Blowing An Estate Tax Deduction

 

Let’s talk about the Estate of Martin W. Griffin.

Martin Griffin (Martin) was married to Maria Creel.

Martin created a revocable trust known as the Martin W. Griffin Trust.

COMMENT: A revocable trust means that the settlor (Martin in this case) can undo the trust. When that happens, the trust is disregarded and Martin and his revocable trust are considered the same person for tax purposes. The classic revocable trust is a “living trust,” which has no effect until one dies. Its purpose is not tax-driven at all and is instead to avoid probate.

Martin next created the MCC Irrevocable Trust.

COMMENT: Irrevocable means that Martin cannot undo the trust. He might be able to tweak a thing or two at the edges, but he cannot do away with the trust itself.

The Irrevocable Trust had the following language in the trust agreement:

The trust shall distribute the sum of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000) to the trustee then serving …. for the benefit of Maria C. Creel. From this bequest, the trustee … shall pay to Maria C. Creel a monthly distribution, as determined by Maria and Trustee to be a reasonable amount, not to exceed $9,000 ….”

You see the word “Estate” in the case name. The issue in this case is estate tax, and it involves passing assets at death to one’s surviving spouse. There are two general ways to do this:

·       You simply transfer the asset to the surviving spouse.

An example here is a principal residence. The deed is in both spouse’s names. When you die, the house transfers directly to her (I am assuming you are the husband). She can then do what she wants: she can keep the house, sell the house, rent it or whatever. She has unfettered control over the house.

·       You transfer a right – but not all the rights – to the asset.

Let’s stay with the above example. You instead transfer a life estate to your wife. Upon her death the house goes to your children from your first marriage. She no longer has unfettered control over the asset. She cannot sell the house, for example. She has some – but not all – incidents of ownership.

The reason this is important is that the estate tax will allow you to deduct category (1) assets from your taxable estate, but category (2) assets have to go through an additional hoop to get there.

Here is the relevant Code section:

26 U.S. Code § 2056 - Bequests, etc., to surviving spouse

(7) Election with respect to life estate for surviving spouse  

(A) In general In the case of qualified terminable interest property—  

(i) for purposes of subsection (a), such property shall be treated as passing to the surviving spouse, and

(ii) for purposes of paragraph (1)(A), no part of such property shall be treated as passing to any person other than the surviving spouse.  

(B) Qualified terminable interest property defined For purposes of this paragraph—  

(i)In general The term “qualified terminable interest property” means property—

(I) which passes from the decedent,

(II) in which the surviving spouse has a qualifying income interest for life, and

(III) to which an election under this paragraph applies.

Section 2056 addresses the hoops we are talking about. If you are transferring less than total and unfettered rights to an asset, you want to make sure that you are transferring enough to qualify the asset as “qualified terminable interest property.” If you do, you get a subtraction for estate tax purposes. If you do not, there is no subtraction. 

It takes a lot to get to an estate tax in 2025 (given the lifetime exemption), but – if you do – the rate ramps to 40% rather quickly.  

Back to Martin.  

The Irrevocable Trust transferred enough to qualify as qualified terminable interest property.

Here is the Court:

The $2 million bequest is not QTIP. It is terminable interest property that does not qualify for the marital deduction and is includible in the estate.”

Huh? What happened?

Go back to (B)(iii) above:

(III) to which an election under this paragraph applies.

How do you make the election?

You include the asset on Schedule M of Form 706 (that is, the estate tax return):

That’s it. It is not complicated, but it must be done. The Code requires it.

Someone missed this while preparing Martin W Griffin’s estate tax return.

Yep, I expect a malpractice suit.

Wiping Out An Inherited IRA

I came across an unfortunate tax situation this week.

It has to do with IRAs and trusts.

More specifically, naming a trust as a beneficiary of an IRA.

This carried a bit more punch before the tax law change of the SECURE Act, effective for 2020. Prior to the change, best planning for an inherited IRA frequently included a much younger beneficiary. This would reset the required distribution table, with the result that the monies could stay in the IRA for decades longer than if the original owner had lived. This was referred to as the “stretch” IRA. The SECURE Act changed that result for most beneficiaries, and now IRAs have to distribute – in general – over no longer than 10 years. 

Trusts created a problem for stretch IRAs, as trusts do not have an age or life expectancy like people do. This led to something called the “look-through” or “conduit” trust, allowing one to look-through the trust to its beneficiary in arriving at an age and life expectancy to make the stretch work.

The steam has gone out of the conduit trust.

One might still want to use a trust as an IRA beneficiary, though. Why? Here is an example:

The individual beneficiary has special needs. There may be income and/or asset restrictions in order to obtain government benefits.

What is the point, you ask? Doesn’t the IRA have to distribute to the individual over no more than 10 years?

Well … not quite. The IRA has to distribute to the trust (which is the IRA beneficiary) over no more than 10 years. The trust, in turn, does not have to distribute anything to its individual beneficiary.

This is referred to as an accumulation trust. Yes, it gets expensive because the trust tax rates are unreasonably compressed. Still, the nontax objectives may well outweigh the taxes involved in accumulating.

There is something about an inherited IRA that can go wrong, however. Do you remember something called a “60-day rollover?” This is when you receive a check from your IRA and put the money back within 60 days. I am not a fan, and I can think of very few cases where I would use or recommend it.

Why?

Because of Murphy’s Law, what I do and have done for over 35 years.

You know who can do a 60-day rollover?

Only a surviving spouse can use a 60-day rollover on an inherited IRA.  

You know who cannot do a 60-day rollover on an inherited IRA?

Anyone other than a surviving spouse.

It is pretty clear-cut.  

I am looking at someone who did not get the memo.

Here are the highlights:

·      Husband died.

·      The wife rolled the IRA into her own name (this is a special rule only for surviving spouses).

·      The wife died.

·      A trust for the kids inherited the IRA.

No harm, no foul so far.

·      The kids wanted to trade stocks within the IRA.

So it begins.

·      The IRA custodian told the kids that they would have to transfer the money someplace else if they wanted to trade.

No prob. The kids should have the IRA custodian transfer the money directly to the custodian of a new IRA that will let them trade to their heart’s content.

·      The kids had the IRA custodian transfer the money to a non-IRA account owned by the trust.

And so it ends.

The kids were hosed. They tried a Hail Mary by filing a private letter request with the IRS, asking for permission to put the money back in the IRA. The IRS looked at the tax law for a split second … and said “No.”

The IRS was right.

And, as usual, I wonder what happened with calling the tax advisor before moving around not-insignificant amounts of money.  

One can point out that taxes would have been payable as the kids withdrew money, and an inherited IRA has to distribute. If mom died in 2020 or later, the IRA would have to be distributed over no more than 10 years anyway.

Still, 10 years is 10 years. If nothing else, it would have given the kids the opportunity to avoid bunching all IRA income into one taxable year.

Not to mention paying for a private letter ruling, which is not cheap.

I hope they enjoy their stock trading.

The cite for the home gamers is PLR 202125007.

A Puff Piece

 

Although we do not condone her inconsistency, we find it is merely puffery in an attempt to obtain new employment and of no significance here.”

There is a word one rarely sees in tax cases: puffery.

Puffery is an exaggeration. It approaches a lie but stops short, and presumably no “reasonable” person would believe what is being said or take it literally. The distinction matters if one’s puffery can be used against them as a statement of fact.

Let’s look at the Robinson case.

Mr Robinson had a lawn care business. Beverly Robinson had a job at Georgia Pacific, but in 2007 she started working at the lawn care business. She did the billing. She was also listed on the business checking account, but she never wrote checks.

She must have been the face of the business through, as for 2007 through 2009 most of the Forms 1099 to the business were sent in her name.

In 2010 the marriage went south. Mr Robinson moved out, and Beverly’s dad chipped-in to pay the mortgage on her house. Needless to say, she was not working at the company with all that going on.

In 2011 they filed a joint tax return for 2010. The return showed tax due of approximately $43 grand. She must have separated hard from the business, as no Forms 1099 were issued to her; all the Forms 1099 were issued to him.

COMMENT: I do not understand filing a joint tax return with someone you are likely to divorce. In Beverly’s defense, though, she did not realize that she had an option. They hired a tax preparer (likely because of the business), but the preparer never explained that the option to file separately existed.

In 2011 she was telling the IRS that they could not pay the 2010 tax debt. She also asked about innocent spouse status.

In 2012 they file a joint 2011 tax return. She was working again at another Georgia Pacific facility and had tax withholdings. The IRS took her withholdings and applied them to the 2010 tax year.

COMMENT: That is how it works.

In 2013 Beverly needed to find a new job. She uploaded her resume on a jobseeker website. She listed her Georgia Pacific gig. She also listed Robinson Lawn Care and embellished her duties, especially glossing over the fact that she no longer worked there.

In 2013 Mr Robinson somehow forced his way back into her house. She called the police and was told that they could not evict him since the two were still married.

In October, 2013 she filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.

About time. The year before Mr Robinson had fathered a child with another woman. In 2013 he started paying her child support.

The divorce became final in 2014. Mr Robinson agreed to assume the 2010 tax due.

Riiiight.

In 2015 she files for innocent spouse because of that 2010 tax debt and the IRS continuing to take her refunds.

The IRS turned down her request.

One of the requirements is that the tax liability for which the spouse is seeking relief belong to the “nonrequesting” spouse. In this case, the nonrequesting spouse was Mr Robinson.

He testified that he had moved out of the house in 2013. Oh, he also remembered Beverly working in the business in 2010.

Not good.

The IRS looked at certain Florida registrations that showed her name through 2014.

They also pointed out that she was a signatory on the business checking account.

Then they looked at her resume on that jobseeker website.

The Court was having none of it.

As for Mr Robinson:

Throughout the trial Mr. Robinson’s testimony was relatively inconsistent, and we give it little value.”

As for the registrations:

Although petitioner is listed as the registered owner of Robinson Lawn Care from December 1998 to December 2014, we find the reason for her filing the fictitious name--that her former husband worked during the day--is a sufficient explanation for why she is listed instead of Mr. Robinson. Moreover, she did not sign any State filings in 2010 or thereafter.

As for the checking account:

Similarly we find that petitioner’s name on the business account is not persuasive support for respondent’s position as Mr. Robinson had control of that account and she never wrote checks on it.

The Court pointed out that none of the 2010 Forms 1099 were made out to her, in clear contrast to prior tax years.

We saw above the Court’s comment on her puffery.

It was clear who the Court believed – and did not believe.

The Court decided that she was entitled to innocent spouse relief.

She cut it close, though.

Our case this time was Beverly Robinson v Commissioner of Internal Revenue T.C. Memo 2020-134.

Can Creditors Reach The Retirement Account Of A Divorced Spouse?

Let’s say that you divorce. Let say that retirement savings are unequal between you and your ex-spouse. As part of the settlement you receive a portion of your spouse’s 401(k) under a “QDRO” order.

COMMENT: A QDRO is a way to get around the rule prohibiting alienation or assignment of benefits under a qualified retirement plan. I generally think of QDROs as arising from divorce, but they could also go to a child or other dependent of the plan participant.

Your QDRO has (almost) the same restrictions as any other retirement savings. As far as you or I are concerned, it IS a retirement account.

You file for bankruptcy.

Can your creditors reach the QDRO?

Sometimes I scratch my head over bankruptcy decisions. The reason is that bankruptcy – while having tax consequences – is its own area of law. If the law part pulls a bit more weight than the tax part, then the tax consequence may be nonintuitive.

Let’s segue to an inherited IRA for a moment. Someone passes away and his/her IRA goes to you. What happens to it in your bankruptcy?

The Supreme Court addressed this in Clark, where the Court had to address the definition of “retirement funds” otherwise protected from creditors in bankruptcy.

The Court said there were three critical differences between a plain-old IRA and an inherited IRA:

(1)  The holder of an inherited IRA can never add to the account.

(2)  The holder of an inherited IRA must draw money virtually immediately. There is no waiting until one reaches or nears retirement.

(3)  The holder of an inherited IRA can drain the account at any time – and without a penalty.

The Court observed that:

Nothing about the inherited IRA’s legal characteristics would prevent (or even discourage) the individual from using the entire balance of the account on a vacation home or sports car immediately after bankruptcy proceedings are complete.”

The Court continued that – to qualify under bankruptcy – it is not sufficient that monies be inside an IRA. Those monies must also rise to the level of “retirement funds,” and – since the inheritor could empty the account at a moment’s notice - the Court was simply not seeing that with inherited IRAs.

I get it.

Let’s switch out the inherited IRA and substitute a QDRO. With a QDRO, the alternate payee steps into the shoes of the plan participant.

The Eighth Circuit steps in and applies the 3-factor test of Clark to the QDRO. Let’s walk through it:

(1)  The alternate payee cannot add to a QDRO.

(2)  The alternate payee does not have to start immediate withdrawals – unless of required age.

(3)  The alternate payee cannot – unless of required age - immediately empty the account and buy that vacation home or sports car.

By my account, the QDRO fails the first test but passes the next two. Since there are three tests and the QDRO passes two, I expect the QDRO to be “retirement funds” as bankruptcy law uses the term.

And I would be wrong.

The Eighth Circuit notes that tests 2 and 3 do not apply to a QDRO. The Court then concludes that the QDRO has only one test, and the QDRO fails that.

The Eighth Circuit explains that Clark:

… clearly suggests that the exemption is limited to individuals who create and contribute funds into the retirement account.”

It is not clear to me, but there you have it – at least if you live in the Eighth Circuit.

No bankruptcy protection for you.

Our case this time for the home gamers was In re Lerbakken.

Rolling Over An Inherited IRA

I am not a fan of the 60-day IRA rollover.

I admit that my response is colored by being the tax guy cleaning-up when something goes awry. Unless the administrator just refuses a trustee-to-trustee rollover, I am hard pressed to come up with a persuasive reason why someone should receive a check during a rollover.

Let’s go over a case. I want you to guess whether the rollover did or did not work.

Taxpayer’s mom died in 2008.

Mom had two IRAs. She left them to her daughter, who received two checks: one for $2,828 and a second for $35,358.

The daughter rolled over $35,358 and kept the smaller check.

On her tax return, she reported gross IRA distributions of $38,194 (there is a small difference; I do not know why) and taxable distributions of $2,828.

She did not have an early distribution penalty, as that penalty does not apply to inherited accounts.

The IRS flagged her, saying that the full $38,194 was taxable.

What do you think?

Let’s go over it.

There is no question she was well within the 60-day period.

The money went into an IRA account. This is not a case where monies erroneously went into something other than an IRA.

This was the daughter’s only rollover, so we are not triggering the rule where one can only roll IRA monies in this manner once every twelve months.

The Court decided that the daughter was taxable on the full amount.

Why?

She ran face-first into a sub-rule: one cannot rollover an inherited account, with the exception of a surviving spouse.

The daughter argued that she intended to roll and also substantially complied with the rollover rules.

Here is the Tax Court:

The Code’s lines are arbitrary. Congress has concluded that some lines of this kind are appropriate. The judiciary is not authorized to redraw the boundaries.”

This is a polite way of saying that tax rules sometimes make no sense. They just are. The Tax Court, not being a court of equity, cannot decide a case just because a result might be viewed as unfair.

The Court did not address the point, but there is one more issue at play here.

There are penalties for overfunding an IRA.

Say that you can put away $6,500. You instead put away $10,000. You have overfunded by $3,500.

So what?

You have to get the excess money out of there, that’s what.

Normally I recommend that the $3,500 be moved as a contribution to the following year, nixing the penalty issue.

Let’s say that you do not do that. In fact, you do not even know to do that.

For whatever reason, the IRS examines your return five years later. Say they catch the issue. You now owe a 6% penalty on the overfunding.

That’s not bad, you think. You will pay $210 and move on.

Nope.

It is 6% a year.

And you still have to get the $3,500 out.

Except it is now not $3,500. It is $3,500 plus any earnings thereon for five years.

Say that amount is $5,500, including earnings.

You take out $5,500.

You have five years of 6% penalties. You also have tax on $2,000 (that is, $5,500 minus $3,500).

If you are under 59 ½ you probably have an early-distribution penalty on the $2,000.

Plus penalties and interest on top of that.

I like to think that the Tax Court cut the taxpayer a break by not spotlighting the overfunding penalty issue.

Our case this time was Beech v Commissioner.

A Divorce Decree And Past Taxes

Let’s say that a couple divorces. The divorce decree stipulates that liability for previous federal taxes will be split 50:50. They had always filed jointly The IRS audits one or more of those earlier years and assesses additional taxes.

Question: what is each spouse’s liability?

Your first thought might be 50:50, as that is what the divorce decree says.

Our protagonists this time would find out.

Mae Asad and Sam Akel filed joint returns for 2008 and 2009. The IRS audited those years, looking at rental losses. They disallowed the losses and assessed over $30,000 in taxes and penalties.

Mae filed for innocent spouse.

Later Sam filed for innocent spouse.

NOTE: Filing for innocent spouse status means that a spouse (probably an ex-spouse, but I had a client who was still married) has been assessed taxes for which he/she does not believe he/she is responsible. The classic case is the stay-at-home spouse, the other self-employed spouse, and the stay-at-home has no participation in or knowledge of the other’s business. Think Carmela Soprano.

The IRS bounced both requests for innocent spouse.

Both ex-spouses filed with the Tax Court.

Before the hearing, the IRS conceded that Mae was responsible for 28% of the 2008 tax and 41% of the 2009 tax. Sam of course was responsible for the balance.

Seems to me that Sam might not like this deal.

I do not know how, but Mae agreed to a 50:50 split. She did not have to, mind you.

The courts have been consistent that a divorce decree is not binding on the IRS, as the IRS is not party to the divorce.  A joint return means that both spouses are liable, and the IRS can go after one … or both, to the extent the IRS desires. The decree may provide for a former spouse to seek restitution against the other, but it has no impact on the IRS.

The Court accepted the IRS previous concession to Mae of 28% and 41%. It did not have to observe the divorce decree and it did not.

Then the Court reviewed the penalties of over $5,000.

But there had been a fatal flaw,

You see, Mae and Sam had filed pro se with the Tax Court. Pro se means one is going in without professional representation (not exactly correct, but close enough). It happens with small tax cases. The paperwork to get to Court and the procedural rules once there are more lenient for small cases.

Sam and Mae had not included the penalty in their petition to the Court.

The Court did not have authority to review the penalties.

But it did provide us a clear example of the downside to representing oneself pro se.