A Paycheck As A Treasure Trove

 

I am looking at a case where the taxpayer was using Cesarini to argue her position.

COMMENT: Cesarini is one of my favorite tax decisions and a big reason this case caught my eye. The family purchased a piano at auction for $15. Seven years later – while cleaning the piano – they discovered approximately $4,500 in currency. The tax case addressed when the $4,500 was taxable – when they bought the piano, when they found the money, or some other date. It also introduced us to the “treasure trove” doctrine, addressing – not surprisingly – when finding a treasure is taxable.

COMMENT: $4,500 does not strike as that much money in 2025. Cesarini however was decided in 1964, when median U.S. household income was about $6,000. We probably would agree that finding 75% of your annual household income by fluke could be described as a treasure trove.

Let’s introduce Corri Fiege, who worked in Alaska for a U.S. subsidiary of an Australian corporation. She participated in a performance rights plan and was granted 60,000 unvested rights in parent company stock. The rights vested over three years, and she received 20,000 shares on each of July 31, 2011, 2012 and 2013.

There of course was tax involved. She had the company sell 1/3 of the stock and send the cash as federal tax withholding. She owed tax. She paid tax. There was no problem with these years.

In 2013 she received a fresh tranche of rights - 400,000 rights vesting over the four-years ending December 21, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.

This time the grant was a handcuff. The parent company was in financial distress and was firing people left and right. However, they wanted to keep Corri - that is, until they let her go on November 24, 2014.

Vesting did not happen until December 21. She wasn’t going to make it.

But the company did something unexpected: it transferred 100,000 shares of stock into her Charles Schwab account. She assumed they made a mistake, and she was required by plan terms to report if there was a mistake. She called someone in Brisbane, Australia; that person had left. She called another in Houston, Texas. That person had left too. She gave up trying to report the matter to the company.

She received a W-2 showing an additional $75,660 from the stock.

But this time there was no selling 1/3 of the shares for tax withholding. She would be writing a check to Uncle Sam.

What to do?

She did not file a joint income tax return for 2014.

COMMENT: Worst. Possible. Decision.

This was easy picking for the IRS computers.

Off to Tax Court they went.

Corri and the IRS had two very different arguments.

She argued that the treasure trove doctrine applied.

Corri argued that the shares were transferred contrary to the performance rights plan, making the money subject to an ongoing claim by her employer under Alaska law.

I get it: she argued treasure trove because it would delay taxation until the taxpayer had undisputed possession.

This of course put a lot of pressure on her argument that she had disputed possession.

The IRS came from an altogether different angle.

·       Corri had an employment relationship.

·       She was compensated both in cash and property.

·       Under the tax Code, both cash and property are taxable.

·       The Code does have a specific provision (Section 83) for property transferred with restrictions on its further transfer or with a risk of forfeiture. This is what happened here. Corri was awarded rights, exercisable in the future. If she remained employed, the rights were exchangeable for actual shares, which she was free to keep or sell without further restriction. The rights were not taxable when awarded, as Corri had to remain employed until the exercise date. Once she reached that date, the restrictions came off and she had taxable compensation.

The IRS argument proved formidable against Corri. She had no further obligations to the company after she left. In addition, she was not required to refrain from acting (think a covenant not to compete). There was no risk of forfeiture from her acting or not acting. She was also free to sell or otherwise transfer the shares.

And it was there that she lost the argument of disputed possession. In Cesarini nobody knew who the cash had belonged to, and the matter of its possession had to be sorted out under state law. In this case all parties knew who the shares belonged to, and there remained nothing to be sorted out under Alaska law.

There was no treasure trove.

There was no delay.

The IRS won.

There are two things in this case that bother me. Neither are tax driven. I would describe them instead as common sense.

1. The Company had the right to overrule the terms of the performance rights plan and award shares even if plan terms were not met. To rephrase, the company was not allowed to remove a benefit already granted but it was allowed to grant a benefit an employee would otherwise not receive. I believe that is what happened here: Corri was a diligent and valued employee, and the company wanted to show appreciation, even if they had to release her.
2. If an employer gives me free money, why wouldn’t I pay tax? It seems to me that I am still better off than without the free money.

Our case this time was Corri Feige v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2025-88.

Can Your Tax Preparer Expose You To Fraud?

We have talked about the statute of limitations many times.

In general, the IRS has three years to challenge your tax return and assess additional taxes. Reverse the direction and you likewise have three years to request refund of a tax overpayment.

The intent is clear: at some point the back and forth must stop.

Mind you, if the IRS assesses additional tax within that period, then the three-year statute for assessment transmutes to a ten-year statute for collection.

There are exceptions to the three years, of course. Here are some exceptions from Section 6501(c):

Let’s do a little tax practice today. Reread (c)(1) above. I have a question for you:

          Must the intent to evade tax be the taxpayer’s?

On first impression, the answer appears to be “yes.” Who - other than the taxpayer - stands to benefit from filing a false or fraudulent return?

Let’s talk about Stephanie Murrin.

For years 1993 to 1999 the Murrins used a tax preparer for their joint individual income tax return, as well as two partnerships in which Ms. Murrin was a general partner. Unbeknownst to the Murrins, the preparer placed false or fraudulent information on those returns with the intent to evade tax.

Why? We are not told.

The Murrins were not aware of the preparer’s actions, nor did they intend to evade tax.

The IRS (somehow) caught up to this and in 2019 (twenty years later) issued a statutory of deficiency for the years at issue. The IRS argued that the years were still open under the statute of limitations pursuant to Section 6501(c).

Mr. Murrin died before the case went to Tax Court.

Mrs. Murrin ran into a formidable obstacle: stare decisis.

The Tax Court had previously decided (in Allen) that Section 6501(c) did not look solely at the taxpayer to find intent.

Mrs. Murrin argued that Allen was wrongly decided. She based her argument on a Federal Circuit Court decision (BASR) disagreeing with the Tax Court decision in Allen.

She had an argument.

The Tax Court noted that each judge in BASR wrote separately, meaning that it was unclear which interpretation of Section 6501(c) prevailed. When everyone has an opinion, there is no standard for precedence.

With that backdrop, the Tax Court stated:

The Federal Circuit’s position on the precise point before us is not clear. We further note that ‘there is no jurisdiction for appeal of any decision of the Tax Court to the [Federal Circuit]’ in any event. Stare decisis principles thus would seem to weigh against our reconsideration of our precedent in light of BASR.”

The Tax Court had two arguments to support its position:

• By its own terms, this provision does not restrict its application to cases where taxpayers personally had intent to evade tax. Instead, Congress showed itself agnostic as to who had to have the intent to evade tax, choosing to ‘key [the extension of the limitation period] to the fraudulent nature of the return’ rather than tie it to taxpayer intent.”

• There are other Code sections (which we will skip for our discussion) where Congress explicitly limited required intent to the taxpayer. The fact that it did not do so here is a tell that Congress did not mean to limit the meaning of “intent” for purposes of this Section.

Mrs. Murrin lost before the Tax Court.

She appealed to the Third Circuit, and I read last week that she lost there also.

Is it fair? My first reaction is no, as taxpayer is the tax return and vice versa. Who else can have a closer connection to that return that the person filing it? It seems to me that the judicial wordsmithing here is drivel and prattle. Still, I acknowledge the necessity and persuasion of stare decisis, although poor drafting of tax law and stare decisis is a bad brew for common sense.

Our case this time was Murrin v Commissioner, No 23-1234 (3^rd Cir, August 18, 2025).