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Friday, October 3, 2014

Silicon Valley Cafeterias And Tax-Free Meals




I have a friend who lives and works on the north side of Cincinnati (or as we south-of-the-river-residents call it: “Ohio”). He works for significant company, and one of the perks is a company cafeteria. The cafeteria provides breakfast, should one choose, and of course it provides lunch. Free.

I admit I am a bit envious.

In this day and age when just about everything is taxed – at least once – you may wonder how this can happen. It has to do with Code Section 119:

(a) Meals and lodging furnished to employee, his spouse, and his dependents, pursuant to employment
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of any meals or lodging furnished to him, his spouse, or any of his dependents by or on behalf of his employer for the convenience of the employer, but only if—
(1)     in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business premises of the employer
                                                                     
How did this provision come to be?

It officially entered the Code in 1954, although employers were already taking the deduction (and employees excluding the income) under administrative and judicial decisions.  Prior to 1954 there was some inconsistency on what was required for the employee to omit the income. Sometimes the courts focused exclusively on the convenience of the employer. Other times the courts would look at whether there was a compensatory reason for the meal. Depending on the focus, they could arrive at different answers, of course.

So Congress stepped-in in 1954 and gave us Section 119. There were differences between the House and Senate bills (The House did not want a convenience-of-the-employer test, but the Senate did). Both House and Senate booted out the issue of “compensatory reason.” If it were primarily for the convenience of the employer, then the meals were free. Whether the employee considered it compensatory was beside the point.

Let’s use an extreme example to understand what Congress was after. In Olkjer, for example, the taxpayer was employed at a remote location in Greenland. The employer provided meals (and, in this case, lodging also) because there was nowhere else to go.

And there any number of examples like that. Think of emergency room personnel. Could they hypothetically get in a car and go to a restaurant for lunch? Of course they could. It would not serve the hospital’s needs, however, and hence they are required to stay on premises. The same can be said for casino workers.

Fast forward a few decades and we now have Silicon Valley. Take Google, for example. If you work at the Googleplex you can eat breakfast, lunch and dinner for free. I recall that the personal chef for the Grateful Dead was one of the early chefs at Google. These companies prey on each other’s chefs, too. Facebook hired a chef away from Google, for example. Facebook now serves Thai-spiced cilantro chicken and salmon with red curry sauce. Their chef will also prepare a special meal as an employee award or recognition. These meals can be quite upscale, featuring seven courses on white tablecloth.


No doubt Section 119 has come a long way from what Congress was thinking back in 1954.

And there is the rub.

In 2013 the Wall Street Journal published an article on these cafeterias, including the question whether the provision of gourmet-level meals were intended to be tax-free. Spring forward a year or so and the IRS has included the issue in their 2014-2015 Priority Guidance Plan. It appears the IRS is shifting resources to develop tax lines-of-reasoning requiring such benefits be reported as taxable compensation to employees.

How? Actually, the direction is fairly straightforward. The IRS will challenge the perk as not being “primarily” for the convenience of the employer. They cannot challenge whether there is a “compensatory” reason, as the reports to the 1954 tax Code makes it clear that Congress was not concerned with that issue.

The companies of course argue that such perks are “primarily” for their convenience. How?
           
·        Encourage employees to arrive early
·        Encourage employees to stay late
·        Employees do not waste time going out to eat
·        Maximize collaboration opportunities, as employees eat together rather than taking individual cars and dining alone elsewhere
·        Help retain people and foster employee trust
·        Help attract prospective employees

You must admit, the companies have a point. My hunch is that the IRS will restrict the definition of “convenience” to require a closer connection between the cafeteria perk and the alleged convenience.

What do I think? I have been in tax practice long enough to see provisions come into the tax Code, and then see practitioners take said provisions into places and distances that Congress or the IRS never intended. There is uproar, and Congress or the IRS then cracks-down. The practitioners regroup, study tape, develop new game plans and all parties eventually take the field again for the next game. It is just the wheel and rhythm of tax law and practice.

I suspect the same will happen here.

I have over the years worked unreasonable hours, and many (not all, mind you) CPA firms will make some provision for their staff during busy season. These meals have been tax-free, as the impetus for the meal was exclusively for the convenience of the CPA firm (as far as I was concerned). There was nothing there that approached this level, however.

But then, Google and Twitter and companies like them have taken this provision into places and distances that Congress likely never intended.

I admit I am a bit envious.

Saturday, September 27, 2014

Do You Actually Need To Rent Before Deducting Rental Expenses?



Let’s say that you own a piece of property. You are trying to claim a rental loss from that property on your tax return. What would you say is the most important requisite in order to claim that loss?

Let’s take a look at the Meinhardt case.

Mr. Meinhardt worked full-time as an architect. His wife operated a day care center out of their home.

In 1976 they purchased 140 acres of farmland in rural Minnesota, consisting of tillable and pasture land and an eighty-year old farmhouse in need of substantial renovation. In subsequent years they sometimes farmed the land, but mostly they rented the land to neighbors for cash rent. They were successful in renting the farmland. They were not so successful in renting the farmhouse.

Thirty years go by.

On their tax returns for 2005, 2006 and 2007 they reported rent from the farmland, as well as substantial expenses for repairs to the old farmhouse. The IRS looked at the return and disallowed the repairs.

They wound up in Tax Court.

The Meinhardts had a simple argument: hey, we own a farm. We rent the farm. For the years under audit our expenses exceeded our income, and we therefore incurred farm losses.

The IRS had a different take. They saw the land being rented on a regular and repetitive basis. There wasn’t much for the IRS to challenge there.

The farmhouse was a different matter. The farmhouse never reported rental income.

That is one lousy rental.

Let’s take a breath. This is not necessarily fatal. The Meinhardts rented a farm. It doesn’t means that all parts and parcels of said farm were equally profitable. As long as it was profitable overall, right?

That, by the way, is the tax concept of aggregation when discussing passive activities, such as rentals.

The Meinhardts explained that they tried to rent the farmhouse, but nobody wanted it. They placed ads in newspapers, put up notices in local stores and spread the word that the house was for rent. The best they could get were renters who would barter for their rent, trading repairs in order to live rent-free. You cannot rent something that no one wants to rent. That doesn’t mean it wasn’t legitimately for rent, though.

The Meinhardts had a reasonable argument.

The IRS, on the other hand, felt that the farmhouse should be separated from the farmland. Hey, they tried to rent the house separate from the land. They rented the land but never rented the house. Does that sound like one rental or two rentals to you?

And there you have the tax concept of disaggregation.

Rent is rent, whether it be land or building. How was the IRS going to pull this off?

The Meinhardts helped them by never reporting rental income from the farmhouse. There was barter, but the documentation was sketchy.

Since the house had not been rented, the IRS wanted to know who had used the house over the years. The Meinhardts used it themselves, but only sporadically and usually coinciding with maintaining the property.

Other tenants included:

·        Wife’s brother (lived their seasonally)
·        Their daughter and son-in-law
·        Their son and his family

It turns out that the Meinhardts – or their family – had used the farmhouse for almost all the years.

Are you kidding me?

Did I mention that the 2005 through 2007 years were not representative, as the Meinhardts were racking up a lot of repairs to that old house? It sure would be nice to slide those expenses over to Uncle Sam.


The Tax Court decided that the farmhouse was either the Meinhardts second residence or it was a property not held for rental – you take your pick. The tax consequence is the same.

The Meinhardts, unhappy with this result, appealed to the Eight Circuit. They lost there too.

What are we to learn from this? That the Meinhardts should never have tried to rent the farmhouse separate from the farmland? That they should have automatically thrown in the farmhouse for a dollar when renting the land? That they never should have allowed the family to stay there? That at least they should have charged the family rent? (I personally think that last one is obvious).

I think we are thinking about this too hard.

Methinks that what the court could not stomach was the Meinhardts selling their house in the suburbs and moving into the farmhouse in 2010.

After fixing it up in 2005, 2006 and 2007.

And deducting it on their tax return.

Courts will “back into” a tax analysis to get the desired result. Happens all the time.

The Meinhardts failed to observe a fundamental tenet of tax strategy: never arm the other side.

Friday, September 19, 2014

Let's Talk Tax Inversions - Part Two



Last time we discussed the taxation of an inverting corporation.

There are three levels of tax severity to the corporation itself:

(1)   The IRS ignores the inversion completely and continues to tax the foreign company as if it were a U.S. company
(2)   The IRS will respect the foreign company as foreign, but woe to whoever tries to move certain assets out of the U.S. or otherwise use certain U.S. – based tax attributes for a period of 10 years.
(3)   The IRS will respect the transaction without reservation.

Then there is the toll-charge on the shareholders. If they own more than 50% of the new foreign company, the shareholders will pay tax on their shares AS IF they had sold them rather than exchanged them for stock in the new foreign parent.  The practical effect is that any inversion has to include cash to the U.S. shareholders, otherwise such shareholders would be reaching into their wallet to pay tax (and would likely vote to scuttle any inversion deal).

It was this toll charge that caught the attention of Congress. If you think about it, someone owning actual shares would be taxed, but someone having a future right to shares would not. Who would such a person be? How about corporate insiders: management and directors? Executives frequently receive stock options and other stock-based compensation. Congress felt that management and directors should also have “skin in the game,” thus the origin of Section 4985. 

One quickly realizes the parity Congress wanted:

(1)   First, Section 4985 applies only if gain is realized by any shareholder. If there is no toll charge on the shareholders, then there will be no toll charge on management and directors.
(2)   The Section 4985 tax will be the highest tax rate payable by the shareholders, which is the capital gains rate (15%)

There is some technical lingo in here. The tax Code dragnets all individuals “subject to the requirements of Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934” – in short, the officers, directors and 10% shareholders. It also includes their families.

So Congress wanted insiders to also pay tax. That’s great. I wanted to play in the NFL.

Let’s take a look at another Congressional attempt to “rope in” executive pay: the golden parachute limitations of Section 280G. This tax applies to “excess” compensation payments upon a change in corporate control. The insider is allowed a base amount (defined as average annual compensation for the five years preceding the year of change in control). The excess is subject to an additional 20% excise tax – in addition to the payroll and income taxes already paid.

How does it work away from the fever swamp of Washington?

It doesn’t. Corporations routinely “gross-up” the executive compensation until the tax is shifted back to the corporation.

I suspect that every tax accountant has run into a compensation “gross up” exercise. I have done enough over the years to make my eyes cross.

Let’s return to our inversion discussion. What do you think companies are doing when their executives are subjected to the 15% Section 4985 excise tax?

Yep, the gross-up.

The mathematics of a gross-up are terrible. Let’s take the example of someone who is subject to the maximum federal tax rate (39.6%), add in the ObamaCare Medicare tax (0.9%), the Section 4985 tax itself (15%) and a state tax (say 6%), and 61.5% of every dollar is going to tax (I am leaving out the deductibility of the state tax). If I am to gross-up a payroll, I am saying that only 38.5 cents of every dollar will be available to satisfy the original Section 4985 tax liability. This means that the gross-up will have to be $2.60 (that is, 1 divided by 38.5%) for every dollar of the original Section 4985 tax.

But Congress, never willing to leave a bigger mess undone, added yet another twist to Section 4985: the corporation is not allowed to deduct the gross-up. Let’s say that the excise tax was $1 million. The gross-up would be $2.6 million, none of which is deductible by the company.

Yipes!

Medtronic is a medical device maker based in Minneapolis. It operates in more than 120 countries and employs approximately 50,000 people worldwide. It has agreed to acquire Covidien, an Irish medical device company. Since we are talking about inversions, you can surmise that the new parent will be based in Ireland. For its part, Medtronic says it will be leaving its Minneapolis-based employees in Minneapolis, which makes sense when you consider that they have employees located throughout the planet.


Medtronic will of course continue to pay U.S. tax on its U.S. income. What it won’t do is pay U.S. tax on income earned outside the U.S. This is not an unreasonable position. Think about your response if California tried to tax you because you drank Napa Valley wine.

Medtronic triggered the Section 4985 excise tax on its executive officers and directors. This tax is estimated to be approximately $24 million.

Remember the loop-the-loop involved with a gross-up. How much will it cost Medtronic to gross-up its insiders for the $24 million?

Around $63 million.

None of which Medtronic can deduct on its tax return.

Can you explain to me how this can possibly be good for the shareholders of Medtronic? It isn’t, of course.


Way to play masters of the universe, Congress.