You Got Repossessed And The Bank Says You Have HOW MUCH Income?

I ran into a cancellation-of-debt issue recently.

You may know that – should the bank or finance company cancel or agree to reduce your debt – you will receive a Form 1099. The tax Code considers forgiveness of debt to be taxable income, as your “wealth” has increased - supposedly by an amount equal to the debt forgiven. There are exceptions to recognizing income if you are insolvent, file for bankruptcy and several other situations.

Let me give you a situation here at galactic headquarters:

Married couple. Husband is a doctor. Husband buys a boat. He puts both the boat and the promissory note in the wife’s name, presumably in case something happens and he gets sued. They divorce. It is understood that he will keep the boat and make the bank payment. He does not. The boat is repossessed and then sold for nickels on the dollar. Wife (who was never taken off the note) receives a Form 1099-C. She has cancellation-of-debt income, which is bad enough. To make it worse, income is inflated as the bank appears to have sold the boat at a fire-sale price.

Our client is – of course – the wife.

The person who signs on the note receives the 1099 and reports any cancellation-of-debt income. If the debt “belongs” to your spouse and not to you, you better have your name removed from the debt before you get out of divorce court. The IRS argues that – if you receive a 1099 that “belongs” to your ex-spouse - you should seek restitution by repetitioning the court. This makes it a divorce and not a tax issue. The IRS is not interested in a divorce issue.

It all sounds fine until real life.

The wife received a $100,000-plus Form 1099-C from that boat.

Let’s reflect on how she there:

(1)  The wife doesn’t have a boat and never did. Hubby wanted a boat. She signed on the note to keep hubby happy.

(2)  The wife’s divorce attorney forgot to get that note out of her name. Alternatively, the attorney could have seen to it that wife also wound up with the boat.

(3)  For whatever reason, husband let the boat be repossessed.

(4)  The bank issued a Form 1099-C to the wife. The income amount was simple math: the debt less whatever the bank received for the boat.

Let’s introduce real life:

• What if the bank makes a mistake?
• What if the bank virtually gives the boat away?

The IRS has traditionally been quite inflexible when it comes to these 1099s. If the bank reports a number, the IRS will run with it.

You can see the recipe for tragedy.

Fortunately, the IRS pressed too far with the 2009 Martin case.

In 1999 Martin bought a Toyota 4-Runner. He financed over $12 thousand, but stopped making payments when the loan amount was about $6,700. The Toyota was repossessed. He received a Form 1099-C for the $6,700.

… which meant that the bank received zero … zip… zilch… on the sale of the 4-Runner.

Doesn’t make sense, does it?

The IRS did not care. Go back to the lender and have them change the 1099, they said.

COMMENT: Sure. I am certain the lender will jump right on this.

Martin did care. He told the Court that the Toyota was worth roughly what he owed on it when repossessed, and that the 1099-C was incorrect.

Enter Code section 6201(d):

(d) Required reasonable verification of information returns In any court proceeding, if a taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect to any item of income reported on an information return filed with the Secretary under subpart B or C of part III of subchapter A of chapter 61 by a third party and the taxpayer has fully cooperated with the Secretary (including providing, within a reasonable period of time, access to and inspection of all witnesses, information, and documents within the control of the taxpayer as reasonably requested by the Secretary), the Secretary shall have the burden of producing reasonable and probative information concerning such deficiency in addition to such information return. 

Normally, the IRS has the advantage in a tax controversy and the taxpayer has the burden of proof. 

Code section 6201(d) provides that – if you can assert a reasonable dispute with respect to an item of income reported on an information return (such as a 1099-C), you can shift the burden of proof back to the IRS.

The Tax Court decided that Martin had shifted the burden of proof. The 4-Runner had to be worth something. The ball was back in the IRS’ court.

Granted, Martin was low-hanging fruit, as the bank reported no proceeds. The IRS should have known better than to take this case to court, but they did and we now have a way to challenge an erroneous 1099-C.  

In our wife’s case, I am thinking of getting a soft appraisal on the value of the boat when repossessed. If it is materially different from the bank’s calculation (which I expect), I am considering a Section 6201(d) challenge.

Why? Because my client should not have to report excess income if the bank gave the boat away. That was a bank decision, not hers. She had every reasonable expectation that the bank would demand and receive fair market value upon sale. Their failure to do so should not be my client’s problem. 

Which will be like poking the IRS bear.

But she has received a questionable $100,000-plus Form 1099-C. That bear is already chasing her.

Credit Card Debt And Yankee Doodle Dandy

There is a tax doctrine known as the Cohan rule. It is named after the American composer and playwright George M. Cohan, the subject of the movie Yankee Doodle Dandy. While a renown musician, composer and playwright, he was not much of a recordkeeper, and he found himself in front of the Court defending his business expenses against challenge by the IRS. The Court took an extremely friendly stance and allowed him to estimate his deductions.

While the Cohan rule still exists (in some capacity) today, it should be noted that the tax Code has been changed to disallow the next George Cohan any tax deduction for estimated meals, travel and entertainment. Those particular deductions have to be substantiated or no deduction will be allowed, with or without a friendly judge.

I just read a case where (I believe) a variation on the Cohan rule came up.

The case has to do with cancellation of indebtedness income.

Did you know you could be taxed if a credit card company forgives your balance?

The reason is that the tax Code considers an "accession to wealth" to be "income" (with exceptions, of course). Take the conventional definition of wealth as 

... assets owned less debts owed ...

and you can see that the definition has two moving parts. The asset part is easy - your paycheck increases your bank account, if only fleetingly. The liability part in turn is the reason you can borrow money and not have it considered income (assets and liabilities increase by the same amount, so the difference is zero). Have the bank forgive the debt, however, and the difference is no longer zero.

Newman did something odd. He wrote a check on his Wells Fargo account and opened a new account at Bank of America. He withdrew money from the new account. Meanwhile the check on Wells Fargo bounced.

Bank of America wanted its money back. Newman did not have it anymore.

Impasse.

You may know that a bank will issue a Form 1099 (Form 1099-C, specifically) when it cancels a debt. That 1099 informs the IRS about the forgiveness, and it is a heads-up to them to check for that income on your tax return.

            Question: when does the the bank issue the 1099?

In general it will be after 36 months of inactivity. Newman bounced the check in 2008 and received the 1099 in 2011.

Newman left the 1099 off his tax return. The IRS put it back on.

The Court decided Newman had - potentially - income in 2011.

Newman fired back: he did not have income because he was insolvent in 2011, and the tax Code allows one to avoid debt income to the extent one is insolvent.

You and I use another word for "insolvent" in our day-to-day conversation:  bankrupt.

Bankrupt means that you owe more than you are worth. The tax Code has an exception to debt income for bankruptcy, but it only applies if one is in Bankruptcy Court. But what if you are trying to work something out without going to Bankruptcy Court? The Code recognizes this scenario and refers to it as "insolvency."

So Newman had to persuade the Court that he was insolvent.

One would expect him to bring in a banker's box of bank statements, credit card bills, car loan balances and so forth to substantiate his argument.

The Court looked and said:

At trial petitioner provided credible testimony that his assets and liabilities were what he claimed they were."

"Testimony?"

What about that banker's box?

Newman ran a Hail Mary play with time expiring on the game clock. While a low-probability play, he connected for a touchdown and the win.

To a tax advisor, however, Newman was decided differently from Shepherd, another Tax Court case from 2012 where the taxpayer needed much more than his testimony to substantiate his insolvency.

Why the difference between the two Court decisions?

With that question you have an insight into the headaches of professional tax practice.

Talking Expatriation (And A Little Latin)

A friend contacted me recently. He was calling to discuss the tax issues of expatriating. As background, there are two types of expatriation. The first is renouncing citizenship, which he is not considering. The second is simply living outside the United States. One remains an American, but one lives elsewhere.

It is not as easy as it used to be. 

I have, for example, been quite critical of Treasury and IRS behavior when it comes to Americans with foreign bank accounts. If you or I moved overseas, one of the first things we would do is open a bank account. As soon as we did, we would immediately be subject to the same regime as the U.S. government applies to the uber-wealthy suspected of stashing money overseas.  

Some aspects of the regime include:

(1) Having to answer questions on your tax return about the existence of foreign accounts. By the way, lying is a criminal offense, although filing taxes is generally a civic matter.

(2) Having to complete a schedule to your tax return listing your foreign financial and other assets. Move here from a society that has communal family ownership of assets and you have a nightmare on your hands. What constitutes wealthy for purposes of this schedule? Let’s start at $50,000, the price of a (very) nice pickup truck.

(3) Having to file a separate report with the Department of Treasury should you have a foreign bank account with funds in excess of $10,000. The reporting also applies if it is not your account but you nonetheless have authority to sign: think about a foreign employer bank account. It should be fun when you explain to your foreign employer that you are required to provide information on their account to the IRS.

(4) Requiring foreign banks to both obtain and forward to the IRS information about your accounts. Technically the foreign banks have a choice, but fail to make the “correct” decision and the IRS will simply keep 30% of monies otherwise going to them.

To add further insult, all this reporting has some of the harshest penalties in the tax Code. Fail to file a given tax form, for example, and take a $10,000 automatic penalty. Fail to file that report with the Treasury Department and forfeit half of your account to the government.

Now, some of this might be palatable if the government limited its application solely to the bigwigs. You know the kind: owners of companies and hedge fund managers and inherited wealth. But they don’t. There cannot be ten thousand people in the country who have enough money overseas to justify this behavior, so one is left wondering why the need for overreach. It would be less intrusive (at least, to the rest of us 320 million Americans) to just audit these ten thousand people every year. There is precedence: the IRS already does this with the largest of the corporations.

Did you know that – if you fail to provide the above information – the IRS will deem your tax return to be “frivolous?” You will be lumped in there with tax protestors who believe that income tax is voluntary and, if not, it only applies to residents of the District of Columbia.

There is yet another penalty for filing a frivolous return: $5,000. That would be on top of all the other penalties, of course. It’s like a party.

Many practitioners, including me, believe this is one of the reasons why record numbers of Americans overseas are turning-in their citizenship. There are millions of American expats. Perhaps they were in the military or foreign service. Perhaps they travelled, studied, married a foreign national and remained overseas. Perhaps they are “accidental” Americans – born to an American parent but have never themselves been to the United States. Can you imagine them having a bank close their account, or perhaps having a bank refuse to open an account, because it would be too burdensome to provide endless reams of information to a never-sated IRS? Why wouldn’t the banks just ban Americans from opening an account? Unfortunately, that is what is happening.

So I am glad to see the IRS lose a case in this area.

The taxpayer timely filed his 2011 tax return. All parties agreed that he correctly reported his interest and dividend income. What he did not do was list every interest and dividend account in detail and answer the questions on Schedule B (that is, Interest and Dividends) Part III. He invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and he wrote that answering those questions might lead to incriminating evidence against him.

Not good enough. The IRS assessed the penalty. The taxpayer in response requested a Collections Due Process Hearing.

Taxpayer said he had an issue: a valid Fifth Amendment claim. The IRS Appeals officer did not care and upheld the penalty.

Off to Tax Court they went.

And the Court reviewed what constitutes “frivolous” for purpose of the Section 6702 penalty:

(1) The document must purport to be a tax return.

(2) The return must either (i) omit enough information to prevent the IRS from judging it as substantially correct or (ii) it must clearly appear to be substantially incorrect.

(3) Taxpayer’s position must demonstrate a desire to impede IRS administration of the tax Code.

The first test is easy: taxpayer filed a return and intended it to be construed as a tax return.

On to the second.

Taxpayer failed to provide the name of only one payer. All parties agreed that the total was correct, however. The IRS argued that it needed this information so that it may defend the homeland, repair roads and bridges and present an entertaining Super Bowl halftime show. The Court asked one question: why? The IRS was unable to give a cogent reply, so the Court considered the return as filed to be substantially correct.

The IRS was feeling froggy on the third test. You see, the IRS had previously issued a Notice declaring that even mentioning the Fifth Amendment on a tax return was de facto evidence of frivolousness. Faciemus quod volumus [*], thundered the IRS. The return was frivolous.

The Court however went back and read that IRS notice. It brought to the IRS’ attention that it had not said that omitting some information for fear of self-incrimination was frivolous. Rather it had said that omitting “all” financial information was frivolous. You cannot file a return with zeros on every line, for example, and be taken seriously. That however is not what happened here.

The IRS could not make a blanket declaration about mentioning the Fifth Amendment because there was judicial precedence it had to observe.  Previous Courts had determined that a return was non-frivolous if the taxpayer had disclosed enough information (while simultaneously not disclosing so much as to incriminate himself/herself) to allow a Court to conclude that there was a reasonable risk of self-incrimination.

The Court pointed out the following:

(1) The taxpayer provided enough information to constitute an accurate return; and

(2) The taxpayer provided enough information (while holding back enough information) that the Court was able to conclude that he was concerned about filing an FBAR. The questions on Schedule B Part III could easily be cross-checked to an FBAR. Given that willful failure to file a complete and accurate FBAR is a crime, the Court concluded that the taxpayer had a reasonable risk of self-incrimination.

The Court dismissed the penalty.

The case is Youssefzadeh v Commissioner, for the at-home players.

I am of course curious why the taxpayer felt that disclosure would be self-incrimination. Why not just file a complete and accurate FBAR and be done with it? Fair enough, but that is not the issue. One would expect that an agency named the Internal “Revenue” Service would task itself with collecting revenue. In this instance, all revenue was correctly reported and collected. With that backdrop, why did the IRS pursue the matter? That is the issue that concerns me. 

[*] Latin for “we do what we want”

JPMorgan's Nondeductible Madoff Deal

On January 7, 2014, JPMorgan entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the Justice Department. This is another payment in the ongoing Bernie Madoff saga, and the bank agreed to pay a $1.7 billion settlement as well as $350 million to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and $543 million to a court-appointed trustee.

Madoff kept significant balances with JPMorgan.  Banks are the first line of defense against fraud, but JPMorgan never filed suspicious activity reports with regulators, even though there were significant reservations as to when they became suspicious. The bank did not admit any criminal activity in the agreement, but it did allow that it missed red flags from the late 1990s to late 2000s.

What caught my eye was the following text from the following joint release by the Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI:
           

… JPMorgan agrees to pay a non-tax deductible penalty of $1.7 billion, in the form of a civil forfeiture, which the Government intends….”

This is unusual language.

The tax code provides a tax deduction for all of the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.

And then the tax Code starts taking back. One take back is Section 162(f):

162(f) FINES AND PENALTIES.— No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any fine or similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any law.

Let’s drill down a little bit into the Regulations:

This prohibition applies to any fines paid by a taxpayer because the taxpayer has been convicted of a crime (felony or misdemeanor) in a full criminal proceeding in an appropriate court.   The prohibition also extends to civil fines if the fines are intended by Congress as punitive in nature.

So, if fines are paid pursuant to a criminal case, then the taxpayer is hosed. However, if fines are paid pursuant to a civil case, there is one more step: are the fines punitive in nature?

Attorneys differentiate damages between those that are remedial and those that are punitive. A remedial payment is intended to compensate the government or another party – to “make one whole,” if you will. It is intended to restore what was disturbed, upset or lost, and not intended as penalty or lashing against the payer.

Let’s complicate it bit. There is a court case (Talley Industries Inc v Commissioner) that allows damages to be deductible if they are remedial in intent, even if labeled as a fine or penalty.

EXAMPLE: The NFL fines a player for unnecessary roughness. The NFL can call this a fine, but it is not a fine per Section 162(f) and will be deductible to the player involved.

You are seeing how this is fertile hunting ground for tax lawyers. Unless the payment is pursuant to a criminal case, odds are good that it is deductible.

Now remember that this agreement is Madoff related, and that there are hard feelings about JPMorgan’s involvement with Madoff over the years, and you can see why the Justice Department included the “nondeductible” language in the agreement.

Let’s take this a step further. Under Talley, JPMorgan could deduct the $1.7 billion on its tax return. Remember, it is not a fine or penalty under Sec 162(f) just because somebody somewhere called it as such.

Would JPMorgan be likely to do this?

This is a “deferred prosecution” agreement.  If JPMorgan did deduct the settlement, they might not have an issue with the IRS, but they would likely have a very sizeable issue with the Justice Department.

When A Tax Shelter Blows Up

Can you image losing a tax case with the IRS and owing a billion dollars?

Who did this? We are talking about Dow Chemical Company (“Dow”). They lost in the District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. I suppose they have no choice but to appeal. It is a billion dollars, after all.

What got them in this mess? 

A couple of tax shelters, one marketed by Goldman Sachs and both implemented by the law firm of King & Spalding. The IRS sued for tax years 1993 to 2003. 

Let’s talk about the first of the shelters – called a SLIP – which lasted from 1993 to 1997. Dow was not the only one that tried to SLIP the IRS. Merck and International Paper tried also.

SLIP stands for “Special Limited Investment Partnership.”  Its claim to fame was taking low-basis assets and turning them into tax deductions.  How would you do this? Well you could contribute them to a partnership, but that low basis would carryover. You would get no increased tax deduction by putting it a partnership.

Hmmm.

What if you put low-basis assets into a partnership and then leased them back?  Wait, the partnership would then have taxable income. Who would own the partnership? If you owned it, then the whole effort would be circular. 

What if there are other partners? Problem: you do not want other partners. 

What if you limit the other partners to a fixed return? It would be the same as paying interest to a bank, right? In partnership taxation we call this a priority or preference distribution. 

Problem: most of that income would be coming back to you. How can we solve this puzzle?

We delink the income distribution from the cash distribution. We bring in partners who will accept 6 or 7 percent priority, and we allocate virtually all the income to them.

Now why would someone agree to this?

If someone doesn’t pay U.S. tax, that’s why. Someone like a foreign bank.

Eureka!

You offer a foreign bank the deal, now referred to as a “structured financial transaction.” This means that it is complicated, and you will be paying top dollar for investment, legal and accounting advice. You explain to the bank that it would:

·        Receive a significant premium over a corporate bond

·        Take on less credit risk than a corporate bond

·        Escape any U.S. tax

Sure enough, Dow and Goldman Sachs rounded up five foreign banks willing to contribute $200 million. Dow set up a maze of subsidiaries, into which it dumped 73 patents. The interesting fact about these patents is that Dow had amortized them virtually to zero, Dow still used them in current operations and retained enough of the processes to make it unlikely anyone would want to buy the patents, though.  The patents appraised at $867 million.

One of those Dow subs contributed the patents into a partnership called Chemtech I, taking back an 81 percent ownership.

Dow paid Chemtech I around $143 million for use of the patents.

Chemtech I paid the foreign banks 7 percent as their priority return. Since the banks had invested $200 million, this was a cool $14 million in their pockets. Chemtech I paid a couple of other things, took the remaining cash and put in a subsidiary. That subsidiary loaned the money back to Dow. How much cash did it loan back, you ask? About $136 million. For one year.

On its tax return Chemtech I reported approximately $122 million in income. It allocated $115 million of that to the banks. Only $28 million in income went back to Dow itself.

What we have just talked about is known in tax lingo as a “strip.”

And there is the SLIP. All Dow did was move money around. It paid the foreign banks $14 million in interest but called it a priority, thereby dragging over $115 million of income with it. As the banks did not pay U.S. tax, they did not care. Dow however did.

In 1997 there was a change in U.S. tax law, and Dow had to switch to another tax strategy. Dow wanted to cash out the banks and start something else.

The banks wanted their share of the market value of those patents on the way out. Seems fair, as they were “partners” and all. Dow said “no way”. The partnership agreement stipulated how the patents were to be valued and how to calculate the banks’ share. Dow paid the banks approximately $8 million. The banks complained, but to no avail. Dow controlled the calculation of value.

Once the banks were out of the way, Dow created a second tax shelter using a fully-depreciated chemical plant in Louisiana. This strategy did not require banks, but it did employ a very clever maneuver to pump-up the basis of the plant, thereby creating depreciation deductions that Dow could use to offset real income from other sources.

Oh, there was a formidable tax issue that Dow resolved by ripping up a piece of paper and replacing it with another.

OBSERVATION: And there you see the IRS’ frustration: Dow is not dealing with independent parties. In Chemtech I, it was dealing with banks acting as banks. Dow called them partners, but it may as well have called them peanut –butter sandwiches for the difference it made. In the second deal (called Chemtech II), Dow did not even leave the ranch. It replaced a deal between its subsidiaries with another deal between its subsidiaries. Really?  No wonder the IRS was hot around the ears.

So the IRS gets into Dow’s tax returns. In 2005 it issued a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment for tax years 1993 and 1994. Dow responds that the IRS did not give the notice to the properly designated person – the Tax Matters Partner – and the notice was therefore invalid.

OBSERVATION: The tax matters partner rule is to protect both the partnership and the IRS. It means something when you have big partnerships with hundreds if not thousands of partners. Dow however was setting up partnerships like they were jellybeans. I find it cheeky – to be polite – that Dow’s defense was “you sent the mail to the wrong cubicle.”

This thing goes back and forth like a tennis match. In the end, a court has to decide. The IRS had scooped up additional years – through 2003 – by the time this was resolved.

How would the IRS attack the shelters?

There are a couple of ways. The first is the “economic substance” doctrine. Think of it as the tax equivalent of “where’s the beef?” The court looks at the transactions and determines if there is any reality to what supposedly is going on. There are three prongs to this test:

(1) Does the transaction have economic substance compelled by business or regulatory realties;

(2) Does the transaction have tax-independent considerations; and

(3)  Is the transaction not designed in toto with tax avoidance intent?

The Court looks at the SLIPS and observes the obvious:

(1) The SLIPs did not change Dow’s financial position in any way. Chemtech I could not have licensed those patents to a third party if it wanted to, as it did not own all the rights. This means that Chemtech I could not produce independent revenue. That is a problem.

(2) The cash flow was circular. The little bit that left (to the banks) was the equivalent of interest. Big problem.

(3) Dow argued that it was preserving its credit rating and borrowing power, but it could not prove any increase in its credit rating or borrowing power. Dow also stumbled explaining why it structured the transaction this way rather than another way – like having domestic banks in Chemtech I.

The second way the IRS attacked was by arguing the partnership was a sham. This argument is slightly different from “economic substance,” as that argument looks at transactions. The sham partnership argument looks at the partnership itself and asks: is this a real partnership?

The Court notes the following:

·        The banks got a priority of 7%.

·        The only room left for the banks to profit was if the patents went up in value. The banks were only allocated 1% of that number, and Dow controlled how to calculate the number.

·        When the banks complained about their lousy 1%, a Dow executive called them “greedy.”

OBSERVATION: It was clear the Court was not impressed with this executive’s comment.

·        It was virtually impossible for the banks to lose money.

·        The one risk to the banks – IRS challenge – was indemnified by Dow.

The Court observed that true partners have the risk of loss and the hope of gain. The banks had virtually no risk of loss and sharply limited room for gain. There may have been a banking relationship, but there was no more a partnership here than in a Kardashian marriage.

The Court said the shelters were bogus and Dow owed the tax.

And a 20 percent penalty to boot.

MY TAKE:  Those who know me, or who follow this blog, know that I generally side with the taxpayer. After all, it is the taxpayer who sets an alarm clock, takes on a mortgage or builds a website that actually works, whereas the government is little more than weight in the trunk.

Still, at least pretend that there is some business reason for all the tax fireworks that are going off.

This court opinion is 74 pages long. While I am somewhat impressed with the tax wizardry that Dow brought to bear, I must admit that I am reading tax planning for its own sake. That may groove someone like me, but that is not enough to pass muster. There has to be a business purpose for moving all the pieces around the board, otherwise the IRS can challenge your best-laid plans.

The IRS challenged Dow. 

Dow lost.