Why is Kinder Morgan Buying Its Own Master Limited Partnerships?

I am reading that Kinder Morgan, Inc (KMI) is restructuring, bringing its master limited partnerships (MLPs) under one corporate structure. We have not spoken about MLPs in a while, and this gives us an opportunity to discuss what these entities are. We will also discuss why a company would reconsolidate, especially in an environment which has seen passthrough entities as the structure of choice for so many business owners.

As a refresher, a plain–vanilla corporation (which we call a “C” corporation) pays tax at the corporate level. The United States has the unenviable position of having one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world, which is certainly a strike against organizing a business as a C corporation. Couple this with the tax Code’s insistence on taxing the worldwide income of a C corporation (with certain exceptions), and there is a second strike for businesses with substantial overseas presence.

A passthrough on the other hand generally does not pay tax at the entity level. It instead passes its income through to its owners, who then combine that income with their personal income and deductions (for example, salary, interest and dividends, as well as mortgage interest and real estate taxes) and pay taxes on their individual tax returns. This is a key reason that many tax professionals are opposed to ever-higher individual tax rates. The business owner’s personal income is artificially boosted by that business income, pushing - if not shoving - him/her into ever-higher tax rates. This is not generally interpreted as an admonition from our government to go forth and prosper. 

MLPs are relatively recent creations, entering the tax Code in 1986. They can be the size of publicly-traded corporations, but they are organized instead as publicly-traded partnerships. They are required to generate at least 90% of their revenues from “qualifying sources,” commonly meaning oil, natural gas or coal. The stock market values MLPs on their cash flow, so the sponsor (in this case, KMI) has great incentive to maximize distributions to the unitholders. MLPs have consequently become legitimate competitors to bonds and dividend-paying stocks. You could, for example, purchase a certificate of deposit paying 1.4%, or you could instead purchase a MLP paying 7%. Introduce a low interest rate environment, couple it with expanded activity in shale and natural gas, and MLPs have been in a very favorable investment environment for a while.

One of the granddaddies of MLPs is Kinder Morgan Inc, which placed its operating activities in three principal MLPs: Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, Kinder Morgan Management and El Paso Pipeline Partners. To say that they have done well is to understate.

There is a tax downside to MLP investing, however. A MLP does not pay dividends, as Proctor & Gamble would. Instead it pays distributions, which may or may not be taxable. You do not pay tax on the distributions per se. You instead pay tax on your distributable income from the MLP, reported on a Schedule K-1. A partner pays tax on his/her income on that K-1; by investing in a MLP you are a partner. To the extent that the K-1 numbers approximate the distribution amount, your tax would be about the same as if you had received a dividend. That, however, almost never happens. Why? Let’s look at one common reason: depreciation. As a partner, you are entitled to your share of the entity’s depreciation expense. Depreciation reduces your share of the distributable income. To the extent that there is heavy depreciation, less and less of your distribution would be taxable. What type of entity would rack up heavy depreciation? How about a pipeline, with hundreds of millions of dollars tied-up in its infrastructure? 

This leads to an (almost) win:win situation for the investor. To the extent there is outsized depreciation, or perhaps depletion or tax credits, you can receive generous distributions but pay tax on a considerably smaller number. There is a tax downside however. To the extent that the distributions exceed the K-1 income, you are deemed to have received a return of your capital. This means that you are getting back part of your investment. This matters later, when you sell the MLP units. Your “basis” in the MLP would now be less (as your investment has been returned to you bit by bit), meaning that any gain on a subsequent sale would be larger by the same amount. Many MLP investors have no intention of ever selling, so they do not fear this contingency. No later sale equals no later tax.

Almost all MLPs pay someone to actually manage the business, whether it is a pipeline or timberland. That someone would be the sponsor or general partner (GP). The general partner receives a base percentage to manage the operations, and many MLPs also further pay an incentive distribution right (IDR) to the general partner, which amount increases as the MLP becomes more and more profitable. For example:

·        A GP receives 2% base to manage the business

·        Then there is an IDR at certain steps

o   At step one, the GP receives 15% of the increment over the first step,

o   At step two, the GP receives 25% of the increment over the second step

o   At step three, he GP receives 35% of the increment over the third step

How high can this go? Well, KMI and its MLPs have done so well that approximately 50% is going to an IDR payment.

This means that KMI is receiving up to 50% of the MLP income it is managing, so 50% comes back to the KMI (a C corporation) anyway. One really has not accomplished much tax-wise as far as that 50% goes.

But that leaves the other 50%, right?

MLPs can have difficulty borrowing money because they pay-out such an outsized percentage of their income, whether as IDRs or distributions. A banker wants to see a profitable business, as well as see the business retain some of that profit, if only to repay the bank. This leads to complicated bank loans, as the GP has to step in as a borrower or a guarantor on any loan. Banks also like to have collateral. Problem: the GP does not have the assets; instead the MLP has the assets. This causes banking headaches. The headache may be small, if the MLP is small.  Let the MLP grow, and headaches increase in intensity. 

Remember what we said about KMI? It is one of the granddaddies of MLPs. Banking and deal making have become a problem.

So KMI Inc has decided to do away with its MLP structure. It has proposed to buy back its MLPs in a $44 billion deal, bringing everything under the corporate roof. It now becomes the third largest energy company in the United States, behind only Exxon Mobil and Chevron.

The stock market seemed to like the deal, as KMI’s stock popped approximately 10% in one day.

What is the tax consequence to all this? Ah, now we have a problem. Let us use Kinder Morgan Energy Partners as an example. These investors will have a sale, meaning they will have to report and pay taxes on their gains. Remember that they have been reducing their initial investment by excess distributions. I have seen estimates of up to $18 tax per KMEP MLP unit owned. Granted, investors will also receive almost $11 in cash per unit, but this is a nasty April 15th surprise waiting to happen.

The restructuring should reduce KMI’s taxable income as much as $20 billion over the next dozen years or so, as KMI will now be able to claim the depreciation on its corporate tax return. In addition, KMI will be able to use its own stock in future acquisitions, as C corporations can utilize their stock to structure tax-free mergers. Standard & Poor’s has said it would upgrade KMI’s credit rating, as its organizational chart will be easier to understand and its cash flow easier to forecast. KMI has already said it would increase its dividend by approximately 10% annually for the rest of the decade.

By the way, are you wondering what the secret is to the tax voodoo used here? Kinder Morgan is bringing its MLPs onto its depreciation schedule, meaning that it will have massive depreciation deductions for years to come. There is a price to pay for this, though: someone has to report gain and pay tax. The IRS is not giving away this step-up in depreciable basis for free. It is however the MLP investors that are paying tax, although KMI is distributing cash to help out. To the extent that KMI optimized the proportion between the tax and the cash, the tax planners hit a home run.   

Why Would a 100+ Year-Old Ohio Company Move To Ireland?

Consider the following statements:

• Eaton Corp acquired Cooper Industries for $13 billion, the largest acquisition in the Cleveland manufacturer's 101-year history.
• Cooper Industries is based in Houston and incorporated in Ireland.
• Eaton Corp incorporated a new company in Ireland - Eaton Corp., plc.
• Eaton Corp will wind up as a subsidiary of Eaton Corp. plc.
• The new company will have about 100,000 employees in 150 countries. It will have annual sales in excess of $20 billion.

This transaction is called an inversion. Visualize it this way: the top of the ladder (Eaton Corp) now becomes a subsidiary – that is, it moved down the ladder. It inverted.

 

To a tax planner this is an “outbound” transaction, and it brings onto the pitch one of the most near-incomprehensible areas of the tax code – Section 367. This construct entered the Code in the 1930s in response to the following little trick:

1. A U.S. taxpayer would transfer appreciated assets to a foreign corporation in a tax haven country. Many times these assets were stocks and bonds, as they were easy to sell. Believe it or not, Canada was a popular destination for this.
2. The corporation would sell the assets at little or no tax.
3. The corporation, flush with cash, would merge back into a U.S. company.
4. The U.S. taxpayer thus had cash and had deftly sidestepped U.S. corporate tax.

OBSERVATION: It sounds like it was much easier to be a tax planner back in the 1930s.

The initial concept of Section 367 was relatively easy to follow: what drove the above transactions was the tax planner’s ability to make most or all the transactions tax-free.  To do this, planners primarily used corporations. This in turn allowed the planner to use incorporations, mergers, reorganizations and divisives to peel assets away from the U.S.  Congress in turn passed this little beauty:

            367(a)(1)General rule.—

If, in connection with any exchange described in section 332, 351, 354, 356, or 361, a United States person transfers property to a foreign corporation, such foreign corporation shall not, for purposes of determining the extent to which gain shall be recognized on such transfer, be considered to be a corporation.

Congress said that – if one wanted to play that appreciated-stock-to-a-Canadian-company game again - it would not permit the Canadian company to be treated as a corporation. As the tax-free status required both parties to be corporations, the game was halted. There were exceptions, of course, otherwise legitimate business transactions would grind to a halt. Then there were exceptions to exceptions, which the planners exploited, to which the IRS responded, and so on to the present day.

By 2004 the planners had gotten very good. Congress passed another law – Section 7874 – to address inversions. It introduced the term “surrogate foreign corporation,” which – as initially drafted – could have pulled a foreign corporation owned by foreign investors with no U.S. operations or U.S. history into the orbit of U.S. taxation. How?

Let’s look at this horror show:

7874(a)(2)(B)Surrogate foreign corporation.—

A foreign corporation shall be treated as a surrogate foreign corporation if, pursuant to a plan (or a series of related transactions)—

7874(a)(2)(B)(i) 

the entity completes … the direct or indirect acquisition of substantially all of the properties … held directly or indirectly by a domestic corporation or substantially all of the properties … of a domestic partnership,

7874(a)(2)(B)(ii) 

after the acquisition at least 60 percent of the stock … is held by former shareholders of the domestic corporation by reason of holding stock in the domestic corporation,

7874(a)(2)(B)(iii) 

after the acquisition the …entity does not have substantial business activities in the foreign country … when compared to the total business activities of such expanded affiliated group.

How can this blow up? Let me give you an example:

• Foreign individuals form a domestic U.S. corporation (Hamilton U.S.) under the laws of Delaware.
• Hamilton U.S. makes a ton of money (not relevant but it makes me happy).
• All shareholders of Hamilton U.S. are either nonresident aliens or a foreign corporation (Hamilton International) also owned by the same shareholders.
• The shareholders have never resided nor have any other business interest in the U.S.
• Hamilton International was formed outside the U.S. and has no other business interest in the U.S.
• The shareholders decide to make Hamilton U.S. a subsidiary of Hamilton International.
• The shareholders have a Board meeting in Leeds and transfer their shares in Hamilton U.S. to Hamilton International. They then head to the pub for a pint.

Let’s pace this out:

• Hamilton U.S. would be subject to U.S. taxation on its operations, as the operations occur exclusively within the U.S. This result is not affected by who owns Hamilton U.S.
• We will meet the threshold of 7874(a)(2)(B)(i) as a foreign corporation acquired substantially all (heck, it acquired all) the properties of a domestic corporation.
• We will meet the threshold of 7874(a)(2)(B)(ii) as more than 60% of the shareholders remain the same. In fact, 100% of the shareholders remain the same.
• We will meet the threshold of 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii) as the business activities are in the U.S., not in the foreign country.

We now have the possibility – and absurdity – that Hamilton International is a “surrogate foreign corporation” and taxable in the U.S. Granted, in our example this doesn’t mean much, as Hamilton International’s only asset is stock in Hamilton U.S., which has to pay U.S. tax anyway. Still, it is an example of the swamp of U.S. tax law.

Let’s get back to Eaton.

Why would Eaton make itself a subsidiary of an Irish parent?

It is not moving to Ireland. Eaton will retain its presence in northern Ohio, and Cooper will remain in Houston. Remember that business activities in the United States will be taxable to the U.S., irrespective of the international parent. What then is the point of the inversion? The point is that more than one-half the new company will be outside the U.S., and the international parent keeps that portion away from the IRS. Remember also that Ireland has a 12.5% tax rate, as opposed to the U.S. 35% rate.

There is another consideration. Placing Eaton in Ireland allows the tax planners to move the treasury function outside the U.S. What is a treasury function? It is lingo for the budgeting, management and investment of cash. Considering that this is a $20 billion company, there is a lot of cash flow. Treasury is a candidate for what has been called “stateless” income.

           

There is more. Now the development of patents and intellectual property can now be sitused outside the United States. By the way, this is a key reason why virtually all (if not all) pharmaceutical and technology companies have presence outside of the United States. It is very difficult to create intellectual property in the U.S. and then move it offshore. How does a tax advisor plan for that? By never placing the intellectual property in the U.S.

           

And the point of all this: Eaton has estimated that the combined companies would realize annual tax savings of about $160 million by 2016.

In 2002, Senator Charles Grassley, then the top Republican on the Finance Committee, called inversion transactions “immoral.”  That ironically was also the year that Cooper Industries inverted to Bermuda, and it later moved to Ireland. The Obama administration has proposed disallowing tax deductions for companies moving outside the United States. Nothing has come of that proposal.

The U.S. policy of worldwide taxation goes back to the League of Nations, when the U.S. thought that advanced nations would eventually move to its side. That did not happen, and with time, many nations moved instead to a territorial system. The U.S. is now the outlier. Our tax policy now presumes irrational economics. I am not going to advise a client to pay more tax just because Senator Grassley thinks they should. 

I will take this step further: many tax planners believe that it may be malpractice NOT to consider placing as much activity offshore as reasonably possible. There is more than a snowball’s chance that I could be sued for advising a client as the Senator wants.

I am glad that Eaton kept its jobs in Ohio. It is unfortunate that it had to go through these gymnastics, though.