The Nick Saban Tax

Have you heard about the “Nick Saban” tax?

Let’s set it up.

There has been a longstanding tax provision limiting the deduction for public company executive compensation to $1 million. Mind you, this is not a restriction on how much you can pay an executive; the restriction only applies to how much you can deduct on a tax return. The restriction does not apply to all executives, either; it applies to the CEO, CFO and three other most-highly-paids.

But there was an exception large enough for the Fortune 500 to drive through. The exception was for “performance.” Magically and almost overnight, virtually all executive compensation packages became based on “performance.” Options were considered performance-based, and eventually options came to be passed around like candy. Realistically, one had to refuse to do any tax planning for this provision to actually apply.

This changed with the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act passed in December, 2017. Congress tightened up this code Section (162(m)) by taking away the performance exception. The $1 million cap now has a real bite.

But Congress was still looking for money.

Congress decided to put the same $1 million compensation limit on nonprofits.

This creates a quandary, as nonprofits (generally) do not pay tax. If I were a nonprofit executive and Congress threatened to disallow my deduction, I would not be feeling the tremulous fear of my for-profit peers.

Congress thought of that. They decided that the nonprofit would pay a 21% tax on my behalf.

Whoa. Now you have my attention. Granted, the tax is not on me, but we all know how this works in the real world. Only small children and Congress believes in free. The rest of us have to pay.

Congress passed a tax provision applying the $1 million cap to the five highest- paid employees of a 501(a), which includes a 501(c)(3). Think nonprofits, certain hospitals, colleges and universities and the like.

BTW medical professors were excluded from this, so it appears clear that Congress was trying to reach the athletics programs and their coaches.

But there is a problem.

Here is Code section 4960 imposing the tax:

       (c)  Definitions and special rules.

For purposes of this section-

(1)  Applicable tax-exempt organization.

The term "applicable tax-exempt organization" means any organization which for the taxable year-

(A)  is exempt from taxation under section 501(a) ,

(B)  is a farmers' cooperative organization described in section 521(b)(1) ,

(C)  has income excluded from taxation under section 115(1) , or

(D)  is a political organization described in section 527(e)(1) .

What is that Section 115(1)?

         § 115 Income of states, municipalities, etc.

Gross income does not include-

(1)  income derived from any public utility or the exercise of any essential governmental function and accruing to a State or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia; or …

What does this mean?

Congress thought that – by extending Section 4960 to reference Section 115(1) – it would reach those entities exempt via Section 115(1).

Entities such as Alabama.

Or the University of Alabama.

Why?

Because the University of Alabama is an instrumentality of the state of Alabama.

And here the tax law goes wonky.

The Courts have looked at the interaction of Sections 115(1) and 511(which is the unrelated business income tax which applies to a nonprofit). Can a state instrumentality (say a university) run a business – say a farm-to-table restaurant chain – and avoid the unrelated business income tax because of Section 115(1)? If that were the case, then Illinois could start a chain called Outfront Steakhouse, make a zillion dollars and never pay tax because of Section 115(1).

The Courts have clarified that is not the case. There is a limit to Section 115(1).

According to that reasoning, it seems to me that Congress should be able to tax those university salaries.

But there is another argument – the doctrine of implied statutory immunity. This arises from our federalist system of government: the federal government has to respect the state government. Under this theory, if the federal government wants to tax a state, it has to say so in an unambiguous manner – that is, it cannot be “implied.”

Continuing our example, if the federal government wanted to tax Illinois for opening a steakhouse chain and locating them adjacent to every Outback Steakhouse location throughout the land, it would have to say something like:

… the [] tax will apply to an entity relying upon Section 115(1) for nontaxability of their [] business activity should that activity be the same or substantially similar to a business activity conducted by a for-profit restaurant chain.”

That is explicit. That breaches implied statutory immunity. The tax would then stick.

Is that what Congress did with the new Section 4960(c) tax?

Nowhere close, it appears.

Under that reasoning the University of Alabama will not pay the Nick Saban tax, as the tax does not reach the University of Alabama.

There are universities clearly affected by this new law: Duke, for example, or Northwestern. They have to pay up. Think of it as the difference between a “public” university and a “tax-exempt” university.

But having the state name in the university’s name, however, does not mean that the university is exempt as “public.” It depends on how the university was organized and chartered. Texas A&M will be affected by the new tax provision, but the University of Texas - Austin will not. It is enough to give one a headache.

What happens next?

The easiest path is for Congress to revise Code section 4960 and clean up the language. Without Congressional action, you can be certain the “public” universities will litigate this matter. They have to.

But the likelihood of the present Congress accomplishing anything seems unlikely, at best.

Let's Talk Tax Inversions - Part Two

Last time we discussed the taxation of an inverting corporation.

There are three levels of tax severity to the corporation itself:

(1)   The IRS ignores the inversion completely and continues to tax the foreign company as if it were a U.S. company

(2)   The IRS will respect the foreign company as foreign, but woe to whoever tries to move certain assets out of the U.S. or otherwise use certain U.S. – based tax attributes for a period of 10 years.

(3)   The IRS will respect the transaction without reservation.

Then there is the toll-charge on the shareholders. If they own more than 50% of the new foreign company, the shareholders will pay tax on their shares AS IF they had sold them rather than exchanged them for stock in the new foreign parent.  The practical effect is that any inversion has to include cash to the U.S. shareholders, otherwise such shareholders would be reaching into their wallet to pay tax (and would likely vote to scuttle any inversion deal).

It was this toll charge that caught the attention of Congress. If you think about it, someone owning actual shares would be taxed, but someone having a future right to shares would not. Who would such a person be? How about corporate insiders: management and directors? Executives frequently receive stock options and other stock-based compensation. Congress felt that management and directors should also have “skin in the game,” thus the origin of Section 4985. 

One quickly realizes the parity Congress wanted:

(1)   First, Section 4985 applies only if gain is realized by any shareholder. If there is no toll charge on the shareholders, then there will be no toll charge on management and directors.

(2)   The Section 4985 tax will be the highest tax rate payable by the shareholders, which is the capital gains rate (15%)

There is some technical lingo in here. The tax Code dragnets all individuals “subject to the requirements of Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934” – in short, the officers, directors and 10% shareholders. It also includes their families.

So Congress wanted insiders to also pay tax. That’s great. I wanted to play in the NFL.

Let’s take a look at another Congressional attempt to “rope in” executive pay: the golden parachute limitations of Section 280G. This tax applies to “excess” compensation payments upon a change in corporate control. The insider is allowed a base amount (defined as average annual compensation for the five years preceding the year of change in control). The excess is subject to an additional 20% excise tax – in addition to the payroll and income taxes already paid.

How does it work away from the fever swamp of Washington?

It doesn’t. Corporations routinely “gross-up” the executive compensation until the tax is shifted back to the corporation.

I suspect that every tax accountant has run into a compensation “gross up” exercise. I have done enough over the years to make my eyes cross.

Let’s return to our inversion discussion. What do you think companies are doing when their executives are subjected to the 15% Section 4985 excise tax?

Yep, the gross-up.

The mathematics of a gross-up are terrible. Let’s take the example of someone who is subject to the maximum federal tax rate (39.6%), add in the ObamaCare Medicare tax (0.9%), the Section 4985 tax itself (15%) and a state tax (say 6%), and 61.5% of every dollar is going to tax (I am leaving out the deductibility of the state tax). If I am to gross-up a payroll, I am saying that only 38.5 cents of every dollar will be available to satisfy the original Section 4985 tax liability. This means that the gross-up will have to be $2.60 (that is, 1 divided by 38.5%) for every dollar of the original Section 4985 tax.

But Congress, never willing to leave a bigger mess undone, added yet another twist to Section 4985: the corporation is not allowed to deduct the gross-up. Let’s say that the excise tax was $1 million. The gross-up would be $2.6 million, none of which is deductible by the company.

Yipes!

Medtronic is a medical device maker based in Minneapolis. It operates in more than 120 countries and employs approximately 50,000 people worldwide. It has agreed to acquire Covidien, an Irish medical device company. Since we are talking about inversions, you can surmise that the new parent will be based in Ireland. For its part, Medtronic says it will be leaving its Minneapolis-based employees in Minneapolis, which makes sense when you consider that they have employees located throughout the planet.

Medtronic will of course continue to pay U.S. tax on its U.S. income. What it won’t do is pay U.S. tax on income earned outside the U.S. This is not an unreasonable position. Think about your response if California tried to tax you because you drank Napa Valley wine.

Medtronic triggered the Section 4985 excise tax on its executive officers and directors. This tax is estimated to be approximately $24 million.

Remember the loop-the-loop involved with a gross-up. How much will it cost Medtronic to gross-up its insiders for the $24 million?

Around $63 million.

None of which Medtronic can deduct on its tax return.

Can you explain to me how this can possibly be good for the shareholders of Medtronic? It isn’t, of course.

Way to play masters of the universe, Congress.