No Shareholder, No S Corporation Election

 Our case this time takes us to Louisville.

There is a nonprofit called the Waterfront Development Corporation (WDC). It has existed since 1986, and its mission is to development, redevelop and revitalize certain industrial areas around the Ohio river downtown. I would probably shy away from getting involved - anticipating unceasing headaches from the city, Jefferson county and the Commonwealth of Kentucky - but I am glad that there are people who will lift that load.

One of those individuals was Clinton Deckard, who wanted to assist WDC financially, and to that effect he formed Waterfront Fashion Week Inc. (WFWI) in 2012. WFWI was going to organize and promote Waterfront Fashion Week – essentially a fundraiser for WDC.

Seems laudable.

Mr Deckard had been advised to form a nonprofit, on the presumption that a nonprofit would encourage people and businesses to contribute. He saw an attorney who organized WFWI as a nonprofit corporation under Kentucky statute.

Unfortunately, Waterfront Fashion Week failed to raise funds; in fact, it lost money. Mr Deckard wound up putting in more than $275,000 of his own money into WFWI to shore up the leaks. There was nothing to contribute to WDC.  What remained was a financial crater-in-the-ground of approximately $300 grand. Whereas WFWI had been organized as a nonprofit for state law purposes, it had not obtained tax-exempt status from the IRS. If it had, Mr Deckard could have gotten a tax-deductible donation for his generosity.

COMMENT: While we use the terms “nonprofit” and “tax-exempt” interchangeably at times, in this instance the technical difference is critical. WFWI was a nonprofit because it was a nonprofit corporation under state law. If it wanted to be tax-exempt, it had to keep going and obtain exempt status from the IRS.  One has to be organized under as a nonprofit for the IRS to consider tax-exempt status, but there also many more requirements.

No doubt Mr Deckard would have just written a check for $275 grand to WDC had he foreseen how this was going to turn out. WDC was tax-exempt, so he could have gotten a tax-deductible donation. As it was, he had ….

…. an idea. He tried something. WFWI had never applied for tax-exempt status with the IRS.

WFWI filed instead for S corporation status. Granted, it filed late, but there are procedures that a knowledgeable tax advisor can use. Mr Deckard signed the election as president of WFWI. An S election requires S corporation tax returns, which it filed. Mind you, the returns were late – the tax advisor would have to face off against near-certain IRS penalties - but it was better than nothing.

Why do this?

An S corporation generally does not pay tax. Rather it passes its income (or deductions) on to its shareholders who then include the income or deductions with their other income and deductions and then pay tax personally on the amalgamation

It was a clever move.

Except ….

Remember that the attorney organized WFWI as a nonprofit corporation under Kentucky statute.

So?

Under Kentucky law, a nonprofit corporation does not have shareholders.

And what does the tax Code require before electing S corporation status?

Mr Deckard has to be a shareholder in the S corporation.

He tried, he really did. He presented a number of arguments that he was the beneficial owner of WFWI, and that beneficial status was sufficient to allow  an S corporation election.

But a shareholder by definition would get to share in the profits or losses of the S corporation. Under Kentucky statute, Mr Deckard could NEVER participate in those profits or losses. Since he could never participate, he could never be a shareholder as intended by the tax Code. There was no shareholder, no S corporation election, no S corporation – none of that.

He struck out.

The sad thing is that it is doubtful whether WFWI needed to have organized as a nonprofit in the first place.

Why do I say that?

If you or I make a donation, we need a tax-exempt organization on the other side. The only way we can get some tax pop is as a donation.

A business has another option.

The payment could just be a trade or business expense.

Say that you have a restaurant downtown (obviously pre-COVID days). You send a check to a charitable event that will fill-up downtown for a good portion of the weekend. Is it a donation? Could be. It could also be just a promotion expense – there are going to be crowds downtown, you are downtown, people have to eat, and you happen to be conveniently located to the crowds. Is that payment more-than-50% promotion or more-than-50-% donation?

I think of generosity when I think of a donation. I think of return-on-investment when I think of promotion or business expenses.

What difference does it make? The more-than-50% promotion or business deduction does not require a tax-exempt on the other side. It is a business expense on its own power; it does not need an assist.

I cannot help but suspect that WFWI was primarily recruiting money from Louisville businesses. I also suspect that many if not most would have had a keen interest in downtown development and revitalization. Are we closer to our promotion example or our donation example?

Perhaps Mr Deckard never needed a nonprofit corporation.

The Tax Doctrine Of The Fruit And The Tree

 

I am uncertain what the IRS saw in the case. The facts were very much in the taxpayer’s favor.

The IRS was throwing a penalty flag and asking the Court to call an assignment of income foul.

Let’s talk about it.

The tax concept for assignment-of-income is that a transaction has progressed so far that one has – for all real and practical purposes – realized income. One is just waiting for the check to arrive in the mail.

But what if one gives away the transaction – all, part or whatever – to someone else? Why? Well, one reason is to move the tax to someone else.

A classic case in this area is Helvering v Horst. Horst goes back to old days of coupon bonds, which actually had perforated coupons. One would tear-off a coupon and redeem it to receive an interest check. In this case the father owned the bonds. He tore off the coupons and gave them to his son, who in turn redeemed them and reported the income. Helvering v Horst gave tax practitioners the now-famous analogy of a tree and its fruit. The tree was the bond, and the fruit was the coupon. The Court observed:

… The fruit is not to be attributed to a different tree from that on which it grew.”

The Court decided that the father had income. If he wanted to move the income (the fruit) then he would have to move the bond (the tree).

Jon Dickinson (JD) was the chief financial officer and a shareholder of a Florida engineering firm. Several shareholders – including JD – had requested permission to transfer some of their shares to the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund (Fidelity). Why did they seek permission? There can be several reasons, but one appears key: it is Fidelity’s policy to immediately liquidate the donated stock. Being a private company, Fidelity could not just sell the shares in the stock market. No, the company would have to buy-back the stock. I presume that JD and the others shareholders wanted some assurance that the company would do so.

JD buttoned-down the donation:

·      The Board approved the transfers to Fidelity.

·      The company confirmed to Fidelity that its books and records reflected Fidelity as the new owner of the shares.

·      JD also sent a letter to Fidelity with each donation indicating that the transferred stock was “exclusively owned and controlled by Fidelity” and that Fidelity “is not and will not be under any obligation to redeem, sell or otherwise transfer” the stock.

·      Fidelity sent a letter to JD after each donation explaining that it had received and thereafter exercised “exclusive legal control over the contributed asset.”

So what did the IRS see here?

The IRS saw Fidelity’s standing policy to liquidate donated stock. As far as the IRS was concerned, the stock had been approved for redemption while JD still owned it. This would trigger Horst – that is, the transaction had progressed so far that JD was an inextricable part. Under the IRS scenario, JD would have a stock redemption – the company would have bought-back the stock from him and not Fidelity – and he would have taxable gain. Granted, JD would also have a donation (because he would have donated the cash from the stock sale to Fidelity), but the tax rules on charitable deductions would increase his income (for the gain) more than the decrease in his income (for the contribution). JD would owe tax.

The Court looked at two key issues:

(1)  Did JD part with the property absolutely and completely?

This one was a quick “yes.” The paperwork was buttoned-up as tight as could be.

(2)  Did JD donate the property before there was a fixed and determinable right to sale?

You can see where the IRS was swinging. All parties knew that Fidelity would redeem the stock; it was Fidelity’s policy. By approving the transfer of shares, the company had – in effect – “locked-in” the redemption while JD still owned the stock. This would trigger assignment-of-income, argued the IRS.

Except that there is a list of cases that look at formalities in situations like this. Fidelity had the right to request redemption – but the redemption had not been approved at the time of donation. While a seemingly gossamer distinction, it is a distinction with tremendous tax weight. Make a sizeable donation but fail to get the magic tax letter from the charity; you will quickly find out how serious the IRS is about formalities. Same thing here. JD and the company had checked all the boxes.

The Court did not see a tree and fruit scenario. There was no assignment of income. JD got his stock donation.

Our case this time was Dickinson v Commissioner, TC Memo 2020-128.

Losing A Tax Exemption

The taxation of tax-exempts can sometimes be tricky.

The reason is that a tax-exempt can – depending on the facts – owe income tax. This type of income is referred to as unrelated business income, and the tax issue developed because Congress did not want tax-exempts to mimic the activities of for-profit companies while not paying tax.

There are certain areas – such as permitting third-party use of membership data – that can trigger the unrelated business tax.

Another would be the rental of real estate with associated indebtedness.

The organization will owe tax on these activities.

Then there is the worst-case scenario: the revocation of the tax-exempt status itself. Think Elon Musk putting Tesla in a 501(c)(3) – the IRS is going to blow-up that arrangement.

Let’s discuss a recent case that walked the revocation ledge.

There is an organization in New York. It is open to seniors from age 55 to 90. To become a member a senior must submit an application and application fee. 

It appears to have four principal activities:

·      To provide burial benefits for members and assistance to surviving family

·      To provide information and referrals to seniors regarding burial as well as general concerns

·      To provide organized activities for senior citizens

·      To provide annual scholarships to needy, promising students

The organization charges fees as follows:

·      An application fee of $100 for seniors age 55 to 70

·      An application fee of $150 for seniors age 71 to 90

·      A $30 annual fee

·      A $10 fee every time a member dies

It doesn’t appear unreasonable to me.

There was an interesting and heartwarming twist to their activities: the organization would pay a separate amount directly to the family of a deceased member, pursuant to a Korean tradition. The organization paid, for example, $11 thousand directly to a funeral home and over $3,200 to the family of a deceased member.

Since we are talking about them, you know that the organization went to audit.

The IRS wanted to revoke their tax-exempt status.

Why?

The is an over-arching requirement that a tax-exempt be operated “exclusively” for an exempt purpose. There is some latitude in the “exclusive” requirement, otherwise de minimis and silly stuff could cost an organization its exemption.

Still, what did the IRS see here?

The first is that benefits were available only to members.

COMMENT: The organization had expressed an intent to include nonmembers, but as of the audit year that goal remained aspirational.

OBSERVATION: The organization had told the IRS of its intent to include nonmembers when it requested exempt status. Upon audit and failure to find nonmember benefits, the IRS argued that the organization had failed to operate in the manner it had previously represented to the IRS. 

Second is that a member was required to pay dues. In fact, if a member failed to pay dues for 90 days after receiving written notice, the organization could terminate the membership and – with it – the requirement to pay any burial benefits.

COMMENT: Sounds a bit like an insurance company, doesn’t it?

Third is that the amount of burial benefits was based on the number of years the deceased had been a member. A member of 12 years would receive more than a member of 5 years.

The IRS brought big heat. The organization was organized in 1996, applied for exempt status in 1998 and was being audited for 2013.

OK, a reasonable number of years had passed since receiving exempt status.

The organization had reported over $2.3 million in revenues on their Form 990.

Sounds to me like they were doing well.

In 2008 they bought a condominium, paying over $800 grand.

Oh, oh.

You can begin to understand where the IRS was coming from. As operated, the organization was looking like a small insurance company. It was accumulating a bank balance; it had bought real estate. The IRS wanted to see obvious charitable activities. If the organization could swing $800 grand on a condo, then they could shake loose a few dollars and waive dues for someone who was broke. They were operating dangerously close to a private club. That is fine, but do not ask for (c)(3) status.

The organization had a remaining argument: there was no diversion of earnings or money. There couldn’t be, as no benefits occurred until someone passed away.

The Court however separated this argument into two parts:

(1)  The earnings and assets of the organization cannot inure (that is, return to) to a member.

The organization successfully argued this point.

(2)  There must be no private benefit.

This makes more sense if one flips the wording: there must be a public benefit. The Court did not see a public benefit, as the organization was not providing benefits to nonmembers or allowing for reduction or abatement of dues for financial need. Not seeing a public benefit, the Court saw a private benefit.

The organization was operating in a manner too close to a for-profit business, and it lost its tax-exempt status.

I get the technical issues, but I do not agree as vigorously as the Court that there was that much private benefit here. Society has an interest in promoting the causes and issues of senior citizens, and the organization – in its own way – was helping. By aiding seniors with government agencies, it was reducing the strain on social services. By assisting seniors with planning and paying for funeral services, it was reducing costs otherwise defaulting to the municipality.

One would have preferred a warning, an opportunity for the organization to right its course, so to speak. What happened instead was akin to burning down the bridge.  

Still, that is how issues in this area go: one is working on a spectrum. The advisor has to judge whether one is on the safe or the non-safe side of the spectrum.

The Court decided the organization had wandered too far to the non-safe side.

Our case this time was The Korean-American Senior Mutual Association v Commissioner.