Fish Bites Section 1239 Trap

 

Let’s talk about how a business purchase transaction can blow up.

The pepper in this stew is that the seller and buyer have different tax goals:

• The buyer wants to deduct as much as possible. In general, this means that the other side (the seller) will be recognizing ordinary income to offset those ordinary deductions.

• The seller wants as much capital gains as possible. In general, this means that the other side (the buyer) may have to amortize or depreciate assets over time rather than deducting them immediately.

M&A tax planning at heart comes down to the above tension.

Sometimes reading M&A cases can be difficult: numerous entities, mind-numbing detail, this move, that move, everyone come down and bust a move. Let’s take one case that caught my attention. As we have (sometimes) done before, we will modify the names to make the story easier to follow.

In 1996 Vernon started a one-man technology company in Kansas City. By 2004 it was one of the largest network security companies in the nation.

Let’s call his company Harry.

Vernon wanted cash for his troubles and travails. He would keep majority control of the company, but he would also have cash for little things - like expensive cars and multiple houses. I am with Vernon here.

Petunia was looking to invest in Harry.

Dial-in the tension between the seller and the buyer. Here is what they came up with

• Vernon owned 100% of Harry, an S corporation.
• Vernon transferred 100% of his stock in Harry to Hermione, a newly-formed S corporation.

COMMENT: There is a problem here: S corporations generally have to be owned by individuals, estates and certain trusts. A corporation cannot own an S corporation, except for …

• Harry immediately elected to be a Qualified Subchapter S Subsidiary (QSSS), an exception to that corporation-owning-an-S thing. Hermione owned Harry and it was all okay.

• Petunia dropped $10.5 million into Hermione in exchange for 43% of newly-issued preferred stock.

COMMENT: The money is now in play. The issue is getting it out to Vernon.

• We have a problem with Hermione. First, an S corporation must have only one class of stock, and Hermione now had two: common and preferred. Second, a QSSS can have only one shareholder: a parent who owns 100% of the QSSS stock. Hermione now had two shareholders. No surprise …

• Hermione’s S election blew up.

COMMENT: This was intentional. Harry was deemed to have transferred its interest in Hermione to a new corporation in exchange for 57% of the new stock. Petunia was deemed to have transferred $10.5 million for the remaining 43% interest. We will call the new corporation Ron.

COMMENT: There is a Code section (Section 351) that normally prevents incorporations from being taxable. There are ways to make it taxable, but most planners stay far away from them. One way? Pay money back to an incorporator (in this case, Harry via Hermione). The geek term for this money is “boot.”

• Ron paid $9.7 million in boot to Harry/Hermione upon reincorporation.

COMMENT: There you go: the planners deliberately sprung the trap. I do not recall ever doing this in my career. Why did they do it? To move the money to Vernon, of course, but also to have a chance at capital gains treatment by rinsing it through a Section 351 transaction.

• Let’s take stock of where we are.

a.     Petunia wanted ordinary deductions. She now has it in the way of amortization and depreciation. She put money into Hermione/Ron – and that money was buying assets; tangible, intangible, whatever. Petunia never bought stock.

b.    Vernon wanted capital gains. The easiest way would have been to sell Harry/Hermione stock, but Petunia wasn’t interested. All this ambulation was to mimic the sale of stock.

I admit: the tax work up to this point is clever.

But someone overlooked this interloper:

26 U.S. Code § 1239 - Gain from sale of depreciable property between certain related taxpayers

(a) Treatment of gain as ordinary income

In the case of a sale or exchange of property, directly or indirectly, between related persons, any gain recognized to the transferor shall be treated as ordinary income if such property is, in the hands of the transferee, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167.

The idea here is simple: Congress did not want related parties to depreciate assets and then sell them to a related party to start the depreciation over again.

Tax being tax, the words have a loaded meaning. For example, does “depreciation” under Section 167 include amortization, which is the equivalent of depreciation but for intangible assets? “Related persons” also has multiple definitions, depending upon where you are in the Code.

Let’s continue.

Remember that we are dealing with a technology consulting company in Kansas City. This is a not a manufacturing plant in Pennsylvania with all kinds of real estate and machinery and equipment. Most of what Petunia bought for $10.5 million was intangible assets, amortizable under Section 197 over 15 years.

At which point I presume the tax planners stopped, reasoning that Section 197 is not Section 167 and therefore Section 1239 was not an issue.

Except for Reg 1.197-2(g)(8):

Also, an amortizable Section 197 intangible is section 1245 property and Section 1239 applies to any gain recognized upon its sale or exchange between related persons (as defined in Section 1239(b)).”

Buried deep, but there it is. Section 1239 slipped its first noose on the transaction.

But were the parties related? Could Harry/Hermione/Ron avoid the second noose?

Here is Section 267(f):

Think of Section 1563 as applying to consolidated corporations (where corporations own other corporations). Section 267 addresses individuals owning corporations (what we would call brother-sisters). Section 267 is taking a consolidation definition and changing it for brother-sisters. It is changing the definition to make it less stringent.

Section 1239 wants related parties, and Section 267 says you have related with more than 50% common ownership.

Vernon owned 100% of Harry and 100% of Hermione. He also owned 57% of Ron.

Yep, related.

Section 1239 applied.

Vernon got ordinary income, not capital gain, treatment on the $9-plus million dollars.

Petunia got her ordinary deductions - over time and not right away.

It is very tough to accommodate both sides.

But Vernon did get his $9-plus million dollars.

Our case this time, modified a spot for ease of writing and readability, was Fish v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2013 - 270.

A Church Contribution Story: Durden

Our next two blogs discuss tax fails involving charitable contributions.

What each has in common is congressional resolve to address an area considered subject to tax abuse. How so? How many times has someone overvalued a Goodwill clothing donation, for example? Congress therefore placed restrictions – primarily documentation requirements – on one’s ability to deduct contributions. The general tax rule is simple: no documentation equals no deduction.  The key is to understand what Congress considers documentation, as your understanding may be different from theirs.

Let’s talk about Durden.

David and Veronda Durden contributed $25,171 in 2007 to the Nevertheless Community Church. With the exception of five checks (totaling $317), all checks were over $250.

FIRST RULE: Under Code Section 170(f)(8)(A), no deduction is allowed for any contribution of $250 or more unless taxpayer has contemporaneous written acknowledgment of the contribution by the charity organization that meets specified requirements.

The Durdens cleared the first rule, as they had a letter from the church dated January 10, 2008.

SECOND RULE: Under Code Section 170(f)(8)(B), the charity must state in the acknowledgment whether it provided any goods or services as consideration for the contributed property or cash. If so, it must include a description and good faith estimate of the value of any goods or services provided.

There is a problem: the church did not include language “no goods and services have been provided” in their letter.

The Durdens obtained a second letter dated June 21, 2009 containing the same information found in the first letter, plus a statement that no goods or services were provided in exchange for the contributions.

THIRD RULE: Code Section 170(f)(8)(C) considers the acknowledgment as contemporaneous if obtained on or before the earlier when the tax return is due or the actual filing date.

The IRS disallowed all but $317 of the charitable deduction for insufficient documentation. The Durdens go to Tax Court. Their argument is reasonable: we substantially complied with the spirit of the law. We had a letter. It might not be exactly the letter the IRS wanted, but we had a letter. When the IRS wanted more, we got them more. The IRS went too far in disallowing the deduction when everyone knows we gave to the church. We even showed them cancelled checks.  The wording in Code Section 170(f)(8)(C) is only one way – a safe harbor maybe – of meeting the “contemporaneous” standard.

The Tax Court disagreed. It noted that Congress intended to tighten the rules in this area and placed specific language in the Code requiring and defining “contemporaneous.” This was not the IRS’ doing; it was Congress’ doing.  The Court in the past had been lenient in cases involving substantial procedural compliance. This was not procedure. This was legislative compliance, and the matter was outside the Court’s hands.

The Durdens did not have the correct letter when they filed their return. That is the last possible date according to the law. There is no deduction. The Court did let them deduct $317, however. Since those individual contributions were under $250, those didn’t require a letter.

MY TAKE: I can understand Congress passing near-incomprehensible tax law to address complex and sophisticated tax issues. Those taxpayers are likely to have expert tax advisors and planners. This is not one of those issues. This is someone donating to a church. I strongly disapprove of routine activities triggering tax rules that make no sense to an average person.  

Congress should have included a “sanity” clause in this statute. They could have given the IRS discretion to accept “other but equal” documentation. True, the IRS could refuse to do so, but at least there would be a chance that the IRS – or a court reviewing the IRS – could blunt the capriciously sharp edge of this tax law.

Next time we will talk about Mohamed.