I am looking
at Baldwin v U.S., at least as much as I can between the September and
October 15th due dates.
In the blog
equivalence of cinematic foreboding, the case comes out of the Ninth Circuit.
The Baldwins
filed a 2007 joint tax return showing an approximate $2.5 million loss from a
movie production business.
They filed
to carry the loss back to 2005 for a refund.
They had
three years to file the refund claim. The three years started with the filing
of their 2007 return – that is, the year that showed the loss. They filed their
2007 return on extension, so three years later would be October 15, 2011.
They filed
the refund claim on June 21, 2011.
Seems plenty
of time.
They filed
using regular mail.
The IRS said
they never received the refund claim.
Problem.
The three
years expired. Sorry about your luck, Baldwins, purred the IRS.
You know
this went to court.
It went to a
California district court.
And we get
to talk about the mailbox rule.
There is a
provision in the tax Code that timely-mailing-equals-timely filing with the
IRS. That is the reason you hear (not as much now in the era of electronic
filing) of people heading to the post office on April 15th. Folks
want to get that “April 15” stamped on the envelope, as that stamp means the
return is considered timely filed with the IRS.
By the way,
that provision did not enter the Code until 1954.
What did folks do before 1954?
They relied
on common law.
Common law
allows one to presume that a properly-mailed envelope will arrive in the
ordinary time required to get from here to there. One would have to prove that
one mailed the envelope, of course, but once that was done the presumption that
the mail arrived in normal time would kick-in.
In 1954
Congress added the following:
§ 7502 Timely
mailing treated as timely filing and paying.
If any return, claim, statement, or other document required to
be filed, or any payment required to be made, within a prescribed period or on
or before a prescribed date under authority of any provision of the internal
revenue laws is, after such period or such date, delivered by United States
mail to the agency, officer, or office with which such return, claim,
statement, or other document is required to be filed, or to which such payment
is required to be made, the date of the United States postmark stamped on the
cover in which such return, claim, statement, or other document, or payment, is
mailed shall be deemed to be the date of delivery or the date of payment, as
the case may be.
Section (c) is important here:
(c) Registered and
certified mailing; electronic filing.
For purposes of this section , if any return, claim, statement, or other document,
or payment, is sent by United States registered mail-
(A) such registration shall be prima facie evidence that
the return, claim, statement, or other document was delivered to the agency,
officer, or office to which addressed; and
(B) the date of registration shall be deemed the postmark
date.
Section (c)
is why accountants encourage the use of certified mail with tax returns.
But the
Baldwins did not certify their mailing.
They instead
argued that they met the common-law standard for timely filing.
Seems a
solid argument.
The IRS went
low.
There are Court
cases out there (Anderson, for example) that decided that the common law
standard continued to exist even after the codification of Section 7502. It
makes sense – at least to me - as that is what common law means.
The IRS
argued that Section 7502 did away with the common-law standard, and the cases
deciding otherwise were decided erroneously.
Sounds like
a truckload of fine-cut bull manure to me.
Let’s load the
truck.
There was a
case in 1984 called Chevron. From it came the Chevron doctrine, an
administrative law principle that a government agency’s interpretation of an
ambiguous or unclear statute should be respected by a court.
I get the
concept.
The first
thing the agency has to do is show that the statute is ambiguous or unclear.
Does Section
7502 appear ambiguous or unclear to you?
We are going
to need a jump to get this truck going.
Let’s introduce
National Cable & Telecommunications Association v Brand X. That case
has to do with the internet and whether it is an information service or a
telecommunication service.
Sounds boring.
Let’s look
at the Ninth Circuit’s take-away from Brand X:
But [a]
court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and
thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”
Let me
translate that word salad:
Since the
prior Court decisions (let’s use Anderson as an example) did not
specifically say that the statute was unambiguous, the statute is therefore
ambiguous.
Huh?
So, if I do
not make clear that I am not a Robert Howard sword-and-sorcery,
skilled, powerful and fearless giant weapon-wielding barbarian, then it can be
deduced that I am that very said barbarian?
Cool!
Brand X lets me say that Section 7502 is
ambiguous, at which point Chevron kicks-in and allows me to argue that
the underlying statute means anything I want it to say.
There is an
aisle for this at Borders. It is called “Fiction.”
The Baldwins
did not get to rely on common-law. Since they could not meet requirements of Section
7502(c), they lost out altogether. No carryback refund for them.