Rolling Over An Inherited IRA

I am not a fan of the 60-day IRA rollover.

I admit that my response is colored by being the tax guy cleaning-up when something goes awry. Unless the administrator just refuses a trustee-to-trustee rollover, I am hard pressed to come up with a persuasive reason why someone should receive a check during a rollover.

Let’s go over a case. I want you to guess whether the rollover did or did not work.

Taxpayer’s mom died in 2008.

Mom had two IRAs. She left them to her daughter, who received two checks: one for $2,828 and a second for $35,358.

The daughter rolled over $35,358 and kept the smaller check.

On her tax return, she reported gross IRA distributions of $38,194 (there is a small difference; I do not know why) and taxable distributions of $2,828.

She did not have an early distribution penalty, as that penalty does not apply to inherited accounts.

The IRS flagged her, saying that the full $38,194 was taxable.

What do you think?

Let’s go over it.

There is no question she was well within the 60-day period.

The money went into an IRA account. This is not a case where monies erroneously went into something other than an IRA.

This was the daughter’s only rollover, so we are not triggering the rule where one can only roll IRA monies in this manner once every twelve months.

The Court decided that the daughter was taxable on the full amount.

Why?

She ran face-first into a sub-rule: one cannot rollover an inherited account, with the exception of a surviving spouse.

The daughter argued that she intended to roll and also substantially complied with the rollover rules.

Here is the Tax Court:

The Code’s lines are arbitrary. Congress has concluded that some lines of this kind are appropriate. The judiciary is not authorized to redraw the boundaries.”

This is a polite way of saying that tax rules sometimes make no sense. They just are. The Tax Court, not being a court of equity, cannot decide a case just because a result might be viewed as unfair.

The Court did not address the point, but there is one more issue at play here.

There are penalties for overfunding an IRA.

Say that you can put away $6,500. You instead put away $10,000. You have overfunded by $3,500.

So what?

You have to get the excess money out of there, that’s what.

Normally I recommend that the $3,500 be moved as a contribution to the following year, nixing the penalty issue.

Let’s say that you do not do that. In fact, you do not even know to do that.

For whatever reason, the IRS examines your return five years later. Say they catch the issue. You now owe a 6% penalty on the overfunding.

That’s not bad, you think. You will pay $210 and move on.

Nope.

It is 6% a year.

And you still have to get the $3,500 out.

Except it is now not $3,500. It is $3,500 plus any earnings thereon for five years.

Say that amount is $5,500, including earnings.

You take out $5,500.

You have five years of 6% penalties. You also have tax on $2,000 (that is, $5,500 minus $3,500).

If you are under 59 ½ you probably have an early-distribution penalty on the $2,000.

Plus penalties and interest on top of that.

I like to think that the Tax Court cut the taxpayer a break by not spotlighting the overfunding penalty issue.

Our case this time was Beech v Commissioner.

An Extreme Way To Deduct Expenses Twice

The estate tax is different from the income tax.

The latter is assessed on your income. This puts stress in defining what is income from what is not, but such is the concept.

The estate tax on assessed on what you own when you die, which is why it is also referred to as the “death” tax. If you try to give away your assets to avoid the death tax, the gift tax will step in and probably put you back in the same spot.

Granted, a tax is a tax, meaning that someone is taking your money. To a great extent, the estate tax and income tax stay out of each other’s way.

With some exceptions.

And a recent case reminds us of unexpected outcomes when these two taxes intersect.

Let’s set it up.

You may recall that – upon death – one’s assets pass to one’s beneficiaries at fair market value (FMV). This is also called the “step up,” as the deceased’s cost or basis in the asset goes away and you (as beneficiary) can use FMV as your new “basis” in the asset. There are reasons for this:

(1) The deceased already paid tax on the income used to buy the asset in the first place.

(2) The deceased is paying tax again for having died with “too many” assets, with the government deciding the definition of “too many.” It wasn’t that long ago that the government thought $600,000 was too much. Think about that for a moment.

(3) To continue using the decedent’s back-in-time cost as the beneficiary’s basis is to repetitively tax the same money. To camouflage this by saying that income tax is different from estate tax is farcical: tax is tax.

I personally have one more reason:

(4) Sometimes cost information does not exist, as that knowledge went to the grave with the deceased. Decades go by; no one knows when or how the deceased acquired the asset; government and other records are not updated or transferred to new archive platforms which allow one to research. The politics of envy does not replace the fact that sometimes simply one cannot come up with this number.

Mr. Backemeyer was a farmer. In 2010 he purchased seed, chemicals, fertilizer and fuel and deducted them on his 2010 joint return.

COMMENT: Farmers have some unique tax goodies in the Code. For example, a farmer is allowed to deduct the above expenses, even if he/she buys them at the end of the year with the intent to use them the following year. This is a loosening of the “nonincidental supplies” rule, which generally holds up the tax deduction until one actually uses the supplies.

So Mr. Backemeyer deducted the above. They totaled approximately $235,000.

He died in March, 2011.

Let’s go to our estate tax rule:

His beneficiary (his wife) receives a new basis in the supplies. That basis is fair market value at Mr. Backemeyer’s date of death ($235,000).

What does that mean?

Mr. Backemeyer deducted his year-end farming supplies in 2010. In tax-speak,” his basis was zero (-0-), because he deducted the cost in 2010. Generally speaking, once you deduct something your basis in said something is zero.

Go on.

His basis in the farming supplies was zero. Her basis in the farming supplies was $235,000. Now witness the power of this fully armed and operational step-up.

Is that a Rogue One allusion?

No, it is Return of the Jedi. Shheeessh.

Anyway, with her new basis, Mrs. Backemeyer deducted the same $235,000 again on her 2011 income tax return.

No way. There has to be a rule.

          That is what the IRS thought.

There is a doctrine in the tax Code called “economic benefit.” What sets it up is that you deduct something – say your state taxes. In a later year, you get repaid some of the money that you deducted – say a tax refund. The IRS takes the position – understandably – that some of that refund is income. The amount of income is equal to a corresponding portion of the deduction from the previous year. You received an economic benefit by deducting, and now you have to repay that benefit.

It is a great argument, except for one thing. What happened in Backemeyer was not an income tax deduction bouncing back. No, what set it up was an estate tax bouncing back on an income tax return in a subsequent year.

COMMENT: She received a new basis pursuant to estate tax rules. While there was an income tax consequence, its origin was not in the income tax.

The Court reminded the IRS of this distinction. The economic benefit concept was not designed to stretch that far. The Court explained it as follows:

(1) He deducted something in 2010.

(2) She deducted the same something in 2011.

(3) Had he died in 2010, would the two have cancelled each other out?

To which the Court said no. If he had died in 2010, he would have deducted the supplies; the estate tax rule would have kicked-in; her basis would have reset to FMV; and she could have deducted the supplies again.

It is a crazy answer but the right answer.

Is it a loophole? 

Some loophole. I do not consider tax planning that involves dying to be a likely candidate for abuse. 

Business League: A Different Type Of Tax-Exempt

You may have heard about business leagues.

One very much in the news recently is the National Football League, which has been considering giving up its tax-exempt status.

In the tax world, exempt entities obtain their exempt status under Section 501(c). There is then a number, and that number is the “type” of exempt under discussion. For example, a classic charity like the March of Dimes would be a 501(c)(3). When we think of tax-exempts, we likely are thinking of (c)(3)’s, for which contributions are deductible to the donor and nontaxable to the recipient charity.

The (c)(3) is about as good as it gets.

A business league is a (c)(6). So is a trade association.

Right off the bat, payments to a (c)(6) are not deductible as contributions. They are, however, deductible as a business expense- which makes sense as they are business leagues. You and I probably could not deduct them, but then again you and I are not businesses.

There are some benefits. For example, a (c)(6) has virtually no limit on its lobbying authority, other than having to pro-rate the member dues between that portion which represents lobbying (and not deductible by anybody) and the balance (deductible as a business expense).

There are requirements to a (c)(6):

(1)  There must be members.

a.     The members must share a common business interest.

                                                              i.     Members can be individuals or businesses.

                                                            ii.     If membership is available to all, this requirement has not been met. This makes sense when you consider that the intent of the (c)(6) is to promote shared interests.

(2)  Activities must be directed to improving business conditions in a line of business.

a.     Think of it as semi-civic: to advance the general welfare by promoting a line of business rather than just the individual companies.

b.    This pretty much means that membership must include competitors.

c.     Sometimes it can be sketchy to judge. For example, the IRS denied exemption to an organization whose principal activity was publishing and distributing a directory of member names, addresses and phone numbers to businesses likely to require their services. The IRS felt this went too close to advertising and too far from the improvement of general business conditions.

(3)  The primary activities must be geared to group and not individual interests.

a.     The American Automobile Association, for example, had its application denied as it was primarily engaged in rendering services to members and not improving a line of business.

(4)  The main purpose cannot be to run a for-profit business.

a.     This requirement is standard in the not-for-profit world. You can run a coffee shop, but you cannot be Starbucks.

b.    For example, a Board of Realtors normally segregates its MLS activities in another – and separate – company. The Board itself would be a (c)(6), but the MLS is safely tucked away in a for-profit entity – less it blow-up the (c)(6).

(5)  Must be not-for-profit.

a.     Meaning no dividends to shareholders or distributions rights if the entity ever liquidates.

b.    BTW – and to clarify – a not-for-profit can show a profit. Hypothetically it could show a profit every year, although it is debatable whether it could rock the profit level of Apple or Facebook and keep its exemption. The idea here is that profits – if any – do not “belong” to shareholders or investors.

(6)  There must be no private inurement or private benefit to key players or a restricted group of individuals.

a.     Again, this requirement is standard in the not-for-profit world.

b.    This issue has been levelled against the NFL. Roger Goodell (the NFL Commissioner) has been paid over $44 million a year for his services. It does not require a PhD in linguistics to ask at what point this compensation level becomes an “inurement” or “benefit” disallowed to a (c)(6).

There is litigation around (4) and (6). The courts have allowed some business activity and some benefit to the members, as long as it doesn’t get out of hand. The courts refer to this as “incidental benefit.”

Which can lead to interesting follow-up issues. Take a case where the organization runs a business (within acceptable limits) and then uses the profit to subsidize something for its members. Can this amount to private inurement? The members are – after all - receiving something at a lower cost than nonmembers.

Let’s take a look at a recent application. I think you know enough now to anticipate how the IRS decided.

(1)  The (c)(6) members are convenience stores and franchisees of “X.”

(2)  Revenues will be exclusively from member fees.

(3)  One-quarter of member fees will be remitted annually to the national franchisee (that is, the franchise above “X”)

(4)  Member franchisees will elect the Board.

(5)  The (c)(6) will educate and assist with franchise policies.

(6)  The (c)(6) will facilitate resolution between members and executives of “X.”

How did it go?

The IRS bounced the application.

Why?

We could have stopped at (1). There is no “line of business” happening here. Members are limited to franchisees of “X.” Granted, “X” participates in an industry but “X” does not comprise an industry. 

The organization tried to clean-up its application after being rejected but it was too little too late.

The organization was not promoting the industry as a whole. It rather was promoting the interest of the franchisee-owners. 

Nothing wrong with that. You just cannot get a tax exemption for it.