Use Of Wrong Form Costs A Tax Refund

Let’s talk about the following Regulation:

26 CFR § 301.6402-2

Claims for credit or refund

(b) Grounds set forth in claim.

(1) No refund or credit will be allowed after the expiration of the statutory period of limitation applicable to the filing of a claim therefor except upon one or more of the grounds set forth in a claim filed before the expiration of such period. The claim must set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof. The statement of the grounds and facts must be verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury. A claim which does not comply with this paragraph will not be considered for any purpose as a claim for refund or credit.

That last sentence is critical and – potentially – punishing.

I suspect the most common “claim for refund” is an amended return. There are other ways to claim, however, depending on the tax at issue. For example, businesses requested refunds of federal payroll taxes under the employee retention credit (“ERC”) program by filing Form 941-X. You or I would (more likely) file our claim for refund on Form 1040-X. 

File a 1040-X and the tax “variance doctrine” comes into play. This means that the filing must substantially inform the IRS of the grounds and reasons that one is requesting a refund. Both parties have responsibilities in tax administration. A taxpayer must adequately apprise so the IRS can consider the request without further investigation or the time and expense of litigation.

Here is a Court on this point in Charter Co v United States:

The law requires a taxpayer “to do more than give the government a good lead based on the government’s ability to infer interconnectedness.”

Another way to say this is that the IRS is not required to go all Sherlock Holmes to figure out what you are talking about. 

Let’s look at the Shleifer case.

Scott Shleifer was a partner in an investment firm. He travelled domestically and abroad to investigate new and existing investment opportunities. Scott was not a fan of commercial airfare, so he used his personal plane. He waived off reimbursement from the partnership for his air travel.

COMMENT: Scott is different from you or me.

The Shleifers filed their 2014 joint individual tax return. Whereas it is not stated in the case, we can assume that their 2014 return was extended to October 15, 2015.

In October 2018 they filed an amended return requesting a refund of almost $1.9 million.

COMMENT: And there you have your claim. In addition, notice that the two Octobers were three years apart. Remember that the statute of limitations for amending a return is three years. Coincidence? No, no coincidence.

What drove the amended return was depreciation on the plane. The accountant put the depreciation on Schedule C. It was – in fact – the only number on the Schedule C.

In July 2020 the IRS selected the amended return for audit.

COMMENT: A refund of almost $1.9 million will do that.

The Shleifer’s accountant represented them throughout the audit.

In March 2022 the IRS denied the refund.

Why?

Look at the Schedule C header above. It refers to a profit or loss “from business.” Scott was not “in business” with his plane. It instead was his personal plane. He did not sell tickets for flights on his plane. He did not rent or lease the plane for other pilots to use. It was a personal asset, a toy if you will, and perhaps comparable to a very high-end car. Granted, he sometimes used the plane for business purposes, but it did not cease being his toy. What it wasn’t was a business.

The accountant put the depreciation on the wrong form.

As a partner, Scott would have received a Schedule K-1 from the investment partnership. The business income thereon would have been reported on his Schedule E. While the letters C and E are close together in the alphabet, these forms represent different things. For example:

·       There must be a trade or business to file a Schedule C. Lack of said trade or business is a common denominator in the “hobby loss” cases that populate tax literature.

·       A partnership must be in a trade or business to file Schedule E. A partner himself/herself does not need to be active or participating. The testing of trade or business is done at the partnership - not the partner - level.

·       A partner can and might incur expenses on behalf of a partnership. White there are requirements (it’s tax: there are always requirements), a partner might be able to show those expenses along with the Schedule K-1 numbers on his/her Schedule E. This does have the elegance of keeping the partnership numbers close together on the same form.   

After the audit went south, the accountant explained to the IRS examiner that he was now preparing, and Scott was now reporting the airplane expenses as unreimbursed partner expenses. He further commented that the arithmetic was the same whether the airplane expenses were reported on Schedule C or on Schedule E. The examiner seemed to agree, as he noted in his report that the depreciation might have been valid for 2014 if only the accountant had put the number on the correct form.

You know the matter went to litigation.

The Shleifers had several arguments, including the conversation the accountant had with the examiner (doesn’t that count for something?); that they met the substantive requirements for a depreciation deduction; and that the IRS was well aware that their claim for refund was due to depreciation on a plane.

The Court nonetheless decided in favor of the IRS.

Why?

Go back to the last sentence of Reg 301.6402-2(b)(1):

A claim which does not comply with this paragraph will not be considered for any purpose as a claim for refund or credit.

The Shleifers did not file a valid refund claim that the Court could review.

Here is the Court:

Although the mistake was costly and the result is harsh …”

Yes, it was.

What do I think?

You see here the ongoing tension between complying with the technical requirements of the Code and substantially complying with its spirit and intent.

I find it hard to believe that the IRS – at some point – did not realize that the depreciation deduction related to a business in which Scott was a partner. However, did the IRS have the authority to “move” the depreciation from one form to another? Then again, they did not have to. The accountant was right: the arithmetic worked out the same. All the IRS had to do was close the file and … move on.

But the IRS also had a point. The audit of Schedule C is different from that of Schedule E. For example, we mentioned earlier that there are requirements for claiming partnership expenses paid directly by a partner. Had the examiner known this, he likely would have wanted partnership documents, such as any reimbursement policy for these expenses. Granted, the examiner may have realized this as the audit went along, but the IRS did not know this when it selected the return for audit. I personally suspect the IRS would not have audited the return had the depreciation been reported correctly as a partner expense. 

And there you have the reason for the variance doctrine: the IRS has the right to rely on taxpayer representations in performing its tax administration. The IRS would have relied on these representations when it issued a $1.9 million refund – or selected the return for audit.

What a taxpayer cannot do is play bait and switch.

Our case this time was Shleifer v United States, U.S. District Court, So District Fla, Case #24-CV-80713-Rosenberg.

A Psychiatrist, Chauffer, Physician, Peace Officer, Pheasant Hunter

 

He said that his patients often called him a psychiatrist, chauffer, physician, peace officer, or even a pheasant hunter.”

He is David Laudon, a chiropractor in Minnesota and the subject of one of the more entertaining Tax Court opinions of the last decade. Laudon, however, reached too far for too long, and he was about to learn about snapback.

Back to the Court:

But not a ghostbuster. The Commissioner rhetorically asserted that some of Laudon’s trips might have made more sense if he was claiming to be a ghostbuster. Laudon then disclaimed any employment as a ghostbuster. In his reply brief the Commissioner conceded that Laudon was not ‘employed or under contract to perform work as a ghostbuster during the tax years at issue in this case.’”

Methinks Laudon missed the joke.

How did Laudon get to court?

Easy: he was audited for years 2007 through 2009.

His records were … colorful, humorous, inadequate.

Laudon did not keep records of his income in any decipherable form.”

The IRS did a reconstruction of his business income by analyzing his bank accounts. The rule of thumb is straightforward: all deposits are income unless one can prove otherwise. A common otherwise is when a taxpayer transfers money between accounts.

Laudon contends that the Commissioner failed to classify certain deposits as nontaxable, including insurance payments for damage to several vehicles, one of which was involved in a ‘high speed police chase’ with a man ‘high on meth and cocaine.’”

There is something you do not see every day. The other thing the Court did not see was “any evidence” that the deposits were what and as Laudon described.

We therefore accept the Commissioner’s reconstruction of income.”

On to deductions.

He treats some of his patients in his home and claims to use roughly half of his house – the basement and half of the garage – for business.”

This could be a problem. Rember that an office in home deduction requires exclusive business use of the space. He claimed a lot of space, ratcheting the pressure on “exclusive.”

Like many chiropractic offices, Laudon’s has beds, tables, and a waiting area. But unlike most, his also comes equipped with a Wii, Xbox 360, big-screen TVs and, for a time, a working hair salon.”

Hair salon? What kind of chiropractic office is this?

I see that Laudon represented himself at Tax Court. I would also guess that he represented himself during the audit. Why do I say that?

We particularly disbelieve his claim that the Xbox, Wii, big-screen TVs and other electronics in his basement were used exclusively for chiropractic purposes since this claim conflicts with his much more plausible admission to the IRS examiner during audit that his daughter and his girlfriend’s son would play these video games while he was on the phone.”

There is an example of why I almost never have a client meet or speak directly with the IRS – I cannot control the exchange.

Laudon was deducting between 40,000 and 60,000 miles per year for business purposes.

.. for example, driving to a ‘schizophrenic’ patient who was – on more than one occasion – ‘running scared of demons’ down a rural Minnesota highway .…”

That last part should be incorporated into a folk or country song. I can almost hear the melody.

Laudon apparently had a penchant for adult beverages.

Laudon claimed to have driven hundreds of miles per day – sometimes without a valid license ….”

I’ll bite. What happened to his license?

Even his testimony about multiple entries in the logs where he wrote “DUI” was not credible: He claimed that these were not references to being stopped by the police while under the influence, or driving while his license was suspended .…”

Then what were they?

They “instead were his misspellings of a patient named: 'Dewey' - a supposed patient of his.'"

This is starting to read like a sit com script. I am waiting for the reference to tiger blood.

But he had a mileage log, right? Did that count for anything?

Laudon had a mileage log, but it fails to meet section 274(d)’s standards. The … entry, for example, describes his purpose as ‘travel to and from places.’”

Zen-like. Nice.

The Court also looked at other expenses, including “Other Expenses” for the three years under audit.

Most of this amount - $22,665 – was a deduction for the value of Laudon’s labor, supplies and stolen goods ….”

Wait on it.

… related to the renovation of a home that Laudon neither lived nor worked in, or even owned.”

It fits. Well done, sir.

Laudon was getting clipped on almost every deduction.

But wait.

You know the IRS wanted penalties.

Laudon asserts the defense that he reasonably relied on the advice of a tax professional.”

Yep, that is a defense, but you must use a tax professional, provide all information – good or bad – to the professional and actually rely on the professional.

Moreover, while he claimed to have brought all of his receipts to H&R Block along with his summaries, he later stated that his preparers didn’t want him to just walk in with his receipts and have them add it up ….”

Folks, accountants do not add up grocery bags of receipts. Considering that the profession usually bills based on work time, I doubt you want to pay someone for adding up your receipts.

The Court was direct:

We don’t need to address the …. because we don’t believe that Laudon provided ‘necessary and accurate information’ to his advisor.”

At this point, the Court did not believe anything Laudon was saying.

Having blinded H&R Block to the details and peculiarities of his chiropractic enterprise, Laudon cannot now claim that he relied on H&R Block’s advice. We sustain the penalty.”

Our case this time was David William Laudon v Commissioner. T.C. Summary Opinion 2015-54.

If you read only one, make it this one.

Blowing An Estate Tax Deduction

 

Let’s talk about the Estate of Martin W. Griffin.

Martin Griffin (Martin) was married to Maria Creel.

Martin created a revocable trust known as the Martin W. Griffin Trust.

COMMENT: A revocable trust means that the settlor (Martin in this case) can undo the trust. When that happens, the trust is disregarded and Martin and his revocable trust are considered the same person for tax purposes. The classic revocable trust is a “living trust,” which has no effect until one dies. Its purpose is not tax-driven at all and is instead to avoid probate.

Martin next created the MCC Irrevocable Trust.

COMMENT: Irrevocable means that Martin cannot undo the trust. He might be able to tweak a thing or two at the edges, but he cannot do away with the trust itself.

The Irrevocable Trust had the following language in the trust agreement:

The trust shall distribute the sum of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000) to the trustee then serving …. for the benefit of Maria C. Creel. From this bequest, the trustee … shall pay to Maria C. Creel a monthly distribution, as determined by Maria and Trustee to be a reasonable amount, not to exceed $9,000 ….”

You see the word “Estate” in the case name. The issue in this case is estate tax, and it involves passing assets at death to one’s surviving spouse. There are two general ways to do this:

·       You simply transfer the asset to the surviving spouse.

An example here is a principal residence. The deed is in both spouse’s names. When you die, the house transfers directly to her (I am assuming you are the husband). She can then do what she wants: she can keep the house, sell the house, rent it or whatever. She has unfettered control over the house.

·       You transfer a right – but not all the rights – to the asset.

Let’s stay with the above example. You instead transfer a life estate to your wife. Upon her death the house goes to your children from your first marriage. She no longer has unfettered control over the asset. She cannot sell the house, for example. She has some – but not all – incidents of ownership.

The reason this is important is that the estate tax will allow you to deduct category (1) assets from your taxable estate, but category (2) assets have to go through an additional hoop to get there.

Here is the relevant Code section:

26 U.S. Code § 2056 - Bequests, etc., to surviving spouse

(7) Election with respect to life estate for surviving spouse  

(A) In general In the case of qualified terminable interest property—  

(i) for purposes of subsection (a), such property shall be treated as passing to the surviving spouse, and

(ii) for purposes of paragraph (1)(A), no part of such property shall be treated as passing to any person other than the surviving spouse.  

(B) Qualified terminable interest property defined For purposes of this paragraph—  

(i)In general The term “qualified terminable interest property” means property—

(I) which passes from the decedent,

(II) in which the surviving spouse has a qualifying income interest for life, and

(III) to which an election under this paragraph applies.

Section 2056 addresses the hoops we are talking about. If you are transferring less than total and unfettered rights to an asset, you want to make sure that you are transferring enough to qualify the asset as “qualified terminable interest property.” If you do, you get a subtraction for estate tax purposes. If you do not, there is no subtraction. 

It takes a lot to get to an estate tax in 2025 (given the lifetime exemption), but – if you do – the rate ramps to 40% rather quickly.  

Back to Martin.  

The Irrevocable Trust transferred enough to qualify as qualified terminable interest property.

Here is the Court:

The $2 million bequest is not QTIP. It is terminable interest property that does not qualify for the marital deduction and is includible in the estate.”

Huh? What happened?

Go back to (B)(iii) above:

(III) to which an election under this paragraph applies.

How do you make the election?

You include the asset on Schedule M of Form 706 (that is, the estate tax return):

That’s it. It is not complicated, but it must be done. The Code requires it.

Someone missed this while preparing Martin W Griffin’s estate tax return.

Yep, I expect a malpractice suit.

Loan Warehousing And The Claim of Right

 

Tax returns are generally filed in one-year increments.

That raises an accounting question: what if the transaction being accounted for stretches over more than one year?

A variation is:

Set aside whether the whether the transaction resolved in the same period. Was there doubt as to a material fact affecting the transaction? If one were to redo the accounting knowing what one knows now, would there be a different answer?

This is the backdrop for the claim of right doctrine. Judge Brandeis referred to it in North American Oil Consolidated v Burnet (1932):

If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent.”

You can immediately see a couple of requirements:

(1) The taxpayer is later required to return the money.

(2) The taxpayer, however, initially received the money without restriction upon its use.

If you are preparing a tax return and learn of the above, what do you do?

(1)  Amend the original tax return?

(2)  Deduct the repayment in the year of repayment?

It might not seem significant upon first hearing, but it can be. Here are two common ways it can be significant:

(1) The original year (that is, the year the income was reported) is closed under the statute of limitations.

(2) Tax rates have changed substantially between the years.

Congress finally passed a Code section codifying the claim of right doctrine in 1954:

26 U.S. Code § 1341 - Computation of tax where taxpayer restores substantial amount held under claim of right

(a) General rule If—

(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such item;

(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was established after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of such item; and

(3) the amount of such deduction exceeds $3,000,

then the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser of the following:

(4) the tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction; or

(5) an amount equal to—

(A) the tax for the taxable year computed without such deduction, minus

(B) the decrease in tax under this chapter (or the corresponding provisions of prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable year (or years) which would result solely from the exclusion of such item (or portion thereof) from gross income for such prior taxable year (or years).

This is a rare find in the tax Code, as Congress actually expanded the claim of right to make it more taxpayer friendly. The Code still allows a deduction in the year of repayment, but it also allows a recalculation using the original year’s tax rates. If tax rates have decreased (overall or yours personally), the recalculation of the original year may be the better way to go.

Let’s look at Norwich Commercial Group v Commissioner.

Here is the first sentence of the decision:

P overreported more than $7 million in income on its 2007 through 2013 federal income tax returns."

Big number. It caught my attention.

Norwich was a residential mortgage loan originator. It engaged in warehouse lending, a term that may sound mysterious but is really not. Here is what warehousing means in a lending context: 

• Norwich (call it the warehouse) borrows money, likely on a line of credit, to start the transaction. 
• The warehouse lends the money to a customer (in this case, a home buyer) in exchange for a promissory note. 
• The warehouse sells the promissory note to an investor. The money received from the sale is (almost certainly) deposited with the lender the warehouse itself borrowed the money from. 
• The lender does its calculations: how much is owed, how much interest is due and other charges, if any. It subtracts this amount from the amount deposited. Whatever is leftover is returned to the warehouse as gross profit (in this context called: mortgage fee income).

If you think about it, this is an inventory accounting of sorts, except that the inventory is money lent.

So, Norwich was a warehouse.

Liberty was Norwich’s primary lender. There were others, but let’s sidestep as they are not necessary to understand the tax issue at play.

Norwich had to design an accounting procedure for its mortgage fee income. It did the following: 

• First, all mortgage deposits were posted to Mortgage Fee Income.
• Second, the amounts kept by Liberty reduced Mortgage Fee Income.
• Third, Norwich would adjust Mortgage Fee Income to whatever Liberty said it was.
• Fourth, the difference was assumed to be Unsold Mortgages.

I get it, but Norwich should backstop its critical accounts.

Let’s see:

(1)  Cash

a.     Well, that is easy to backstop with a bank statement.

(2)  Loan payable to Liberty.

a.     Again: easy. Liberty should be able to tell them that number.

(3)  Unsold Mortgages.

a.     Liberty cannot help Norwich here, as these have not entered Liberty’s accounting system. They are off the radar as far as Liberty is concerned.

We have identified the weak spot in the accounting, as Unsold Mortgages are just a subtraction. Best practice would involve keeping detail – more or less, as required – to have a reality check on the running balance.

In 2014 Norwich started using new accounting software.

It could not reconcile certain accounts.

COMMENT: This is my shocked face.

Norwich contacted Liberty, who in turn provided detail and balances to help with reconciliations. One of those numbers was collateral held by Liberty to secure the line of credit. The collateral included everything, including loans in process or otherwise but not yet sold by Norwich.

If that sounds a lot like Norwich’s Unsold Mortgages account, that is because it is.

Liberty’s number was significantly less than Norwich’s – by over $7 million. Mind you, all this stuff was collateral for the line of credit. If the actual Unsold Mortgages balance was substantially less than previously reported, Norwich might be undercollateralized. The term for this is “out of trust,” and it could also cause problems for Liberty on the regulator side.

BTW Liberty did not initially believe that Norwich was correct or that the situation was urgent. Norwich tried repeatedly to schedule meetings with Liberty. Liberty in turn delayed, expecting nothing to be amiss.

We will fast forward through the banking side of this.

Norwich filed its claim of right refund – for $7.5 million – on its 2014 tax return.

The IRS denied the refund entirely.

You know this went to Court.

And the arguments are easy to predict:

Norwich: We had an unrestricted right to that income in prior years. It was not until 2014 that we discovered otherwise. Under claim of right, 2014 is the proper year for the deduction.

IRS: Everything here is a loan. Norwich issued loans. Norwich borrowed on loans. When originated loans were sold, Norwich in turn paid back its loans. Everything that happened here circles around loans of one type or another. The claim of right has nothing to do with loans.

Both sides had a point.

Here is the Court:

This, the Commissioner focuses on the origin of the funds rather than the origin of the transaction ….”

I agree. The business activity required extensive use of loans, but the intended result of all the loans was to generate a profit, not to maintain a loan into perpetuity.

The Court noted that everybody - including Liberty - thought that Norwich was entitled to the money when Norwich received it.

The repayment was also deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense and was not barred by another Code section.

2014 was also the correct year for the deduction. It was the year Norwich found the error, which discovery was memorialized in paperwork between Norwich and Liberty. Norwich agreed to either (1) provide more collateral or (2) pay down its line of credit with Liberty.

The Court did tweak some numbers, but overall Norwich prevailed in its claim of right refund request.

Our case this time was Norwich Commercial Group v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2025-43.