A Church Contribution Story: Durden

Our next two blogs discuss tax fails involving charitable contributions.

What each has in common is congressional resolve to address an area considered subject to tax abuse. How so? How many times has someone overvalued a Goodwill clothing donation, for example? Congress therefore placed restrictions – primarily documentation requirements – on one’s ability to deduct contributions. The general tax rule is simple: no documentation equals no deduction.  The key is to understand what Congress considers documentation, as your understanding may be different from theirs.

Let’s talk about Durden.

David and Veronda Durden contributed $25,171 in 2007 to the Nevertheless Community Church. With the exception of five checks (totaling $317), all checks were over $250.

FIRST RULE: Under Code Section 170(f)(8)(A), no deduction is allowed for any contribution of $250 or more unless taxpayer has contemporaneous written acknowledgment of the contribution by the charity organization that meets specified requirements.

The Durdens cleared the first rule, as they had a letter from the church dated January 10, 2008.

SECOND RULE: Under Code Section 170(f)(8)(B), the charity must state in the acknowledgment whether it provided any goods or services as consideration for the contributed property or cash. If so, it must include a description and good faith estimate of the value of any goods or services provided.

There is a problem: the church did not include language “no goods and services have been provided” in their letter.

The Durdens obtained a second letter dated June 21, 2009 containing the same information found in the first letter, plus a statement that no goods or services were provided in exchange for the contributions.

THIRD RULE: Code Section 170(f)(8)(C) considers the acknowledgment as contemporaneous if obtained on or before the earlier when the tax return is due or the actual filing date.

The IRS disallowed all but $317 of the charitable deduction for insufficient documentation. The Durdens go to Tax Court. Their argument is reasonable: we substantially complied with the spirit of the law. We had a letter. It might not be exactly the letter the IRS wanted, but we had a letter. When the IRS wanted more, we got them more. The IRS went too far in disallowing the deduction when everyone knows we gave to the church. We even showed them cancelled checks.  The wording in Code Section 170(f)(8)(C) is only one way – a safe harbor maybe – of meeting the “contemporaneous” standard.

The Tax Court disagreed. It noted that Congress intended to tighten the rules in this area and placed specific language in the Code requiring and defining “contemporaneous.” This was not the IRS’ doing; it was Congress’ doing.  The Court in the past had been lenient in cases involving substantial procedural compliance. This was not procedure. This was legislative compliance, and the matter was outside the Court’s hands.

The Durdens did not have the correct letter when they filed their return. That is the last possible date according to the law. There is no deduction. The Court did let them deduct $317, however. Since those individual contributions were under $250, those didn’t require a letter.

MY TAKE: I can understand Congress passing near-incomprehensible tax law to address complex and sophisticated tax issues. Those taxpayers are likely to have expert tax advisors and planners. This is not one of those issues. This is someone donating to a church. I strongly disapprove of routine activities triggering tax rules that make no sense to an average person.  

Congress should have included a “sanity” clause in this statute. They could have given the IRS discretion to accept “other but equal” documentation. True, the IRS could refuse to do so, but at least there would be a chance that the IRS – or a court reviewing the IRS – could blunt the capriciously sharp edge of this tax law.

Next time we will talk about Mohamed.

1099s and Weatherly v Commissioner

There are two new questions on your income tax returns this year:

·         Did you make any payments in 2011 that would require you to file Form(s) 1099?

·         If “Yes,” did you file or will you file all required Forms 1099?

Several points come immediately to mind:

·         Remember that you are signing this return as being “true, correct and complete” to the best of your knowledge.

·         I, as the preparer, have to exercise due diligence by also asking you this question.

·         What are the consequences of answering “No?”

Congress will be unsatisfied until it has combed your sofa cushions for loose change. This pressure unfortunately passes down to the IRS, and we are seeing the results in OVDI, FATCA, automated collections and taxpayer liens. Obviously they believe there is money to be found here.

This brings us to Jeremiah Weatherly v. Commissioner (TC Memo 2011-206). It’s a tax case having to do with Forms 1099.

JW operated a bailiff consulting business. These are people who perform evictions and serve process, for example. He hired daily workers to help out. He must have been doing relatively well, as he reported $177,925 of Contract Labor on his 2005 return.

He got audited. The IRS wanted his Forms 1099. JW provided the IRS with 64 Forms 1099.There was a problem, however. JW had not filed the Forms with the IRS.

                OBSERVATION: Really, JW?

The IRS now had no confidence in the 64 Forms 1099, so they requested JW obtain and submit Forms 4669 from the 64 people. Form 4669 requires the payee to report the amount of the payment and where it is reported on his/her return.

OBSERVATION: This is not going to go over well.

JW’s response rate was pretty much what you would expect: he got eight replies. The IRS bounced 2 of them, as the social security numbers were invalid. With the remaining six, JW was able to document $25,115 of his Contract Labor expense. The IRS simply disallowed the remaining $152,810.

JW appealed pro se to the Tax Court. He got schooled. Tax law and long-standing tax doctrine require a taxpayer to maintain records sufficient to establish the amounts of allowable deductions and enable the Commissioner to determine the correct tax liability. This is a two-step requirement: your records have to be good enough for you to prepare a correct return AND to allow someone to double-check your work.

The Tax Court asked for JW’s books and records. Nothing. The Tax Court asked for other evidence to substantiate that these amounts were actually paid. Nothing. The Court then wanted JW to testify about his bookkeeping practices. Nothing. Frustrated, the Court held for the IRS. JW got charged with additional tax of $67,436 and penalties of $29,425.

What can we learn from JW?

Let’s admit, JW should never have represented himself. All he accomplished was to aggravate the Court. It is possible that another taxpayer – more responsive and attuned – could have obtained a different result. The Court did try to help JW, even alluding to the Cohan rule where it will allow estimates as long as the Court is convinced that there truly was an expenditure.

Nonetheless, we can see the position the IRS can and may take if one fails to file Forms 1099. Perhaps your bookkeeping practices are different from JW’s, and you could have provided the Court with substantial and satisfactory alternative documentation. However remember that you would have engaged – and paid – a tax CPA to represent you at audit and Appeals before even arriving at the Court. And you would still be at the Court’s mercy.

This process seems expensive to me. Here is another idea: issue 1099s, especially since you are now required to affirmatively respond to the new questions on your 2011 tax returns. There is now one more reason for the Court to turn you down: you lied when you answered “No” to the first question.

The Anschutz Company v. Commissioner

So what do you do when you own a fortune in stock but do not want to pay the tax man?

Let’s look at Philip and Nancy Anschutz and The Anschutz Company (TAC). Philip Anschutz (PA) began acquiring oil and mineral companies during the 1960s. He expanded his activities to include railroad, real estate and entertainment companies. This meant he owned large blocks of various companies’ stock, and he housed them in TAC. TAC was an S corporation, a fact which is important and to which we will return later.

Well, if you keep buying companies, eventually you wind up having a lot of money invested in those companies. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, PA and TAC began looking for ways to free up some of that invested cash.

In 2000 and 2001 TAC received approximately $375 million from a series of variable prepaid forward contracts with Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette (DLJ). The contracts involved shares of Union Pacific and Andarko Petroleum. DLJ later became part of Credit Suisse.

Let’s get into eye-rolling territory and talk about a “forward contract.” Here is an example:

You want to unload $250 million worth of AJ stock but delay any tax consequence. Tony Soprano (TS) wants to help you. You hire a firm (BADA BING) who proposes a business deal involving TS. You loan the stock to TS. No, instead you loan the stock to BADA BING and you grant TS a security interest in the shares. TS then sells the stock. TS sells short, though.

QUESTION: By selling short, TS is saying that he does not own the stock. This is consistent with the story so far, as you lent the stock to TS. TS has a security interest in the stock, but that interest is not the same as owning the stock. Therefore TS has to sell short. He is protected however because – if ever called upon – he can deliver your shares to close-out the trade. Remember, your shares are in his possession.

                What do you get out of this? Nothing so far.

But let’s say that TS gives you 75% the money from the short sale. Ah, now you have something – you have cash in your pocket. The transaction as described is now a “prepaid” forward contract. The “prepaid” means that you got money.

There is more. You get a 5% prepaid lending fee because, by golly, you are lending the use of your shares to TS.

Somewhere down the line this story has to end, however. Say that 8 or 10 years down the road you are obligated to deliver to TS either:

·         a (variable) number of AJ shares, or

·         cash, or

·         equivalent but not identical stock 

The variable number of shares permitted to settle the contract makes this a variable prepaid forward contract.

There is also a way to do this with puts and calls and is referred to as a collar. It is interesting in a train-wreck sort of way, but let’s spare ourselves that discussion.

Let’s give TS some incentive to do the deal. We can add the following:

·         If the stock appreciates over the term of the deal, you get the first 50% in appreciation but TS gets ALL the appreciation after that.

·         TS kept 25% of the cash. He could invest it over the term of the deal and keep the earnings.

·         TS did sell the stock short, so if the stock goes down, the short sale would earn TS additional profit.

·         Upon the occurrence of certain events (bankruptcy, material change in economic position), TS could accelerate the settlement date of the deal.

How could TS lose money? TS already sold all the stock and paid you 75% of the proceeds. TS kept the remaining 25% for a period of time. Granted, TS did sell the shares short, so TS would have the risk of the stock going up in price over the term of the deal. This is how one loses money on a short sale, as it would make it more expensive for TS to close out his short position. But wait, TS has physical possession of your stock. If you do not make TS whole, he will simply take your stock to cover the short sale. What if the stock goes down? Then TS has a profit on the short sale. TS dealt a pretty good hand for himself.

How could you lose money? You really can’t. If the stock goes down, you buy it at the lower price and deliver it to TS. If the stock goes up you participate in the gain. Not all the gain, but still a gain. You lose by not making as much money as you could have by holding on to the stock. I can live with that kind of loss.

What was the underlying tax law that drove this transaction? Under long-standing tax law, a taxpayer did not have a sale - for tax purposes – of securities until the taxpayer delivered shares from his/her long position. In a forward contract, the delivery is delayed for years, possibly many years. So a forward contract, even a prepaid forward contract, of securities was not considered a "sale.” The IRS changed this in 1997 with Section 1259, which provided tax rules for constructive sales of financial positions. You may remember that you used to be able to protect an appreciated stock position at year-end by something called a “short sale against the box.” Then one day your accountant told you that you could not do that anymore because the law had changed. Tax law now requires you to have some level of risk in the position. The question is: how much risk?

Since TAC entered into these transactions in 2000 and 2001, it at least had the warning of Section 1259. TAC did not however have clarification of how far it could push the “link” between a variable contract and a stock loan. Tax law takes time to evolve. This is an innovative tax area involving financial instruments and derivatives, and tax clarification takes time. In 2006 the IRS finally gave warning that it did not like this structure. Too late for TAC to close the barn door, of course.

The IRS went after TAC.

What was the IRS position? We can hear the IRS saying:

“TAC did not keep enough risk to avoid a constructive sale of the Union Pacific and Andarko stock.”

What was TAC’s position? We can almost hear them saying:

“What are you talking about? We entered into two transactions - a prepaid variable and a stock loan, not one. The prepaid variable did not rise to the level of a constructive sale. The loan was to Wilmington Trust Company as collateral agent and trustee. Last time we checked, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette was not Wilmington Trust Co.

In addition, is it fair to make tax law retroactive?”

In 2010 the Tax Court agreed with the IRS. TAC immediately appealed. The Appeals Court handed down its decision on Tuesday, December 27, 2011.

The 10^th Circuit Appeals Court noted that TAC effectively exchanged its shares for …

(1)    Upfront monies of 75% and 5%

(2)    the  potential to benefit to a limited degree if the pledged stock increased in value, and

(3)    the elimination of any risk of loss of value in the pledged stock

NOTE: Think about this for a moment. TAC transferred its shares to DLJ and DLJ relieved TAC of any risk of loss. What does this sound like?

The 10^th Circuit Appeals Court further reasoned that DLJ…

(1)    obtained all incidents of ownership in the shares, including the right to transfer them

(2)    acquired an interest in the property that it could not prudently abandon

(3)    had a present obligation to pay monies to TAC

(4)    had the right to sell or rehypothecate the shares

NOTE: DLJ had an immediate obligation to pay TAC and also had the right to sell the shares. What does that sound like?

Welcome to the new tax shelters. There was a time that shelters involved real estate or oil and gas and relied on nonrecourse loans or accelerated depreciation. Contemporary shelters use financial derivatives.

At the heart of this case is a metaphysical tax question: when is a sale a sale? The IRS did not challenge the substance of the deal. What it did challenge was this important detail: TAC lent its shares to DLJ to make the deal work. TAC argued that the stock loan and variable forwards were separate deals and that the stock was loaned to Wilmington Trust, not DLJ. The Tax Court in 2010 could not overcome the fact that, when TAC lent its shares, the shares were effectively gone and could not be recovered. A common factor of a sale is that the seller no longer has possession of the property sold.  

Why did TAC do this? TAC is an S corporation. S corporations can pay tax if they have a unique fact pattern called “built-in gains.” Sure enough, TAC had built-in gains in the Union Pacific and Andarko stock. The built-in gain had a clawback period of ten years. Sale of property with built-in gains within this period triggers the built-in gains tax. TAC was trying to avoid the double-taxation of built-in gains and then capital gains.

TAC lost big. The taxes were about $110 million. Oh, add on about another $30 million for penalties and taxes. Since TAC was an S corporation, all its income, deductions and credits flowed-through to PA and were reported on his individual income tax return. This means that PA lost big too.