Fish Bites Section 1239 Trap

 

Let’s talk about how a business purchase transaction can blow up.

The pepper in this stew is that the seller and buyer have different tax goals:

• The buyer wants to deduct as much as possible. In general, this means that the other side (the seller) will be recognizing ordinary income to offset those ordinary deductions.

• The seller wants as much capital gains as possible. In general, this means that the other side (the buyer) may have to amortize or depreciate assets over time rather than deducting them immediately.

M&A tax planning at heart comes down to the above tension.

Sometimes reading M&A cases can be difficult: numerous entities, mind-numbing detail, this move, that move, everyone come down and bust a move. Let’s take one case that caught my attention. As we have (sometimes) done before, we will modify the names to make the story easier to follow.

In 1996 Vernon started a one-man technology company in Kansas City. By 2004 it was one of the largest network security companies in the nation.

Let’s call his company Harry.

Vernon wanted cash for his troubles and travails. He would keep majority control of the company, but he would also have cash for little things - like expensive cars and multiple houses. I am with Vernon here.

Petunia was looking to invest in Harry.

Dial-in the tension between the seller and the buyer. Here is what they came up with

• Vernon owned 100% of Harry, an S corporation.
• Vernon transferred 100% of his stock in Harry to Hermione, a newly-formed S corporation.

COMMENT: There is a problem here: S corporations generally have to be owned by individuals, estates and certain trusts. A corporation cannot own an S corporation, except for …

• Harry immediately elected to be a Qualified Subchapter S Subsidiary (QSSS), an exception to that corporation-owning-an-S thing. Hermione owned Harry and it was all okay.

• Petunia dropped $10.5 million into Hermione in exchange for 43% of newly-issued preferred stock.

COMMENT: The money is now in play. The issue is getting it out to Vernon.

• We have a problem with Hermione. First, an S corporation must have only one class of stock, and Hermione now had two: common and preferred. Second, a QSSS can have only one shareholder: a parent who owns 100% of the QSSS stock. Hermione now had two shareholders. No surprise …

• Hermione’s S election blew up.

COMMENT: This was intentional. Harry was deemed to have transferred its interest in Hermione to a new corporation in exchange for 57% of the new stock. Petunia was deemed to have transferred $10.5 million for the remaining 43% interest. We will call the new corporation Ron.

COMMENT: There is a Code section (Section 351) that normally prevents incorporations from being taxable. There are ways to make it taxable, but most planners stay far away from them. One way? Pay money back to an incorporator (in this case, Harry via Hermione). The geek term for this money is “boot.”

• Ron paid $9.7 million in boot to Harry/Hermione upon reincorporation.

COMMENT: There you go: the planners deliberately sprung the trap. I do not recall ever doing this in my career. Why did they do it? To move the money to Vernon, of course, but also to have a chance at capital gains treatment by rinsing it through a Section 351 transaction.

• Let’s take stock of where we are.

a.     Petunia wanted ordinary deductions. She now has it in the way of amortization and depreciation. She put money into Hermione/Ron – and that money was buying assets; tangible, intangible, whatever. Petunia never bought stock.

b.    Vernon wanted capital gains. The easiest way would have been to sell Harry/Hermione stock, but Petunia wasn’t interested. All this ambulation was to mimic the sale of stock.

I admit: the tax work up to this point is clever.

But someone overlooked this interloper:

26 U.S. Code § 1239 - Gain from sale of depreciable property between certain related taxpayers

(a) Treatment of gain as ordinary income

In the case of a sale or exchange of property, directly or indirectly, between related persons, any gain recognized to the transferor shall be treated as ordinary income if such property is, in the hands of the transferee, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167.

The idea here is simple: Congress did not want related parties to depreciate assets and then sell them to a related party to start the depreciation over again.

Tax being tax, the words have a loaded meaning. For example, does “depreciation” under Section 167 include amortization, which is the equivalent of depreciation but for intangible assets? “Related persons” also has multiple definitions, depending upon where you are in the Code.

Let’s continue.

Remember that we are dealing with a technology consulting company in Kansas City. This is a not a manufacturing plant in Pennsylvania with all kinds of real estate and machinery and equipment. Most of what Petunia bought for $10.5 million was intangible assets, amortizable under Section 197 over 15 years.

At which point I presume the tax planners stopped, reasoning that Section 197 is not Section 167 and therefore Section 1239 was not an issue.

Except for Reg 1.197-2(g)(8):

Also, an amortizable Section 197 intangible is section 1245 property and Section 1239 applies to any gain recognized upon its sale or exchange between related persons (as defined in Section 1239(b)).”

Buried deep, but there it is. Section 1239 slipped its first noose on the transaction.

But were the parties related? Could Harry/Hermione/Ron avoid the second noose?

Here is Section 267(f):

Think of Section 1563 as applying to consolidated corporations (where corporations own other corporations). Section 267 addresses individuals owning corporations (what we would call brother-sisters). Section 267 is taking a consolidation definition and changing it for brother-sisters. It is changing the definition to make it less stringent.

Section 1239 wants related parties, and Section 267 says you have related with more than 50% common ownership.

Vernon owned 100% of Harry and 100% of Hermione. He also owned 57% of Ron.

Yep, related.

Section 1239 applied.

Vernon got ordinary income, not capital gain, treatment on the $9-plus million dollars.

Petunia got her ordinary deductions - over time and not right away.

It is very tough to accommodate both sides.

But Vernon did get his $9-plus million dollars.

Our case this time, modified a spot for ease of writing and readability, was Fish v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2013 - 270.

The Sysco Merger and the Double Dummy

Recently a financial advisor called me to discuss investments and, more specifically, Sysco’s acquisition of U.S. Foods.  I had to read up on what he was talking about.

The Sysco deal is a reverse triangular merger. It is not hard to understand, although the terms the tax attorneys and CPAs throw around can be intimidating. Let’s use an example with an acquiring company (let’s call it Big) and a target company (let’s call it Small).

·        Big creates a subsidiary (Less Big).

·        Less Big merges into Small.

·        Less Big ceases to exist after the merger.

·        Small survives.

·        Big now owns Small.

Voila!

This merger is addressed in the tax Code under Section 368, and the reverse triangular is technically a Section 368(a)(2)(E) merger. Publicly traded companies use Section 368 mergers extensively to mitigate the tax consequences to the companies and to both shareholder groups.

In an all-stock deal, for example, the shareholders of Small receive stock in Big. Granted, they do not receive cash, but then again they do not have tax to pay. They control the tax consequence by deciding whether or not to receive cash (up to a point).

Sysco used $3 billion of its stock to acquire U.S. Foods. It also used $500 million in cash.

And therein is the problem with the Section 368 mergers.

It has to do with the cash. Accountants and lawyers call it the “basis” issue. Let’s say that Sysco had acquired U.S. Foods solely for stock. Sysco would acquire U.S. Foods' “basis” in its depreciable assets (think equipment), amortizable assets (think patents) and so on. In short, Sysco would take over the tax deductions that U.S. Foods would have had if Sysco had left it alone.

Now add half a billion dollars.

Sysco still has the tax deductions that U.S. Foods would have had.

To phrase it differently, Sysco has no more tax deductions than it would have had had it not spent the $500 million.

Then why spend the money? Well… to close the deal, of course. Someone in the deal wanted to cash-out, and Sysco provided the means for them to do so. Without that means, there may have been no deal.

Still, spending $500 million and getting no tax-bang-for-the-buck bothers many, if not most, tax advisors.

Let’s say you and I were considering a similar deal. We would likely talk about a double dummy transaction.

The double dummy takes place away from Section 368. We instead are travelling to Section 351, normally considered the Code section for incorporations.  

 

Let’s go back to Big and Small. 

·        Big and Small together create a new holding company.

·        The holding company will in turn create two new subsidiaries.

·        Big will merge into one of the subsidiaries.

·        Small will merge into the other subsidiary.

In the end, the holding company will own both Big and Small.

How did Small shareholders get their money? When Big and Small created the new holding company, Small shareholders exchanged their shares for new holding company shares as well as cash. Was the cash taxable to them? You bet, but it would have been taxable under a Section 368 merger anyway. The difference is that – under Section 362 – the holding company increases its basis by any gain recognized by the Small shareholders.

And that is how we solve our basis problem.

The double dummy solves other problems. In a publicly traded environment, for example, a Section 368 merger has to include at least 40% stock in order to meet the continuity-of-interest requirement. That 40% could potentially dilute earnings per share beyond an acceptable level, thereby scuttling the deal. Since a double dummy operates under Section 351 rather than Section 368, the advisor can ignore the 40% requirement.

The double dummy creates a permanent holding company, though. There are tax advisors who simply do not like holding companies.

Sysco included $500 million cash in a Section 368 deal. Assuming a combined federal and state tax rate of 40%, that mix cost Sysco $200 million in taxes. We cannot speak for the financial “synergies” of the deal, but we now know a little more about its tax implications.