Kentucky, Bourbon and Tax Accounting

I came across a proposed tax bill that caught my eye.

It has to do with bourbon.

Bourbon is closely associated with Kentucky, as the state produces approximately 95% of the world supply. I have heard that there are more barrels of bourbon aging in Kentucky than there are residents (of which I am one). I do not know if that is true, but it does summarize the importance of the industry to the commonwealth.

So Kentucky senators and representatives have introduced a tax bill to exempt bourbon producers from the interest capitalization rules.

This is relatively old tax law, having entered the Code in 1986. It caused practitioners quite a bit of problem at start-up (I was a young CPA), but for the most part it has settled down since.

The explanation for the law was to bring consistency to inventory tax accounting. By itself that was laudable, but the law went further. Congress also decided that certain costs associated with a manufacturing or production process were not being appropriately captured by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). To correct that accounting oversight, the tax Code would henceforth require the capitalization of costs not previously capitalized on financial statements.

In accounting-speak, “capitalizing” means removing an expense from net income by putting it (that is, by “capitalizing” it) on the balance sheet as an asset. It can remain there for six months, fifteen years or until the end of time, depending upon. The common result is that it is not an expense on the income statement. Extrapolate that and it probably is not a deduction on the tax return.

You can see Congress’ fascination with becoming tax accounting experts.

This tax provision is referred to as uniform capitalization, or - for the hard core – Section 263A, which is the Code section that houses it. Most of the accountants I have worked with consider uniform capitalization little more than a slight-of-hand (and other earthier words) to increase taxes on inventory-intensive businesses.

Let’s be blunt: if there were issues with the inventories of Kimberley-Clark or Proctor & Gamble, the resulting lawsuits would have self-corrected the matter years ago.

Interest expense is one of the costs that have to be capitalized under Section 263A.

A perfect tax trap would be an expensive inventory which takes many, many years to get to market. One would have to capitalize interest every year. Granted, there would be a tax deduction down the line when the inventory was sold, but the wait to get there could get expensive.

What would be an example of such an inventory?

Well, bourbon.

Some high-end bourbons are aged for a long time. Take a personal favorite – Pappy Van Winkle Family Reserve 15 Year. It has a 20-year brother, but many aficionados consider the 15 a better product. There are bourbons aged even longer. That is a lot of years to carry an inventory.

The problem is that many bourbon competitors do not have this tax issue. Consider rum or vodka, for example, with a short ageing process.  Scotch whisky would be comparable, but the UK does not have an equivalent to Section 263A. This means that scotch producers do not have the tax problem of their US bourbon counterparts. Wine production would be comparable. Perhaps the Kentucky delegation could join forces with their California peers on this matter.

But why exempt bourbon producers but not others adversely affected by interest capitalization?

It is a fair question.

To which there is a fair answer: if international accounting firms are willing to be sued for the amount of inventory shown on audited financial statements, should we not presume that number is substantially correct? Why then does the Code require another calculation of inventory for the tax return?

We know why. It is the same as you losing a credit for your kid’s college tuition because you make enough money to send your kid to college. The tax Code is riddled with these things. Interest capitalization is a clever backdoor, however, as it dives into tax accounting itself. This area is arcane and boring and likely to keep someone from looking too closely. That is – of course – why it was done.

Bill Yung and Columbia Sussex Sue Grant Thorton

I am reading Yung v Grant Thornton. This is a mammoth decision – it runs over 200 pages.

William Yung (Yung) owns a hotel and casino company (Columbia Sussex) based in northern Kentucky. I remember meeting with some of his tax people several years ago.  I have watched fireworks from his Kentucky office location.

Then there is Grant Thornton (Grant), a national accounting firm, and its former partner, Jon Michel (Michel). Jon and I worked for the same accounting firm, although not at the same time. I remember having lunch with Jon a few years later and discussing joining Grant Thornton’s tax team. I also remember the unacceptable sales pressure that went with joining Grant. I passed on that, and I am glad I did.

Jon is in the tax literature, and not in a good way. It has a lot to do with that sales pressure.

Today we are talking about tax shelters.

CPA firms - especially the nationals - in the 1990s and aughts became almost pathologically obsessed with profitability. Accounting practice was changing, and the tradition of accountants being business advisors and confidantes was being replaced with a new, profit-driven model. We saw metrics like “write-ups” and “write-downs” by individual accountants. There were “individual” marketing plans for accountants two or three years into the profession and having another five or seven job changes ahead of them. I remember a CPA whose promotion to manager was delayed because she missed her “chargeable” budget by approximately 40 hours – over the course of an entire year.

And tax departments were leaned upon to come up with new “products” to market to clients.

COMMENT: Referring to tax advice as a “product” tells one a lot about the underlying motivation of whoever is promoting it. I for example do not sell a “product.” I provide business and tax advice. If you want a product, go to Amazon.

So what flavor of tax shelter are we talking about?

Yung and family and family entities (such as Columbia Sussex) own casinos and hotels. Some of them are in the Cayman Islands, which would make them controlled foreign corporations (CFCs). You may recall that the U.S. wants to tax all U.S. businesses on their worldwide income. Since doing so would almost guarantee that there would be no U.S. - based international businesses, the tax Code allows for tax deferrals, then exceptions to those deferrals, and then exceptions to the exceptions, and so on. It borders on lunacy, frankly, but this is what Yung and entities were caught in. Yung and entities had monies overseas, but it would have cost a fortune in taxes to bring the monies back to the U.S. Yung’s son Joe traveled regularly to the Caribbean, Central and South America seeking acquisition opportunities as a means to reinvest the Cayman monies. Grant was their accounting firm. Jon Michel even assisted in the acquisition of a Canadian hotel.

There was opportunity there for a sharp tax advisor.

Here is opportunity knocking:

·        A partnership contributes cash to a foreign corporation (FC). It receives the common stock.

·        Another party also contributes cash. In return it receives preferred stock.

·        The FC borrows money from a bank.

·        With the money, the FC buys marketable securities.

·        FC then distributes the securities, with its attendant debt (sort of), to the partnership, liquidating the partnership’s investment in FC.

·        There is a technical tax rule concerning a distribution with debt attached. The debt reduces the fair market value of the securities. If the debt were equal to the value of the securities, for example, the net distribution would be zero (-0- ).

·        The partnership received a liquidating distribution worth zero (or near zero) but had an investment equal to the cash it put in FC. This leads to a big tax loss.

So far, so good. The partnership received marketable securities, but it also has to pay back the bank. Where is the tax shelter, then?

·        The FC later pays off the debt.

Whoa!

The partnership is out no money but has a big tax loss.

The key to this was being able to reduce the liquidating distribution by the bank debt, even though the partnership never intended to pay the debt. Some tax CPAs and tax attorneys argued that this was fine, as tax Code Section 301(b)(2)(B) reduced the distribution…

“… by the amount of any liability to which the property received by the shareholder is subject immediately before, and immediately after, the distribution.”

We are talking the Bond and Optional Sales Strategy tax shelter sold by Price Waterhouse in the 1990s. The nickname was BOSS, and the IRS was determined to come down hard on the BOSS transactions and enablers. Frankly, I don’t blame them.

In 1999 the IRS published Notice 99-59, which warned that tax losses claimed in a BOSS transaction were not allowable for federal income tax purposes. The Service also warned of substantial and numerous penalties.

Congress followed this up with new tax Regulations to Section 301 in 2000.

So what did Grant Thornton do? It developed a new “product” which it called “Leveraged 301 Distributions” or Lev301.  How did it work? Here is an internal Grant document:

           

The objective of the Leveraged 301 Distributions tax product is to structure distributions in order to permanently avoid taxability to shareholders. Either closely-held C corporations or S corporations can distribute assets subject to liabilities … and provide this benefit to shareholders.”

           

How similar is this thing to BOSS, which provoked Notice 99-59 and new tax Regulations? Back to that Grant internal document:

Further the IRS may assert arguments it used against the BOSS transaction in Notice 99-59 and against the subject-to language of former IRS Section 357”

This has to be a finalist for the “Worst Timing Ever” award.

Grant goes live with the product in June 2000. Jon Michel begins to promote the thing, including to Yung and Columbia Sussex.

You already know this thing went to trial, so let’s fast-forward to some language from the Court:

           

No one associated with Grant Thornton, even those intimately involved in the process who testified to the court, has stepped forward and taken credit for the idea and creation of Lev301.”

Hey, but Lev301 is substantially different from BOSS, right?

Here is the Court:

Grant Thornton believed that there was a 90% chance that the IRS would disallow the tax benefits on the Lev301 on audit.”

Good grief! Why would a self-respecting tax advisor be associated with this?

Yung and Columbia Sussex were not told about the 90% chance.

The court finds that Yung and associates brought income into the United States from his CFC’s on a routine basis. Yung and his associates looked for ways to accelerate this process but vetted possible means of doing so with a close concern for the risks involved, as evidenced by the decision not to participate in other tax strategies presented to them. Yung and his associates maintained a very conservative risk level about income tax reporting as evidenced by the IRS complimenting the consistent approach to paying taxes. The court finds the Yung’s testimony to be consistent with this approach to tax reporting and, therefore, to be credible.”

What did the Court say about Grant?

The evidence indicates everyone who participated was on high alert regarding this product. As a result, while this court certainly understands the fading of memory, the failure of some of Grant Thornton’s witnesses to recall anything about their participation in the research and development of this product is disingenuous and not credible.”

Let’s continue. Would Jon Michel have been permitted to meet and pitch Lev301 to Yung had Yung’s tax department been informed of the risk?

The likelihood that the IRS would view the Lev301 as an unlawful abusive tax shelter was a present risk that would have impacted … (Columbia Sussex’ CFO) decision to allow …. J(on) Michel to present Lev301 to Yung. Had the risk been disclosed … (Columbia Sussex’ CFO), (as he had done with the prior proposals) would have terminated discussions about Lev301 at that point.”

So Jon Michel and Yung meet. Yung wanted to know if other Grant clients had used this scheme.

J(on) Michel told Yung that, while he could not divulge the names of other Grant Thornton clients, he could disclose that a local jet-engine manufacturer and a local consumer products manufacturer had successfully used the Lev301 strategy to transfer foreign wealth to the U.S.”

For those of us who live in Cincinnati, the reference to GE and Proctor & Gamble is unmistakable. Still, if GE and P&G did use the strategy…

When Michel made this representation to Joe Yung, he had no knowledge as to whether GE and P&G had utilized a Lev301-like strategy.”

All right then.

In 2002 the IRS initiated an examination of Grant Thornton. The IRS issued a summons asking for documents relating to Grant’s promotion of Lev301 and the names of clients who participated in the product.

Grant Thornton did not notify the Yungs … about the summons, which further increased the likelihood that the Yungs … would be audited by the IRS on account of their participation in the Lev301.”

In November of 2002 the IRS audited Columbia Sussex for reasons unrelated to Lev301.

NOTE: This is fairly common for larger, higher-profile corporations. It does not necessarily mean anything.     

Grant was hired to represent during the tax audit.

In 2003 Yung and Columbia Sussex received an Information Document Request from the IRS. The IRS wanted to know whether they had directly or indirectly participated in any transactions that were the same or substantially similar to a “listed” transaction.

            NOTE: Like a BOSS or a BOSS-like transaction.

Jon Michel answered the question “No.”

The tax director at Columbia Sussex later read in a trade journal that the government was summoning Grant Thornton. He called Jon Michel. Jon informed Yung and associates that Grant was likely to comply with the summons and that client names would be turned over to the IRS.

And they were.

The IRS expanded its audit of Columbia Sussex to include more years, the Yung family, family entities and any unfortunate soul driving past corporate headquarters on I-275 in northern Kentucky. On the other hand, in 2004 Jon Michel wrote a nice letter to Yung and entities offering limited tax representation before the IRS.

Do we need to continue this story?

The Yung family and entities owed over $18 million in tax, interest and penalties to the IRS.

If this were you, what would you do next?

You would sue Grant Thornton.

           

COMMENT: Be honest: this is a Mr. Obvious moment.

A Kentucky circuit court has just ordered Grant Thornton to pay Yung and family and entities approximately $100 million, including $80 million in punitive damages. The judge described Grant’s actions as “reprehensible.”

Grant intends to appeal, saying:

We are disappointed in the Court’s ruling and believe we have strong grounds for an appeal, which we will pursue.”

Grant has to appeal the decision, of course.

My thoughts?

Remember that Yung is in the hotel and casino business, an industry subject to higher financial and personal scrutiny. What is the collateral and reputational damage to him and his entities from an abusive tax shelter? Yung has said the ordeal has already cost him a casino license in Missouri.

I have little patience for this type of practice. What was motivating Grant with the Lev301 “product”- solving a client’s tax problem or generating a million dollar fee? Could it be both? Sure, but the smart money would bet the other way. This type of behavior is not “practice.” It is greed, it is an abuse of a professional relationship and it is disreputable to those of us who try to practice between the lines.

State Tax Refunds And Debit Cards

I have noticed that more and more states are increasingly requiring individual income tax refunds to be electronically deposited or received on a debit card.

What got me thinking about this is Virginia’s decision to require electronic refunds, beginning with the 2013 tax season.  One can have his/her refund electronically deposited or loaded onto a debit card. There will be no physical checks.

Virginia is joining Louisiana and Oklahoma with its electronic refund/debit card policy.

I find myself recalling IRS issues with identity theft and debit cards this past filing season. The IRS has estimated that more than $5 billion was refunded to identity thieves in 2011.   A majority of these cases used direct deposits, including debit cards. Thieves prefer debit cards to a paper check, which may require a photo ID matching the taxpayer’s name to cash it. Makes sense.

So what does the identity thief need? He needs a name and social security number, preferably from someone who will not be filing a tax return. An address would also be nice. Find a foreclosed house. Maybe put a new mailbox on it. The thief fills out a tax return, making up the wages, withholdings and so on. As long as he is the first person using the identity for the tax year, it is – as one U.S. Attorney phrased it – a “remarkably simple crime to commit.” Couple this with a hard-to-trace debit card, and the IRS is almost sending cash through the mail.

Do you find yourself wondering how it is cheaper for a state to issue debit cards rather than a physical check? Say that Kentucky issues 1,200,000 refunds using physical checks. Kentucky has the cost of the checks, plus equipment, personnel costs and postage. If Kentucky associates with a debit-card-issuing institution (I am thinking the to-be-formed Hamilton Bank of the Bluegrass, as an example), they instead send one transfer to The Hamilton Bank, as well as a data base of the individual refunds. No mess, no fuss. One can see the savings to Kentucky.

I would – I mean The Hamilton Bank of the Bluegrass would – issue the debit cards. How does The Hamilton Bank make money? First, there would be the float while the debit cards carry balances. Second, there could be merchant fees upon use of the card. Third, The Hamilton Bank would allow one to withdraw cash, but only at conveniently-located-Hamilton-Bank-ATM locations in greater Cincinnati, northern Kentucky and the Bluegrass. Any other ATM’s would trigger a fee. Fourth, The Hamilton Bank would charge fees for inactivity, replacement cards and etc.  I am thinking this could be a sweet deal for me, er… I mean The Hamilton Bank of the Bluegrass.

Kidding aside, I do understand the states’ interest in moving tax administration to an all-electronic format. Practitioners have already seen some of the advantages of electronic processing: verification of receipt and filing, record of filings and payments, transcript deliveries and etc. Electronic refunds fit into this structure. However, the government cannot electronically refund to someone who does not have a bank account, which is how we wind up talking about preloaded debit cards.

New Kentucky Tax Amnesty Program

Kentucky has rolled-out a tax amnesty. It exists for a very short period of time: from October 1, 2012 to November 30, 2012. If this applies to you, you will have 61 days to apply.

The amnesty applies to taxes for periods…

·         after November 30, 2001 and

·         before October 1, 2011

You will be eligible if …

·         you did not file a return

·         you did file but are now amending a return

·         you did file but still have an outstanding tax liability

That last one is amazing. It indicates that Kentucky wants money, and it is willing to cut a break on assessed tax already due.

Certain taxes are not eligible, such as ...

·         your real estate taxes (as they are collected locally)

·         motor vehicle taxes (collected by county clerks)

·         tangible property taxes (again, collected locally)

What do you gain? You still owe the tax, of course, but Kentucky will waive one-half the interest and ALL the penalties.

What is the hitch? Kentucky wants your cash, so you will have to write them a check. There is a very limited exception for hardship, but even there you will have to pay-off Kentucky in full by May 31, 2013.

Consider this program if you have nexus with Kentucky but never filed, or if you have unfiled or unpaid sales taxes.

For more information you can contact Kentucky at 1-855-KYTAXES.