Using A Fancy Trust Without An Advisor

 

I am a fan of charitable remainder trusts. These are (sometimes) also referred to as split interest trusts.

What is an interest in a trust and how can you split it?

In a generic situation, an interest in a trust is straightforward:

(1) Someone may have a right to or is otherwise permitted to receive an income distribution from a trust. This is what it sounds like: if the trust has income, then someone might receive all, some or none of it – depending on what the trust is designed to do. This person is referred to as an “income” beneficiary.

(2) When there are no more income beneficiaries, the trust will likely terminate. Any assets remaining in the trust will go to the remaining beneficiaries. This person(s) is referred to as a “remainder” beneficiary.

Sounds complicated, but it does not have to be. Let me give you an example.

(1)  I set up a trust.

(2)  My wife has exclusive rights to the income for the rest of her life. My wife is the income beneficiary.

(3)  Upon my wife’s death, the assets remaining in the trust go to our kids. Our kids are the remainder beneficiaries.

(4)  BTW the above set-up is referred to as a “family trust” in the literature.

Back to it: what is a split interest trust?

Easy. Make one of those interests a 501(c)(3) charity.

If the charity is the income beneficiary, we are likely talking a charitable lead trust.

If the charity is the remainder beneficiary, then we are likely talking a charitable remainder trust.

Let’s focus solely on a charity as a remainder interest.

You want to donate to your alma mater – Michigan, let’s say. You are not made of money, so you want to donate when you pass away, just in case you need the money in life. One way is to include the University of Michigan in your will.

Another way would be to form a split interest trust, with Michigan as the charity. You retain all the income for life, and whatever is left over goes to Michigan when you pass away. In truth, I would bet a box of donuts that Michigan would even help you with setting up the trust, as they have a personal stake in the matter.

That’s it. You have a CRT.

Oh, one more thing.

You also have a charitable donation.

Of course, you say. You have a donation when you die, as that is when the remaining trust assets go to Michigan.

No, no. You have a donation when the trust is formed, even though Michigan will not see the money (hopefully) for (many) years.

Why? Because that is the way the tax law is written. Mind you, there is crazy math involved in calculating the charitable deduction.

Let’s look at the Furrer case.

The Furrers were farmers. They formed two CRATs, one in 2015 and another in 2016.

COMMENT: A CRAT is a flavor of CRT. Let’s leave it alone for this discussion.

In 2015 they transferred 100,000 bushels of corn and 10,000 bushels of soybeans to the CRAT. The CRAT bought an annuity from a life insurance company, the distributions from which were in turn used to pay the Fullers their annuity from the CRT.

They did the same thing with the 2016 CRT, but we’ll look only at the 2015 CRT. The tax issue is the same in both trusts.

The CRT is an oddball trust, as it delays - but does not eliminate – taxable income and paying taxes. Instead, the income beneficiary pays taxes as distributions are received.

EXAMPLE: Say the trust is funded with stock, which it then sells at a $500,000 gain. The annual distribution to the income beneficiary is $100,000. The taxes on the $500,000 gain will be spread over 5 years, as the income beneficiary receives $100,000 annually.

Think of a CRT as an installment sale and you get the idea.

OK, we know that the Furrers had income coming their way.

Next question: what was the amount of the charitable contribution?

Look at this tangle of words:

§ 170 Charitable, etc., contributions and gifts.

           (e)  Certain contributions of ordinary income and capital gain property.

(1)  General rule.

The amount of any charitable contribution of property otherwise taken into account under this section shall be reduced by the sum of-

(A)  the amount of gain which would not have been long-term capital gain (determined without regard to section 1221(b)(3)) if the property contributed had been sold by the taxpayer at its fair market value (determined at the time of such contribution),

This incoherence is sometimes referred to as the “reduce to basis” rule.

The Code will generally allow a charitable contribution for the fair market value of donated property. Say you bought Apple stock in 1997. Your cost (that is, your “basis”) in the stock is minimal, whereas the stock is now worth a fortune. Will the Code allow you to deduct what Apple stock is worth, even though your actual cost in the stock is (maybe) a dime on the dollar?

Yep, with some exceptions.

Exceptions like what?

Like the above “amount of gain which would not have been long-term capital gain.”

Not a problem with Apple stock, as that thing is capital gain all day long.

How about crops to a farmer?

Not so much. Crops to a farmer are like yoga pants to Lululemon. That is inventory - ordinary income in nerdspeak - as what a farmer ordinarily does is raise and sell crops. No capital gain there.

Meaning?

The Furrers must reduce their charitable deduction by the amount of income that would not be capital gain.

Well, we just said that none of the crop income would be capital gain.

I see income minus (the same) income = zero.

There is no charitable deduction.

Worst … case … scenario.

I found myself wondering how the tax planning blew up.

In July 2015, after seeing an advertisement in a farming magazine, petitioners formed the Donald & Rita Furrer Charitable Remainder Annuity Trust of 2015 (CRAT I), of which their son was named trustee. The trust instrument designated petitioners as life beneficiaries and three eligible section 501(c)(3) charities as remaindermen.”

The Furrers should have used a tax advisor. A pro may not be necessary for routine circumstances: a couple of W-2s, a little interest income, interest expense and taxes on a mortgage, for example.

This was not that. This was a charitable remainder trust, something that many accountants might not see throughout a career.

Yep, don’t do this.

Our case this time is Furrer v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2022-100.

Qualifying For Stock Loss Under Section 1244

 

I am looking at a case having to do with Section 1244 stock.

And I am thinking: it has been a while since I have seen a Section 1244.

Mind you; that is not a bad thing, as Section 1244 requires losses. The most recent corporate exit I have seen was a very sweet rollup of a professional practice for approximately $10 million. No loss = no Section 1244.

Let’s set up the issue.

We are talking about corporations. They can be either C or S corporations, but this is a corporate tax thing. BTW there is a technical issue with Section 1244 and S corporations, but let’s skip it for this discussion.

The corporation has gone out of business.

A corporation has stock. When the corporation goes out of business, that stock is worthless. This means that the shareholder has incurred a loss on that stock. If he/she acquired the stock for $5,000, then there is a loss of $5,000 when the corporation closes.

Next: that loss is – unless something else kicks-in – a capital loss.

Capital losses offset capital gains dollar-for-dollar.

Let’s say taxpayer has no capital gains.

Capital losses are then allowed to offset (up to) $3,000 of other income.

It will take this person a couple of years to use up that $5,000 loss.

Section 1244 is a pressure valve, of sorts, in this situation.

A shareholder can claim up to $50,000 of ordinary loss ($100,000 if married filing joint) upon the sale, liquidation or worthlessness of stock if:

 

(1)  The stock is be either common or preferred, voting or nonvoting, but stock acquired via convertible securities will not qualify;

(2)  The stock was initially issued to an individual or partnership;

(3)  The initial capitalization of the corporation did not exceed $1 million;

(4)  The initial capitalization was done with stock and property (other than stock and securities);

(5)  Only persons acquiring stock directly from the corporation will qualify; and

(6)  For the five tax years preceding the loss, the corporation received more than 50% of its aggregate gross receipts from sources other than interest, dividends, rents, royalties, and the sale or exchange of stocks or securities.

The advantage is that the ordinary loss can offset other income and will probably be used right away, as opposed to that $3,000 year-by-year capital loss thing.

Mind you, there can also be part Section 1244/part capital loss.

Say a married couple lost $130,000 on the bankruptcy of their corporation.

Seems to me you have:

                      Section 1244                     100,000

                      Capital loss                         30,000

Let’s look at the Ushio case.

Mr Ushio acquired the stock of PCHG, a South Carolina corporation, for $50,000.

PCHG intended to was looking to get involved with alternative energy. It made agreements with a Nevada company and other efforts, but nothing ever came of it. PCHG folded in 2012.

Ushio claimed a $50,000 Section 1244 loss.

The IRS denied it.

There were a couple of reasons:

(1)  Mr. Ushio still had to prove that $1 million limit.

 

The issue here was the number at the corporate level: was the corporation initially capitalized (for cash and property other than stock and securities) for $1 million or less? If yes, then all the issued stock qualified. If no, the corporation must identify which shares qualified and which shares did not.

        

It is possible that PCHG was not even close to $1 million in capitalization, in which a copy of its initial tax return might be sufficient. Alternatively, PCHG’s attorney or accountant might/should have records to document this requirement.        

 

(2)  PCHG never had gross receipts.

 

This means that PHGC could not meet the 50% of gross receipts requirement, as it had no gross receipts at all.

 

Note that opening a savings or money market account would not have helped. PCHG might then have had gross receipts, but 100% of its gross receipts would have been interest income – the wrong kind of income.

Mr Ushio did not have a Section 1244 loss, as PCHG did not qualify due to the gross-receipts requirement. You cannot do percentages off a denominator of zero.

My first thought when reviewing the case was the long odds of the IRS even looking at the return, much less disallowing a Section 1244 loss on said return. That is not what happened. The IRS was initially looking at other areas of the Ushio return. In fact, Ushio had not even claimed a capital loss – much less a Section 1244 loss – on the original return. The issue came up during the examination, making it easy for the IRS to say “prove it.”

How would a tax advisor deal with this gross-receipts hurdle in practice?

Well, the initial and planned activity of PCHG failed to produce any revenues. It seems to me that an advisor would look to parachute-in another activity that would produce some – any – revenues, in order to meet the Section 1244 requirement. The tax Code wants to see an operating business, and it uses gross receipts as its screen for operations.

Could the IRS challenge such effort as failing to rise to the level of a trade or business or otherwise lacking economic substance? Well, yes, but consider the alternative: a slam-dunk failure to qualify under Section 1244.

Our case this time was Ushio v Commissioner, TC Summary Opinion 2021-27.

Abandoning A Partnership Interest

I suspect that most taxpayers know that there is a difference between long-term capital gains and ordinary income. Long-term capital gains receive a lower tax rate, incentivizing one to prefer long-terms gains, if at all possible.

Capital losses are not as useful. Capital losses offset capital gains, whether short-term or long-term. If one has net capital losses left over, then one can claim up to $3,000 of such losses to offset non-capital gain income (think your W-2).

That $3,000 number has not changed since I was in school.

And there is an example of a back-door tax increase. Congress has imposed an effective tax increase by not pegging the $3,000 to (at least) the rate of inflation for the last how-many decades. It is the same thing they have done with the threshold amount for the net investment income or the additional Medicare tax. It is an easy way to raise taxes without publicly raising taxes.

I am looking at a case where two brothers owned Edwin Watts Golf. Most of the stores were located on real estate also owned by the brothers, so the brothers owned two things: a golf supply business and the real estate it was housed in.

In 2003 a private equity firm (Wellspring) offered the brothers $93 million for the business. The brothers took the money (so would I), kept the real estate and agreed to certain terms, such as Wellspring having control over any sale of the business. The brothers also received a small partnership position with Wellspring.

Why did they keep the real estate? Because the golf businesses were paying rent, meaning that even more money went their way.

The day eventually came when Wellspring wanted out; that is what private equity does, after all. It was looking at two offers: one was with Dick’s Sporting Goods and the other with Sun Capital.  Dick’s Sporting already had its own stores and would have no need for the existing golf shop locations. The brothers realized that would be catastrophic for the easy-peasy rental income that was coming in, so they threw their weight behind the offer by Sun Capital.

Now, one does not own a private equity firm by being a dummy, so Wellspring wanted something in return for choosing Sun Capital over Dick’s Sporting.

Fine, said the brothers: you can keep our share of the sales proceeds.

The brothers did not run the proposed transaction past their tax advisor. This was unfortunate, as there was a tax trap waiting to spring.  

Generally speaking, the sale or exchange of a partnership interest results in capital gain or loss. The partners received no cash from the sale. Assuming they had basis (that is, money invested) in the partnership, the sale or exchange would have resulted in a capital loss.

Granted, one can use capital losses against capital gains, but that means one needs capital gains.   What if you do not have enough gains? Any gains? We then get back to an obsolete $3,000 per year allowance. Have a big enough loss and one would need the lifespan of a Tolkien elf to use-up the loss.

The brothers’ accountant found out what happened during tax season and well after the fact. He too knew the issue with capital losses. He played a card, in truth the only card he had. Could what happened be reinterpreted as the abandonment of a partnership interest?

There is something you don’t see every day.

Let’s talk about it.

This talk gets us into Code sections, as the reasoning is that one does not have a “sale or exchange” of a partnership interest if one abandons the interest. This gets the tax nerd away from the capital gain/loss requirement of Section 741 and into the more temperate climes of Section 165. One would plan the transaction to get to a more favorable Code section (165) and avoid a less favorable one (741). 

There are hurdles here, though. The first two are generally not a problem, but the third can be brutal.

The first two are as follows:

(1) The taxpayer must show an intent to abandon the interest; and

(2)  The taxpayer must show an affirmative act of abandonment.

This is not particularly hard to do, methinks. I would send a letter to the tax matters or general partner indicating my intent to abandon the interest, and then I would send (to all partners, if possible) a letter that I have in fact abandoned my interest and relinquished all rights and benefits thereunder. This assumes there is no partners’ meeting. If there was a meeting, I would do it there. Heck, I might do both to avoid all doubt.

What is the third hurdle?

There can be no “consideration” on the way out.

Consideration in tax means more than just receiving money. It also includes someone assuming debt you were previously responsible for.

The rule-of-thumb in a general partnership is that the partners are responsible for their allocable share of partnership debt. This is a problem, especially if one is not interested in being liable for any share of any debt. This is how we got to limited partnerships, where the general partner is responsible for the debts and the limited partners are not.

Extrapolating the above, a general partner in a general partnership is going to have issues abandoning a partnership interest if the partnership has debt. The partnership would have to pay-off that debt, refinance the debt from recourse to nonrecourse, or perhaps a partner or group of partners could assume the debt, excluding the partner who wants to abandon.

Yea, the planning can be messy for a general partnership.

It would be less messy for a limited partner in a limited partnership.

Then we have the limited liability companies. (LLCs). Those bad boys have a splash of general partnership, a sprinkling of limited partnership, and they can result in a stew of both rules.

The third plank to the abandonment of a partnership interest can be formidable, depending on how the entity is organized and how the debts are structured. If a partner wants an abandonment, it is more likely than not that pieces on the board have to be moved in order to get there.   

The brothers’ accountant however had no chance to move pieces before Wellspring sold Edwin Watts Golf. He held his breath and prepared tax returns showing the brothers as abandoning their partnership interests. This gave them ordinary losses, meaning that the losses were immediately useful on their tax returns.

The IRS caught it and said “no way.”

There were multiple chapters in the telling of this story, but in the end the Court decided for the IRS.

Why?

Because the brothers had the option of structuring the transaction to obtain the tax result they desired. If they wanted an abandonment, then they should have taken the steps necessary for an abandonment. They did not. There is a long-standing doctrine in the Code that a taxpayer is allowed to structure a transaction anyway he/she wishes, but once structured the taxpayer has to live with the consequences. This doctrine is not tolerant of taxpayer do-overs.

The brothers had a capital and not an ordinary loss. They were limited to capital gains plus $3 grand per year. Yay.

Our case this time for the home gamers was Watts, T.C. Memo 2017-114.

You Sell Your Lottery Winnings

I was looking at a case where someone won the New York State Lottery.

I could have worse issues, methinks.

But there was a tax issue that is worth talking about.

Let’s say you won $17.5 million in the lottery.

You elect to receive it 26 years.

          QUESTION: How is this going to be taxed?

Easy enough: the tax Code considers lottery proceeds to be the same as gambling income. It will be taxed the same as a W-2 or an IRA distribution. You will pay ordinary tax rates. You will probably be maxing the tax rates, truthfully.

Let’s say you collected for three years and then sold the remaining amounts-to-be-received for $7.1 million.

          QUESTION: How is this going to be taxed?

I see what you are doing. You are hoping to get that $7.1 million taxed at a capital gains rate.

You googled the definition of a capital asset and find the following:

            § 1221 Capital asset defined.

(a)  In general.

For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include-

(1)  stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business;

(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167 , or real property used in his trade or business;

(3) a patent, invention, model or design (whether or not patented), a secret formula or process, a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memorandum, or similar property, held by-

(A)  a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,

(B)  in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a taxpayer for whom such property was prepared or produced, or

(C)  a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined, for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or part by reference to the basis of such property in the hands of a taxpayer described in subparagraph (A) or (B) ;

(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or business for services rendered or from the sale of property described in paragraph (1) ;

(5) a publication of the United States Government (including the Congressional Record) which is received from the United States Government or any agency thereof, other than by purchase at the price at which it is offered for sale to the public, and which is held by-

(A)  a taxpayer who so received such publication, or

(B)  a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such publication is determined, for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or in part by reference to the basis of such publication in the hands of a taxpayer described in subparagraph (A) ;

(6) any commodities derivative financial instrument held by a commodities derivatives dealer, unless-

(A)  it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that such instrument has no connection to the activities of such dealer as a dealer, and

(B)  such instrument is clearly identified in such dealer's records as being described in subparagraph (A) before the close of the day on which it was acquired, originated, or entered into (or such other time as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe);

(7) any hedging transaction which is clearly identified as such before the close of the day on which it was acquired, originated, or entered into (or such other time as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe); or

(8) supplies of a type regularly used or consumed by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of a trade or business of the taxpayer.

Did you notice how this Code section is worded: a capital asset is property that is not …?

You don’t see anything there that looks like your lottery, and you are thinking maybe you have a capital asset. The sale of a capital asset gets one to capital gains tax, right?

You call me with your tax insight and planning.

If tax practice were only that easy.

You see, over the years the Courts have developed doctrines to fill-in the gaps in statutory Code language.

We have spoken of several doctrines before. One was the Cohan rule, named after George Cohan, who showed up at a tax audit long on deductions and short on supporting documentation.  The Court nonetheless allowed estimates for many of his expenses, reasoning that the Court knew he had incurred expenses and it would be unreasonable to allow nothing because of inadequate paperwork.

Congress felt that the Cohan rule could lead to abuses when it came to certain expenses such as meals, entertainment and travel. That is how Code section 274(d) came to be: as the anti-Cohan rule for selected expense types. No documentation means no deduction under Sec 274(d).

Back to our capital gains.

Look at the following language:

We do not see here any conversion of a capital investment. The lump sum consideration seems essentially a substitute for what would otherwise be received at a future time as ordinary income."

The substance of what was assigned was the right to receive future income. The substance of what was received was the present value of income which the recipient would otherwise obtain in the future. In short, consideration was paid for the right to receive future income, not for an increase in the value of the income-producing property."

This is from the Commissioner v PG Lake case in 1958.

The Court is describing what has come to be referred to as the “substitute for ordinary income” doctrine.

The easiest example is when you receive money right now for a future payment or series of future payments that would be treated as ordinary income when received.

Like a series of future lottery payments.

Mind you, there are limits on this doctrine. For example, one could argue that the value of a common stock is equal to its expected stream of future cash payments, whether as dividends or in liquidation. When looked at in such light, does that mean that the sale of stock today would be ordinary and not capital gain income?

The tax nerds would argue that it is not the same. You do not have the right to those future dividends until the company declares them, for example. Contrast that to a lottery that someone has already begun collecting. There is nothing left to do in that case but to wait for the mailman to come with your check.

I get the difference.

In our example the taxpayer got to pay ordinary tax rates on her $7.1 million. The Court relied on the “substitute for ordinary income” doctrine and a case from before many of us were born.

Our case this time was Prebola v Commissioner, TC Memo 2006-240.

Oh Henry!

It is a classic tax case.

Let’s travel back to the 1950s.

Let us introduce Robert Lee Henry, both an attorney and a CPA.  He was a tax expert, but he did not restrict his practice solely to tax.

He was also an accomplished competitive horse rider. After he returned from military service, the Army discontinued its horse show team. In response, he organized the United States horse show civilian team.

He met the wealthy and influential, benefiting his practice considerably.

Then he had to give up riding. Heart issues, I believe.

But he was quite interested in continuing to meet the to-do’s and well-connected.

He bought a boat.

He traded it in for a bigger boat.

He bought a flag for the boat. It was red, white and blue and had the numbers “1040.”

People would ask. He would present his background as a tax expert. He was meeting and greeting.

His doctor told him to relax and take time off. Robert Lee called his son, and together they took the boat from New York to Florida. They then decided to spend the winter, as they were already there.

Robert Lee deducted 100% of the boat expenses.

QUESTION: Can Robert Lee deduct the expenses?

NERDY DETAIL: The tax law changed after this case was decided, so the decision today would be easier than it was back in the 1950s. Still, could he deduct the boat expenses in the 1950s?

The key issue was whether the boat expenses were “ordinary and necessary.” That standard is fundamental to tax law and has been around since the beginning. Just because a business activity pays for something does not mean that it is deductible. It has to strain through the “ordinary and necessary” colander.

In truth, this is not a difficult standard in most cases. It can however catch one in an oddball or perhaps (overly) aggressive situation.

Robert Lee was an accomplished rider, and he had developed a book of business because of his equestrian accomplishments. He monetized his equestrian contacts. He now saw an opportunity to meet the same crowd of folk by means of a boat.

Problem: Robert Lee did not use the boat to entertain or transport existing clients or prospective contacts.

And there is the hook. Had he used the boat to entertain, he could more easily show an immediate and proximate relationship between the boat, its expenses and his legal and accounting practice.

He instead had to argue that the boat was a promotional scheme, akin to advertising. It was not as concrete as saying that he schmoozed rich people in the Atlantic on his boat.

He had to run the “ordinary and necessary” gauntlet.

Let’s start.

He continued to have a sizeable equestrian clientele after he left competitive riding.

Good.

He was however unable to provide the Court a single example of a client who came to him because of the boat, at least until years later. Even then, there still wasn’t much in the way of fees.

Bad.

So what, argued Robert Lee. How is this different from buying a full-page ad in an upscale magazine?

Quite a bit, said the Court. You gave up riding for health reasons. There is no question that you derived tremendous personal enjoyment from riding. You have now substituted boating for riding. Enjoyment does not mean that there is no business deduction, but it does mean that the Court may look with a more skeptical eye. It would have been an easier decision for us if you had bought a full-page ad. There is no personal joy in advertising.

As a professional, I have to develop and cultivate many contacts – business, social, personal, political – retorted Robert Lee. One never knows who one will meet, and it takes money to meet money. That is my business reason.

Could not agree with you more, replied the Court. Problem is, that does not make every expenditure deductible. What you are doing is not ordinary. Let’s be frank, Robert Lee, the average attorney/CPA does not keep a yacht.

They would if they could, muttered Robert Lee.

Even if we agreed the expenses were “ordinary,” continued the Court, we have to address whether they are “necessary.” This test is heightened when expenses may have been incurred primarily for personal reasons. You did sail from New York to Florida, by the way. With your son. And you deducted 100% of it.

I am meeting rich people, countered Robert Lee.

Perhaps, answered the Court, but there must be a proximate relationship between the expense and the activity. What you are talking about is remote and incidental. It is difficult to clear the “necessary” hurdle with your “someday I’ll” argument.

Robert Lee shot back: my point should be self-evident to any professional person.

COMMENT: Folks, do not say this when you are trying to persuade a Court.

The Court decided that Robert Lee could not prove either “ordinary” or “necessary.”

The conclusion that the expenditures here involved were primarily related to petitioner’s pleasure and only incidentally related to his business seems inescapable.”

The Court denied his boat deductions.

Our case this time for the home-gamers and riders was Henry v Commissioner.

Patents, Capital Gains and Hogitude

I have an acquaintance who has developed several patents.  He works for a defense contractor, so I suspect he has more opportunity than a tax CPA.

COMMENT: Did you know that tax advisors have tried to “patent” their tax planning? I suppose I could develop a tax shelter that creates partnership basis out of thin air and then pop the shelter to release a gargantuan capital loss to offset a more humongous capital gain…. Wait, that one has already been done. Fortunately, Congress passed legislation in 2011 effectively prohibiting such nonsense.

Let’s say that you develop a patent someday. Let’s also say that you have not signed away your rights as part of your employment package. Someone is now interested in your patent and you have a chance to ride the Money Train. You call to ask how about taxes.

Fair enough. It is not everyday that one talks about patents, even in a CPA firm.

Think of a patent as a rental property. Say you have a duplex. Every month you receive two rental checks. What type of income do you have?

You have rental income, which is to say you have ordinary income. It will run the tax brackets if you have enough income to make the run.

Let’s say you sell the duplex. What type of income do you have?

Let’s set aside depreciation recapture and all that arcana. You will have capital gains.

People prefer capital gains to ordinary income. Capital gains have a lower tax rate.

Patents present the same tax issue as your duplex. Collect on the patent - call it royalties, licensing fees or a peanut butter sandwich – and you have ordinary income. You can collect once or over a period of time; you can collect a fixed amount, a set percentage or on a sliding rate scale. It is all ordinary income.

Or you can sell the patent and have capital gains.

But you have to part with it, same as you have to part with the duplex. 

Intellectual property however is squishier than real estate, which make sense when you consider that IP exists only by force of law. You cannot throw IP onto the bed of a pickup truck.

Congress even passed a Code section just for patents:

§ 1235 Sale or exchange of patents.

(a)  General.

A transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or devise) of property consisting of all substantial rights to a patent, or an undivided interest therein which includes a part of all such rights, by any holder shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year, regardless of whether or not payments in consideration of such transfer are-

(1)  payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with the transferee's use of the patent, or (2) contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the property transferred.

The tax Code wants to see you part with “substantial rights,” which basically means the right to use and sell the patent. Limit such use – say by geography, calendar or industry line – and you probably have not parted with all substantial rights.

Bummer.

What if you sell to yourself?

It’s been tried, but good thinking, tax Padawan.

What if you sell to yourself but make it look like you did not?

This has potential. Your training is starting to kick-in.

Time to repeat the standard tax mantra:

pigs get fat; hogs get slaughtered

Do not push the planning to absurd levels, unless you are Google or Apple and have teams of lawyers and accountants chomping on the bit to make the tax literature.

Let’s look at the Cooper case as an example of hogitude.

James Cooper was an engineer with more than 75 patents to his credit. He and his wife formed a company, which in turn entered into a patent commercialization deal with an independent third party.

So far, so good. The Coopers got capital gains.

But the deal went south.

The Coopers got their patents back.

Having been burned, Cooper was now leery of the next deal. Some sharp attorney advised him to set up a company, keep his ownership below 25% and bring in “independent” but trusted partners.

Makes sense.

Mrs. Cooper called her sister to if she wanted to help out. She did. In fact, she had a friend who could also help out.

Neither had any experience with patents, either creating or commercializing them.

Not fatal, methinks.

They both had full-time jobs.

So what, say I.

They signed checks and transferred funds as directed by the accountants and attorneys.

They did not pursue independent ways to monetize the patents, relying almost exclusively on Mr. Cooper.

This is slipping away a bit. There is a concept of “agency” in the tax Code. Do exactly what someone tells you and the Code may consider you to be a proxy for that someone.

Maybe the tax advisors should wrap this up and live to fight another day.

The sister and her friend transferred some of the patents back to Cooper.

Good.

For no money.

Bad.

The sister and her friend owned 76% of the company. They emptied the company of its income-producing assets, receiving nothing in return. Real business owners do not do that. They might have a career in the House of Representatives, though.

Meanwhile, Cooper quickly made a patent deal with someone and cleared six figures.

This mess wound up in Tax Court.

To his credit, Cooper argued that the Court should just look at the paperwork and not ask too many questions. Hopefully he did it with aplomb, and a tin man, scarecrow and cowardly lion by his side.

The Tax Court was having none of his nonsense about substantial rights and 25% and no-calorie donuts.

The Court decided he did not meet the requirements of Section 1235.

The Tax Court also sustained a “substantial understatement” penalty. They clearly were not amused. 

Cooper reached for hogitude. He got nothing.