from places.’”

Zen-like. Nice.

The Court also looked at other expenses, including “Other Expenses” for the three years under audit.

Most of this amount - $22,665 – was a deduction for the value of Laudon’s labor, supplies and stolen goods ….”

Wait on it.

… related to the renovation of a home that Laudon neither lived nor worked in, or even owned.”

It fits. Well done, sir.

Laudon was getting clipped on almost every deduction.

But wait.

You know the IRS wanted penalties.

Laudon asserts the defense that he reasonably relied on the advice of a tax professional.”

Yep, that is a defense, but you must use a tax professional, provide all information – good or bad – to the professional and actually rely on the professional.

Moreover, while he claimed to have brought all of his receipts to H&R Block along with his summaries, he later stated that his preparers didn’t want him to just walk in with his receipts and have them add it up ….”

Folks, accountants do not add up grocery bags of receipts. Considering that the profession usually bills based on work time, I doubt you want to pay someone for adding up your receipts.

The Court was direct:

We don’t need to address the …. because we don’t believe that Laudon provided ‘necessary and accurate information’ to his advisor.”

At this point, the Court did not believe anything Laudon was saying.

Having blinded H&R Block to the details and peculiarities of his chiropractic enterprise, Laudon cannot now claim that he relied on H&R Block’s advice. We sustain the penalty.”

Our case this time was David William Laudon v Commissioner. T.C. Summary Opinion 2015-54.

If you read only one, make it this one.

Loan Warehousing And The Claim of Right

 

Tax returns are generally filed in one-year increments.

That raises an accounting question: what if the transaction being accounted for stretches over more than one year?

A variation is:

Set aside whether the whether the transaction resolved in the same period. Was there doubt as to a material fact affecting the transaction? If one were to redo the accounting knowing what one knows now, would there be a different answer?

This is the backdrop for the claim of right doctrine. Judge Brandeis referred to it in North American Oil Consolidated v Burnet (1932):

If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent.”

You can immediately see a couple of requirements:

(1) The taxpayer is later required to return the money.

(2) The taxpayer, however, initially received the money without restriction upon its use.

If you are preparing a tax return and learn of the above, what do you do?

(1)  Amend the original tax return?

(2)  Deduct the repayment in the year of repayment?

It might not seem significant upon first hearing, but it can be. Here are two common ways it can be significant:

(1) The original year (that is, the year the income was reported) is closed under the statute of limitations.

(2) Tax rates have changed substantially between the years.

Congress finally passed a Code section codifying the claim of right doctrine in 1954:

26 U.S. Code § 1341 - Computation of tax where taxpayer restores substantial amount held under claim of right

(a) General rule If—

(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such item;

(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was established after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of such item; and

(3) the amount of such deduction exceeds $3,000,

then the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser of the following:

(4) the tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction; or

(5) an amount equal to—

(A) the tax for the taxable year computed without such deduction, minus

(B) the decrease in tax under this chapter (or the corresponding provisions of prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable year (or years) which would result solely from the exclusion of such item (or portion thereof) from gross income for such prior taxable year (or years).

This is a rare find in the tax Code, as Congress actually expanded the claim of right to make it more taxpayer friendly. The Code still allows a deduction in the year of repayment, but it also allows a recalculation using the original year’s tax rates. If tax rates have decreased (overall or yours personally), the recalculation of the original year may be the better way to go.

Let’s look at Norwich Commercial Group v Commissioner.

Here is the first sentence of the decision:

P overreported more than $7 million in income on its 2007 through 2013 federal income tax returns."

Big number. It caught my attention.

Norwich was a residential mortgage loan originator. It engaged in warehouse lending, a term that may sound mysterious but is really not. Here is what warehousing means in a lending context: 

• Norwich (call it the warehouse) borrows money, likely on a line of credit, to start the transaction. 
• The warehouse lends the money to a customer (in this case, a home buyer) in exchange for a promissory note. 
• The warehouse sells the promissory note to an investor. The money received from the sale is (almost certainly) deposited with the lender the warehouse itself borrowed the money from. 
• The lender does its calculations: how much is owed, how much interest is due and other charges, if any. It subtracts this amount from the amount deposited. Whatever is leftover is returned to the warehouse as gross profit (in this context called: mortgage fee income).

If you think about it, this is an inventory accounting of sorts, except that the inventory is money lent.

So, Norwich was a warehouse.

Liberty was Norwich’s primary lender. There were others, but let’s sidestep as they are not necessary to understand the tax issue at play.

Norwich had to design an accounting procedure for its mortgage fee income. It did the following: 

• First, all mortgage deposits were posted to Mortgage Fee Income.
• Second, the amounts kept by Liberty reduced Mortgage Fee Income.
• Third, Norwich would adjust Mortgage Fee Income to whatever Liberty said it was.
• Fourth, the difference was assumed to be Unsold Mortgages.

I get it, but Norwich should backstop its critical accounts.

Let’s see:

(1)  Cash

a.     Well, that is easy to backstop with a bank statement.

(2)  Loan payable to Liberty.

a.     Again: easy. Liberty should be able to tell them that number.

(3)  Unsold Mortgages.

a.     Liberty cannot help Norwich here, as these have not entered Liberty’s accounting system. They are off the radar as far as Liberty is concerned.

We have identified the weak spot in the accounting, as Unsold Mortgages are just a subtraction. Best practice would involve keeping detail – more or less, as required – to have a reality check on the running balance.

In 2014 Norwich started using new accounting software.

It could not reconcile certain accounts.

COMMENT: This is my shocked face.

Norwich contacted Liberty, who in turn provided detail and balances to help with reconciliations. One of those numbers was collateral held by Liberty to secure the line of credit. The collateral included everything, including loans in process or otherwise but not yet sold by Norwich.

If that sounds a lot like Norwich’s Unsold Mortgages account, that is because it is.

Liberty’s number was significantly less than Norwich’s – by over $7 million. Mind you, all this stuff was collateral for the line of credit. If the actual Unsold Mortgages balance was substantially less than previously reported, Norwich might be undercollateralized. The term for this is “out of trust,” and it could also cause problems for Liberty on the regulator side.

BTW Liberty did not initially believe that Norwich was correct or that the situation was urgent. Norwich tried repeatedly to schedule meetings with Liberty. Liberty in turn delayed, expecting nothing to be amiss.

We will fast forward through the banking side of this.

Norwich filed its claim of right refund – for $7.5 million – on its 2014 tax return.

The IRS denied the refund entirely.

You know this went to Court.

And the arguments are easy to predict:

Norwich: We had an unrestricted right to that income in prior years. It was not until 2014 that we discovered otherwise. Under claim of right, 2014 is the proper year for the deduction.

IRS: Everything here is a loan. Norwich issued loans. Norwich borrowed on loans. When originated loans were sold, Norwich in turn paid back its loans. Everything that happened here circles around loans of one type or another. The claim of right has nothing to do with loans.

Both sides had a point.

Here is the Court:

This, the Commissioner focuses on the origin of the funds rather than the origin of the transaction ….”

I agree. The business activity required extensive use of loans, but the intended result of all the loans was to generate a profit, not to maintain a loan into perpetuity.

The Court noted that everybody - including Liberty - thought that Norwich was entitled to the money when Norwich received it.

The repayment was also deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense and was not barred by another Code section.

2014 was also the correct year for the deduction. It was the year Norwich found the error, which discovery was memorialized in paperwork between Norwich and Liberty. Norwich agreed to either (1) provide more collateral or (2) pay down its line of credit with Liberty.

The Court did tweak some numbers, but overall Norwich prevailed in its claim of right refund request.

Our case this time was Norwich Commercial Group v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2025-43.

The IRS Goes Rounds With Cohan

 

The decision begins with the IRS seeking taxes of $805,149, $1,145,104, $1,161,864, and $831,771 for years 2013 through 2016. The penalties were unsurprisingly also enormous.

I want to know what happened here.

The taxpayer was Mohammad Nasser Aboui, and he was the sole shareholder of an S corporation called HPPO. He owned several used vehicle lots, and in 2009 he put them into HPPO as its initial corporate capitalization.

It sounds like a tough business:

·       Most of HPPO customers had bad credit.

·       Many did not have a checking account and instead paid HPPO in cash.

·       HPPO financed between 90% and 95% of its sales.

·       Customers repaid their loans less than 10% of the time.

·       HPPO repossessed approximately 25% of the cars it sold within 3 or 4 months.

·       HPPO had quite the barter system going with its mechanics: the mechanic would work on HPPO cars in exchange for rent of HPPO’s garage space.

Around 2014 Aboui decided to close the business. There were serious family health issues and HPPO was not making any money.

The IRS started its audit in September 2015.

HPPO’s accountant was ill at the time and later died.

To its credit, the IRS waited.

More than 3 years later HPPO engaged another accountant to represent the audit.

The second accountant made immediate mistakes, such as getting HPPO’s accounting method wrong when dealing with the IRS Revenue Agent (RA).

COMMENT: More specifically, the accountant told the RA that HPPO used the overall cash basis of accounting. HPPO did not. In fact, it could not because inventory was a material income-producing factor.

The RA wanted HPPO’s books and records, including access to its accounting software. HPPO could provide much but not the software. Its software license expired when it left the vehicle business in 2018.

This is a nightmare.

HPPO did eventually reactivate the software, but it was too late to help with the RA.

The RA – being told by the second accountant that HPPO used the cash basis of accounting – decided to use bank statements to reconstruct gross income.

BTW HPPO wound up dismissing the second accountant.

The results were odd: HPPO had reported more sales for 2013 through 2015 – nearly $3.25 million - than was deposited at the bank.

The pattern reversed in 2016 when HPPO deposited approximately $539 grand more than it reported in sales.

COMMENT: I have an idea what happened.

The RA also saw following bad debt expense:

          2013             $1,069,739

          2014             $ 668,537

          2015             $ 902,967

          2016             $ 436,738    

Here is something about the cash basis of accounting: you cannot have bad debt expense. It makes sense when you remember that gross income is reported as monies are deposited. Bad debts are receivables that are never collected, meaning there is nothing to deposit. One never leaves home plate.

So, the RA disallowed the bad debt expense entirely.

I am pretty sure about my earlier hunch.

The RA also determined that HPPO had distributed the following monies to Aboui, one way or another:

          2013             $2,476,301

          2014             $1,704,329

          2015             $1,406,893

2016             $1,934,033

There were other issues too.

Off they went to Tax Court.

Remember what I said about reactivating the accounting software license? Aboui now presented thousands of pages to document cost of sales and other expenses. The Court encouraged the IRS to accept and review the new records.

The IRS said, “nah, we’re good.”

COMMENT: Strike one.

The Court started its opinion with HPPO’s sales.

The RA stated to the Court that HPPO used the overall cash basis of accounting.

Don’t think so, said the Court. The Court saw HPPO using the accrual basis of accounting for sales and the cash basis of accounting for everything else.

COMMENT: This is referred to as a hybrid method: a pinch of this, a sprinkle of that. If one is consistent – and the results are not misleading – a hybrid is an acceptable method of accounting.

The Court asked Treasury why it thought that HPPO used the cash basis of accounting.

Treasury replied that it had never said that.

The Court pointed out that the RA had said that she understood HPPO to be a cash basis taxpayer. To be fair, that is what the second accountant had told her.

Nope, never used the cash method insisted Treasury.

COMMENT: An explanation is in order here. Treasury Department attorneys take over when the matter goes to Court. Perhaps the attorneys meant “direct” Treasury. The RA – while working for the IRS which itself is part of the Treasury – would then be “indirect” Treasury. I am only speculating, as this unforced error makes no sense. Clearly it bothered the Court.

Strike two.

The Court then reasoned why HPPO was reporting more sales than it deposited in the bank: it was reporting the total vehicle sale price in revenues at the time of sale. That also explained the bad debt expense: HPPO financed most of its sales and most of those loans went sour.

But why the reversal in 2016?

Aboui explained to the Court that by 2016 he was closing the vehicle business. He would have slowed and eventually stopped selling cars, with the result that he would be depositing more in the bank than he currently sold.

The Court decided that HPPO had correctly recorded its sales for the years at issue.

Next came the cost of vehicles sold.

This accounting was complicated because so much cash was running through the business. Sometimes cash was used to immediately pay expenses without first being deposited into a bank account – NOT a recommended accounting practice.

The RA had also identified certain debits to HPPO’s bank account that were either distributions or otherwise nondeductible.

The Court could find no evidence that those identified debits had been deducted on the tax returns.

The RA – and by extension, the … Treasury – was losing credibility.

Aboui meanwhile provided extensive documentation of HPPO’s expenses at trial. Some of these were records the Court had asked the IRS to accept and review – and which the IRS passed on.

Here is the Court:

Petitioners provided extensive documentation at trial to substantiate the COGS and business expenses. Mr. Aboui testified that HPPO was unprofitable. Given the record in its entirety, we find that petitioners have substantiated HPPO’s COGS and business expenses as reported on HPPO’s returns for each year at issue, except for meal and entertainment expenses of …..”

COMMENT: Strike three.

The Court went to the bad debts.

Mr. Aboui credibly testified that he was unable to repossess approximately 250 cars during the years at issue. The loss of these cars adequately substantiates the amount of HPPO’s bad debt deductions for the years at issue under the Cohan rule.”

The Court went to the distributions.

Respondent determined that petitioners failed to report approximately $7.5 million in taxable distributions from HPPO during the years at issue.”

COMMENT: Remember that HPPO is an S corporation, and Aboui would be able to withdraw his invested capital – plus any business income he had paid taxes on personally but left in the business – without further tax. This amount is Aboui’s “basis” in his S corporation stock.

Here is the Court:

Respondent argues that petitioners have not established Mr. Aboui’s basis in HPPO during the years at issue. We disagree and that the record and Mr. Aboui’s credible testimony provides sufficient evidence for us to reasonably estimate his basis under the Cohan rule.”

The IRS won a partial victory with the distributions. The Court thought Aboui’s basis in HPPO was approximately $5.1 million.

The IRS had wanted zero basis.

The effect was to reduce the excess distributions to $$2.4 million ($7.5 minus $5.1).

Still, it was a rare win for the IRS.

Excess distributions are taxable. Aboui had taxable distributions of $2.4 million. Yes, it is a lot, but it is also a lot less than the IRS wanted.

COMMENT: The nerd part of me wonders how the Court arrived at an estimate of $5.1 million for Aboui’s basis. Unfortunately, there is no further explanation on this point.

Oh, one more thing from the Court:

… we hold that petitioners are not liable for any penalties.”

While not contained within the four corners of this decision, I am curious why the Court repetitively went to the Cohan rule. I have followed this literature for years, and this result is not normal. Courts generally expect a business to maintain an accounting system that produces reliable numbers. Yes, every now and then there may be a leak in the numbers, and the court may use Cohan to plug said leak. That is not what we have here, though. This boat was sinking.

Perhaps Aboui presented his case well.

Mr. Aboui was incredibly forthright in his testimony.”

And perhaps the IRS should not have argued that an RA – an IRS employee – is not the IRS.

Our case this time was Aboui and Mizani v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2024-106.

An IRS Employee And Unreported Income

 

You may have heard that Congress is tightening the 1099 reporting requirements for third party payment entities such as PayPal and Venmo. The ultimate goal is to report cumulative payments exceeding $600. Because of implementation issues, the IRS has adjusted this threshold to $5,000 for 2024.

Many, I suspect, will be caught by surprise.

Receiving a 1099-K does not necessarily mean that you have taxable income. It does mean that you were paid by one of the reporting organizations, and that payment will be presumed business-related. This is of concern with Venmo, for example, as a common use is payment of group-incurred personal expenses, such as the cost of dining out. Venmo will request one to identify a transaction as business or personal, using that as the criterion for IRS reporting  

What you cannot do, however, is ignore the matter. This IRS matching is wholly computerized; the notice does not pass by human eyes before being mailed. In fact, the first time the IRS reviews the notice is when you (or your tax preparer) respond to it. Ignore the notice however and you may wind up in Collections, wondering what happened.

The IRS adjusted the 2004 and 2005 returns for Andrea Orellana.

The IRS had spotted unreported income from eBay. Orellana had reported no eBay sales, so the computer match was easy.

There was a problem, though: Orellana worked for the IRS as a revenue officer.

COMMENT: A revenue officer is primarily concerned with Collections. A revenue agent, on the other hand, is the person who audits you.

Someone working at the IRS is expected to know and comply with his/her tax reporting obligations. As a revenue officer, she should have known about 1099-Ks and computer matching.

It started as a criminal tax investigation.

Way to give the benefit of the doubt there, IRS.

There were issues with identifying the cost of the items sold, so the criminal case was closed and a civil case opened in its place.

The agent requested and obtained copies of bank statements and some PayPal records. A best guess analysis indicated that over $36 thousand had been omitted over the two years.

Orellana was having none of this. She requested that the case be forwarded to Appeals.

Orellana hired an attorney. She was advised to document as many expenses as possible. The IRS meanwhile subpoenaed PayPal for relevant records.

Orellana did prepare a summary of expenses. She did not include much in the way of documentation, however.

The agent meanwhile was matching records from PayPal to her bank deposits. This proved an unexpected challenge, as there were numerous duplicates and Orellana had multiple accounts under different names with PayPal.

The agent also needed Orellana’s help with the expenses. She was selling dresses and shoes and makeup and the like. It was difficult to identify which purchases were for personal use and which were for sale on eBay.

Orellana walked out of the meeting with the agent.

COMMENT: I would think this a fireable offense if one works for the IRS.

This placed the agent in a tough spot. Without Orellana’s assistance, the best she could do was assume that all purchases were for personal use.

Off they went to Tax Court.

Orellana introduced a chart of deposits under dispute. She did not try to trace deposits to specific bank accounts nor did she try to explain – with one exception - why certain deposits were nontaxable.

Her chart of expenses was no better. She explained that any documents she used to prepare the chart had been lost.

Orellana maintained that she was not in business and that any eBay activity was akin to a garage sale. No one makes a “profit” from a garage sale, as nothing is sold for more than its purchase price.

The IRS pointed out that many items she bought were marketed as “new." Some still had tags attached.

Orellana explained that she liked to shop. In addition, she had health issues affecting her weight, so she always had stuff to sell.

As for “new”: just a marketing gimmick, she explained.

I always advertise as new only because you can get a better price for that.” 

… I document them as new if it appears new.”

Alright then.

If she can show that there was no profit, then there is no tax due.

Orellana submitted records of purchases from PayPal.

… but they could not be connected or traced to her.

She used a PayPal debit card.

The agent worked with that. She separated charges between those clearly business and those clearly personal. She requested Orellana’s help for those in between. We already know how that turned out.

How about receipts?

She testified that she purchased personal items and never kept receipts.

That would be ridiculous, unheard of. Unless there was some really bizarre reason why I keep a receipt, there were no receipts.”

The IRS spotted her expenses that were clearly business. They were not enough to create a loss. Orellana had unreported income.

And the Court wanted to know why an IRS Revenue Officer would have unreported income.

Frankly, so would I.

Petitioner testified that she ‘had prepared 1040s since she was 16’ and that she ‘would ‘never look at the instructions.’”

Good grief.

The IRS also asked for an accuracy penalty.

The Court agreed.

Our case this time was Orellana v Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2010-51.