An Erroneous Tax Refund Check In The Mail

 

Let’s start with the Code section:

§ 6532 Periods of limitation on suits.

(b)  Suits by United States for recovery of erroneous refunds.

 

Recovery of an erroneous refund by suit under section 7405 shall be allowed only if such suit is begun within 2 years after the making of such refund, except that such suit may be brought at any time within 5 years from the making of the refund if it appears that any part of the refund was induced by fraud or misrepresentation of a material fact.

 

I have not lost sleep trying to understand that sentence.

But someone has.

Let’s introduce Jeffrey Page. He filed a 2016 tax return showing a $3,463 refund. In early May 2017, he received a refund check of $491,104. We are told that the IRS made a clerical error.

COMMENT: Stay tuned for more observations from Captain Obvious.

Page held the check for almost a year, finally cashing it on April 5, 2018.

The IRS – having seen the check cash – wanted the excess refund repaid.

Page wanted to enjoy the spoils.

Enter back and forth. Eventually Page returned $210,000 and kept the rest.

On March 31, 2020, Treasury sued Page in district court.

Page blew it off.

Treasury saw an easy victory and asked the district court for default judgement.

The court said no.

Why?

The court started with March 31, 2020. It subtracted two years to arrive at March 31, 2018. The court said that it did not know when Page received the check, but it most likely was before that date. If so, more than two years had passed, and Treasury could not pass Section 6532(b). They would not grant default. Treasury would have to prove its case.

Treasury argued that it was not the check issuance date being tested but rather the check clearance date. If one used the clearance date, the suit was timely.

The district court was having none of that. It pointed to precedence – from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals - and dismissed the case.

The government appealed.

To the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, ironically.

The Ninth wanted to know when a refund was “made.”

“within 2 years after the making of such refund …”

Is this when the refund is allowed or permitted or is it when the check clears or funds otherwise change hands?

The Ninth reasoned that merely holding the check does not rise to the threshold of “making” a refund.

Why, we ask?

Because Treasury could cancel the check.

OK. Score one for the government.

The Ninth further reasoned that the statute of limitations cannot start until the government is able to sue.

Why, we again ask?

Had Page shredded the check, could the government sue for nearly half a million dollars? Of course not. Well then, that indicates that a refund was not “made” when Page merely received a check.

Score two for the government.

The Ninth continued its reasoning, but we will fast forward to the conclusion:

… we hold that a refund is made when the check clears the Federal Reserve.”

Under that analysis, Treasury was timely in bring suit. The Ninth reversed the district court decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

What do I think?

I see common sense, although I admit the Ninth has many times previously eluded common sense. Decide otherwise, however, and Treasury could be negatively impacted by factors as uncontrollable as poor mail delivery.

Or by Page’s curious delay in depositing the check.

Then again, maybe a non-professional was researching the matter, and it took a while to navigate to Section 6532 and its two years.

Our case this time was U.S. v Page, No 21-17083 (9th Cir. June 26, 2024).

Use Certified Mail With The IRS

I am looking at Baldwin v U.S., at least as much as I can between the September and October 15^th due dates.

In the blog equivalence of cinematic foreboding, the case comes out of the Ninth Circuit.

The Baldwins filed a 2007 joint tax return showing an approximate $2.5 million loss from a movie production business.

They filed to carry the loss back to 2005 for a refund.

They had three years to file the refund claim. The three years started with the filing of their 2007 return – that is, the year that showed the loss. They filed their 2007 return on extension, so three years later would be October 15, 2011.

They filed the refund claim on June 21, 2011.

Seems plenty of time.

They filed using regular mail.

The IRS said they never received the refund claim.

Problem.

The three years expired. Sorry about your luck, Baldwins, purred the IRS.

You know this went to court.

It went to a California district court.

And we get to talk about the mailbox rule.

There is a provision in the tax Code that timely-mailing-equals-timely filing with the IRS. That is the reason you hear (not as much now in the era of electronic filing) of people heading to the post office on April 15^th. Folks want to get that “April 15” stamped on the envelope, as that stamp means the return is considered timely filed with the IRS.

By the way, that provision did not enter the Code until 1954.

What did folks do before 1954?

They relied on common law.

Common law allows one to presume that a properly-mailed envelope will arrive in the ordinary time required to get from here to there. One would have to prove that one mailed the envelope, of course, but once that was done the presumption that the mail arrived in normal time would kick-in.

In 1954 Congress added the following:

§ 7502 Timely mailing treated as timely filing and paying.

(a)  General rule.

(1)  Date of delivery.

If any return, claim, statement, or other document required to be filed, or any payment required to be made, within a prescribed period or on or before a prescribed date under authority of any provision of the internal revenue laws is, after such period or such date, delivered by United States mail to the agency, officer, or office with which such return, claim, statement, or other document is required to be filed, or to which such payment is required to be made, the date of the United States postmark stamped on the cover in which such return, claim, statement, or other document, or payment, is mailed shall be deemed to be the date of delivery or the date of payment, as the case may be.

Section (c) is important here:

(c)  Registered and certified mailing; electronic filing.

(1)  Registered mail.

For purposes of this section , if any return, claim, statement, or other document, or payment, is sent by United States registered mail-

(A)  such registration shall be prima facie evidence that the return, claim, statement, or other document was delivered to the agency, officer, or office to which addressed; and

(B)  the date of registration shall be deemed the postmark date.

Section (c) is why accountants encourage the use of certified mail with tax returns.

But the Baldwins did not certify their mailing.

They instead argued that they met the common-law standard for timely filing.

Seems a solid argument.

The IRS went low.

There are Court cases out there (Anderson, for example) that decided that the common law standard continued to exist even after the codification of Section 7502. It makes sense – at least to me - as that is what common law means.

The IRS argued that Section 7502 did away with the common-law standard, and the cases deciding otherwise were decided erroneously.

Sounds like a truckload of fine-cut bull manure to me.

Let’s load the truck.

There was a case in 1984 called Chevron. From it came the Chevron doctrine, an administrative law principle that a government agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous or unclear statute should be respected by a court.

I get the concept.

The first thing the agency has to do is show that the statute is ambiguous or unclear.

Does Section 7502 appear ambiguous or unclear to you?

We are going to need a jump to get this truck going.

Let’s introduce National Cable & Telecommunications Association v Brand X. That case has to do with the internet and whether it is an information service or a telecommunication service.

Sounds boring.

Let’s look at the Ninth Circuit’s take-away from Brand X:

But [a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”

Let me translate that word salad:

Since the prior Court decisions (let’s use Anderson as an example) did not specifically say that the statute was unambiguous, the statute is therefore ambiguous.

Huh?

So, if I do not make clear that I am not a Robert Howard sword-and-sorcery, skilled, powerful and fearless giant weapon-wielding barbarian, then it can be deduced that I am that very said barbarian?

Cool!

Brand X lets me say that Section 7502 is ambiguous, at which point Chevron kicks-in and allows me to argue that the underlying statute means anything I want it to say.

There is an aisle for this at Borders. It is called “Fiction.”

The Baldwins did not get to rely on common-law. Since they could not meet requirements of Section 7502(c), they lost out altogether. No carryback refund for them.

Ode To Joy

Sabadell is a city in the Spanish province of Catalonia. Banco Sabadell was celebrating its 130th year anniversary, and it wanted to do something worthwhile and memorable for the citizens of the city. Banco Sabadell did.

This is an exceptional street performance. If it sounds familiar, it is because you are hearing Beethoven's Symphony Number 9 Ode to Joy.

We talk about tax here because we are a tax blog. However, tax is not life. Enjoy, and remember to laugh and smile as often as you can.

The Estate of Marilyn Monroe

There is a saying among tax pros: “do not let the tax tail wag the dog.” The point is to not let taxes so influence the decision that the final decision is not in your best interest. An example is failing to sell a profitable stock position for the sake of not paying taxes. Seems a good idea until the stock market – and your stock – takes a dive.

This past week I was reading about the estate of Marilyn Monroe. Did you know that her estate was the third highest-earning estate in 2011?  Her estate earned $27 million and came in behind the estates of Michael Jackson and Elvis Presley. What is driving this earning power?

What is driving it is “rights of publicity.” For example, the website Squidoo.com reports that Marilyn Monroe posters remain one of the top-sellers for students decorating their dorm rooms. A “right of publicity” exists at the whim of state statute. There is no federal law equivalent. Indiana is considered to have one of the most far-reaching statutes, recognizing rights to publicity for 100 years after death.

Marilyn Monroe divorced Joe DiMaggio in October, 1954. She then left California for New York. In 1956 she married Arthur Miller, and the couple lived In Manhattan’s Sutton Place. Marilyn still considered this her home when she died in Brentwood, California in August, 1962.

The executors of her estate had a tax decision to make: was her estate taxable to California (where she died) or New York (where she maintained the apartment and staff). They decided it would be New York, primarily because California’s estate taxes would have been expensive. By treating her as a New York resident, they were able to limit California to less than $800 in taxes.

Let’s go forward three or four decades, and states like California and Indiana now permit celebrities’ estates to earn large revenues, in large part by liberalizing property interests such as publicity rights. Some states have not been so liberal - states such as New York.

You can see this coming, can’t you?

Let’s continue. In 2001 The New York County Surrogate’s Court permitted the estate to close, transferring the assets to a Delaware corporation known as Marilyn Monroe LLC (MMLLC). The licensing agent for MMLLC is CMG Worldwide, an Indiana company that also manages the estate of James Dean. Is the selection of Indiana coincidental? I doubt it, given what we discussed above.

Marilyn is an iconoclastic image, and her photographs – and the rights to those photographs – are worth a mint. Enter Sam Shaw, who took many photographs of Marilyn, including the famous photo of her standing over a subway grate with her skirt billowing. The Shaw Family Archives (SFA) got into it with MMLLC, with MMLLC arguing that it exclusively owned the Monroe publicity rights.  SFA sued MMLLC in New York, and the court granted SFA summary judgment. The court noted that Marilyn Monroe was not a domiciliary of Indiana at her time of death, so her estate could not transfer assets to Indiana and obtain legal rights that did not exist when she died. She was either a resident of New York or California, and neither state recognized a posthumous right of publicity at her time of death.

MMLLC had no intention of rolling over. It called a few people who knew a few people.

In 2007 Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law a bill creating a posthumous right of publicity, so long as the decedent was a resident of California at the time of death. Even better, the law was made retroactive. The law could reach back to the estate of Marilyn Monroe. Wow! How is that for tax planning!

Now the estate of Marilyn Monroe started singing a different tune: of course Marilyn was a resident of California at her time of death. That entire issue of making her a New York resident was a misunderstanding. She had been living in California. She loved California and had every intention of making it her home, especially now that California retroactively changed its law 45 years after her death.

You know this had to go to court. MMLLC did not help by aggressively suing left and right to protect the publicity rights.

Last week the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (that is, California’s circuit) ruled that The Milton Greene Archives can continue selling photographs of Marilyn Monroe without paying MMLLC for publicity rights. The court noted that the estate claimed Monroe was a New York resident to avoid paying California taxes. The estate (through MMLLC) cannot now claim Monroe was a California resident to take advantage of a state law it desires.

NOTE: This is called “judicial estoppel,” and it bars a party from asserting a position different from one asserted in the past.

The appeals judge was not impressed with MMLLC and wrote the following:

"This is a textbook case for applying judicial estoppel. Monroe’s representatives took one position on Monroe’s domicile at death for forty years, and then changed their position when it was to their great financial advantage; an advantage they secured years after Monroe’s death by convincing the California legislature to create rights that did not exist when Monroe died. Marilyn Monroe is often quoted as saying, 'If you’re going to be two-faced, at least make one of them pretty.'”

What becomes now of MMLLC’s rights to publicity? Frankly, I do not know. It is hard to believe they will pick up their tent and leave the campground, however.

I am somewhat sympathetic to the estate and MMLLC’s situation. It was not as though the estate made its decision knowing that property rights were at stake.  At the time there were no property rights. It made what should have been a straightforward tax decision. Who could anticipate how this would turn out?

On a related note, guess whose case will also soon come before the Ninth Circuit on the issue of post-mortem publicity rights?  Here is a clue: he was from Seattle, had a four-year career and died a music legend. Give up?

It’s the estate of Jimi Hendrix.