CTG University: Part One

Let's discuss a famous tax case, and then I will ask you how you would decide a second case based on the decision in the first.

We are going back to 1944, and Lewis received a $22 thousand bonus.  He reported it on his 1944 tax return. It turns out that the bonus had been calculated incorrectly, and he returned $11,000 in 1946. Lewis argued that the $11,000 was mistake, and as a mistake it should not have been taxed to him in 1944. He should be able to amend his 1944 return and get his taxes back. This had an extra meaning since his tax rate in 1946 was lower (remember: post-war), so if he could not amend 1944 he would never get all his taxes back.

The IRS took a very different stand. It pointed out that the tax Code measures income annually. While arbitrary, it is a necessary convention otherwise one could not calculate income or the tax thereon, as there would (almost) always be one or more transactions not resolving by the end of the year. Think for example of writing a check to the church on December 31 but the check not clearing until the following year. The Code therefore taxes income on a "period" concept and not a "transactional" concept. With that backdrop, Lewis would have a deduction in 1946, when he returned the excess bonus.

The case went to the Supreme Court, which found that the full bonus was taxable in 1944. The Court reasoned that Lewis had a "claim of right," a phrase which has now entered the tax literature. It means that income is taxable when received, if there are no restrictions on its disposition. This is true even if later one has to return the income. The reasoning is that there are no limits on one's ability to spend the money, and there is also no immediate belief that it has to be repaid. Lewis had a deduction in 1946.

Looks like the claim of right is a subset of "every tax year stands on its own."

Let's roll into the 1950s. There was a company by the name of Skelly Oil. During the years 1952 through 1957 it overcharged customers approximately $500 thousand. In 1958 it refunded the $500 thousand.

You can pretty much see the Lewis and claim-of-right issue.

But there was one more fact.

Skelly Oil had deducted depletion of 27.5%. Depletion is a concept similar to depreciation, but it does not have to be tied to cost. Say you bought a machine for $100,000. You would depreciate the machine by immediately expensing, allocating expense over time or whatever, but you would have to stop at $100,000. You cannot depreciate more than what you spent. Depletion is a similar concept, but without that limitation. One would deplete (not depreciate) an oil field, for example. One would continue depleting even if one had fully recovered the cost of the field. It is a nice tax gimmick.

Skelly Oil had claimed 27.5% depletion against its $500,000 thousand or so, meaning that it had paid tax on a net of $366,000.

Skelly Oil deducted the $505,000 thousand.

Skelly Oil had a leg up after the Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks and Lewis decisions, as every tax year was to stand on its own. It refunded $505,000, meaning it had a deduction of $505,000. Seemed a slam dunk.

The IRS said no way. The $505,000 had a trailer attached - that 27.5% depletion - and wherever it went that 27.5% went. The most Skelly Oil could deduct was the $366,000.

But the IRS had a problem: the tax Code was based on period reporting and not transactional reporting. The 27.5% trailer analogy was stunning on the big screen and all, but it was not tax law. There was no ball hitch on the $505,000 dragging depletion in its wake.

Here is the Supreme Court: 

[T]he Code should not be interpreted to allow respondent 'the practical equivalent of double deduction,' *** absent a clear declaration of intent by Congress."

The dissent argued (in my words):           

So what? Every year stands on its own. Since when is the Code concerned with the proper measurement of income?

Odd thing, though: the dissent was right. The Lewis decision does indicate that Skelly Oil had a $505,000 deduction, even though it might not have seemed fair. The Court reached instead for another concept - the Arrowsmith concept. 

[T]he annual accounting concept does not require us to close our eyes to what happened in prior years."

There is your ball hitch. The concept of "net items" would drag the 27.5% depletion into 1958. "Net items" would include revenues and deductions so closely related as to be inseparable. Like oil revenues and its related depletion deduction.

The Court gave us the following famous quote: 

In other situations when the taxes on a receipt do not equal the tax benefits of a repayment, either the taxpayer or the Government may, depending on circumstances, be the beneficiary. Here, the taxpayer always wins and the Government always loses."

And over time the Skelly Oil case has come to be interpreted as disallowing a tax treatment where "the taxpayer always wins and the Government always loses." The reverse, however, is and has always been acceptable to the Government.

But you can see something about the evolution of tax law: you don't really know the law until the Court decides the law. Both Lewis and Skelly Oil could have gone either way.

Now think of the tax law, rulings and Regulations being published every year. Do we really know what this law means, or are we just waiting our turn, like Lewis and Skelly Oil?

Pouring Concrete In Phoenix

I read the tax literature differently than I did early in my career. There is certainly more of “been there, read that,” but there is also more consideration of why the IRS decided to pursue an issue.

I am convinced that sometimes the IRS just walks in face-first, as there is no upside for them. Our recent blog about the college student and her education credit was an example. Other times I can see them backfilling an area of tax law, perhaps signaling future scrutiny. I believe that is what the IRS is doing with IRAs-owning-businesses (ROBS).

A third category is when the IRS goes after an issue even though the field has been tilled for many years. They are signaling that they are still paying attention.

I am looking at a reasonable compensation case.  I believe it is type (3), although it sure looks a lot like type (1).

To set up the issue, a company deducts someone’s compensation – a sizeable bonus, for example. In almost all cases, that someone is going to be an owner of the company or a relation thereto. 

There are two primary reasons the IRS goes after reasonable compensation:

(1)  If the taxpayer is a C corporation (meaning it pays its own tax), the deduction means that the compensation is being taxed only once (deducted by the corporation; taxed once to the recipient). The IRS wants to tax it twice. In a C environment, the IRS will argue that you are paying too much compensation. It wants to move that bonus to dividends paid, as there is no tax deduction for paying dividends.

(2) If the taxpayer is an S corporation (and its one level of tax), the IRS will argue that you are paying too little compensation. There is no income tax here for the IRS to chase. What it is chasing instead is social security tax. And penalties. Some of the worst penalties in the tax Code revolve around payroll.

There is a world of literature on how to determine “reasonable.” The common judicial tests have you run a gauntlet of five factors:

(1) The employee’s role in the company

(2) Comparison to compensation paid others for similar services

(3) Character and condition of the company

(4) Potential conflict of interest

(5) Internal consistency of compensation

Let’s look at the Johnson case as an example.

Mom and dad started a concrete company way back when. They had two sons, each of which came into the business. They specialized in Arizona residential development. As time went on, the brothers wound up owning 49% of the stock; mom owned the remainder. The family was there at the right time to ride the Phoenix housing boom, and the company prospered.

A downside to the boom was periodic concrete shortages. The company did not produce its own concrete, and the brothers came to believe it to be a business necessity. They presented an investment opportunity in a concrete supplier to mom. Mom wanted nothing to do with it; she argued that the company was a contractor, not a supplier. This was how companies overextend and eventually fail, she reasoned.

The brothers went ahead and did it on their own. They invested personally, and mom stayed out. They even guaranteed some of the supplier’s bank debt.

Who would have thought that concrete had so many problems? For example, did you know that concrete becomes unusable after 

(1) 90 minutes or

(2) If it reaches 90 degrees.

I am not sure what to do with that second issue when you are in Phoenix. 

The brothers figured out how to do it. They developed a reputation for specialized work. They worked 10 or 12 hours a day, managed divisions of 100 employees each, were hands-on in the field and often ran job equipment themselves. Sometimes they even designed equipment for a given job, having their fabrication foreman put it together.

Not surprisingly, the developers and contractors loved them.

That concrete supplier decision paid off. They always had concrete when others would not. They could even charge themselves a “friendly” price now and then.

We get to tax years June 30, 2003 and 2004 and they paid themselves a nice bonus. The brothers pulled over $4 million in 2003 and over $7 million in 2004.

COMMENT: I really missed the boat back in college.

The brothers were well-advised. They maintained a cumulative bonus pool utilizing a long-time profit-sharing formula, and they had the company pay annual dividends.

The IRS disallowed a lot of the bonus. You know why: they were a C corporation and the government was smelling money.

The Court went through the five tests:

(1) The brothers ran the show and were instrumental in the business success. Give this one to the taxpayer.

(2) The IRS argued that compensation was above the average for the industry. Taxpayer responded that they were more profitable than the industry average. Each side had a point. Having nothing more to go on, however, the Court considered this one a push.

(3) Company sales and profitability were on a multi-year uptrend. This one went to the taxpayer.

(4) The IRS appears to have wagered all on this test. It brought in an expert who testified that an “independent investor” would not have paid so much compensation and bonus, because the result was to drop the company’s profitability below average.

Oh, oh. This was a good argument.

The idea is that someone – say Warren Buffett – wants to buy the company but not work there. That investor’s return would be limited to dividends and any increase in the stock price. Enough profitability has to be left in the company to make Warren happy.

This usually becomes a statistical fight between opposing experts.

It did here.

And the Court thought that the brothers’ expert did a better job than the government’s expert.

COMMENT: One can tell that the Court liked the brothers. It was not overly concerned that one or two years’ profitability was mildly compromised, especially when the company had been successful for a long time. The Court decided there was enough profitability over enough years that an independent investor would seriously consider the company. 

Give this one to the taxpayer.

(5) The company had a cumulative bonus program going back years and years. The formula did not change.

This one went to the taxpayers.

By my count the IRS won zero of the tests.

Why then did the IRS even pursue this?

They pursued it because for years they have been emphasizing test (4) – conflict of interest and its “independent investor.” They have had significant wins with it, too, although some wins came from taxpayers reaching too far. I have seen taxpayers draining all profit from the company, for example, or changing the bonus formula whimsically. There was one case where the taxpayer took so much money out of the company that he could not even cash the bonus check. That is silly stuff and low-hanging fruit for the IRS.

This time the IRS ran into someone who was on top of their game.

Michael Jordan, The Grizzlies And The Jock Tax

I have been reading recently that the jock tax may be affecting where athletes decide to play. For example, Ndamukong Suh, an NFL defensive tackle formerly with the Detroit Lions, was wooed by the Oakland Raiders but opted instead to sign with the Miami Dolphins. I can understand a top-tier athlete not wanting to play for a team as dysfunctional as the Raiders, but one has to wonder whether that 13.3% top California tax rate was part of the decision. Florida of course has no income tax.

Let’s not feel sorry for Suh, however. His contract is worth approximately $114 million, with $60 million guaranteed.

So what is the jock tax?

Let’s say that you work in another state for a few days. You may ask whether that state will want to tax you for the days you work there. Some states tell you upfront that there is no tax unless you work there for a minimum number of days (say 10, for example). Other states say the same thing obliquely by not requiring withholding if you would not have a tax liability, requiring you (or your accountant) to reverse-engineer a tax return to figure out what that magic number is. And then there are … “those states,” the ones that will try to tax you just for landing at one of their airports.

Take the same concept, introduce a professional athlete, a stadium and a game and you have the jock tax.

It started in California. Travel back to 1991 when Michael Jordan led the Bulls to the NBA Finals. After the net was cut and the celebrations finished, Los Angeles contacted Jordan and informed him that he would have to pay taxes for the days that he spent there.

Illinois did not like the way California was treating their favorite son, so they in turn passed a law imposing income tax on athletes from other states if their state imposed a tax on an Illinois athlete. This law became known as “Michael Jordan’s Revenge.”

How do you allocate an athlete’s income to a given city or state? That is the essence of the jock tax and what makes it different from you or me working away from home for a week or so.

If we work a week in Illinois, our employer can carve-out 1/52 of our salary and tax it to Illinois. Granted, there may be issues with bonuses and so on, but the concept is workable.

But an athlete does not work that way. What are his/her work days: game days? Game and travel days? Game, travel, and practice days?

Let’s take football. There are the Sunday games, of course, but there are also team meetings, practice sessions, film study, promotional events, as well as minicamps and OTAs and so on. Let’s say that this works out to be 160 days. You are with Bengals and travel to Philadelphia for an away game. You spend two days there. Philadelphia would likely be eying 2/160 of your compensation.

This method is referred to as the “duty days” method.

Cleveland separated from the pack and wanted to tax players based on the number of games in the season. For example, the city tried to tax Chicago Bears linebacker Hunter Hillenmeyer based on the number of season games, which would be 20 (16 regular season and 4 preseason). Reducing the denominator makes Cleveland’s share larger (hence why Cleveland liked this method), but it ignores the fact that Hillenmeyer had duty days other than Sunday. What Cleveland wanted was a “games played” method, and it was shot down by the Ohio Supreme Court.

Cleveland also had an interesting twist on the “games played” method. It wanted to tax Indianapolis Colts center Jeff Saturday for a game in 2008.  However, Saturday was injured and did not play in that game, making Cleveland’s stance hard to understand. In fact, Saturday was injured enough that he stayed in Indianapolis and did not travel with the team, now making Cleveland’s position impossible to understand. Sometimes bad law surfaces when pushed to its logical absurdity, and the Ohio Supreme Court told Cleveland to stop its nonsense.

Tennessee wrote its jock tax a bit differently. Since the state does not have an income tax (more accurately, it has an income tax on dividends and interest only) it could not do what California, Illinois and Ohio had done before. Tennessee instead charged a visiting athlete a flat rate, irrespective of his/her income. For example, if you were a visiting NBA player, it would cost $2,500 to play against the Memphis Grizzlies.

Tennessee also taxed NHL players (think Nashville Predators) but not NFL players (think Tennessee Titans).

I guess the NFL bargains better than the NHL or NBA.

One can understand the need to fund stadiums, but this tax is arbitrary and capricious. What about a non-athlete traveling with the team? That $2,500 may be more than he/she earned for the game.

Tennessee has since abolished this tax for NHL players but has delayed abolishment until June 1, 2016 for NBA players.

In other news, NFL players remain untaxed.

We have talked about the denominator of the fraction to be multiplied against an athlete’s compensation. Are you curious what goes into that compensation bucket?

Let’s answer this with a question: why do so many athletes chose to live in Texas or Florida? The athlete may have an apartment in the city where he/she plays, but his/her main home (and family) is in Dallas, Nashville or Miami.

Let’s say the athlete receives a signing bonus. There is an extremely good argument that the bonus is not subject to the jock tax, as it is not contingent upon future performance by the athlete. The bonus is earned upon signing; hence its situs for state taxation should be tested at the moment of signing. Tax practitioners refer to this as “non-apportionable” income, and it generally defaults to taxation by the state of residence. Take residence in a state with no income tax (hello Florida), and the signing bonus escapes state tax.

Consider Suh and the Miami Dolphins. California’s cut of his $60 million signing bonus would have been almost $8 million. Florida’s cut is zero.

What would you do for $8 million?

The IRS Did Not Like This Bonus

Let’s say that you own 100% of a company. Let’s say your company is quite profitable, and that you take out massive bonuses at year-end. The bonuses serve two purposes: first: why not? You took risk, borrowed money and worked hard. If the thing folded, you would have sunk with it. If it succeeds, why shouldn’t you succeed with it? After all, no politician built it for you. Second, bonuses help reduce taxes the company has to pay. Granted, they increase the taxes the shareholder has to pay, but that is a conversation for another day.

Let’s say the IRS questions the bonus.  They think your bonus is unreasonable.

Let’s discuss the Midwest Eye Center case.

Dr. Afzal Ahmad was the sole shareholder of Midwest Eye Center (Midwest), a multi-location ophthalmology and eye care center in Chicagoland. This is a pretty large practice, with approximately 50 employees, five surgeons, three optometrists and so on. Dr. Ahmad was doing well, receiving a salary of $30,000 every two weeks. At the end of the year he would also draw a sizeable bonus, which coincidently reduced corporate taxable income to zero. In 2007 he took a bonus of $2,000,000.   

Dr. Afzal Ahmad

There were reasons for the bonus. One of his busier surgeons quit unexpectedly in June, 2007. That surgeon was generating approximately $750,000 in revenues, and Dr. Ahmad took over the additional patients. Then there was another doctor who was reducing her workload as she established her own practice. Dr Ahmad starting absorbing some of these patients too.

Busy year for the doctor.

One more fact: Midwest filed taxes as a C corporation, which means it paid its own taxes.

The IRS came in and disallowed $1,000,000 of the bonus. Why $1,000,000 exactly? Who knows, except that (1) it is an impressive amount, and (2) it is close enough for government work.

As Midwest was a professional services corporation, its tax rate was the maximum, so there immediately was additional tax of $340,000.  The IRS also assessed penalties of over $62,000.

This was a nice audit for the IRS: limited issues and big bucks.

So how did the tax advisor defend Midwest?

There is standard text that any tax practitioner (at least, one who follows tax cases) has read a thousand times:

“Deductions are a matter of legislative grace and are allowed only as specifically provided by statute.”

Basically the tax Code says that everything is taxable and nothing is deductible – unless the Code says otherwise.  IRC Section 162 allows us to deduct “reasonable and necessary expenses.” So far, so good. Salaries have to be deductible, right? Hold up. The Code says that a “reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation” is deductible.

We have to show the “reasonableness” of the salary.

The first way is to show that an “independent investor” would have paid the salary. Midwest decided not to use this line of defense, as no dividends were paid and no profits were left in the company. You have to leave some crumbs on the plate so the investor does not starve. Granted, Warren Buffett does not pay dividends, but he always leaves profit in Berkshire Hathaway.

OBSERVATION: The lack of dividends does not have to be fatal, but it does complicate the argument. For example, if I owned an NFL team, I might be willing to operate it at a loss. The value of my team (if I were to sell it) would likely be increasing more than enough to offset that operating loss.

The next way is by comparison to other businesses. Think professional athletes. If a team is willing to pay the salary, the player must then be worth it. Therefore if someone somewhere with your job duties has a similar salary, there is a prima facie argument that your salary is reasonable. This is more difficult to do with closely-helds than publicly-tradeds, as closely-helds do not tend to publish profitability data.  

A third way involves profit-sharing and other incentive plans, hopefully written down and providing formulas should certain thresholds be met. It is important to establish the plan ahead of time and to be certain there is some rhyme or reason to the calculations. Examples include: 

1.  Documenting the doctor’s activities over the years, putting a value to it and keeping a running tally of how compensation is still due. This can be done to “reimburse” the shareholder for those start-up years when the money was not there to properly compensate the shareholder, for example.
2. Setting up a bonus formula and following it from year-to-year. If there isn’t enough cash to pay out the amount generated by the formula, then the business would accrue it as “compensation payable.” It is not deductible until paid, but it does indicate that there is a compensation plan in place.
3. Having an independent Board of Directors, who in turn decide the amount of compensation. This can be done on an annual basis, preferably earlier rather than later in the year. This technique is not often seen in practice. 
4. Valuing the company on a regular basis (perhaps as frequently as annually). The intent is to attribute the increase in the value of the business to the shareholder’s efforts. The business would then share some of that increase via a bonus.

So what did Midwest do?

They did nothing, that’s what they did.

And I am at a loss. Midwest had a professional tax preparer, but when push came to shove the preparer provided the Court … nothing.

On to the penalty. The IRS will reverse a penalty if the taxpayer can show that he/she relied upon professional advice. The insurance companies go apoplectic, but it is common (enough) practice for a CPA to fall on the sword to get the client out of a penalty. 

But Midwest’s tax preparer was nowhere to be found.

The IRS won on all fronts.

My thoughts?

My corporate clients have overwhelmingly shifted to S corporations over the years. S corporations have their own tax issues, but reasonable compensation is not one of them. It is rare for a tax practitioner to recommend a C corporation nowadays, unless that practitioner works with Fortune 500 companies.

Midwest is an example why. It is a second pocketbook for the IRS to pick.