Paying Tax Without Setting Foot In California

 

I expect that many tax practitioners would consider state taxes to be a bane in their professional practice. I – unsolicited and without trying – have known more than a few.

Let’s limit our discussion to state income tax.

Mind you, we are not discussing the right of a state to tax. I practice within a Tristate area (Indiana, Kentucky and Ohio) and all three states impose business and personal income taxes. Yes, it can get messy. Take bonus depreciation, for example. This is a federal tax provision allowing the accelerated deduction of equipment and similar asset purchases. Some states will follow along with the federal treatment, others will ignore it completely, and yet others will have some odd hybrid. Take a relatively simple business return with activities across multiple states, and depreciation alone can raise the difficulty level of the return.

Mind you, some states are user-friendly with their tax laws (at least, as much as possible), but some states do not even pretend to be.

I am going to crimp from a notorious California tax case, changing the underlying taxpayer just a smidge to someone you will recognize.

Let’s take a partially retired Cincinnati tax CPA. He has several California clients, both business and personal. He consults, prepares returns and assists with tax agency correspondence and issues.  He of course invoices for his work, and some of those California clients issue him a Form 1099 to memorialize the payment. Critically, he never sets foot in California, and he has not for decades.

Does our Cincinnati tax CPA need to file a California income tax return?

Let’s walk through this.

The California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) annually matches 1099s to filed returns to identify individuals who may not have filed required California returns. The FTB saw those California-origin 1099s and contacted our valiant protagonist, who explained that he did not live in California, had not been in California in years, and – given its current deterioration – had no intention to ever visit California for any reason.

The FTB rejected his explanation, explaining that he had performed services for California businesses and thus had California-source income. The FTB sent a Proposed Assessment for tax, penalty and interest.

Our scrappy hero protested the assessment.

The Office of Tax Appeals (a/k/a Vought) decided as follows:

California imposes a tax on the taxable income of every nonresident, broadly defined as “gross income and deductions derived from sources within this state.”

There is no dispute that appellant, as owner of a sole proprietorship … conducted his … business as a sole proprietor.”

Regulation 17951-4 does not define the term ‘unitary business,’ but the definition can be inferred from Regulation 17951-4(b) … applying to a nonresident’s business, trade or profession … conducted partly within and partly without the state, where the part conducted within the state and the part conducted without the state are not so separate and distinct from and unconnected to each other to be separate businesses, trades or professions.”

Here, appellant … conducted a one-service business …. Therefore, we find that appellant was conducting a unitary business.”

What is the point of all this gum flapping?

California wants to apportion the California invoices to California. They do not even care if you were ever there.

Under the statutory grant of authority of R&TC section 25136(b), the FTB promulgated Regulation 25136-2, which provides detailed market-based sales factor sourcing provisions that implement and interpret R&TC section 25136.”

Pray tell, oh Oracle. How shall R&TC section 25136 be interpreted?

Regulation 25136-2(c) states that sales from services are assigned to [California] to the extent the customer of the taxpayer receives the benefit of the service in [California].”

Here is the wrap:

       

I do not mean to distract the lofty legal minds at the big-building-with-marble columns, but don’t you have to start with more-than-one if you are uniting down to one? Is there a trick-of-the-language thing happening here? Asking for a friend.

The case we are discussing (with some literary license) is Appeal of Bindley (CA OTA, May 30, 2019, No. 18032402).

What got me thinking about Bindley is the (very) recent case of Xavier Garcia-Rojas v FTB, A172054, CA Ct of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, 5/1/26.

Garcia-Rojas was a radiologist from Texas. He read images from around the nation, some of which came from California. The FTB wanted its pound of flesh, relying on Appeal of Bindley above.

This is, BTW, how bad tax law metastasizes. The first court misses the pitch altogether, and the next court just piggybacks.

The Court fortunately recognized the issue:

Here is the decision:

Bindley held that a “self-employed screenplay writer” in Arizona was a unitary business, and thus could be taxed under regulation 17951-4(c). (Bindley, at pp. 1, 4–5.) But in doing so, it focused on the tests to determine whether two different businesses are unitary. (Bindley, at pp. 4–5.) It ignored that there must be separate business activities to unite. (Ibid.; Bunzl Distribution USA, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 991.) The Board also relies on regulation 25120, subdivision (b), but that regulation states it applies only if there are “two or more businesses of a single taxpayer.” Thus, the Board failed to show that Garcia-Rojas is a unitary business as a matter of law.

It took it a while but they eventually got it right. This did not help Bindley, however, who was robbed on an issue a second-year accounting student could spot.

This seems to be an awful lot of work just to determine if our winsome-CPA-hero-of-the-story needs to file a nonresident California tax return. It is also why many CPAs consider state tax to be the bane of their practice.

Abusing A Tax-Exempt

I am looking at a tax-exempt case that went off the rails.

There are rules in the tax-exempt area to encourage one to keep their nose clean. The rules can be different depending on whether the entity is a private foundation or not. The reason is that a foundation is generally considered more susceptible to influence than a “classic” tax-exempt, such as a 501(c)(3), as a foundation generally has a smaller pool of donors.

A doctor (Dr O) organized a 501(c)(3) called American Medical Missionary Care, Inc (AMMC) in 1998. In 2000 it applied for and received tax-exempt status from the IRS. Its exempt purpose was to operate a clinic in Michigan providing medical examination and treatment for individuals unable to afford such services.

Sounds like a great cause to me.

Dr O served as president. His spouse (Mrs O) served on the board of directors as well as secretary and treasurer over the years.

In 2013 AMMC filed its Form 990 reporting compensation of $26,000 paid Dr O and $21,000 paid Mrs O.

AMMC however issued W-2s of $26,000 apiece.

There is a mistake here, but it is not necessarily a big deal. They should tighten down the numbers going forward, though.

On its 2014 Form 990 AMMC reported no compensation to Dr or Mrs O.

Seems odd. Compensation does not tend to turn off and on like a spigot.

Meanwhile, Dr O had gotten in trouble with the Michigan Board of Medicine in 2014. He was required to pay a significant amount of money and also relinquished his medical license. Dr O eventually returned to Nigeria in 2017, leaving his wife in the United States.

The IRS selected the nonprofit for examination.

The revenue agent dug around the AMMC’s various bank accounts for 2014 and found biweekly checks to Mrs O of $1,000 each. There were also certified checks ranging from $6,000 to $10,000. In all, Dr and Mrs O had received cash, checks and money orders from AMMC totaling approximately $130 thousand.

The 990 showed the $130 grand as a loan receivable from Dr O.

Oh please.

Dr O got into trouble and needed cash. He turned to AMMC because that is where the money was. A loan implies an ability to repay and intent to collect, all within the normal course and conduct of business. I seriously doubt that is what we had here.

Dr O and Mrs O had outsized influence over the (c)(3). Who was going to tell them no, much less point out that making loans to officers and board members is minefield territory in the tax Code?

The IRS revenue agent felt the same way and assessed a tier-one penalty.

Penalties in the nonprofit area can be a bit different. There can be penalties on an individual or on the entity itself, for example. The more severe penalties revolve around “excess benefit” transactions and “disqualified persons,” which are – as you might suspect – people with substantial authority or influence over the tax-exempt. Dr O organized AMMC years before and served as its president. He was a poster child for a disqualified person.

The IRS assessed a tier-one penalty of $32,500. It also revoked the exempt status of AMMC.

Let’s walk through the tiered penalty.

The IRS assessed a tier-one penalty of $32,500 on the O's. This is 25% of the $130,000 that Dr and Mrs O drew in 2014. The reason I call it a “tier-one” is that there is a possible “tier two.” To avoid a tier-two, one has to return the money to the tax-exempt.

What happens if one fails to return the money?

The penalty goes to 200%.

This is one of the severest penalties in the tax Code, and Congress intended it that way. Years ago, the only recourse the IRS had was to revoke the entity’s exempt status. Congress felt that this response was a sledgehammer, and it instead created a set of “intermediate” penalties, shifting the burden to the person benefiting from the transaction. With that as background, Congress did not consider 200 percent as excessive.

So the O’s now had another penalty of $230,000.

COMMENT: 200 percent of $130,000 is $260,000, not $230,000. The Court made some tweaks which need not concern us here.

You may be wondering why Dr O would care, if he was safely ensconced in Nigeria.

For one, his wife was still in the United States.

And she was on the Board. She had served as secretary and treasurer. She was a disqualified person in her own right. She was also considered to be a disqualified person by being married to a disqualified person. She was not getting out of this snare.

Mrs O was going to get hammered.

She fielded a last stand:

(1) She argued that much of the money was distributed to needy people to help with rent and utilities, after-school programs for the kids and so forth.

Problem was: she had no records to substantiate any of this. She had not drawn checks in a manner commensurate with this storyline, although she testified that she would hold and re-deposit the certified checks back into the (c)(3) if and as needed. The Court was – by this point – quite skeptical of anything she had to say.

(2)  She argued that much of the money represented compensation to either her or both Dr O and her.

This was her best argument, but unfortunately this route was closed to her.

You see, AMMC should have issued W-2s if it intended for the monies to represent compensation. The tax-exempt did not issue W-2s for 2014. It did not even authorize compensation in its minutes. Some things have to be done currently, and this is one of those things.

A W-2 (or 1099) would have saved a penalty equal to twice its face amount. That is, a $26,000 W-2 to Dr O would have saved a penalty of $52,000 ($26,000 times 200%).

It was a worst-case scenario for the O’s.

Then again, they abused AMCC. That money did not belong to the O’s. It belonged to the (c)(3). The exempt purpose of AMMC was to assist the poor with access to medical care, not to enrich its founding family after the loss of a medical license.

Our case this time was Ononuju v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2021-94.

 

The Tax Doctrine Of The Fruit And The Tree

 

I am uncertain what the IRS saw in the case. The facts were very much in the taxpayer’s favor.

The IRS was throwing a penalty flag and asking the Court to call an assignment of income foul.

Let’s talk about it.

The tax concept for assignment-of-income is that a transaction has progressed so far that one has – for all real and practical purposes – realized income. One is just waiting for the check to arrive in the mail.

But what if one gives away the transaction – all, part or whatever – to someone else? Why? Well, one reason is to move the tax to someone else.

A classic case in this area is Helvering v Horst. Horst goes back to old days of coupon bonds, which actually had perforated coupons. One would tear-off a coupon and redeem it to receive an interest check. In this case the father owned the bonds. He tore off the coupons and gave them to his son, who in turn redeemed them and reported the income. Helvering v Horst gave tax practitioners the now-famous analogy of a tree and its fruit. The tree was the bond, and the fruit was the coupon. The Court observed:

… The fruit is not to be attributed to a different tree from that on which it grew.”

The Court decided that the father had income. If he wanted to move the income (the fruit) then he would have to move the bond (the tree).

Jon Dickinson (JD) was the chief financial officer and a shareholder of a Florida engineering firm. Several shareholders – including JD – had requested permission to transfer some of their shares to the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund (Fidelity). Why did they seek permission? There can be several reasons, but one appears key: it is Fidelity’s policy to immediately liquidate the donated stock. Being a private company, Fidelity could not just sell the shares in the stock market. No, the company would have to buy-back the stock. I presume that JD and the others shareholders wanted some assurance that the company would do so.

JD buttoned-down the donation:

·      The Board approved the transfers to Fidelity.

·      The company confirmed to Fidelity that its books and records reflected Fidelity as the new owner of the shares.

·      JD also sent a letter to Fidelity with each donation indicating that the transferred stock was “exclusively owned and controlled by Fidelity” and that Fidelity “is not and will not be under any obligation to redeem, sell or otherwise transfer” the stock.

·      Fidelity sent a letter to JD after each donation explaining that it had received and thereafter exercised “exclusive legal control over the contributed asset.”

So what did the IRS see here?

The IRS saw Fidelity’s standing policy to liquidate donated stock. As far as the IRS was concerned, the stock had been approved for redemption while JD still owned it. This would trigger Horst – that is, the transaction had progressed so far that JD was an inextricable part. Under the IRS scenario, JD would have a stock redemption – the company would have bought-back the stock from him and not Fidelity – and he would have taxable gain. Granted, JD would also have a donation (because he would have donated the cash from the stock sale to Fidelity), but the tax rules on charitable deductions would increase his income (for the gain) more than the decrease in his income (for the contribution). JD would owe tax.

The Court looked at two key issues:

(1)  Did JD part with the property absolutely and completely?

This one was a quick “yes.” The paperwork was buttoned-up as tight as could be.

(2)  Did JD donate the property before there was a fixed and determinable right to sale?

You can see where the IRS was swinging. All parties knew that Fidelity would redeem the stock; it was Fidelity’s policy. By approving the transfer of shares, the company had – in effect – “locked-in” the redemption while JD still owned the stock. This would trigger assignment-of-income, argued the IRS.

Except that there is a list of cases that look at formalities in situations like this. Fidelity had the right to request redemption – but the redemption had not been approved at the time of donation. While a seemingly gossamer distinction, it is a distinction with tremendous tax weight. Make a sizeable donation but fail to get the magic tax letter from the charity; you will quickly find out how serious the IRS is about formalities. Same thing here. JD and the company had checked all the boxes.

The Court did not see a tree and fruit scenario. There was no assignment of income. JD got his stock donation.

Our case this time was Dickinson v Commissioner, TC Memo 2020-128.