Michael Jordan, The Grizzlies And The Jock Tax

I have been reading recently that the jock tax may be affecting where athletes decide to play. For example, Ndamukong Suh, an NFL defensive tackle formerly with the Detroit Lions, was wooed by the Oakland Raiders but opted instead to sign with the Miami Dolphins. I can understand a top-tier athlete not wanting to play for a team as dysfunctional as the Raiders, but one has to wonder whether that 13.3% top California tax rate was part of the decision. Florida of course has no income tax.

Let’s not feel sorry for Suh, however. His contract is worth approximately $114 million, with $60 million guaranteed.

So what is the jock tax?

Let’s say that you work in another state for a few days. You may ask whether that state will want to tax you for the days you work there. Some states tell you upfront that there is no tax unless you work there for a minimum number of days (say 10, for example). Other states say the same thing obliquely by not requiring withholding if you would not have a tax liability, requiring you (or your accountant) to reverse-engineer a tax return to figure out what that magic number is. And then there are … “those states,” the ones that will try to tax you just for landing at one of their airports.

Take the same concept, introduce a professional athlete, a stadium and a game and you have the jock tax.

It started in California. Travel back to 1991 when Michael Jordan led the Bulls to the NBA Finals. After the net was cut and the celebrations finished, Los Angeles contacted Jordan and informed him that he would have to pay taxes for the days that he spent there.

Illinois did not like the way California was treating their favorite son, so they in turn passed a law imposing income tax on athletes from other states if their state imposed a tax on an Illinois athlete. This law became known as “Michael Jordan’s Revenge.”

How do you allocate an athlete’s income to a given city or state? That is the essence of the jock tax and what makes it different from you or me working away from home for a week or so.

If we work a week in Illinois, our employer can carve-out 1/52 of our salary and tax it to Illinois. Granted, there may be issues with bonuses and so on, but the concept is workable.

But an athlete does not work that way. What are his/her work days: game days? Game and travel days? Game, travel, and practice days?

Let’s take football. There are the Sunday games, of course, but there are also team meetings, practice sessions, film study, promotional events, as well as minicamps and OTAs and so on. Let’s say that this works out to be 160 days. You are with Bengals and travel to Philadelphia for an away game. You spend two days there. Philadelphia would likely be eying 2/160 of your compensation.

This method is referred to as the “duty days” method.

Cleveland separated from the pack and wanted to tax players based on the number of games in the season. For example, the city tried to tax Chicago Bears linebacker Hunter Hillenmeyer based on the number of season games, which would be 20 (16 regular season and 4 preseason). Reducing the denominator makes Cleveland’s share larger (hence why Cleveland liked this method), but it ignores the fact that Hillenmeyer had duty days other than Sunday. What Cleveland wanted was a “games played” method, and it was shot down by the Ohio Supreme Court.

Cleveland also had an interesting twist on the “games played” method. It wanted to tax Indianapolis Colts center Jeff Saturday for a game in 2008.  However, Saturday was injured and did not play in that game, making Cleveland’s stance hard to understand. In fact, Saturday was injured enough that he stayed in Indianapolis and did not travel with the team, now making Cleveland’s position impossible to understand. Sometimes bad law surfaces when pushed to its logical absurdity, and the Ohio Supreme Court told Cleveland to stop its nonsense.

Tennessee wrote its jock tax a bit differently. Since the state does not have an income tax (more accurately, it has an income tax on dividends and interest only) it could not do what California, Illinois and Ohio had done before. Tennessee instead charged a visiting athlete a flat rate, irrespective of his/her income. For example, if you were a visiting NBA player, it would cost $2,500 to play against the Memphis Grizzlies.

Tennessee also taxed NHL players (think Nashville Predators) but not NFL players (think Tennessee Titans).

I guess the NFL bargains better than the NHL or NBA.

One can understand the need to fund stadiums, but this tax is arbitrary and capricious. What about a non-athlete traveling with the team? That $2,500 may be more than he/she earned for the game.

Tennessee has since abolished this tax for NHL players but has delayed abolishment until June 1, 2016 for NBA players.

In other news, NFL players remain untaxed.

We have talked about the denominator of the fraction to be multiplied against an athlete’s compensation. Are you curious what goes into that compensation bucket?

Let’s answer this with a question: why do so many athletes chose to live in Texas or Florida? The athlete may have an apartment in the city where he/she plays, but his/her main home (and family) is in Dallas, Nashville or Miami.

Let’s say the athlete receives a signing bonus. There is an extremely good argument that the bonus is not subject to the jock tax, as it is not contingent upon future performance by the athlete. The bonus is earned upon signing; hence its situs for state taxation should be tested at the moment of signing. Tax practitioners refer to this as “non-apportionable” income, and it generally defaults to taxation by the state of residence. Take residence in a state with no income tax (hello Florida), and the signing bonus escapes state tax.

Consider Suh and the Miami Dolphins. California’s cut of his $60 million signing bonus would have been almost $8 million. Florida’s cut is zero.

What would you do for $8 million?

How Choosing The Correct Court Made The Difference

I am looking at a District Court case worth discussing, if only for the refresher on how to select a court of venue. Let’s set it up.

ABC Beverage Corporation (ABC) makes and distributes soft drinks and non-alcoholic beverages for the Dr Pepper Snapple Group Inc. Through a subsidiary it acquired a company in Missouri. Shortly afterwards it determined that the lease it acquired was noneconomic. An appraisal determined that the fair market rent for the facility was approximately $356,000 per year, but the lease required annual rent of $1.1 million. The lease had an unexpired term of 40 years, so the total dollars under discussion were considerable.

The first thing you may wonder is why the lease could be so disadvantageous. There are any number of reasons. If one is distributing a high-weight low-value product (such as soft drinks), proximity to customers could be paramount. If one owns a franchise territory, one may be willing to pay a premium for the right road access. Perhaps one’s needs are so specific that the decision process compares the lease cost to the replacement cost of building a facility, which in turn may be even more expensive. There are multiple ways to get into this situation.

ABC obtained three appraisals, each of which valued the property without the lease at $2.75 million. With the lease the property was worth considerably more.

NOTE: Worth more to the landlord, of course. 

ABC approached the landlord and offered to buy the facility for $9 million. The landlord wanted $14.8 million. Eventually they agreed on $11 million. ABC capitalized the property at $2.75 million and deducted the $6.25 million difference.

How? ABC was looking at the Cleveland Allerton Hotel decision, a Sixth Circuit decision from 1948. In that case, a hotel operator had a disastrous lease, which it bought out. The IRS argued that that the entire buyout price should be capitalized and depreciated. The Circuit Court decided that only the fair market value of the property could be capitalized, and the rest could be deducted immediately. Since 1948, other courts have decided differently, including the Tax Court. One of the advantages of taking a case to Tax Court is that one does not have to pay the tax and then sue for refund. A Tax Court filing suspends the IRS’ ability to collect. The Tax Court is therefore the preferred venue for many if not most tax cases.

However and unfortunately for ABC, the Tax Court had decided opposite of Cleveland Allerton (CA), so there was virtually no point in taking the case there. ABC was in Michigan, which is in the Sixth Circuit. CA had been decided in the Sixth Circuit. To get the case into the District Court (and thus the Circuit), ABC would have to pay the tax and sue for refund. It did so.

The IRS came out with guns blazing. It pointed to Code Section 167(c)(2), which reads:

            (2) Special rule for property subject to lease

If any property is acquired subject to a lease—

(A) no portion of the adjusted basis shall be allocated to the leasehold interest, and

(B) the entire adjusted basis shall be taken into account in determining the depreciation deduction (if any) with respect to the property subject to the lease.

The IRS argued that the Section meant what it said, and that ABC had to capitalize the entire buyout, not just the fair market value.  It trotted out several cases, including Millinery Center and Woodward v Commissioner. It argued that the CA decision had been modified – to the point of reversal – over time. CA was no longer good precedent.

The IRS had a second argument: Section 167(c)(2) entered the tax Code after CA, with the presumption that it was addressing – and overturning – the CA decision.

The Circuit Court took a look at the cases. In Millinery Center, the Second Circuit refused to allow a deduction for the excess over fair market value. The Sixth Circuit pointed out that the Second Circuit had decided that way because the taxpayer had failed its responsibility of proving that the lease was burdensome. In other words, the taxpayer had not gotten to the evidentiary point where ABC was.

In Woodward the IRS argued that professional fees pursuant to a stockholder buyout had to be capitalized, as the underlying transaction was capital in nature. Any ancillary costs to the transaction (such as attorneys and accountants) likewise had to be capitalized. The Sixth Circuit pointed out the obvious: ABC was not deducting ancillary costs. ABC was deducting the transaction itself, so Woodward did not come into play.

The Court then looked at Section 167(c)(2) – “if property is acquired subject to a lease.” That wording is key, and the question is: when do you look at the property? If the Court looked before ABC bought out the lease, then the property was subject to a lease. If it looked after, then the property was not. The IRS of course argued that the correct time to look was before. The Court agreed that the wording was ambiguous.

The Court reasoned that a third party purchaser looking to acquire a building with an extant lease is different from a lessee purchaser. The third party acquires a building with an income stream – two distinct assets - whereas the lessee purchaser is paying to eliminate a liability – the lease. Had the lessee left the property and bought-out the lease, the buy-out would be deductible.

The Court decided that the time to look was after. There was no lease, as ABC at that point had unified its fee simple interest. Section 167(c)(2) did not apply, and ABC could deduct the $6.25 million. The Court decided that its CA decision from 1948 was still precedent, at least in the Sixth Circuit.

ABC won the case, and kudos to its attorneys. Their decision to take the case to District Court rather than Tax Court made the case appealable to the Sixth Circuit, which venue made all the difference.

Why Would a 100+ Year-Old Ohio Company Move To Ireland?

Consider the following statements:

• Eaton Corp acquired Cooper Industries for $13 billion, the largest acquisition in the Cleveland manufacturer's 101-year history.
• Cooper Industries is based in Houston and incorporated in Ireland.
• Eaton Corp incorporated a new company in Ireland - Eaton Corp., plc.
• Eaton Corp will wind up as a subsidiary of Eaton Corp. plc.
• The new company will have about 100,000 employees in 150 countries. It will have annual sales in excess of $20 billion.

This transaction is called an inversion. Visualize it this way: the top of the ladder (Eaton Corp) now becomes a subsidiary – that is, it moved down the ladder. It inverted.

 

To a tax planner this is an “outbound” transaction, and it brings onto the pitch one of the most near-incomprehensible areas of the tax code – Section 367. This construct entered the Code in the 1930s in response to the following little trick:

1. A U.S. taxpayer would transfer appreciated assets to a foreign corporation in a tax haven country. Many times these assets were stocks and bonds, as they were easy to sell. Believe it or not, Canada was a popular destination for this.
2. The corporation would sell the assets at little or no tax.
3. The corporation, flush with cash, would merge back into a U.S. company.
4. The U.S. taxpayer thus had cash and had deftly sidestepped U.S. corporate tax.

OBSERVATION: It sounds like it was much easier to be a tax planner back in the 1930s.

The initial concept of Section 367 was relatively easy to follow: what drove the above transactions was the tax planner’s ability to make most or all the transactions tax-free.  To do this, planners primarily used corporations. This in turn allowed the planner to use incorporations, mergers, reorganizations and divisives to peel assets away from the U.S.  Congress in turn passed this little beauty:

            367(a)(1)General rule.—

If, in connection with any exchange described in section 332, 351, 354, 356, or 361, a United States person transfers property to a foreign corporation, such foreign corporation shall not, for purposes of determining the extent to which gain shall be recognized on such transfer, be considered to be a corporation.

Congress said that – if one wanted to play that appreciated-stock-to-a-Canadian-company game again - it would not permit the Canadian company to be treated as a corporation. As the tax-free status required both parties to be corporations, the game was halted. There were exceptions, of course, otherwise legitimate business transactions would grind to a halt. Then there were exceptions to exceptions, which the planners exploited, to which the IRS responded, and so on to the present day.

By 2004 the planners had gotten very good. Congress passed another law – Section 7874 – to address inversions. It introduced the term “surrogate foreign corporation,” which – as initially drafted – could have pulled a foreign corporation owned by foreign investors with no U.S. operations or U.S. history into the orbit of U.S. taxation. How?

Let’s look at this horror show:

7874(a)(2)(B)Surrogate foreign corporation.—

A foreign corporation shall be treated as a surrogate foreign corporation if, pursuant to a plan (or a series of related transactions)—

7874(a)(2)(B)(i) 

the entity completes … the direct or indirect acquisition of substantially all of the properties … held directly or indirectly by a domestic corporation or substantially all of the properties … of a domestic partnership,

7874(a)(2)(B)(ii) 

after the acquisition at least 60 percent of the stock … is held by former shareholders of the domestic corporation by reason of holding stock in the domestic corporation,

7874(a)(2)(B)(iii) 

after the acquisition the …entity does not have substantial business activities in the foreign country … when compared to the total business activities of such expanded affiliated group.

How can this blow up? Let me give you an example:

• Foreign individuals form a domestic U.S. corporation (Hamilton U.S.) under the laws of Delaware.
• Hamilton U.S. makes a ton of money (not relevant but it makes me happy).
• All shareholders of Hamilton U.S. are either nonresident aliens or a foreign corporation (Hamilton International) also owned by the same shareholders.
• The shareholders have never resided nor have any other business interest in the U.S.
• Hamilton International was formed outside the U.S. and has no other business interest in the U.S.
• The shareholders decide to make Hamilton U.S. a subsidiary of Hamilton International.
• The shareholders have a Board meeting in Leeds and transfer their shares in Hamilton U.S. to Hamilton International. They then head to the pub for a pint.

Let’s pace this out:

• Hamilton U.S. would be subject to U.S. taxation on its operations, as the operations occur exclusively within the U.S. This result is not affected by who owns Hamilton U.S.
• We will meet the threshold of 7874(a)(2)(B)(i) as a foreign corporation acquired substantially all (heck, it acquired all) the properties of a domestic corporation.
• We will meet the threshold of 7874(a)(2)(B)(ii) as more than 60% of the shareholders remain the same. In fact, 100% of the shareholders remain the same.
• We will meet the threshold of 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii) as the business activities are in the U.S., not in the foreign country.

We now have the possibility – and absurdity – that Hamilton International is a “surrogate foreign corporation” and taxable in the U.S. Granted, in our example this doesn’t mean much, as Hamilton International’s only asset is stock in Hamilton U.S., which has to pay U.S. tax anyway. Still, it is an example of the swamp of U.S. tax law.

Let’s get back to Eaton.

Why would Eaton make itself a subsidiary of an Irish parent?

It is not moving to Ireland. Eaton will retain its presence in northern Ohio, and Cooper will remain in Houston. Remember that business activities in the United States will be taxable to the U.S., irrespective of the international parent. What then is the point of the inversion? The point is that more than one-half the new company will be outside the U.S., and the international parent keeps that portion away from the IRS. Remember also that Ireland has a 12.5% tax rate, as opposed to the U.S. 35% rate.

There is another consideration. Placing Eaton in Ireland allows the tax planners to move the treasury function outside the U.S. What is a treasury function? It is lingo for the budgeting, management and investment of cash. Considering that this is a $20 billion company, there is a lot of cash flow. Treasury is a candidate for what has been called “stateless” income.

           

There is more. Now the development of patents and intellectual property can now be sitused outside the United States. By the way, this is a key reason why virtually all (if not all) pharmaceutical and technology companies have presence outside of the United States. It is very difficult to create intellectual property in the U.S. and then move it offshore. How does a tax advisor plan for that? By never placing the intellectual property in the U.S.

           

And the point of all this: Eaton has estimated that the combined companies would realize annual tax savings of about $160 million by 2016.

In 2002, Senator Charles Grassley, then the top Republican on the Finance Committee, called inversion transactions “immoral.”  That ironically was also the year that Cooper Industries inverted to Bermuda, and it later moved to Ireland. The Obama administration has proposed disallowing tax deductions for companies moving outside the United States. Nothing has come of that proposal.

The U.S. policy of worldwide taxation goes back to the League of Nations, when the U.S. thought that advanced nations would eventually move to its side. That did not happen, and with time, many nations moved instead to a territorial system. The U.S. is now the outlier. Our tax policy now presumes irrational economics. I am not going to advise a client to pay more tax just because Senator Grassley thinks they should. 

I will take this step further: many tax planners believe that it may be malpractice NOT to consider placing as much activity offshore as reasonably possible. There is more than a snowball’s chance that I could be sued for advising a client as the Senator wants.

I am glad that Eaton kept its jobs in Ohio. It is unfortunate that it had to go through these gymnastics, though.