Deducting Expenses Paid With Paycheck Protection Loans

There was a case in 1931 that is influencing a public controversy today.

Let’s talk about it.

The taxpayer (Slayton) was in the business of buying, holding and selling tax-exempt bonds. He would at times borrow money to buy or to carry tax-exempt bonds he already owned.

Slayton had tax-exempt interest income coming in. That amount was approximately $65 thousand.

Slayton was also paying interest. That amount was approximately $78 thousand.

COMMENT: On first read it does not appear that dear old Slayton was the Warren Buffett of his day.

Time came to file his tax return. He omitted the $65 grand in interest received because … well, it was tax-exempt.

He deducted the $78 grand that he was paying to carry those tax-exempt securities.

The IRS said no dice.

Off to Court they went.

Slayton was hot. He made several arguments:

(1)  The government was discriminating against owners of tax-exempt securities and – in effect – nullifying their exemption from taxation.

(2)  The government was discriminating against dealers in tax-exempt bonds that had to borrow money to carry an inventory of such bonds.

(3)  The government was discriminating in favor of dealers of tax-exempt bonds who did not have to borrow to carry an inventory of such bonds.

I admit: he had a point.

The government had a point too.

(1)  The income remained tax-exempt. The issue at hand was not the interest income; rather it was the interest expense.

(2)  Slayton borrowed money for the express purpose of carrying tax-exempt securities. This was not an instance where someone owned an insubstantial amount of tax-exempts within a larger portfolio or where a business owning tax-exempts borrowed money to meet normal business needs.

The link between the bonds and the loans to buy them was too strong in this case. The Court disallowed the interest expense. Since then, tax practitioners refer to the Slayton issue as the “double-dip.”  The dip even has its own Code section:

        § 265 Expenses and interest relating to tax-exempt income.

(a)  General rule.

No deduction shall be allowed for-

(1)  Expenses.

Any amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable to one or more classes of income other than interest (whether or not any amount of income of that class or classes is received or accrued) wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this subtitle, or any amount otherwise allowable under section 212 (relating to expenses for production of income) which is allocable to interest (whether or not any amount of such interest is received or accrued) wholly exempt from the taxes imposed by this subtitle.

Over the years the dip has evolved to include income other than tax-exempt interest, but the core concept remains: one cannot deduct expenses with too strong a tie to nontaxable income.

Let’s fast forward almost 90 years and IRS Notice 2020-32.

To the extent that section 1106(i) of the CARES Act operates to exclude from gross income the amount of a covered loan forgiven under section 1106(b) of the CARES Act, the application of section 1106(i) results in a “class of exempt income” under §1.265- 1(b)(1) of the Regulations. Accordingly, section 265(a)(1) of the Code disallows any otherwise allowable deduction under any provision of the Code, including sections 162 and 163, for the amount of any payment of an eligible section 1106 expense to the extent of the resulting covered loan forgiveness (up to the aggregate amount forgiven) because such payment is allocable to tax-exempt income. Consistent with the purpose of section 265, this treatment prevents a double tax benefit.

I admit, it is not friendly reading.

The CARES Act is a reference to the Paycheck Protection loans. These are SBA loans created in response to COVID-19 to help businesses pay salaries and rent. If the business uses the monies for their intended purpose, the government will forgive the loan.

Generally speaking, forgiveness of a loan results in taxable income, with exceptions for extreme cases such as bankruptcy. The tax reasoning is that one is “wealthier” than before, and the government can tax that accession to wealth as income.

However, the CARES Act specifically stated that forgiveness of a Paycheck Protection loan would not result in taxable income.

So we have:

(1)  A loan that should be taxable – but isn’t - when it is forgiven.

(2)  A loan whose proceeds are used to pay salaries and rent, which are routine deductible expenses.

This sets up the question:

Are the salaries, rent and other qualified expenses paid with a Paycheck Protection loan deductible?

You see how we got to this question, with Section 265, Slayton and subsequent cases that expanded on the double dip.

The IRS said No.

This answer makes sense from a tax perspective.

This answer does not make sense from a political perspective, with Senators Wyden and Grassley and Representative Neal writing to Secretary Mnuchin that this result was not the intent of Congress.

I believe them.

I have a suggestion.

Change the tax law.

Marijuana And Tax-Exempt Status

I am not surprised.

I am looking at a Private Letter Ruling on a tax -exempt application for an entity involved with marijuana and CBD.

I doubt the CBD plays any role here. It is all about marijuana.

I have become sensitive to the issue as I have two friends who are dealing with chronic pain. The pain has risen to the level that it is injuring both their careers. The two have chosen different ways to manage: one does so through prescriptions and the other through marijuana.

Through one I have seen the debilitating effect of prescription painkillers.

The other friend wants me to establish a marijuana specialization here at Command Center.

I am not. I am looking to reduce, not expand, my work load.

What sets up the tax issue?

Federal tax law. More specifically, this Code section:

        § 280E Expenditures in connection with the illegal sale of drugs.

No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or business (or the activities which comprise such trade or business) consists of trafficking in controlled substances (within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Controlled Substances Act) which is prohibited by Federal law or the law of any State in which such trade or business is conducted.

Marijuana is a Schedule I substance, so it runs full-face into Section 280E. There is “no deduction or credit” allowed on that tax return.

There is one exception, and that has to do with the cost of the marijuana itself. Accountants refer to this as “cost of sales,” and it would include more than just the cost of the product. It would include costs associated with buying the product or storing it, for example. Still, the big bucks would be with the cost of the product itself.

There is a Court decision which defines taxable revenues as revenues after deduction for cost of goods sold. The decision applies to all businesses, not just marijuana.

What it leaves out is everything other than cost of sales, such as rent, utilities or the wages required to staff and run the business.

That gets expensive. One is paying taxes on business profit, without being allowed to deduct all the costs and expenses normally allowed in calculating business profit. That is not really “profit” in the common usage of the word.

I am reading that someone applied for tax exempt status. They argued that their exempt purpose was:

·      To aid financially disadvantaged patients and families affected by the cost of THC and CBD medical treatment

·      To educate health providers about THC and CBD medical treatments

·      To support research into said THC and CBD medical treatments

The entity anticipated the usual stuff:

·      It will be supported by contributions and gifts

·      It will develop a website, which will give it another venue to educate about its mission as well as fundraise

·      It will develop relevant medical and treatment literature

·      It will conduct relevant seminars and classes

·      It will organize support groups for patients and their families

·      It will track and publish relevant medical data

The IRS led with:

You were formed to aid financially disadvantaged patients and patient’s families who are affected by the costs of THC and CBD medical treatment by providing financial support to cover costs of living and other expenses that the patients may incur.”

It continued:

… you are providing funding to the users of these substances who may be struggling to pay living and/or travel expenses because of their use of these illegal substances. Furthermore, your financial assistance is only available to users of these substances.”

In response the entity argued that it did not directly provide THC or CBD to individuals nor did it provide direct funding for the same.

The IRS was unmoved:

You were formed for the purpose of providing financial assistance to individuals who are engaged [in] an illegal activity which is contrary to public policy.”

The IRS rejected the tax-exempt application.

There are numerous tax-exempts throughout the nation that counsel, research, educate and proselytize concerning their mission. A substance abuse clinic can provide methadone, for example. What it cannot do is provide the heroin.

The entity could, I suppose, withdraw the financial support platform from its mission statement, greatly increasing the likelihood for tax-exempt status.

If its core mission was to provide such financial support, however, this alternative might be unacceptable.

If I were advising, I might consider qualifying the entity as a supporting organization for a pain clinic. The clinic would likely address more than marijuana therapy (it would have to, otherwise we are just circling the block), which represents a dilution of the original mission. In addition, a supporting organization transfers some of its governance and authority to the supported organization. It may be that either or both of these factors could be deal-breakers.

It has been interesting to see the continuing push on this area of tax law.

New Tax On Colleges

I read that Harvard estimates that a change from the Tax Cut and Jobs Act will cost approximately $38 million.

Harvard is referring to the “endowment tax” on colleges and universities.

Have you heard about this?

Let us set up the issue by discussing the taxation of private foundations.

The “best” type of charity (at least tax-wise) is the 501(c)(3). These are the March of Dimes and United Ways, and they are publicly-supported by a broad group of interested donors. In general, this means a large number of individually modest donations. Mind you, there can be an outsized donation (or several), but there are mathematical tests to restrict a limited number of donors from providing a disproportionate amount of the charity’s support.

Then we get to private foundations. In general, this means that a limited number of donors provide a disproportionate amount of support. Say that CTG comes into big bucks and sets up the CTG Family Foundation. There is little question that one donor provided a lopsided amount of donations: that donor would be me. In its classic version, I would be the only one funding the CTG Family Foundation.

There can be issues when a foundation and a person are essentially alter egos, and the Code provides serious penalties should that someone forget the difference. Foundations have enhanced information reporting requirements, and they also pay a 2% income tax on their net investment income. The 2% tax is supposedly to pay for the increased IRS attention given foundations compared to publicly-supported charities.

The Tax Cut and Jobs Act created a new tax – the 1.4% tax on endowment income – and it targets an unexpected group: colleges and universities that enroll at least 500 tuition-paying students and have endowment assets of at least $500,000 per student.

Let me think this through. I went to graduate school at the University of Missouri at Columbia. Its student body is approximately 30,000. UMC would need an endowment of at least $15 billion to come within reach of this tax.

I have two immediate thoughts:

(1)  Tax practitioners commonly refer to the 2% tax on foundations as inconsequential, because … well, it is. My fee might be more than the tax; and

(2)  I am having a difficult time getting worked up over somebody who has $15 billion in the bank.

The endowment tax is designed to hit a minimal number of colleges and universities – probably less than 50 in total. It is expected to provide approximately $200 million in new taxes annually, not an insignificant sum but not budget-balancing either. As a consequence, there has been speculation as to its provenance and purpose.

With this Congress has again introduced brain-numbing complexity to the tax Code. For example, the tax is supposed to exclude endowment funds used to carry-on the school’s tax-exempt purpose.  Folks, it does not take 30-plus years of tax practice to argue that everything a school does furthers its tax-exempt purpose, meaning there is nothing left to tax. Clearly that is not the intent of the law, and tax practitioners are breathlessly awaiting the IRS to provide near-Torahic definitions of terms in this area.  

The criticism of the tax has already begun. Here is Harvard referring to its $40 billion endowment:

“We remain opposed to this damaging and unprecedented tax that will not only reduce resources available to colleges and universities to promote excellence in teaching and to sustain innovative research…”

Breathe deeply there, Winchester. Explain again why any school with $40 billion in investments even charges tuition.

Which brings us to Berea College in central Kentucky, south of Lexington. The school has an endowment of approximately $700,000 per student, so it meets the first requirement of the tax. The initial draft of the tax bill would have pulled Berea into its dragnet, but there was bipartisan agreement that the second requirement refer to “tuition-paying” students.

So what?

Berea College does not charge tuition.

The Nick Saban Tax

Have you heard about the “Nick Saban” tax?

Let’s set it up.

There has been a longstanding tax provision limiting the deduction for public company executive compensation to $1 million. Mind you, this is not a restriction on how much you can pay an executive; the restriction only applies to how much you can deduct on a tax return. The restriction does not apply to all executives, either; it applies to the CEO, CFO and three other most-highly-paids.

But there was an exception large enough for the Fortune 500 to drive through. The exception was for “performance.” Magically and almost overnight, virtually all executive compensation packages became based on “performance.” Options were considered performance-based, and eventually options came to be passed around like candy. Realistically, one had to refuse to do any tax planning for this provision to actually apply.

This changed with the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act passed in December, 2017. Congress tightened up this code Section (162(m)) by taking away the performance exception. The $1 million cap now has a real bite.

But Congress was still looking for money.

Congress decided to put the same $1 million compensation limit on nonprofits.

This creates a quandary, as nonprofits (generally) do not pay tax. If I were a nonprofit executive and Congress threatened to disallow my deduction, I would not be feeling the tremulous fear of my for-profit peers.

Congress thought of that. They decided that the nonprofit would pay a 21% tax on my behalf.

Whoa. Now you have my attention. Granted, the tax is not on me, but we all know how this works in the real world. Only small children and Congress believes in free. The rest of us have to pay.

Congress passed a tax provision applying the $1 million cap to the five highest- paid employees of a 501(a), which includes a 501(c)(3). Think nonprofits, certain hospitals, colleges and universities and the like.

BTW medical professors were excluded from this, so it appears clear that Congress was trying to reach the athletics programs and their coaches.

But there is a problem.

Here is Code section 4960 imposing the tax:

       (c)  Definitions and special rules.

For purposes of this section-

(1)  Applicable tax-exempt organization.

The term "applicable tax-exempt organization" means any organization which for the taxable year-

(A)  is exempt from taxation under section 501(a) ,

(B)  is a farmers' cooperative organization described in section 521(b)(1) ,

(C)  has income excluded from taxation under section 115(1) , or

(D)  is a political organization described in section 527(e)(1) .

What is that Section 115(1)?

         § 115 Income of states, municipalities, etc.

Gross income does not include-

(1)  income derived from any public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function and accruing to a State or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia; or …

What does this mean?

Congress thought that – by extending Section 4960 to reference Section 115(1) – it would reach those entities exempt via Section 115(1).

Entities such as Alabama.

Or the University of Alabama.

Why?

Because the University of Alabama is an instrumentality of the state of Alabama.

And here the tax law goes wonky.

The Courts have looked at the interaction of Sections 115(1) and 511(which is the unrelated business income tax which applies to a nonprofit). Can a state instrumentality (say a university) run a business – say a farm-to-table restaurant chain – and avoid the unrelated business income tax because of Section 115(1)? If that were the case, then Illinois could start a chain called Outfront Steakhouse, make a zillion dollars and never pay tax because of Section 115(1).

The Courts have clarified that is not the case. There is a limit to Section 115(1).

According to that reasoning, it seems to me that Congress should be able to tax those university salaries.

But there is another argument – the doctrine of implied statutory immunity. This arises from our federalist system of government: the federal government has to respect the state government. Under this theory, if the federal government wants to tax a state, it has to say so in an unambiguous manner – that is, it cannot be “implied.”

Continuing our example, if the federal government wanted to tax Illinois for opening a steakhouse chain and locating them adjacent to every Outback Steakhouse location throughout the land, it would have to say something like:

… the [] tax will apply to an entity relying upon Section 115(1) for nontaxability of their [] business activity should that activity be the same or substantially similar to a business activity conducted by a for-profit restaurant chain.”

That is explicit. That breaches implied statutory immunity. The tax would then stick.

Is that what Congress did with the new Section 4960(c) tax?

Nowhere close, it appears.

Under that reasoning the University of Alabama will not pay the Nick Saban tax, as the tax does not reach the University of Alabama.

There are universities clearly affected by this new law: Duke, for example, or Northwestern. They have to pay up. Think of it as the difference between a “public” university and a “tax-exempt” university.

But having the state name in the university’s name, however, does not mean that the university is exempt as “public.” It depends on how the university was organized and chartered. Texas A&M will be affected by the new tax provision, but the University of Texas - Austin will not. It is enough to give one a headache.

What happens next?

The easiest path is for Congress to revise Code section 4960 and clean up the language. Without Congressional action, you can be certain the “public” universities will litigate this matter. They have to.

But the likelihood of the present Congress accomplishing anything seems unlikely, at best.

Can Creditors Reach The Retirement Account Of A Divorced Spouse?

Let’s say that you divorce. Let say that retirement savings are unequal between you and your ex-spouse. As part of the settlement you receive a portion of your spouse’s 401(k) under a “QDRO” order.

COMMENT: A QDRO is a way to get around the rule prohibiting alienation or assignment of benefits under a qualified retirement plan. I generally think of QDROs as arising from divorce, but they could also go to a child or other dependent of the plan participant.

Your QDRO has (almost) the same restrictions as any other retirement savings. As far as you or I are concerned, it IS a retirement account.

You file for bankruptcy.

Can your creditors reach the QDRO?

Sometimes I scratch my head over bankruptcy decisions. The reason is that bankruptcy – while having tax consequences – is its own area of law. If the law part pulls a bit more weight than the tax part, then the tax consequence may be nonintuitive.

Let’s segue to an inherited IRA for a moment. Someone passes away and his/her IRA goes to you. What happens to it in your bankruptcy?

The Supreme Court addressed this in Clark, where the Court had to address the definition of “retirement funds” otherwise protected from creditors in bankruptcy.

The Court said there were three critical differences between a plain-old IRA and an inherited IRA:

(1)  The holder of an inherited IRA can never add to the account.

(2)  The holder of an inherited IRA must draw money virtually immediately. There is no waiting until one reaches or nears retirement.

(3)  The holder of an inherited IRA can drain the account at any time – and without a penalty.

The Court observed that:

Nothing about the inherited IRA’s legal characteristics would prevent (or even discourage) the individual from using the entire balance of the account on a vacation home or sports car immediately after bankruptcy proceedings are complete.”

The Court continued that – to qualify under bankruptcy – it is not sufficient that monies be inside an IRA. Those monies must also rise to the level of “retirement funds,” and – since the inheritor could empty the account at a moment’s notice - the Court was simply not seeing that with inherited IRAs.

I get it.

Let’s switch out the inherited IRA and substitute a QDRO. With a QDRO, the alternate payee steps into the shoes of the plan participant.

The Eighth Circuit steps in and applies the 3-factor test of Clark to the QDRO. Let’s walk through it:

(1)  The alternate payee cannot add to a QDRO.

(2)  The alternate payee does not have to start immediate withdrawals – unless of required age.

(3)  The alternate payee cannot – unless of required age - immediately empty the account and buy that vacation home or sports car.

By my account, the QDRO fails the first test but passes the next two. Since there are three tests and the QDRO passes two, I expect the QDRO to be “retirement funds” as bankruptcy law uses the term.

And I would be wrong.

The Eighth Circuit notes that tests 2 and 3 do not apply to a QDRO. The Court then concludes that the QDRO has only one test, and the QDRO fails that.

The Eighth Circuit explains that Clark:

… clearly suggests that the exemption is limited to individuals who create and contribute funds into the retirement account.”

It is not clear to me, but there you have it – at least if you live in the Eighth Circuit.

No bankruptcy protection for you.

Our case this time for the home gamers was In re Lerbakken.

Cincinnati Reds, Tax And Bobbleheads

Did you hear about the recent tax case concerning the Cincinnati Reds?

It has to do with sales and use tax. This area is considered dull, even by tax pros, who tend to have a fairly high tolerance for dull. But it involves the Reds, so let’s look at it.

The Reds bought promotional items - think bobbleheads - to give away. They claimed a sales tax exemption for resale, so the vendor did not charge them sales tax.

Ohio now wants the Reds to pay use tax on the promotional items.

COMMENT: Sales tax and use tax are (basically) the same thing, varying only by who is remitting the tax. If you go to an Allen Edmunds store and buy dress shoes, they will charge you sales tax and remit it to Ohio on your behalf. Let’s say that you buy the shoes online and are not charged sales tax. You are supposed to remit the sales tax you would have paid Allen Edmunds to Ohio, except that now it is called a use tax. 

The amount is not insignificant: about $88 grand to the Reds, although that covers 2008 through 2010.

What are the rules of the sales tax game?

The basic presumption is that every sale of tangible personal property and certain services within Ohio is taxable, although there are exemptions and exceptions. Those exemptions and exceptions had better be a tight fit, as they are to be strictly construed.

The Reds argued the following:

·      They budget their games for a forthcoming season in determining ticket prices.

·      All costs are thrown into a barrel: player payroll, stadium lease, Marty Brennaman, advertising, promotional items, etc.

·      They sell tickets to the games. Consequently, the costs – including the promotional items – have been resold, as their cost was incorporated in the ticket price.

·      Since there is a subsequent sale via a game ticket, the promotional items were purchased for resale and qualify for an exemption.

Ohio took a different tack:

·      The sale of tangible personal property is not subject to sales tax only if the buyer’s purpose is to resell the item to another buyer. Think Kroger’s, for example. Their sole purpose is to resell to you.

·      The purpose of the exemption is meant to delay sales taxation until that final sale, not to exempt the transaction from sales tax forever. There has to be another buyer.

·      The bobbleheads and other promotions were not meant for resale, as evidenced by the following:

o   Ticket prices remain the same throughout the season, irrespective of whether there is or isn’t a promotional giveaway.

o   Fans are not guaranteed to receive a bobblehead, as there is normally a limited supply.

o   Fans may not even know that they are purchasing a bobblehead, as the announcement may occur after purchase of the ticket.

The Ohio Board of Appeals rejected the Reds argument.

The critical issue was “consideration.”

Let’s say that you went to a game but arrived too late to get a bobblehead. You paid the same price as someone who did get a bobblehead, so where is the consideration? Ohio argued and the Board agreed that the bobbleheads were not resold but were distributed for free. There was no consideration. Without consideration one could not have a resale.

Here is the Board:

The evidence in the record supports our conclusion that the cost of the subject promotional items is not included in the ticket price.”

The Reds join murky water on the issue of promotional items. The Kansas City Royals, for example, do not pay use tax on their promotional items, but the Milwaukee Brewers do. Sales tax varies state by state.

Then again perhaps the Reds will do as the Cavaliers did: charge higher ticket prices for promotional giveaway games.

This is (unsurprisingly) heading to the Ohio Supreme Court. We will hear of The Cincinnati Reds, LLC v Commissioner again.

Honest Attorneys Go Farr

I had forgotten about the conversation.

About a couple of years ago I received a call from a nonclient concerning tax issues for his charity. I normally try to help, at least with general tax issues. I rarely, if ever, help with specific tax advice. That advice is tailored to a given person or situation and should occur in a professional – and compensated – relationship.

Some accountants will not even take the call. I get their point. Tax season, for example, is notorious for nonclient phone calls saying “I just have a quick question.” Sure. Get a Masters degree, practice for 30 years and you will have your answer, Grasshopper.

This phone-call fellow was thinking about drawing payroll from a charity he had founded. It had to do with housing, and he was thinking of contributing additional rental properties he owned personally. However, those rentals provided him some sweet cash flow, and he was looking at ways to retain some of that flow once the properties were in the charity.

Got it. A little benevolence. A little self-interest. Happens all the time.

What about drawing management fees for … you know, managing the properties for the charity.

Someone has to. A charity cannot do so itself because, well, it doesn’t have a body.

Now the hard facts: the charity did not have an independent Board or compensation committee. He was reluctant to form one, as he might not be able to control the outcome. There was no pretense of a comparative compensation or fee study. He arrived at his number because he needed X-amount of money to live on.

Cue the sounds of warning sirens going off.

This is not a likely client for me. I have no problem being aggressive – in fact, I may be more aggressive than the client - but we must agree to play within the lines. Play fudge and smudge and you can find another advisor. We are not making a mutual suicide pact here.

Let’s talk about “excess benefits” and nonprofits.

The concept is simple: the assets of a nonprofit must be used to advance the charitable mission and not for the benefit of organization insiders. If the IRS catches you doing this, there is a 25% penalty. Technically the IRS calls it an “excise tax,” but we know a penalty when we see one. Fail to correct the problem in a timely fashion and the penalty goes to 200%.

That is one of the harshest penalties in the Code.

Generally speaking, an excess benefit requires two things:

(1) Someone in a position to exercise substantial influence over the charity. The term is “disqualified,” and quickly expands to others related to, or companies owned by, such people.

(2) The charity transfers property (probably cash, of course) to a disqualified person without fair value in exchange.

The second one clearly reaches someone who is paid $250,000 for doing nothing but opening the mail, but it would also reach a below-market-interest-rate loan to a disqualified person.

And the second one can become ninja-level sneaky:

When the organization makes a payment to a disqualified for services, it must contemporaneously document its intent to treat such payment as consideration for services. The easiest way to do that is by an employment contract with the issuance of a Form W-2, but there can be other ways.

Fail to do that and it is almost certain that you have an excess benefit, even if the disqualified person is truly working there and even if the payment is reasonable. Think of it as “per se”: it just is.

Yet it happens all the time. How do people get around that “automatic” problem?

There is a safe-harbor in the Code.

(1) An independent Board approves the payment in advance.

(2) Prior to approval, the Board does comparative analysis and finds the amount reasonable, based on independent data.

(3) All the while the Board must document its decision-making process. It could hire an English or History graduate to write everything down, I suppose.

Follow the rules and you can hire a disqualified.

Don’t follow the rules and you are poking the bear. 

I thought my caller did not have a prayer.

Would I look into it, he asked.

Cheeky, I thought.

As I said, I forgot about the call, the caller and the “would I look into it.”

What made me think about this was a recent Tax Court decision. It involves someone who had previously organized the Association for Honest Attorneys (AHA). She had gotten it 501(c)(3) status and continued on as chief executive officer.

From its 990 series I can tell AHA is quite small.

Here is a blip from their website:

However, our C.E.O. has 40+ years experience, education and observation of the legal system, holds a B.S. and M.S. Degree in Administration of Justice from Wichita State University, and has helped take ten cases to the United States Supreme Court.

I do not know what a Masters in Administration of Justice is about, but it sounds like she has chops. She should be able to figure out the ins-and-outs of penalties and excess benefits.

She used the charity’s money for the following from 2010 through 2012:

1. Dillards
2. Walmart
3. A&A Auto Salvage
4. Derby Quick Lube
5. Westar Energy
6. Lowes
7. T&S Tree Service
8. Gene’s Stump Grinding Service
9. an animal clinic
10. St John’s Military School (her son’s tuition)
11. The exhumation and DNA testing of her father’s remains

Alrighty then. 

The Tax Court went through the exercise: she used charity money for personal purposes; she never reported the money as income; there was no pretense of the safe harbor.

She was on the hook for both the 25% and 200% excise tax.

How did she expect to get away with this?

I suspect she was playing the audit lottery. If she was not caught then there was no foul, or so she reasoned. That is more latitude than I have. As a tax professional, I am not permitted to consider the audit lottery when deciding whether to take or not take a tax position.

The case is Farr v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2018-2 for the home gamers.