CTG University: Part One

Let's discuss a famous tax case, and then I will ask you how you would decide a second case based on the decision in the first.

We are going back to 1944, and Lewis received a $22 thousand bonus.  He reported it on his 1944 tax return. It turns out that the bonus had been calculated incorrectly, and he returned $11,000 in 1946. Lewis argued that the $11,000 was mistake, and as a mistake it should not have been taxed to him in 1944. He should be able to amend his 1944 return and get his taxes back. This had an extra meaning since his tax rate in 1946 was lower (remember: post-war), so if he could not amend 1944 he would never get all his taxes back.

The IRS took a very different stand. It pointed out that the tax Code measures income annually. While arbitrary, it is a necessary convention otherwise one could not calculate income or the tax thereon, as there would (almost) always be one or more transactions not resolving by the end of the year. Think for example of writing a check to the church on December 31 but the check not clearing until the following year. The Code therefore taxes income on a "period" concept and not a "transactional" concept. With that backdrop, Lewis would have a deduction in 1946, when he returned the excess bonus.

The case went to the Supreme Court, which found that the full bonus was taxable in 1944. The Court reasoned that Lewis had a "claim of right," a phrase which has now entered the tax literature. It means that income is taxable when received, if there are no restrictions on its disposition. This is true even if later one has to return the income. The reasoning is that there are no limits on one's ability to spend the money, and there is also no immediate belief that it has to be repaid. Lewis had a deduction in 1946.

Looks like the claim of right is a subset of "every tax year stands on its own."

Let's roll into the 1950s. There was a company by the name of Skelly Oil. During the years 1952 through 1957 it overcharged customers approximately $500 thousand. In 1958 it refunded the $500 thousand.

You can pretty much see the Lewis and claim-of-right issue.

But there was one more fact.

Skelly Oil had deducted depletion of 27.5%. Depletion is a concept similar to depreciation, but it does not have to be tied to cost. Say you bought a machine for $100,000. You would depreciate the machine by immediately expensing, allocating expense over time or whatever, but you would have to stop at $100,000. You cannot depreciate more than what you spent. Depletion is a similar concept, but without that limitation. One would deplete (not depreciate) an oil field, for example. One would continue depleting even if one had fully recovered the cost of the field. It is a nice tax gimmick.

Skelly Oil had claimed 27.5% depletion against its $500,000 thousand or so, meaning that it had paid tax on a net of $366,000.

Skelly Oil deducted the $505,000 thousand.

Skelly Oil had a leg up after the Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks and Lewis decisions, as every tax year was to stand on its own. It refunded $505,000, meaning it had a deduction of $505,000. Seemed a slam dunk.

The IRS said no way. The $505,000 had a trailer attached - that 27.5% depletion - and wherever it went that 27.5% went. The most Skelly Oil could deduct was the $366,000.

But the IRS had a problem: the tax Code was based on period reporting and not transactional reporting. The 27.5% trailer analogy was stunning on the big screen and all, but it was not tax law. There was no ball hitch on the $505,000 dragging depletion in its wake.

Here is the Supreme Court: 

[T]he Code should not be interpreted to allow respondent 'the practical equivalent of double deduction,' *** absent a clear declaration of intent by Congress."

The dissent argued (in my words):           

So what? Every year stands on its own. Since when is the Code concerned with the proper measurement of income?

Odd thing, though: the dissent was right. The Lewis decision does indicate that Skelly Oil had a $505,000 deduction, even though it might not have seemed fair. The Court reached instead for another concept - the Arrowsmith concept. 

[T]he annual accounting concept does not require us to close our eyes to what happened in prior years."

There is your ball hitch. The concept of "net items" would drag the 27.5% depletion into 1958. "Net items" would include revenues and deductions so closely related as to be inseparable. Like oil revenues and its related depletion deduction.

The Court gave us the following famous quote: 

In other situations when the taxes on a receipt do not equal the tax benefits of a repayment, either the taxpayer or the Government may, depending on circumstances, be the beneficiary. Here, the taxpayer always wins and the Government always loses."

And over time the Skelly Oil case has come to be interpreted as disallowing a tax treatment where "the taxpayer always wins and the Government always loses." The reverse, however, is and has always been acceptable to the Government.

But you can see something about the evolution of tax law: you don't really know the law until the Court decides the law. Both Lewis and Skelly Oil could have gone either way.

Now think of the tax law, rulings and Regulations being published every year. Do we really know what this law means, or are we just waiting our turn, like Lewis and Skelly Oil?

Paying Tax Twice On The Same Income

Let me set up a scenario for you, and you tell me whether you spot the tax issue.

There is a fellow who is involved with health delivery services. He is paid by an insurance company, and he in turn pays out claims against that reimbursement. Whatever is left over is his profit.

In the first year, he received reimbursements from Cigna. There were issues, and in a second year he had to repay those monies. There was of course litigation. It turned out he was right, and Cigna – in yet a third year – paid him approximately $258,000.

Is the $258,000 taxable to him?

There is a doctrine in the tax Code that every tax year stands on its own. One has to resolve all the numbers that go into income for that year, even if some debate about an "exact" number exists. More commonly this is an issue for an accrual-basis taxpayer, meaning that one pays tax on amounts receivable even before receiving cash. Fortunately one is also able to deduct amounts payable (with exceptions) before writing the check. This is generally accepted accounting and is the way that almost all larger businesses report their income.

There is an alternative way. One can report income when cash is received and deduct expenses when bills are paid. This is the cash basis of accounting, and it too is generally accepted accounting.

For the most part, cash basis is the domain of smaller businesses. Depending upon the type of business, however, it may not matter if one is large or small. For example, an inventory-intensive business is required to use accrual accounting.

Our taxpayer is Udeobong, and he uses the cash basis of accounting.

When Cigna paid him the first time, he would have reported income in year one - the year he received the check.

When he repaid Cigna in year two, he had two options:

(1) He could deduct the payment in that second year, as he was repaying amounts previously taxed to him; or

(2) He could file his taxes for the second year using Section 1341, known in tax-speak as the “claim of right.”

The Code recognizes that just deducting the repayment in a second year could be unfair.  Let me give you an example. Let’s say that you received a very large bonus in 2014, large enough for you to retire. You invest the money and live comfortably, but 2014 was your bellwether year and is never to be repeated. Something happens – say that there is clawback - and you have to return some of the bonus in 2016. Sure, you could deduct the repayment, but that repayment could overwhelm your income in 2016. It is possible that you would lose any tax advantage once your income goes negative. If one looks at the two years together (2014 and 2016), you would have paid tax on income you did not get to keep.

That is where Section 1341 comes in. The Code allows you to do a special calculation:

·        You start off with the tax you actually paid in 2014

·        You then do a pro forma calculation, subtracting the repaid amount from your income in 2014. This gives you a revised tax amount.

·        You subtract the revised tax amount from the actual tax you paid in 2014.

·        The IRS allows you to claim that difference as tax paid in 2016.

The Code is trying to be fair, and for the most part it works.

There is one more piece you need to know. Udeobong did not either deduct the repayment or use the claim-of-right in year two. He did ... nothing.

Is the $258,000 in year three taxable to him?

Unfortunately, it is.

But why?

Because the Code gives him two options: deduct the payment in year two or use the claim of right alternative.

COMMENT: You may be wondering if he could amend his year-one return. This is the technical problem with every tax year standing on its own. Unless there were exceptional circumstances, the Code takes the position   that he received and had control over the income in year one, even if something occurs later requiring him to repay some or all of that income. Since he had control in year one, he had income in year one. Should he repay in a later year, then the repayment is reported in the later year.

The Code does not give him a third option of excluding the $258,000 in year three.

So he has to pay tax again.

It is a harsh result. One can understand the reasoning without the conclusion feeling fair or just ... or right.  I am also frustrated with Udeobong. There is no mention that he used a tax advisor. He had no idea of what he walked into.

He tried to save professional fees, perhaps because he saw his tax return as a simple matter of cash in and cash out. I understand, and I do not – in general – disagree. Still, one has to be cognizant when something unusual happens, like swapping real estate, exercising stock options or repaying Cigna a lot of money. The combination of "unusual" and "a lot" probably means it is a good time to see a tax expert.  

Romancing The Income

Let’s discuss Blagaich, an early 2016 decision from the Tax Court. This is a procedural decision within a larger case of whether cash and property transfers represent income. 

Blagaich was the girlfriend and in 2010 was 54 years old.

Burns was the boyfriend and in 2010 was 72 years old.

Their romance lasted from November 2009 until March 2011.

It appears that Burns was fairly well heeled, as he wired her $200,000, bought her a Corvette and wrote her several checks. These added up to $343,819.

He was sweet on her, and she on him. Neither wanted to marry, but Burns wanted some level of commitment. What to do …?

On November 29, 2010 they decided to enter into a written agreement. This would formalize their “respect, appreciation and affection for each other.” They would “respect each other and … continue to spend time with each other consistent with their past practice.” Both would “be faithful to each other and … refrain from engaging in intimate or other romantic relations with any other individual.”

The agreement required Burns to immediately pay Blagaich $400,000, because nothing says love like a check you can immediately take to the bank.

Surprisingly, the relationship went downhill soon after entering into the agreement.

On March 10, 2011 Blagaich moved out of Burn’s house.

The next day Burns sent her a notice of termination of the agreement.

That same month Burns also sued her for nullification of the agreement, as she had been involved with another man throughout the entire relationship. He wanted his Corvette, his diamond ring - all of it - returned.

Somewhere in here Burns must have met with his accountant, as he/she sent Blagaich a Form 1099-MISC for $743,819.

She did not report this amount as income. The IRS of course wanted to know why.

The IRS learned that she was being sued, so they decided to hold up until the Circuit Court heard the case.

The Circuit Court decided that:

·        The Corvette, ring and cash totaling $343,819 were gifts from him to her.

·        The $400,000 was different. She was paid that under a contract. Flubbing the contract, she now had to pay it back.

Burns had passed away by this time, but his estate sent Blagaich a revised Form 1099-MISC for $400,000.

With the Circuit Court case decided, the IRS moved in. They increased her income by $743,819, assessed taxes and a crate-load of penalties. She strongly disagreed, and the two are presently in Tax Court. Blagaich moved for summary adjudication, meaning she wanted the Tax Court to decide her way without going through a full trial.

QUESTION: Do you think she has income and, if so, in what amount?

Let’s begin with the $400,000.

The Circuit Court had decided that $400,000 was not a gift. It was paid pursuant to a contract for the performance of services, and the performance of services usually means income. Additionally, since the payment was set by contract and she violated the contract terms, she had to repay the $400,000.

She argued that she could not have income when she had to pay it back. In legal-speak, this is called “rescission.”

In the tax arena, rescission runs head-on into the “claim of right” doctrine. A claim of right means that you have income when you receive an increase in wealth without a corresponding obligation to repay or a restriction on your being able to spend. If it turns out later that you in fact have to repay, then tax law will allow you a deduction – but at that later date.

Within the claim of right doctrine there is a narrow exception IF you pay the money back by the end of the same year or enter into a binding contract by the end of the same year to repay. In that case you are allowed to exclude the income altogether.

Blagaich did not do this. She clearly did not pay the $400,000 back in the same year. She also did not enter in an agreement in 2010 to pay it back. In fact, she had no intention to pay it back until the Circuit Court told her to.

She did not meet that small exception to the claim-of-right doctrine. She had income. She will also have a deduction upon repayment.

OBSERVATION: This is a problem if one’s future income goes down. Say that she returns to a $40,000/year job. Sure, she can deduct $400,000, but she can only offset $40,000 of income and the taxes thereon. The balance is wasted. Practitioners sometimes see this result with athletes who retire, leaving their sport (and its outsized paychecks) behind. It may never be possible to get back all the taxes one paid in the earlier year.

Let’s go to the $343,819.

She argued that the Circuit Court already decided that the $343,819 was a gift. To go through this again is to relitigate – that is, a double jeopardy to her. In legal-speak this is called “collateral estoppel.”

The Court clarified that collateral estoppel precludes the same parties from relitigating issues previously decided in a court of competent jurisdiction.

It also pointed out that the IRS was not party to the Circuit Court case. The IRS is not relitigating. The IRS never litigated in the first place.

She argued that the IRS knew of the case, requested and received updates, pleadings and discovery documents. The IRS even held up the tax examination until the Circuit Court case was decided.

But that does not mean that the IRS was party to the case. The IRS was an observer, not a litigant. Collateral estoppel applies to the litigants. That said, collateral estoppel did not apply to the IRS.

Blagaich lost her request for summary, meaning that the case will now be heard by the Tax Court.

What does this tax guy think?

She has very much lost the argument on the $400,000. Most likely she will have to pay tax for 2010 and then take a deduction later when she repays the money. The problem – as we pointed out – is that unless she has at least $400,000 in income for that later year, she will never get back as much tax as she is going to pay for 2010. It is a flaw in the tax law, but that flaw has been there a long time.

On the other hand, she has a very good argument with the $343,819. The Court was correct that a technical issue disallowed it from granting summary. That does not however mean that the technical issue will carry the day in full trial. That Circuit Court decision will carry a great deal of evidentiary weight.

We will know the final answer when Blagaich v Commissioner goes to full trial.

Lance Armstrong’s Tax Problem

You may have read or heard that Lance Armstrong has been stripped of his seven Tour de France victories because of doping. The UCI Management Committee stated that it would not award the titles stripped from Armstrong to any other riders. History books will show no winner of the race between the years 1999 and 2005. UCI has demanded that Armstrong return his winnings from the vacated years, an amount estimated at approximately $4 million.

SCA Promotions, a Dallas insurance firm, has indicated that it will demand repayment of bonuses it insured for Armstrong’s wins in 2002, 2003 and 2004. It is reportedly seeking approximately $12 million.

There wasn’t much goodwill between SCA and Armstrong to begin with. SCA delayed paying a $5 million bonus for his 2005 win, responding to then-swirling allegations and controversies surrounding possible drug use. Armstrong sued, and SCA settled the case.

Then there are the endorsements. Armstrong earned more than $17 million in endorsements and speaking fees in 2005, when he won his last Tour de France. That amount grew to an estimated $21 million in 2010. And do not forget that Armstrong was the founder and driving force behind the Livestrong Foundation, which assists those struggling with cancer. Nike, Honey Stinger and Easton Bell Sports have dropped his endorsement, for example, and make seek clawback of prior monies.

Let us suppose that Armstrong has to repay some of these monies. What are the tax consequences to Armstrong?

The first step is easy: Armstrong will be entitled to a deduction. The repayment is tied to monies originally earned in his trade or business as a cyclist or spokesman, so the tax linkage is clear.

The second question is one of tax benefit. Armstrong paid taxes on these monies in prior years. Can he go back and have the IRS refund those monies? There is the rub. What would be your argument for amending those tax years?

You:     He had to repay those monies.

Me:      Did he not have unrestricted access to those monies in the prior year?

You:     I am not saying that. He did, but now he has to pay it back.

Me:      So is the transaction we are talking about for the year he received the money or the year he   pays it back?

You:     What is the difference?

Me:      He earned it in 2004 but pays it back in 2013. What year do you amend?

You:     You cannot amend 2013. It hasn’t happened yet.

Me:      So you would amend 2004?

You:     Yep.

Me:      There are two issues. The IRS is going to have a problem with your argument that he did not receive the money and owe tax. He did receive the money. And the IRS will expect its tax, because in 2004 he had no reason to think that he wasn’t entitled to keep the money.

You:     What is the second issue?

Me:      You cannot amend 2004. Remember, a tax year is open for only three years. The statute period has long since expired.

You:     So I am stuck with 2013?

Me:      That’s right.

Let’s pursue this point of tax benefit a bit further. Let’s say that Armstrong was in the maximum tax bracket in 2004. Let’s also say that his income for 2013 is not what it was in 2004. How much tax does he recoup from repaying prior winnings? You guessed it: whatever the deduction saves him in 2013, which can be a very different – and much smaller – amount than what he actually paid in 2004.

You:     That doesn’t seem fair!

Me:      There is one more tax option.

That option is IRS Section 1341, sometimes referred to the “claim of right” section. The “claim of right” concept is something akin to “I thought at the time that the money was mine to keep.” Section 1341 gives one the option to:   

            

(1)    Deduct the payment in the year of repayment, or

(2)    Calculate a hypothetical tax, excluding the repaid income from the tax year originally received. That gives one a change in tax. One then calculates the tax for the year of repayment, not including the repayment itself, and subtracts the previously-calculated change in tax from that tax.

You:     Huh?

Me:      Let’s use an example. Say that Armstrong repays $3 million in 2013. Let’s further say (to keep this easy) that the entire $3 million was attributable to 2004 winnings and endorsements. We go back and recompute his 2004 income tax excluding that $3 million. Let’s say his tax goes down by $1,050,000 (3,000,000 * 35%).

You:     OK, so he gets a $1.05 million tax break.

Me:      Not yet. There is another step.

Let’s say that his 2013 taxable income is also $3 million. We estimate his 2013 tax on the $3 million to be $1,027,000 (granted, no one can guess what taxes will be).  His tax benefit is limited to $1,027,000, not the $1,050,000 from 2004.

You:     So he loses over $22 grand. That isn’t too bad, all things considered.

In our example, you are right. The $22 grand is small potatoes. But we used a very simple example. 

Let us complicate the scenario. What if the athlete’s knock-it-out-of-the-park income years are behind him or her? Let’s use a football player. Say that he had an 8-year NFL career. What if he has to pay back $2 million several years after retirement? It is very possible that he will never again be in the same tax bracket as when he was playing. That said, he would never get back the actual tax he paid on the income, whether one uses Section 1341 or not.

Let’s use another example. What if our athlete was frugal and saved his/her career earnings? He/she now has a very attractive portfolio of tax-exempt securities and dividend-paying stocks. Let’s say that the portfolio will generate $2 million in 2013. He/she pays back $2 million. What do you see? Tax-exempts are – well, tax-exempt. Their tax rate is zero. Next year tax rates on dividends may go to the maximum rate. Let’s say they do. He/she will offset the maximum rate on the dividends, but remember that dividends are only a part of the $2 million the portfolio is earning. He/she is still not whole.

Section 1341 many times helps, but there is no guarantee that one will get a tax break equal to the tax actually paid when one received the income.

P.S. Armstrong resigned from the Livestrong board of directors on November 4. He had previously resigned as chairman on October 17 but had kept a seat on the board.