Losing An Alimony Tax Deduction

There are certain tax topics that repeat – weekly, monthly, ceaselessly and without end. One such is the tax issues surrounding divorce. I have often wondered why this happens, as divorce is surely one of the most lawyered life events an average person can experience. I will often skip divorce tax cases, as I am just tired of the topic.

But a recent one caught my eye.

The spouses were trying to work something out between them. It was clear to me that they solicited no tax advice, as they plunged off the bridge without checking the depth of the water below.

John and Beatrix were married. They legally separated in 2008 and divorced in 2013. In the interim John agreed to make 48 monthly maintenance payments of $2,289. There was a clause stipulating that payments were to be taxable to her and deductible by him, and the payments were to cease upon her remarriage or death.

John found himself unemployed. His payments were to begin in 2010. Presumably concerned about his financial situation, he and Beatrix agreed in 2009 to transfer his IRA worth $38,913.

John did not deduct the IRA as an alimony payment on his 2009 tax return.

Why not? Because Beatrix was to start withdrawing $2,289 monthly from the IRA the following year, presumably until the $38,913 was exhausted. It made more sense to John that those monthly payments would trigger the alimony.

There is some rhyme or reason to his thinking.

It appears his finances improved, as in 2010 he was able to directly pay Beatrix $6,920.  

In 2010 he deducted $27,468 ($2,289 times 12) as alimony.

The IRS disallowed all but $6,920.

Off to Tax Court they went.

There are four key statutory requirements before any payment can be deductible as alimony:

(1)  The payment must be required under a divorce or separation decree.

(2) The decree cannot say that the payments are not deductible/taxable.

(3)  The two individuals cannot be members of the same household.

(4) There cannot be any requirement to continue the payments after the death of the payee spouse.

It is amazing how often someone will fail one of these. A common story is one spouse beginning payments before the court issues the order, or a spouse paying more than the court order. Do that and the payment is not “required.” Another story is presuming that the payment is deductible because the decree says that it is. The IRS does not consider itself bound because one included such language in the decree.

Then there are the softer, non-key requirements.

For example, only cash payments will qualify as alimony.

If you think about this one for a moment, it makes sense. The Code already allows spouses to transfer property in a divorce without triggering tax (Code section 1041). This allows spouses to transfer the house, for example, as well as retirement benefits under a QDRO order. The Code views these transactions as property settlements – meaning the ex-spouses are simply dividing into separate ownership what they previously owned together.

COMMENT: It is highly debatable whether John’s IRA is “cash.”  Granted, there may be cash in the IRA, but that not is not the same as saying the IRA is cash or a cash equivalent. It would make more sense to say that it is the equivalent of stocks or mutual funds. This would make it property, not cash.

Let’s next go back to rule (4) above. A way to rephrase that rule is that the payee spouse cannot be enriched after death. Obviously, if maintenance payments were to continue after death, then the payee-spouse’s estate would be enriched. That is not allowed.

In our situation, Beatrix now owned an IRA. Granted, the expectation may have been that she would outlive any balance in the IRA, but that expectation is not controlling. If she passed away, the balance in the IRA would be hers to transfer pursuant to her beneficiary designation.

She was enriched. She had something that continued past her (albeit hypothetical) death.

Another issue was whether John should get credit for IRA withdrawals by Beatrix in 2010. Why?  John transferred the IRA to her in 2009. The account was no longer his. It was hers, and he could no longer piggyback on anything the IRA did. If he was going to deduct anything, he would have had to deduct it in 2009.

Which, by the way, he could not because of rule (1): it was not required under the decree. The decree called for payments beginning in 2010, not in 2009.

The Tax Court decided that John had a 2010 alimony deduction for $6,920, the amount he paid Beatrix directly.

Why did John do it this way? 

If John was less than 59 1/2, so he could not get into his IRA without penalty.  He could QDRO, but that is just a property settlement. John wanted an alimony deduction. If he kept the IRA, he would have income on the withdrawal and a deduction for the alimony. That is a push - except for the 10% penalty on the early withdrawal. John was in a tough spot.

Then again, maybe he didn't think of tax matters at all.

Diabetes, Disability And A Penalty

I have a friend who damaged his back, leading to nerve complications which have greatly affected his ability to work. Granted, he can still work, but not with the same intensity as before and certainly not for as many continuous hours. Sometimes by midday he has to take pain medications, which tend to knock him out. It is an unfortunate cycle, and the impact on his earning power is significant.

Let’s talk about disability. Then let’s talk about a disability exception to a penalty.

First, is disability income taxable or nontaxable?

Let’s confine this discussion to a disability policy purchased from an insurance company, omitting coverage from workers compensation and social security. There is a rule of thumb that is very important when thinking about disability insurance:

If you deducted the insurance, then payments under the insurance are taxable.

Let’s say that you purchased a short-term disability policy through your cafeteria plan. Amounts run through a cafeteria plan are generally not taxable to you. That is the point of the cafeteria, after all. Collect on the policy, however, and you trigger the above rule.

As a consequence, just about any financial or tax advisor will tell you to pay for disability insurance with after-tax dollars. The issue becomes even more important when purchasing long-term disability, as you would be permanently disabled (however defined) should you collect. You do not need the tax burden at the same time that your earning power is compromised.

You may recall that there is a 10% penalty if you take monies out of your 401(k) or IRA early. Early has different meanings, depending upon whether it is an IRA (or IRA-based) plan or a qualified plan. You can take money from a 401(k) at age 55 without penalty, for example, if you no longer work for the employer. An IRA does not care about your employer, but it does make you wait instead to age 59 ½. Take a distribution before those ages and you are likely facing a penalty.

But there is an exception to the 10% penalty if you get disabled.

Let’s say that you are injured enough to collect disability. Will that count for purposes of avoiding the 10% penalty?

You would think so, right?

Let’s talk about the Trainito case.

Trainito worked with the Boston Department of Environmental Health (DEH).  He was diagnosed with type 2 diabetes in 2005. He unfortunately did not take good care of himself, and he had continuous and increasing issues with neuropathy. He worked for DEH until October 2010, when he resigned due to the diabetes. He did not pursue disability benefits from DEH. Perhaps they did not offer such benefits.

Then he stopped taking his meds.

Fast forward six months. Trainito took a retirement distribution of over $22 thousand in April 2011.

Two months later he was found at his home in a diabetic coma. He was taken to a hospital where he spent more than a month recuperating, leaving the hospital in late July 2011. Damage was done, and he had reduced use of an arm and leg. He then applied for disability benefits with the state.

When preparing his return for 2011 he claimed the disability exception to the 10% penalty on the retirement distribution. The IRS disagreed, and the two found themselves in Tax Court.

The Code section at play is Sec 72(m)(7):

            (7) Meaning of disabled

For purposes of this section, an individual shall be considered to be disabled if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration. An individual shall not be considered to be disabled unless he furnishes proof of the existence thereof in such form and manner as the Secretary may require.

On first reading, it seems to make sense. Introduce an attorney and a couple of non-immediate points appear:

(1) The disability must be “total.”

This is a rewording of “unable to engage in any substantial gainful…” This is not an insignificant requirement, as it does not look to one’s regular and primary employment.

Many private disability policies will find you disabled if you are unable to perform your own occupation. The IRS definition is much stricter, requiring one to be unable to reasonably perform almost any occupation. As a consequence, it is possible that someone may be considered disabled by his/her insurance company but not considered so by this section.

(2) The distribution must be attributable to the disability.

The clearest way to show this is to take the distribution after being medically adjudged as disabled. Trainito did not do that. It is extremely likely that he knew he was seriously compromised by his diabetes, but he had not obtained a medical signoff to that effect.

The question before the Court was whether the absence of that medical signoff was fatal. 

The Court acknowledged that “substantial gainful activity” can be impaired by progressive diseases, such as diabetes. The Court further clarified that the presence of an impairment (such as diabetes) does not necessarily mean that an individual is disabled as intended under Sec 72(m)(7).

COMMENT: Makes sense. Odds are we each know someone who is diabetic but has it under medical control.

Trainito provided the Court with the record of his six weeks in the hospital, from June through July, 2011.  He was in a coma for most of it.

The Court wanted records back to April, 2011, when Trainito took the distribution.

Trainito testified that he saw a primary care doctor twice a month after being diagnosed in 2005. He stopped that when he was no longer working at DEH.

The Court sniffed:

Thus the fact that petitioner suffered a diabetic coma on June 12, 2011 does not indicate whether he was disabled on April 22, 2011. Petitioner undoubtedly suffered from diabetes on April 22, 2011 but he has not provided sufficient evidence to show that his diabetes caused him to be disabled within the meaning of section 72(m)(7).”

This seems a bit harsh. There is a “duh” element considering that he has a progressive disease. Perhaps if Trainito had his doctor testify, perhaps if he introduced his earlier medical records …

But Trainito did not have his doctor testify nor did he provide his earlier medical records. Why? Who knows. I suspect there may have been a financial consideration, but the Court did not say. It is also possible that he thought his testimony, accompanied by his shortly-thereafter month-long coma, would be sufficient proof to the Court.

The Court concluded that Trainito did not meet test (2) above: he did not show that the distribution was attributable to the disability. Trainito owed the penalty.

What are my thoughts?

Sometimes tax is not just about Code sections and Regulations. Sometimes it is about facts and – more importantly – being able to prove those facts. I believe you when you tell me that you donated multiple rooms of furniture to charity when you moved, but you still need receipts and documentation. I believe you when you explain how you supported your children from a previous marriage, but I still need to review the divorce decree and related legal paperwork to determine whether you can claim the children as dependents.

The IRS told Trainito to “prove it.”

He didn’t.

How An Estate Can Lose A Charitable Deduction

It happened again this week. I was speaking with another accountant when he raised a tax question concerning an “estate” return. My stock question to him was whether it was an “estate fiduciary” or an “estate estate.” Both have the word “estate” in it, so one needs further clarification.

What is the difference?

If one dies with too many assets, then the government requires one to pay taxes on the transfer of assets to the next person. This is sometimes referred to as the “death” tax, and I sometimes refer to it as the “estate estate” tax.

It has gotten a little more difficult to trigger the federal estate tax, as the taxable threshold has been raised to over $5 million. That pretty much clears out most folk.

Then you can have the issue of the estate earning income. How can this happen? An easy way is to own stock, or a business – or perhaps a part of a business through a partnership or S corporation. That income will belong to the estate until the business is transferred to the beneficiary. That may require a trip to probate court, getting on the docket, waiting on the judge…. In the interim the estate has income.

And what do you have when an estate has income? You have an income tax return, of course. There is no way the government is not going to grab its share. I sometimes refer to that tax return as the “estate fiduciary.” A trust is a fiduciary, for example. The estate is behaving as a fiduciary because it is handling money that belongs to other people – the same as a trust.

Say that an estate receives a disbursement from someone’s 401(k). That represents income. This is usually a significant amount, and Hamilton’s Third Theorem states that a percentage of a significant number is likely to also be a significant number. This seems to always come as a surprise when the attorney fires over an estate’s paperwork – usually very near the filing due date – with the expectation that I “take care of it.”

Then we are looking for deductions.

A fiduciary has a deduction called an “income distribution,” which I rely upon heavily in situations like this. We will not dwell on it, other than to say that the fiduciary may be allowed a deduction when he/she writes a check to a beneficiary.

No, the deduction I want to talk about today is about a contribution to charity.  Does our “estate fiduciary” get a deduction for a charity? You bet.

Let’s take this a step further. What if the estate intends to write a check to charity but it cannot just yet? Can it still get a deduction?

Yep.

This is a different rule than for you and me, folks. The estate has a more lenient rule because it may have to wait on a court hearing and receive a judge’s approval before writing that check. The IRS – acknowledging that this could wreak havoc on claiming deductions – grants a little leeway.

But only a little. This rule is known as the “set aside,” and one must meet three requirements:

(1)   The contribution is coming from estate income (that is, not from estate corpus)

(2)   The contribution must be allowed by estate organizing documents (like a will), and

(3)    The money must be permanently set aside, meaning that the likelihood that it would not be used as intended is negligible.

So, if we can clear the above three requirements – and the estate intends to make a contribution – then the estate has a possible deduction against that 401(k) distribution that I learned about only two or three days before the return is due.

What can go wrong?

One can flub the “negligible” requirement.

I cannot remember the last time I read about a case where someone flubbed this test, but I have recently finished reading one.

The decedent (Ms Belmont) passed way with a quarter million in her 401(k) and a condo in California. She lived in Ohio.

Alright, there is more than one state involved. It is a pain but it happens all the time.

Her brother lived in the condo. He was to receive approximately $50,000, with the bulk of the estate going to charity. He was under mental care, so there may have been a disability involved.

How can this blow up? Her brother did not want to move out of the house. He offered to exchange his $50,000 for a life estate. He really wanted to stay in that house.

The charity on the other hand did not want to be a landlord.

Her brother brought action and litigation. He argued that he had a life estate, and he was being deprived of his contractual rights.  He filed with the Los Angeles County Probate Court and the California Recorder’s Office.  

Meanwhile the estate fiduciary return was due. There was a big old number in there for the 401(k) distribution. The accountant – who somehow was not fully informed of developing events in California – claimed a charitable contribution deduction using the “set aside” doctrine.

The California court decided in the brother’s favor and orders a life estate to him and a remainder deed to the charity.

The estate thinks to itself, “what are the odds?” It keeps that set aside deduction on the estate fiduciary return though.

The IRS thinks otherwise. It points out that the brother was hip deep by the time the accountant prepared the return, and the argument that risks to the set aside were “negligible” were unreasonable when he was opening up all the guns to obtain that life estate.

The estate lost and the IRS  won. Under Hamilton’s Third Theorem, there was a big check due.

What do I see here? There was a tax flub, but I suspect that the underlying issue was non-tax related. Likely Ms Belmont expected to outlive her brother, especially if he was disabled. It did not occur to her to plan for the contingency that she might pass away first, or that he might contest a life estate in the house where he took care of their mom up to her death while his sister was in Ohio.

What Happens To Inherited IRAs in Bankruptcy?

Let us discuss IRAs.

You may be aware that there is bankruptcy protection for IRAs. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 exempts up to $1 million in IRAs created and funded by the debtor. Employer plans have even more favorable protection.

Why? The government has expressed interest that citizens be able to save for their retirement. This diminishes the odds of future government assistance and deemed in the public interest.

Fair enough. But I have one more question.

Let us say that you inherited the IRA. Does the above protection still apply to you?

Why wouldn’t it, you might ask. It is like an ice cream bar. It is still an ice cream bar whether you or I take it from the freezer, right?

This very question made it to the Supreme Court in the recent case of Clark v Rameker. While a bankruptcy case, it does have tax implications.

In 2001 Ruth Heffron established a traditional IRA and named her daughter as beneficiary.

NOTE:  “Traditional” means the classic IRA: contributions to it are deductible and withdrawals from it are taxable. Contrast this with a “nondeductible” IRA (contributions are nondeductible and withdrawals are taxable, according to a formula) and Roths (contributions are nondeductible and withdrawals are nontaxable).

Mrs Heffron passed away a year later – 2001 – and left approximately $400,000 to her daughter in the IRA account. Inherited IRAs have special rules on distributions, and one has to take distributions over a life expectancy or withdraw the entire balance within five years. Her daughter – Ms. Heffron-Clark - elected to use life expectancy with monthly distributions.

Fast forward to 2010 and Ms. Heffron-Clark and her husband file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The IRA has approximately $300,000 remaining, and you can bet that the couple considered the IRA to be an exempt asset. The unsecured creditors of the bankruptcy estate disagreed, thus beginning the litigation.

·       The Bankruptcy Court said that the IRA was not exempt and could be reached by creditors.

·       The District Court reversed, saying that the IRA was exempt and could not be reached by creditors.

·       The Appeals Court for the Seventh Circuit reversed, saying that the IRA was not exempt and could be reached by creditors.

This set up disagreement between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, so the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

Believe it or not, the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “retirement funds,” resulting in the above courts drawing such different conclusions. The Supreme Court declared that the term must be defined in order to arrive at a correct conclusion. The Court looked a dictionary and saw that “retirement” is defined as …

       … withdrawal from one’s occupation, business or office.”

The Court wanted to look at the legal characteristics of funds set aside for the day one stops working. It focused on three:

(1)  One can put additional monies into a retirement account.

POINT: One cannot put additional monies into an inherited account. In fact, if one inherits again, one cannot mingle the two accounts. Each is to remain separate and unique.

COUNTERPOINT: One cannot put additional monies into an IRA after age 70 ½.

(2)  Holders of an inherited account are required to begin distributions in the year following the death.

POINT: There are no age 59 ½ or 70 ½ minimum distribution requirements here. It does not matter whether the beneficiary is three years old or ninety-three; distributions must begin in the year following death, unless one fully depletes the account over 5 years.

OBSERVATION: The Court asked obvious question: how does this distribution requirement tie-in to the beneficiary’s retirement in any way?

(3)  The beneficiary can withdraw the entire balance at any time, without penalty.

POINT: You and I cannot do that with our own IRA until we are age 59 ½. 

OBSERVATION”: The Court noted that there is a ‘stick” if one wants to access a traditional IRA early – the 10% penalty. That expresses Congress’ intent to discourage use of traditional IRA s for day-to-day non-retirement purposes. The inherited IRA has no such prohibition. What does that say about Congress’ intent with inherited IRAs?

Rest assured that Ms Heffron-Clark was arguing furiously that the funds in that inherited IRA are “retirement funds” because, at some point, they were set aside for retirement.

The Court looked at the three criteria above and said that the inherited IRA certainly constitutes “funds,” but it cannot see how they rise to the level of “retirement funds.” They simply do not have the characteristics of normal retirement funds.

The Supreme Court unanimously decided that an inherited IRA do not constitute “retirement funds” and are not exempt from bankruptcy claims. Ms. Heffron-Clark’s creditors could in fact reach that $300 grand.

Granted, this is a bankruptcy case, but I see two immediate tax consequences from this decision:

(1) First, a surviving spouse (that is, the widow or widower) has a tax  option offered no other IRA beneficiary.

The surviving spouse can take the IRA as an inherited IRA (and be subject to bankruptcy claims) or he/she can rollover the IRA to his/her own personal name.

In the past, this decision was sometimes made based on the survivor’s age. For example, if the surviving spouse thought he/she might need the money before age 59 ½, the tax planner would lean towards an inherited IRA. Why? Because there is no 10% penalty for early withdrawals from an inherited IRA. There would be penalties on early withdrawals from a rollover IRA.

This decision now gives planners another reason to consider a spousal rollover.

(2) Second, there may be increased attention to IRA accumulation trusts.

A trust is allowed to be an IRA beneficiary, but at the cost of some highly specific tax rules. There are two types of permitted trusts. The first is the conduit trust. The trust receives the annual minimum required distributions (MRDs) but is required to immediately pay them out to the beneficiary.  While you may wonder what purpose this trust serves, consider that the trust – while unable to protect the annual income – can still protect the principal of the trust.

The second type is the accumulation trust. It is eponymous: it accumulates. There are no required distributions to the beneficiaries. The tax cost for this can be enormous, however. A trust reaches the maximum federal tax rate at the insanely low threshold of approximately $12,000. Obviously, this strategy works best when the beneficiaries are themselves at the maximum tax bracket.

The other point that occurred to me is the future of stretch IRAs. There has been considerable discussion about imposing a five-year distribution requirement (with very limited exceptions) on inherited IRAs. This of course is in response to the popular tax strategy of “stretch” IRAs. The stretch is easy to explain: I leave my IRA to my granddaughter. The IRA resets its mandatory distributions, using her life expectancy rather than mine (which is swell, as I am dead). Say that she is age 11. Whereas there are mandatory distributions, those distributions are spread out over the life expectancy of an eleven-year-old girl. That is the purpose and use of the “stretch.”

Consider that the Court just decided that an inherited IRA does not constitute “retirement funds.” This may make it easier for Congress to eventually do away with stretch IRAs.