The Fruit Of The Tree

 

I have a friend who is pressing an employment lawsuit.

It is not pretty: falsified records, deleted files, retaliatory firings. The legal process itself is glacial: may we live long enough to see the end. They enter discovery soon. I suspect the employer/defendant will then seek to settle rather than risk any further public disclosure.

I suppose I am my friend’s tax advisor.

The taxation of litigation is not what it used to be.

Let’s travel back to 2005. The Supreme Court was hearing two cases involving income recognition and legal contingency fees.

ISSUE: You sue for $100 grand. If you win, the attorney takes 30 percent. Are you taxed on $100 grand or on $70 grand?

The Appeals courts had split, which is how the Supreme Court got involved.

We will restrict ourselves to one case: Banks v Commissioner. Banks had brought an employment lawsuit. Before going to trial, he settled for $464,000 and paid a contingency fee of $150 grand. The Sixth Circuit reasoned there was no extant income when the contingency was created, making the agreement more akin to a division of property (the claim) than a division of spoils (the settlement). Banks did not have a sufficiently uninterrupted claim to require reporting of the entire amount ($464,000).

The Supreme Court took a different tack and saw anticipatory assignment of income. This is a classic tax doctrine; one I learned in school as “fruit of the tree.” The concept is that income (the fruit) should be taxed to the person earning or generating it (the tree). An example would be my working all week but having my paycheck go to my child. I earned the paycheck and cannot avoid taxation by redirecting its payment.

This result could have been disastrous to Banks, requiring him to pay taxes on $150 grand which he did not receive. Pause to consider that his attorney was also reporting the same $150 grand in income, so the contingency fee was being taxed twice. Unless there was a safety valve somewhere, this was not taxation – it was confiscation.

But Banks fortunately had a safety valve: itemized deductions. Take a look at this itemized deduction schedule (Schedule A) for 2015: 

             

Go to the bottom where you see “Miscellaneous Deductions.”

You know what was a miscellaneous deduction? Yes, contingency fees paid an attorney on a legal judgement or settlement.

Was it a perfect answer? No. The deduction came after Adjusted Gross Income (AGI), so a tax attribute based on AGI would be unfortunately skewed. It was an itemized deduction, and the taxpayer may not have been itemizing except for the contingency fee. And it was a “miscellaneous” itemized deduction, meaning that the taxpayer had to subtract 2% of AGI off-the-top before getting to the deductible amount.

Still, it was something and much better than nothing.

Then the tax law changed with the 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA).

One of the things that the TCJA did was to eliminate almost all miscellaneous itemized deductions, beginning in 2018.

Those contingency fees were no longer deductible.

Congress argued that it was simplifying the tax Code by reducing the number of taxpayers who were itemizing. While this result did happen, Congress also eliminated the economic handcuff to the Banks case: a deduction somewhere on a tax return to offset that severe 100% income recognition.

COMMENT: Let’s clarify this issue by separating legal fees between business and nonbusiness lawsuits. Business legal fees are still deductible. Nonbusiness legal fees (think employment lawsuits) are generally nondeductible. There still exists a narrow deduction for selected nonbusiness litigation (such as certain discrimination and whistleblower claims), but for the vast majority of nonbusiness litigation there simply is no deduction for legal fees.

Let’s look at the Eiler case.

James and Kathryn Eiler sued LexisNexis, Equifax, Experian and Trans Union for inaccurate, incomplete or otherwise injurious information on their credit reports. The parties settled for $64,750, of which $4,700 went to the Eilers.

COMMENT: The comment writes itself, I would say.

The IRS came in, eyes gleaming and jaws slavering, with a Notice of Deficiency totaling over $11 grand.

The Eilers were in a tough spot. Under Banks the IRS was correct, and there remained only a few ways to deduct related nonbusiness legal fees. The Eilers started thinking: we brought action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which is kinda-sorta like the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), which has explicit discrimination protections. If the FCRA is like the ECOA, and if “unlawful discrimination” includes “enforcement of civil rights,” and if the moon hits your eye like a big pizza pie …

The Eilers wanted a deduction because of civil rights discrimination.

To be accurate, the Eilers just wanted a deduction. They were being creative on how to get there.

And the Tax Court shot them down.

They received $4,700 and owed over $11 grand.

My thoughts?

I question whether the Supreme Court would decide Banks the same way given today’s tax Code. When a line of reasoning (assignment of income rather than co-ownership of a claim) leads to absurd results (such as double taxation of the same “fruit”), a sober and responsible person would conclude that the reasoning is flawed.

And there you have the taxation of nonbusiness litigation since 2018.

Our case this time was Eiler v Commissioner, 167 T.C. No. 3, Docket No. 16903-22, 7/14/2026.

Having Assets And Filing An Offer In Compromise

I glanced at the case because it involved an offer in compromise, a collections hearing, a lien and currently noncollectible (CNC) status.

That is a lot going on for approximately $23 grand in tax debt.

First thing I noticed was that the taxpayer represented himself before the Tax Court. This is referred to as “pro se.” It happens quite a bit, and it usually does not work out well for the taxpayer.

I double-shudder when I think about “pro se” and going hard procedural with the IRS, such as with liens and offers in compromise.

Let’s walk through it:

(1) On November 16, 2016 the taxpayer filed an Offer in Compromise. The tax was approximately $23 grand. He offered approximately $12 grand.

COMMENT: There are several “flavors” of Offers in Compromise. This one was the traditional vanilla: inability to pay or to pay in full. Those late-night commercials are hawking this type.

(2) On May 30, 2017 the IRS sent a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing.

The taxpayer filed for a hearing, called a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. I probably would have done the same.

(3) On July 11, 2017 the IRS indicated it would not accept the Offer in Compromise, at least as submitted. 

Taxpayer appealed. Again, I probably would have done the same.

(4) On September 27, 2017 the IRS settlement officer sent taxpayer a letter that the CDP hearing was being delayed until the Offer in Compromise was resolved.

COMMENT: Left hand: right hand. Happens all the time.

(5) Wouldn’t you know that the appeal of the Offer in Compromise was assigned to the same IRS settlement officer handling the Collections hearing?

(6) The IRS scheduled a telephone hearing for December 14, 2017. The settlement officer also offered to place the taxpayer’s case in currently noncollectible (CNC) status.

COMMENT: I have used CNC status over the years, especially during and after the Great Recession of 2008. The IRS realizes that there is no money to collect, so it places the case on hold, generally for a year or so. Their normal collections machinery is paused.

Mind you, the IRS is not writing-off the debt. They are allowing a break in collection activity, hoping your situation improves.

(7) Not waiting until the hearing, taxpayer on December 1 sent the settlement officer a letter addressing the rejection of his offer in compromise.

COMMENT. He should include additional or expanded financial information, as his offer was based on inability to pay. The common-sense response to rejection of an offer based on inability to pay is to expand on why one is unable to pay.

Having taken the stage, taxpayer also alleged that the IRS engaged in criminal activity.

COMMENT: Stop that. You are not winning with that behavior.

The settlement officer rescheduled the hearing for January 9th.

(8)  On December 12 taxpayer sent the settlement officer another letter lamenting the rejection of his offer in compromise.

COMMENT: Once again: no additional or expanded financial information. This action was fruitless and ill-advised.

(9) We finally get to the hearing. The settlement officer reviewed the offer in compromise. She sees debt of approximately $23 grand and assets of approximately $110 grand. Receiving no additional or expanded financial information from the taxpayer, the officer decided that rejection of the offer was appropriate.

(10) After the hearing taxpayer sent a letter to the settlement officer, complaining about the IRS Fresh Start Program and including correspondence the taxpayer previously exchanged with the Taxpayer Advocate Service.

Taxpayer was focused on the lien and highlighted a TAS letter including the statement “the IRS has determined that the lien should be withdrawn.”

He wanted the lien withdrawn.

The settlement officer, to her credit, looked into this. It did not change the outcome, but she did try.

The immediate takeaway is the someone with $100-plus grand in assets is probably not going to be able to offer-down $23 grand in tax debt, irrespective of having low income. While true as a generalization, there are several specific considerations.

(1)  Given his focus on removing an IRS lien, I presume that taxpayer’s house comprised most if not all of taxpayer’s assets. I can see not wanting to refinance when one has limited income. In truth, one probably could not refinance, as no traditional mortgage provider would originate the loan.

a.     And there is how I would respond to the request for additional financial information: by providing rejection letters from a couple of mortgage companies.

(2)  Let’s say that the house is not the lion’s share of the assets. Perhaps it is something else, like a retirement account.

a.     If a retirement account, I would argue economic hardship.

                                                                         i.      That is, taxpayer needs that asset and the income therefrom in order to meet reasonable basic living expenses. The loss of said asset would be an economic hardship.

                                                                      ii.      It is already stipulated that the taxpayer is low income. How hard of an argument is this?

(3)  In general, I am unmoved by the IRS filing a lien.

a.     I may be moved if disclosure of said lien would adversely affect one’s career or public status (a mayor or judge, for example), but those instances are few and far between.

b.     Distinguish a lien from a levy.

                                                                         i.      A lien just secures the government’s interest. A lien on my house cannot be collected until I sell the house.

                                                                      ii.      A levy is a different matter. The IRS going into your bank account is an example of a levy.

(4)  Let’s circle back to the presumption that taxpayer’s residence represented the majority of his assets, hence his focus on removing the lien. The IRS just bounced his offer. What happens next?

a.     Folks, the IRS cannot (barring exceptional circumstances) take one’s primary residence.

b.     Yep, he will get periodic and annoying IRS correspondence, but …

c.     … so what? There is little bite left in that dog.

d.     And after 10 years (without the IRS taking the matter to Court to obtain judgement), the statute of limitations will kick-in.

You can see the downside to a pro se, especially when dealing with IRS procedure. There is a lot going on here, and I suspect that – with professional advice – taxpayer could have gotten the offer. I doubt he would have gotten the lien released, though. He saved a few grand in professional fees in order to completely strike out with the IRS.

The case for the home gamers is Banks, TC Memo 2019-166.