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Showing posts with label right. Show all posts
Showing posts with label right. Show all posts

Sunday, January 21, 2018

Patents, Capital Gains and Hogitude


I have an acquaintance who has developed several patents.  He works for a defense contractor, so I suspect he has more opportunity than a tax CPA.
COMMENT: Did you know that tax advisors have tried to “patent” their tax planning? I suppose I could develop a tax shelter that creates partnership basis out of thin air and then pop the shelter to release a gargantuan capital loss to offset a more humongous capital gain…. Wait, that one has already been done. Fortunately, Congress passed legislation in 2011 effectively prohibiting such nonsense.
Let’s say that you develop a patent someday. Let’s also say that you have not signed away your rights as part of your employment package. Someone is now interested in your patent and you have a chance to ride the Money Train. You call to ask how about taxes.

Fair enough. It is not everyday that one talks about patents, even in a CPA firm.

Think of a patent as a rental property. Say you have a duplex. Every month you receive two rental checks. What type of income do you have?

You have rental income, which is to say you have ordinary income. It will run the tax brackets if you have enough income to make the run.

Let’s say you sell the duplex. What type of income do you have?

Let’s set aside depreciation recapture and all that arcana. You will have capital gains.

People prefer capital gains to ordinary income. Capital gains have a lower tax rate.

Patents present the same tax issue as your duplex. Collect on the patent - call it royalties, licensing fees or a peanut butter sandwich – and you have ordinary income. You can collect once or over a period of time; you can collect a fixed amount, a set percentage or on a sliding rate scale. It is all ordinary income.

Or you can sell the patent and have capital gains.

But you have to part with it, same as you have to part with the duplex. 

Intellectual property however is squishier than real estate, which make sense when you consider that IP exists only by force of law. You cannot throw IP onto the bed of a pickup truck.

Congress even passed a Code section just for patents:

§ 1235 Sale or exchange of patents.
(a)  General.
A transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or devise) of property consisting of all substantial rights to a patent, or an undivided interest therein which includes a part of all such rights, by any holder shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year, regardless of whether or not payments in consideration of such transfer are-
(1)  payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with the transferee's use of the patent, or (2) contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the property transferred.

The tax Code wants to see you part with “substantial rights,” which basically means the right to use and sell the patent. Limit such use – say by geography, calendar or industry line – and you probably have not parted with all substantial rights.

Bummer.

What if you sell to yourself?

It’s been tried, but good thinking, tax Padawan.

What if you sell to yourself but make it look like you did not?

This has potential. Your training is starting to kick-in.

Time to repeat the standard tax mantra:

pigs get fat; hogs get slaughtered

Do not push the planning to absurd levels, unless you are Google or Apple and have teams of lawyers and accountants chomping on the bit to make the tax literature.

Let’s look at the Cooper case as an example of hogitude.


James Cooper was an engineer with more than 75 patents to his credit. He and his wife formed a company, which in turn entered into a patent commercialization deal with an independent third party.

So far, so good. The Coopers got capital gains.

But the deal went south.

The Coopers got their patents back.

Having been burned, Cooper was now leery of the next deal. Some sharp attorney advised him to set up a company, keep his ownership below 25% and bring in “independent” but trusted partners.

Makes sense.

Mrs. Cooper called her sister to if she wanted to help out. She did. In fact, she had a friend who could also help out.

Neither had any experience with patents, either creating or commercializing them.

Not fatal, methinks.

They both had full-time jobs.

So what, say I.

They signed checks and transferred funds as directed by the accountants and attorneys.

They did not pursue independent ways to monetize the patents, relying almost exclusively on Mr. Cooper.

This is slipping away a bit. There is a concept of “agency” in the tax Code. Do exactly what someone tells you and the Code may consider you to be a proxy for that someone.

Maybe the tax advisors should wrap this up and live to fight another day.

The sister and her friend transferred some of the patents back to Cooper.

Good.

For no money.

Bad.

The sister and her friend owned 76% of the company. They emptied the company of its income-producing assets, receiving nothing in return. Real business owners do not do that. They might have a career in the House of Representatives, though.

Meanwhile, Cooper quickly made a patent deal with someone and cleared six figures.

This mess wound up in Tax Court.

To his credit, Cooper argued that the Court should just look at the paperwork and not ask too many questions. Hopefully he did it with aplomb, and a tin man, scarecrow and cowardly lion by his side.

The Tax Court was having none of his nonsense about substantial rights and 25% and no-calorie donuts.

The Court decided he did not meet the requirements of Section 1235.

The Tax Court also sustained a “substantial understatement” penalty. They clearly were not amused. 

Cooper reached for hogitude. He got nothing.

Monday, October 2, 2017

Is It Income If You Pay It Back?

You receive unemployment benefits.

You repay unemployment benefits.

Do you have taxable income?

To start with: did you know that unemployment benefits are taxable? I have long considered this a dim bulb in taxation. Taxing the little you receive as unemployment seems cruel to me.


Back to our question: it depends.

It depends on when you pay it back.

Let’s look at the Yoklic case.

Yoklic applied for unemployment benefits in 2012.  He received $3,360, and then the state determined that he was not entitled to benefits. The state sent him a letter in October, 2012 requesting repayment.

Yoklic sent a check in September, 2013.

And he left the unemployment off of his 2012 return. How could it be income, he reasoned, if he had to pay it back. It was more of a loan, or alternatively monies that he received and to which he was not entitled.

Makes sense.

But tax theory does not look at it that way.

Enter the “claim of right” doctrine. It is an oldie, tracing back to a Supreme Court case in 1932.

The problem starts with accounting periods. You and I file taxes every year, so our accounting period is the calendar year. Sometimes something will start in one period (say October, 2012) but not resolve until another period (say September, 2013).

This creates a tax accounting issue: what do you do with that October, 2012 transaction? Do you wait until it resolves (in this case, until September, 2013) before you put it on a tax return? What if it doesn’t resolve for years? How many years do you wait? Does this transaction hang out there until the cows come home?

Enter the claim of right. If you receive monies – and you are not restricted in how you can use the monies – then you are taxable upon receipt. If it turns out that you are restricted – say by having to repay the monies - then you have a deduction in the year of repayment.

If you think about it, this is a reason that a bank loan is not income to you: you are immediately restricted by having to repay the bank. There is no need to wait until repayment, as the liability exists from the get go.

Find a bag of money in a Brooks Brothers parking lot, however, and you probably have a different answer.

Unless you repay it by the end of the year. Remember: you have a deduction in the year of repayment. If you find the bag of money and the police require you to return it, then the income and deduction happen in the same year and they fizzle out.

What if you promise to return the bag of money by year-end, but you do not get around to it until January 5th? You may have an argument here, albeit a weak one. You could reduce your promise to writing, say by signing a contract. That seems a better argument.

What did Yoklic do wrong?

He repaid the monies in the following year.

He had income in 2012.

He had a deduction in 2013.

The problem, of course, is that the 2012 income may hurt more than the 2013 deduction may help.

There is – by the way - a Code section that addresses this situation: Section 1341, aptly described as the “claim of right” section. It allows an alternate calculation to mitigate the income-hurt-more-than-the-deduction-benefited-me issue. We have talked about Section 1341 before, but let me see if I can find a fresh story and we can revisit this area again.



Friday, August 12, 2016

CTG University: Part One

Let's discuss a famous tax case, and then I will ask you how you would decide a second case based on the decision in the first.



We are going back to 1944, and Lewis received a $22 thousand bonus.  He reported it on his 1944 tax return. It turns out that the bonus had been calculated incorrectly, and he returned $11,000 in 1946. Lewis argued that the $11,000 was mistake, and as a mistake it should not have been taxed to him in 1944. He should be able to amend his 1944 return and get his taxes back. This had an extra meaning since his tax rate in 1946 was lower (remember: post-war), so if he could not amend 1944 he would never get all his taxes back.

The IRS took a very different stand. It pointed out that the tax Code measures income annually. While arbitrary, it is a necessary convention otherwise one could not calculate income or the tax thereon, as there would (almost) always be one or more transactions not resolving by the end of the year. Think for example of writing a check to the church on December 31 but the check not clearing until the following year. The Code therefore taxes income on a "period" concept and not a "transactional" concept. With that backdrop, Lewis would have a deduction in 1946, when he returned the excess bonus.

The case went to the Supreme Court, which found that the full bonus was taxable in 1944. The Court reasoned that Lewis had a "claim of right," a phrase which has now entered the tax literature. It means that income is taxable when received, if there are no restrictions on its disposition. This is true even if later one has to return the income. The reasoning is that there are no limits on one's ability to spend the money, and there is also no immediate belief that it has to be repaid. Lewis had a deduction in 1946.

Looks like the claim of right is a subset of "every tax year stands on its own."

Let's roll into the 1950s. There was a company by the name of Skelly Oil. During the years 1952 through 1957 it overcharged customers approximately $500 thousand. In 1958 it refunded the $500 thousand.

You can pretty much see the Lewis and claim-of-right issue.

But there was one more fact.

Skelly Oil had deducted depletion of 27.5%. Depletion is a concept similar to depreciation, but it does not have to be tied to cost. Say you bought a machine for $100,000. You would depreciate the machine by immediately expensing, allocating expense over time or whatever, but you would have to stop at $100,000. You cannot depreciate more than what you spent. Depletion is a similar concept, but without that limitation. One would deplete (not depreciate) an oil field, for example. One would continue depleting even if one had fully recovered the cost of the field. It is a nice tax gimmick.

Skelly Oil had claimed 27.5% depletion against its $500,000 thousand or so, meaning that it had paid tax on a net of $366,000.

Skelly Oil deducted the $505,000 thousand.

Skelly Oil had a leg up after the Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks and Lewis decisions, as every tax year was to stand on its own. It refunded $505,000, meaning it had a deduction of $505,000. Seemed a slam dunk.

The IRS said no way. The $505,000 had a trailer attached - that 27.5% depletion - and wherever it went that 27.5% went. The most Skelly Oil could deduct was the $366,000.

But the IRS had a problem: the tax Code was based on period reporting and not transactional reporting. The 27.5% trailer analogy was stunning on the big screen and all, but it was not tax law. There was no ball hitch on the $505,000 dragging depletion in its wake.

Here is the Supreme Court: 
[T]he Code should not be interpreted to allow respondent 'the practical equivalent of double deduction,' *** absent a clear declaration of intent by Congress."

The dissent argued (in my words):           
So what? Every year stands on its own. Since when is the Code concerned with the proper measurement of income?

Odd thing, though: the dissent was right. The Lewis decision does indicate that Skelly Oil had a $505,000 deduction, even though it might not have seemed fair. The Court reached instead for another concept - the Arrowsmith concept. 
[T]he annual accounting concept does not require us to close our eyes to what happened in prior years."

There is your ball hitch. The concept of "net items" would drag the 27.5% depletion into 1958. "Net items" would include revenues and deductions so closely related as to be inseparable. Like oil revenues and its related depletion deduction.

The Court gave us the following famous quote: 
In other situations when the taxes on a receipt do not equal the tax benefits of a repayment, either the taxpayer or the Government may, depending on circumstances, be the beneficiary. Here, the taxpayer always wins and the Government always loses."

And over time the Skelly Oil case has come to be interpreted as disallowing a tax treatment where "the taxpayer always wins and the Government always loses." The reverse, however, is and has always been acceptable to the Government.

But you can see something about the evolution of tax law: you don't really know the law until the Court decides the law. Both Lewis and Skelly Oil could have gone either way.

Now think of the tax law, rulings and Regulations being published every year. Do we really know what this law means, or are we just waiting our turn, like Lewis and Skelly Oil?

Thursday, June 23, 2016

Paying Tax Twice On The Same Income


Let me set up a scenario for you, and you tell me whether you spot the tax issue.

There is a fellow who is involved with health delivery services. He is paid by an insurance company, and he in turn pays out claims against that reimbursement. Whatever is left over is his profit.

In the first year, he received reimbursements from Cigna. There were issues, and in a second year he had to repay those monies. There was of course litigation. It turned out he was right, and Cigna – in yet a third year – paid him approximately $258,000.

Is the $258,000 taxable to him?

There is a doctrine in the tax Code that every tax year stands on its own. One has to resolve all the numbers that go into income for that year, even if some debate about an "exact" number exists. More commonly this is an issue for an accrual-basis taxpayer, meaning that one pays tax on amounts receivable even before receiving cash. Fortunately one is also able to deduct amounts payable (with exceptions) before writing the check. This is generally accepted accounting and is the way that almost all larger businesses report their income.

There is an alternative way. One can report income when cash is received and deduct expenses when bills are paid. This is the cash basis of accounting, and it too is generally accepted accounting.

For the most part, cash basis is the domain of smaller businesses. Depending upon the type of business, however, it may not matter if one is large or small. For example, an inventory-intensive business is required to use accrual accounting.

Our taxpayer is Udeobong, and he uses the cash basis of accounting.

When Cigna paid him the first time, he would have reported income in year one - the year he received the check.

When he repaid Cigna in year two, he had two options:

(1) He could deduct the payment in that second year, as he was repaying amounts previously taxed to him; or
(2) He could file his taxes for the second year using Section 1341, known in tax-speak as the “claim of right.”

The Code recognizes that just deducting the repayment in a second year could be unfair.  Let me give you an example. Let’s say that you received a very large bonus in 2014, large enough for you to retire. You invest the money and live comfortably, but 2014 was your bellwether year and is never to be repeated. Something happens – say that there is clawback - and you have to return some of the bonus in 2016. Sure, you could deduct the repayment, but that repayment could overwhelm your income in 2016. It is possible that you would lose any tax advantage once your income goes negative. If one looks at the two years together (2014 and 2016), you would have paid tax on income you did not get to keep.

That is where Section 1341 comes in. The Code allows you to do a special calculation:

·        You start off with the tax you actually paid in 2014
·        You then do a pro forma calculation, subtracting the repaid amount from your income in 2014. This gives you a revised tax amount.
·        You subtract the revised tax amount from the actual tax you paid in 2014.
·        The IRS allows you to claim that difference as tax paid in 2016.

The Code is trying to be fair, and for the most part it works.

There is one more piece you need to know. Udeobong did not either deduct the repayment or use the claim-of-right in year two. He did ... nothing.

Is the $258,000 in year three taxable to him?

Unfortunately, it is.


But why?

Because the Code gives him two options: deduct the payment in year two or use the claim of right alternative.
COMMENT: You may be wondering if he could amend his year-one return. This is the technical problem with every tax year standing on its own. Unless there were exceptional circumstances, the Code takes the position   that he received and had control over the income in year one, even if something occurs later requiring him to repay some or all of that income. Since he had control in year one, he had income in year one. Should he repay in a later year, then the repayment is reported in the later year.
The Code does not give him a third option of excluding the $258,000 in year three.

So he has to pay tax again.

It is a harsh result. One can understand the reasoning without the conclusion feeling fair or just ... or right.  I am also frustrated with Udeobong. There is no mention that he used a tax advisor. He had no idea of what he walked into.

He tried to save professional fees, perhaps because he saw his tax return as a simple matter of cash in and cash out. I understand, and I do not – in general – disagree. Still, one has to be cognizant when something unusual happens, like swapping real estate, exercising stock options or repaying Cigna a lot of money. The combination of "unusual" and "a lot" probably means it is a good time to see a tax expert.  

Thursday, February 11, 2016

Romancing The Income



Let’s discuss Blagaich, an early 2016 decision from the Tax Court. This is a procedural decision within a larger case of whether cash and property transfers represent income. 

Blagaich was the girlfriend and in 2010 was 54 years old.

Burns was the boyfriend and in 2010 was 72 years old.

Their romance lasted from November 2009 until March 2011.

It appears that Burns was fairly well heeled, as he wired her $200,000, bought her a Corvette and wrote her several checks. These added up to $343,819.

He was sweet on her, and she on him. Neither wanted to marry, but Burns wanted some level of commitment. What to do …?

On November 29, 2010 they decided to enter into a written agreement. This would formalize their “respect, appreciation and affection for each other.” They would “respect each other and … continue to spend time with each other consistent with their past practice.” Both would “be faithful to each other and … refrain from engaging in intimate or other romantic relations with any other individual.”

The agreement required Burns to immediately pay Blagaich $400,000, because nothing says love like a check you can immediately take to the bank.

Surprisingly, the relationship went downhill soon after entering into the agreement.

On March 10, 2011 Blagaich moved out of Burn’s house.

The next day Burns sent her a notice of termination of the agreement.

That same month Burns also sued her for nullification of the agreement, as she had been involved with another man throughout the entire relationship. He wanted his Corvette, his diamond ring - all of it - returned.

Somewhere in here Burns must have met with his accountant, as he/she sent Blagaich a Form 1099-MISC for $743,819.

She did not report this amount as income. The IRS of course wanted to know why.

The IRS learned that she was being sued, so they decided to hold up until the Circuit Court heard the case.

The Circuit Court decided that:

·        The Corvette, ring and cash totaling $343,819 were gifts from him to her.
·        The $400,000 was different. She was paid that under a contract. Flubbing the contract, she now had to pay it back.

Burns had passed away by this time, but his estate sent Blagaich a revised Form 1099-MISC for $400,000.

With the Circuit Court case decided, the IRS moved in. They increased her income by $743,819, assessed taxes and a crate-load of penalties. She strongly disagreed, and the two are presently in Tax Court. Blagaich moved for summary adjudication, meaning she wanted the Tax Court to decide her way without going through a full trial.

QUESTION: Do you think she has income and, if so, in what amount?

Let’s begin with the $400,000.

The Circuit Court had decided that $400,000 was not a gift. It was paid pursuant to a contract for the performance of services, and the performance of services usually means income. Additionally, since the payment was set by contract and she violated the contract terms, she had to repay the $400,000.

She argued that she could not have income when she had to pay it back. In legal-speak, this is called “rescission.”

In the tax arena, rescission runs head-on into the “claim of right” doctrine. A claim of right means that you have income when you receive an increase in wealth without a corresponding obligation to repay or a restriction on your being able to spend. If it turns out later that you in fact have to repay, then tax law will allow you a deduction – but at that later date.

Within the claim of right doctrine there is a narrow exception IF you pay the money back by the end of the same year or enter into a binding contract by the end of the same year to repay. In that case you are allowed to exclude the income altogether.

Blagaich did not do this. She clearly did not pay the $400,000 back in the same year. She also did not enter in an agreement in 2010 to pay it back. In fact, she had no intention to pay it back until the Circuit Court told her to.

She did not meet that small exception to the claim-of-right doctrine. She had income. She will also have a deduction upon repayment.

OBSERVATION: This is a problem if one’s future income goes down. Say that she returns to a $40,000/year job. Sure, she can deduct $400,000, but she can only offset $40,000 of income and the taxes thereon. The balance is wasted. Practitioners sometimes see this result with athletes who retire, leaving their sport (and its outsized paychecks) behind. It may never be possible to get back all the taxes one paid in the earlier year.

Let’s go to the $343,819.

She argued that the Circuit Court already decided that the $343,819 was a gift. To go through this again is to relitigate – that is, a double jeopardy to her. In legal-speak this is called “collateral estoppel.”

The Court clarified that collateral estoppel precludes the same parties from relitigating issues previously decided in a court of competent jurisdiction.

It also pointed out that the IRS was not party to the Circuit Court case. The IRS is not relitigating. The IRS never litigated in the first place.

She argued that the IRS knew of the case, requested and received updates, pleadings and discovery documents. The IRS even held up the tax examination until the Circuit Court case was decided.

But that does not mean that the IRS was party to the case. The IRS was an observer, not a litigant. Collateral estoppel applies to the litigants. That said, collateral estoppel did not apply to the IRS.

Blagaich lost her request for summary, meaning that the case will now be heard by the Tax Court.

What does this tax guy think?

She has very much lost the argument on the $400,000. Most likely she will have to pay tax for 2010 and then take a deduction later when she repays the money. The problem – as we pointed out – is that unless she has at least $400,000 in income for that later year, she will never get back as much tax as she is going to pay for 2010. It is a flaw in the tax law, but that flaw has been there a long time.

On the other hand, she has a very good argument with the $343,819. The Court was correct that a technical issue disallowed it from granting summary. That does not however mean that the technical issue will carry the day in full trial. That Circuit Court decision will carry a great deal of evidentiary weight.

We will know the final answer when Blagaich v Commissioner goes to full trial.

Tuesday, April 21, 2015

Pilgrim's Pride, A Senator And Tax Complexity



The Democratic staff of the Senate Finance Committee published a report last month titled “How Tax Pros Make the Code Less Fair and Efficient: Several New Strategies and Solutions.”

I set it aside, because it was March, I am a tax CPA and I was, you know, working. I apparently did not have the time liberties of Congressional staffers. You know the type: those who do not have to go in when it snows. When I was younger I wanted one of those jobs. Heck, I still do.

There was a statement from Senator Wyden, the ranking Democrat senator from Oregon:

Those without access to fancy tax planning tools shouldn’t feel like the system is rigged against them. 

Sophisticated taxpayers are able to hire lawyers and accountants to take advantage of … dodges, but hearing about these loopholes make middle-class taxpayers want to pull their hair out.”

There is some interesting stuff in here, albeit it is quite out of my day-to-day practice. The inclusion of derivatives caught my eye, as that of course was the technique by which the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee transmuted $1,000 into $100,000 over the span of ten months once her husband became governor of Arkansas. It must have taken courage for the staffers to have included that one.

Problem is, of course, that tax advisors do not write the law.  

There are complex business transactions taking place all the time, with any number of moving parts. Sometimes those parts raise tax issues, and many times those issues are unresolved. A stable body of tax law allows both the IRS and the courts to fill in the blanks, allowing practitioners to know what the law intended, what certain words mean, whether those words retain their same meaning as one travels throughout the Code and whether the monster comes to life after one stitches together a tax transaction incorporating dozens if not hundreds of Code sections. And that is “IF” the tax Code remains stable, which is of course a joke.

Let’s take an example.

Pilgrim’s Pride is one of the largest chicken producers in the world. In the late 1990s it acquired almost $100 million in preferred stock from Southern States Cooperative. The deal went bad.  Southern gave Pilgrim an out: it would redeem the stock for approximately $20 million.


I would leap at a $20 million, but then again I am not a multinational corporation. There was a tax consideration … and it was gigantic.

You see, if Pilgrim sold then stock, it would have an $80 million capital loss. Realistically, current tax law would never allow it to use up that much loss. What did it do instead? Pilgrim abandoned the stock, meaning that it put it outside on the curb for big trash pick-up day.

Sound insane?

Well, the tax Code considered a redemption to be a “sale or exchange,” meaning that any loss would be capital loss. Abandoning the stock meant that there was no sale or exchange and thus no mandatory capital loss.

Pilgrim took its ordinary loss and the IRS took Pilgrim to Court.

Tax law was on Pilgrim’s side, however. Presaging the present era of law being whatever Oz says for the day, the IRS conscripted an unusual Code section – Section 1234A – to argue its position.

Section 1234A came into existence to address options and futures, more specifically a combination of options and futures called a straddle. . What options and futures have in common is that one is not buying an underlying asset but rather is buying a right to said underlying asset. A straddle involves both a sale and a purchase of that underlying asset, and you can be certain that the tax planners wanted one side to be capital (probably the gain) and the other side to be ordinary (probably the loss). Congress wanted both sides to be capital transactions (hence capital gains and losses) even though the underlying capital asset was never bought or sold – only the right to it was bought or sold.

This is not one of the easiest Code sections to work with, truthfully, but you get an idea of what Congress was after.

Reflect for a moment. Did Pilgrim have (A) a capital asset or (B) a right to a capital asset?

Pilgrim owned stock – the textbook example of a capital asset.

Still, what is stock but the right to participate in the profits and management of a company? The IRS argued that – when Pilgrim gave up its stock – it also gave up its rights to participate in the profits and management of Southern. Its relinquishment of these rights pulled the transaction into the ambit of Section 1234A.

You have to admit, there are some creative minds at the IRS. Still, it feels … wrong, doesn’t it? It is like saying that a sandwich and a right to a sandwich are the same thing. One you can eat and the other you cannot, and we instead are being wound in a string ball of legal verbiage.

The Tax Court agreed with the IRS.  Pilgrim appealed, of course. It had to; this was a $80 million issue. The Appeals Court has now overturned the Tax Court.

The Appeal Court’s reasoning?

A “right” is a claim to something one does not presently have. Pilgrim already owned all the rights it was ever going to have, which means that it could not have had a right as envisioned under Section 1234A.

The tax law changed after Pilgrim went into this transaction, by the way.

Do I blame the attorneys and accountants for arguing the issue? No, of course not. The fact that an Appeals Court agreed with Pilgrim means the tax advisors were right. The fact that the law was later changed means the IRS also had a point.

And none of the parties involved  – Pilgrim and its attorneys and accountants, the IRS , the Tax Court and the Appeals Court wrote the law, did they?

Although the way Congress works nowadays, they may have been the first ones to actually read the bill-become-law. There perhaps is the real disgrace.