Revoking A Church’s Tax-Exempt Status

 

I do not recall an audit of a church during my career.

I have however practiced at the other end: helping religious organizations obtain tax-exempt status.

Terms are important here. Let us look at two: churches and religious organizations.

A church is the immediate mental image: a congregation; an established place to meet; a code of doctrine; procedures for ordaining ministers, and so forth. A more intuitive term would be “a house of worship,” and worship would include Christianity and other religions.

A religious association is a religiously-oriented entity other than a church.

The terminology is important be cause churches do not need to apply for and obtain tax-exempt status. As long as they meet basic Section 501(c) requirements, they are deemed to be tax-exempt – the term is “per se” – just by being a church. That said, it is not unusual for a church to formally apply for tax-exempt status. Why? To tie to bow, so to speak. Chances are the church will regularly and routinely seek tax-deductible donations. It might be helpful to assure donors that the IRS recognizes the church as qualifying to receive such donations.

Since a church does not need to request and obtain 501(c) status, it is also not required to file annual Forms 990. It can, of course, the same as it can also formally apply for exempt status. The church can decide.

A religious organization – not being a church – must apply for exempt status, file annual Forms 990, and all the paperwork we routinely associate with being tax-exempt.

Let’s return to the requirements, and then we will discuss a church that crossed the line.

There are five basic requirements under Section 501(c):

·      The entity must be a corporation.

·      The entity must be organized and operated exclusively for religious, educational, scientific, and other charitable purposes.

·      Net earnings may not inure to the benefit of any private individual or shareholder.

·      No substantial part of the organization’s activity may be attempting to influence legislation.

·      The organization may not intervene in political campaigns.

These are the minimum hurdles. In practice there is some latitude (must be a corporation, for example, but the definition of corporation for this purpose is generous), but one must still keep the tires on the pavement.

The Community Worship Fellowship (CWF) was founded in 1998 by Lester Goddard and his family. The organizing documents with Oregon had all the magic words (“organized exclusively for …”), and it obtained tax-exempt status from the IRS. It was governed by an uncompensated council of elders.

There are two broad requirements in this area: what the paperwork says and what you actually do. So far, the paperwork seems normal.

However, it turned out that your name had to be “Goddard” (or related to) to be on the council of elders – the governing body of the church.

Bad start. They might want to address this as soon as possible.

After a decade the IRS began asking questions. There were reports that CWF assets were being used for personal benefit. The church blew off the initial inquiry. The IRS responded by auditing years 2013 through 2016.

COMMENT: Brilliant.

The IRS discovered the following:

·      Lester Goddard determined his own salary and bonus.

·      His salary and bonus were approved by the members, but most of the members were related to Lester.

·      CWF credit cards showed purchases of Prada handbags, jewelry, perfume, and furs.

·      CWF paid personal boat payments and private travel, including Disneyland and Hawaii.

·      CWF paid for improvements (think a pool) at Lester’s home.

·      CWF lent money to Lester and family. Let’s say CWF was … not rigorous … about the money being repaid.

In tax lingo, this money shuffle is called “private inurement.” In common conversation, we call it something else.

Meanwhile CWF moved its incorporation from Oregon to Hawaii. Why? I am not sure. The IRS – to the best of my knowledge – still reaches Hawaii.

In December 2018 the IRS revoked CWF’s exemption.

Problem: the IRS did not publicly disclose the revocation. How were donors to know?

In March 2019 CWF filed suit.

In October 2025 the Federal Court of Claims finally decided.

The reason for a six-year delay? There were 18 stays for additional discovery.

This is not a pretty story, and church exemptions is not an area the IRS likes to tread. Tax and constitutional law weave together closely, and even an IRS win might be construed as pyrrhic. There are more than 350,000 religious tax-exempt organizations, for example, but less than five lost their exemption in 2023. None of those five were churches.

Our case this time was Community Worship Fellowship v United States, No 19-352 (Fed Cl October 23, 2025).

FICA’s Special Timing Rule

 

I do not often read ERISA cases.

ERISA deals with employee retirement plans and refers to federal law: Employee Retirement and Security Act. It is old law (1974), and provides protection for individuals enrolled in private retirement and health plans. It can be as abstruse as the tax Code, and as difficult to follow. It is more in the purview of retirement specialists and not so much that of a general tax practitioner.

What made me think about it was a reference to the Henkel case from 2015.

Henkel involved a top hat plan for selected management and other highly compensated employees. The idea behind a top hat is to provide benefits in excess of those available to employees through regular plans (think 401(k), cafeteria plans and the like.) Top hats are mostly exempt from ERISA because of that select group of covered employees, You and I are unlikely to ever be enrolled in a top hat plan.

In Henkel, select employees were covered by a nonqualified deferred compensation plan. After benefits began, the company (Henkel Corporation) reduced the monthly benefits for federal tax withholding. ERISA has restrictions on reducing someone’s benefits – hence the litigation.

The federal withholding was FICA.

There is an odd rule in the tax Code for FICA taxation of deferred compensation. What sets it up is the income taxation of the deferred compensation itself.

Generally speaking, deferred compensation will include some kind of qualifying event. For example, say that an executive is entitled to 1% of his/her 2025 division profits as compensation, payable in 2028. To be entitled to the bonus, the executive must remain employed with the company through December 31, 2026.

It is that condition subsequent that makes the income taxation tick. It would be unfair to tax the executive in 2025, as he/she may never receive a dime if they are not employed through December 2026. Let’s say that they are employed through December 2026. It would still be unfair to subject the bonus to income taxation in 2026, as there is no cash until 2028. In general (and a big general at that) the tax Code will slow the income tax horses until 2028.

But this is compensation, meaning that there will also be FICA tax due.

When is that tax due?

A reasonable person would expect the FICA and income tax to lock arms and be due at the same time.

A reasonable person would be wrong.

FICA tax will be due at the later of:

The date the employee performs the services causing the deferred compensation (in our case, 2025), or

The date on which the employee is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiting the deferred compensation (in our case, 2026).

Our executive would be subject to FICA tax in 2026.

What about concern for having cash to pay the tax?

It does not appear to apply to the FICA tax, only to income tax.

In practice, this is rarely as big an issue as it may first appear. FICA is divided into two parts: the old age (which is 6.2%) and Medicare (which is 1.45%). The old age (the acronym is OASDI) cuts off at a certain dollar amount. Medicare does not cut off. Odds are that someone in a top hat plan is well over the OASDI limit (meaning no old age tax), leaving only Medicare. 

It is unlikely that one is going to do a lot of tax planning for 1.45%.

This FICA trigger is called the “special timing rule.”

There is an upside to the special timing rule, and it depends on how the deferred compensation is determined.

If one can flat-out calculate the deferred compensation (in our case, 1% of division profits), the plan is referred to as an account balance plan. Granted, one can add interest or whatever to it to allow for the passage of intervening years, but one can calculate the beginning number.

If one pays FICA on an account balance plan under the special timing rule, there is no additional FICA when the plan finally pays out. This means that interest (for example) added to the beginning number is never subject to FICA.

Sweet.

Switch this over to a nonaccount balance plan and FICA can change. FICA is calculated on the actual distribution, but one is given credit for FICA previously paid under the special timing rule. In this case, one would pay FICA on the interest added to the beginning number.

There are also different ways to calculate the FICA under the special timing rule: the estimated method, the lag method, the administrative convenience method and so on.

Throw all the above in a bag, shake thoroughly, and that is how we got the Henkel case. How can the benefits go down? Take a nonaccount balance plan, with FICA being paid later rather earlier.

Is it a reduction in benefits?

Yes and no. It is technically a reduction if one was not thinking about the FICA.

It is not however a reduction for purposes of ERISA.

Our case this time was Davidson v Henkel, USDC, Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division, Case No. 12-cv-14103.

A Paycheck As A Treasure Trove

 

I am looking at a case where the taxpayer was using Cesarini to argue her position.

COMMENT: Cesarini is one of my favorite tax decisions and a big reason this case caught my eye. The family purchased a piano at auction for $15. Seven years later – while cleaning the piano – they discovered approximately $4,500 in currency. The tax case addressed when the $4,500 was taxable – when they bought the piano, when they found the money, or some other date. It also introduced us to the “treasure trove” doctrine, addressing – not surprisingly – when finding a treasure is taxable.

COMMENT: $4,500 does not strike as that much money in 2025. Cesarini however was decided in 1964, when median U.S. household income was about $6,000. We probably would agree that finding 75% of your annual household income by fluke could be described as a treasure trove.

Let’s introduce Corri Fiege, who worked in Alaska for a U.S. subsidiary of an Australian corporation. She participated in a performance rights plan and was granted 60,000 unvested rights in parent company stock. The rights vested over three years, and she received 20,000 shares on each of July 31, 2011, 2012 and 2013.

There of course was tax involved. She had the company sell 1/3 of the stock and send the cash as federal tax withholding. She owed tax. She paid tax. There was no problem with these years.

In 2013 she received a fresh tranche of rights - 400,000 rights vesting over the four-years ending December 21, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.

This time the grant was a handcuff. The parent company was in financial distress and was firing people left and right. However, they wanted to keep Corri - that is, until they let her go on November 24, 2014.

Vesting did not happen until December 21. She wasn’t going to make it.

But the company did something unexpected: it transferred 100,000 shares of stock into her Charles Schwab account. She assumed they made a mistake, and she was required by plan terms to report if there was a mistake. She called someone in Brisbane, Australia; that person had left. She called another in Houston, Texas. That person had left too. She gave up trying to report the matter to the company.

She received a W-2 showing an additional $75,660 from the stock.

But this time there was no selling 1/3 of the shares for tax withholding. She would be writing a check to Uncle Sam.

What to do?

She did not file a joint income tax return for 2014.

COMMENT: Worst. Possible. Decision.

This was easy picking for the IRS computers.

Off to Tax Court they went.

Corri and the IRS had two very different arguments.

She argued that the treasure trove doctrine applied.

Corri argued that the shares were transferred contrary to the performance rights plan, making the money subject to an ongoing claim by her employer under Alaska law.

I get it: she argued treasure trove because it would delay taxation until the taxpayer had undisputed possession.

This of course put a lot of pressure on her argument that she had disputed possession.

The IRS came from an altogether different angle.

·       Corri had an employment relationship.

·       She was compensated both in cash and property.

·       Under the tax Code, both cash and property are taxable.

·       The Code does have a specific provision (Section 83) for property transferred with restrictions on its further transfer or with a risk of forfeiture. This is what happened here. Corri was awarded rights, exercisable in the future. If she remained employed, the rights were exchangeable for actual shares, which she was free to keep or sell without further restriction. The rights were not taxable when awarded, as Corri had to remain employed until the exercise date. Once she reached that date, the restrictions came off and she had taxable compensation.

The IRS argument proved formidable against Corri. She had no further obligations to the company after she left. In addition, she was not required to refrain from acting (think a covenant not to compete). There was no risk of forfeiture from her acting or not acting. She was also free to sell or otherwise transfer the shares.

And it was there that she lost the argument of disputed possession. In Cesarini nobody knew who the cash had belonged to, and the matter of its possession had to be sorted out under state law. In this case all parties knew who the shares belonged to, and there remained nothing to be sorted out under Alaska law.

There was no treasure trove.

There was no delay.

The IRS won.

There are two things in this case that bother me. Neither are tax driven. I would describe them instead as common sense.

1. The Company had the right to overrule the terms of the performance rights plan and award shares even if plan terms were not met. To rephrase, the company was not allowed to remove a benefit already granted but it was allowed to grant a benefit an employee would otherwise not receive. I believe that is what happened here: Corri was a diligent and valued employee, and the company wanted to show appreciation, even if they had to release her.
2. If an employer gives me free money, why wouldn’t I pay tax? It seems to me that I am still better off than without the free money.

Our case this time was Corri Feige v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2025-88.