Jurate Antioco's Nightmare On IRS Street

Ms. Jurate Antioco lived in Martha’s Vineyard, where she owned a bed and breakfast with her husband. The B&B was their home. In 2006 they divorced (after 27 years) and sold the B&B for almost $2 million. They used some of the money to pay off marital debt, but over $1 million went to her after she was unable to finish a Section 1031 exchange within the permitted time.

After approximately 1 year, she took the money and borrowed another $950,000 to buy a multifamily in San Francisco. She moved into one unit, moved her 90-something-year-old mother into another and rented the remaining three units as a source of income.

Ms. Antioco made a mistake concerning her taxes, though. She thought that – perhaps because the B&B had been her residence – that she would not owe any taxes. She fell behind in filing her 2006 taxes but did better with 2007. Her accountant informed her that she owed taxes on the sale for 2006. She was unprepared for this, as she had put almost all her money in the multifamily. She filed the tax returns, though.

The IRS of course assessed tax, interest and penalties. It is what they do.

In April, 2009 the IRS sends her a notice of intent to levy. Ms. Antioco has all her money tied up in the multifamily, so she filed for a collection due process (CDP) hearing.  She proposed paying $1,000 per month until she could work out a loan. She explained that her mom was having health issues, she was moving into caregiver mode, and anything more than $1,000 at the moment would cause economic hardship. As a show of good faith, she started paying $1,000 a month.

She contacted other lenders about a loan, but she soon learned that she had a problem. Even though she had considerable equity in the property, her current lender had included a nuclear option in the mortgage giving them the right to foreclose if another lien was put on the building

OBSERVATION: There is a very good reason to request a CDP, as the IRS will routinely file a lien to secure its debt. This could have been very bad for Ms. Antioco.

She goes back to the primary lender, and they tell her that they are not interested in loaning her any more money.

She has a problem.

The IRS sends her paperwork (Form 433-A) and schedules a hearing for September, 2009. The IRS tells her that she simply has to try to borrow before they will consider an installment plan. If she cannot, then proof of that must also be submitted.

She finds another lender and a better interest rate. The new lender will refinance but not lend any new money. Still, a lower payment frees-up cash, so Ms. Antioco decides to refinance. The new lender wants her to put her mom on the deed, which she does by granting her mother a joint tenancy in the property.

She sends her financial information (the Form 433-A), along with supporting bank documentation and a copy of her most recent tax return, to the IRS. She hears nothing.

In November, 2009 she received a notice from the IRS stating that they were sustaining the levy. The notice stated that she had requested a payment plan, but she had failed to provide additional financial information. In addition the IRS completely blew off her economic hardship argument.

Ms. Antioco appealed to the Tax Court. She pointed out that she was never asked for additional financial information, and –by the way – what happened to her economic hardship request?

And then something amazing happened: the IRS pulled the case, admitting to the Court that the Appeals officer had never requested additional financial information and had in fact abused her discretion.

The Court sent the matter back to IRS Appeals, hoping that the system would work better this time.

Uh, sure.

Enter Alan Owyang. The first thing he did was call Ms. Antioco to schedule a face-to-face meeting and review detailed questions. . Ms. Antioco explained that she would call back later that day, as she wanted to collect her documents to help her with the detailed questions. Owyang didn’t wait, and he kept calling her back that same day. At one point her accused her of being “uncooperative’ and that she “put your money where your mouth is.” He added that he had been a witness in her case.

Ms. Antioco was so rattled that she hired an attorney. Sounds like a great idea to me.

Mr. Owyang sent her a letter a few days later, saying that he thought Ms. Antioco had added her mother to the deed to defraud the government and that he also thought she could pay her taxes but “simply chose not to do so.” He asked for all kinds of additional paperwork, but not curiously no new financial information – the very reason the Tax Court sent the matter back to IRS Appeals. 

Her attorney submitted a bundle of information and requested another CDP hearing for April, 2011. He explained to Mr. Owyang that Ms. Antioco’s mother was declining and would (likely) not survive a sale and move from the apartment building. All Ms. Antioco wanted was time – to allow her mom to pass away or to finally get a new loan – after which she would able to pay the balance of the tax. She was willing to pay under a short-term installment plan until then.

Mr. Owyang told the attorney that he would not grant an installment agreement because Ms. Antioco had chosen to transfer the equity in the apartment building by adding her mother to the deed. He could not see another reason for it.

·        Even though he had a letter from the lender stating it wasn’t willing to lend any more money. And to include her mom on the deed if she wanted to refinance.

He refused to consider whether there was any “hardship.”

·        One of the reasons it went back to the IRS to begin with.

He also thought that all the talk about taking care of a 90-something-year-old mom was a “diversionary argument” that he “would not consider.”

·        I am stunned.

Mr. Owyang also contacted the IRS Compliance Division. He said that the government’s interest was in “jeopardy,” and he recommended that the IRS file a manual lien. There were problems with the filing, and Mr. Owyang went out of his way to follow up personally.

In May, 2011 Mr. Owyang filed a supplemental notice of determination, concluding that Ms. Antioco had “fraudulently” transferred the building to her mother. He went all Sherlock Holmes explaining how he had deduced that Ms. Antioco had committed fraud, concealed the transfer, became insolvent because of it and was left without any assets to pay the government. It was his judgement that she could have gotten a loan if she really wanted one, and that Ms. Antioco was a “won’t pay taxpayer” who was using her ailing mother as an “emotional diversion.”

This guy is a few clowns short of a circus.

They are back in Tax Court. The IRS this time sees nothing wrong with Mr. Owyang's behavior. They did however acknowledge that Mr. Owyang never ran the numbers to see if Ms. Antioco was insolvent, and that his determination of fraud was … “flawed.”

But Mr. Owyang had not abused his discretion. No sir!! Not a smidgeon.

The IRS wanted the Court to dismiss the case.

The Court instead heard the case.

The Court went through the steps, noting that the Commissioner can file liens to secure the collection of an assessed tax.  The IRS however must follow procedures, such as notifying the taxpayer, granting a collections appeal if the taxpayer requests one, and so on. The taxpayer had proposed a payment alternative, and the IRS never completed its analysis of her proposed payment plan. The IRS had also failed to consider her complaint of economic hardship.

The IRS did not follow procedure.

The Court then reviewed Mr. Owyang’s behaviors and assertions, refuting each in turn. The Court even pointed out that Ms. Antioco had paid down her tax debt by $88,000 by the time of trial, not exactly the conduct of someone looking to shirk and run. The Court was not even sure what Mr. Owyang’s real reason was for his determination, as his reasons were contradicted by documentation in file, not to mention changing over time.

The Court decided that Mr. Owyang had abused his discretion.

In February, 2013 the Court sent the case back to the IRS again, as the IRS never reviewed whether the $1,000 was a reasonable payment plan.

Back to the IRS. Introduce a new Appeals officer.

Ms. Antioco then filed suit against the IRS for wrongful action – that is, over the behavior of Mr. Owyang. This type of suit is very difficult to win. Ms. Antioco focused her arguments on Mr. Owyang’s abusive behavior.  The District Court determined that this behavior occurred while Mr. Owyang was “reviewing” collection action and not actually “conducting” collection, which barred liability under Section 7433.

OBSERVATION: No, he was “collecting.” What is a lien, if not a collection action?

In June 2013 the IRS finally agreed to an installment payment plan.

In July, 2014 the IRS filed suit to reduce Ms. Antioco’s liability to judgment. Reducing an assessment to judgment gives the IRS the ability to collect long after the 10-year statute of limitations.

Ms. Antioco filed a motion to dismiss.

Her reason for requesting dismissal? The tax Code itself. Code Section 6331(k)(3)(A) bars the IRS from bringing a proceeding in court while an installment agreement is in effect.

The IRS realized it got caught and last month agreed to dismiss.

And that is where we are as of this writing.

For a tax pro, the Jurate Antioco cases have been interesting, as they highlight the importance of following procedural steps when matters get testy with the IRS. From a human perspective, however, this is a study of a government agency run amok.  How often does the IRS get spanked twice by the Tax Court for abuse on the same case?

Ms. Antioco’s mom, by the way, is now 97 years old and suffering from congestive heart failure. Ms. Antioco is herself a senior citizen. May they both yet live for a very long time.

When Does A Grocery Store Get To Deduct the Fuel Points You Receive?

There is a grocery store chain that my wife uses on a regular basis. They have a gasoline-discount program, whereby amounts spent on purchasing groceries go toward price discounts on the purchase of gasoline. As the gas stations are adjacent to the grocery store, it is a convenient perk.

I admit I used the discount all the time. I purchased a luxury car this year, however, and my mechanic has advised me not to use their gasoline. It sounds a bit over the top, but until I learn otherwise I am purchasing gasoline elsewhere. My wife however continues as a regular customer.

Giant Eagle is a grocery store chain headquartered out of Pittsburgh. They have locations In Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia and Maryland. They have a similar fuel perk program, except that their gasoline station is called “GetGo” and their fuel points are called “fuelperks!”

Their fuelperks! operate a bit differently, though. The perks expire after three months, and they reduce the price of the fuel to the extent possible. I suppose it is possible that they could reduce the price to zero. My fuel points reduce the price of a gallon by 10-cent increments, up to a ceiling. I am not going to get to zero.

Giant Eagle found itself in Tax Court over its 2006 and 2007 tax returns. The IRS was questioning a deduction on its consolidated tax return: the accrued liability for those fuelperks! at year-end. The liabilities were formidable, amounting to $6.1 million and $1.1 million for 2006 and 2007, respectively. Multiply that by a corporate tax rate of 34% and there are real dollars at stake.

What are they arguing over?

To answer that, let’s step back for a moment and talk about methods of accounting. There are two broad overall methods: the cash method and the accrual method. The cash method is easy to understand: one has income upon receiving money and has deductions upon spending money. There are tweaks for uncashed checks, credit cards and so forth, but the concept is intuitive.

The accrual method is not based on receiving or disbursing cash at all. Rather, one has income when monies are due from sale of product or for performance of services. That is, one has income when one has a “receivable” from a customer or client. Conversely one has a deduction when one owes someone for the provision of product or services. That is, one has a “payable” to a vendor, government agency or employee.

If one has inventories, one has to use the accrual method for tax purposes. Take a grocery store – which is nothing but inventory – and Giant Eagle is filing an accrual-basis tax return. There is no choice on that one.

There are additional and restrictive tax rules that are placed on “payables” before one is allowed to deduct them on a tax return. These are the “all events” rules, are found in IRC Section 461(h), and have three parts:

·        Liability must be fixed as of year end

·        Liability must be determined with reasonable accuracy

·        Economic performance must occur

Why all this?

Congress was concerned that accrual taxpayers could “make up” deductions willy-nilly absent more stringent rules. For example, a grocery store could argue that its coolers were continuously wearing out, so a deduction for a “reserve” to replace the coolers would be appropriate. Take the concept, multiply it by endless fact patterns and – unfortunately – Congress was probably right.

All parties would agree that Giant Eagle has a liability at year-end for those fuel points. Rest assured that the financials statement auditors are not have any qualms about showing the liability. The question becomes: does that liability on the financial statements rise to the level of a deduction on the tax return?

You ever wonder what people are talking about when they refer to a company’s financial statements and tax return and say that there are “two sets of books?” Here is but a small example of how that happens, and it happens because Congress made it happen. There are almost endless examples throughout the tax Code.

The IRS is adamant that Giant Eagle has not met the first requirement: the “liability must be fixed.”

To a non-tax person, that must sound like lunacy. Giant Eagle has tens of thousands of customers throughout multiple states, racking up tons of fuel discount points for the purchase of gasoline at – how convenient – gasoline stations right next to the store. What does the IRS think that people are going to do with those points? Put them on eBay? If that isn’t a liability then the pope is not Catholic.

But consider this…

The points expire after three months. There is no guarantee that they are going to be used.

OK, you say, but that does not mean that there isn’t a liability. It just means that we are discussing how much the liability is. The existence of the liability is given.

COMMENT: Say, you have potential as a tax person, you know that?

That is not what the IRS was arguing. Instead they were arguing that the liability was not “fixed,” meaning that all the facts to establish the liability were not in.

How could all the facts not be in? The auditors are going to put a liability on the year-end audited financial statements. What more do you want?

The IRS reminds you that it refuses to be bound by financial statement generally-accepted-accounting-principles accounting. Its mission is to raise and collect money, not necessarily to measure things the way the SEC would require in a set of audited financial statements in order for you not to go to jail. In fact, if you were to release financial statements using IRS-approved accounting you would probably have serious issues with the SEC.

OK, IRS, what “fact” is missing?

The customer has to return. To the gasoline station. And buy gasoline. And enough gasoline to zero-out the fuel points. Until then all the facts are not in.

Another way of saying it is that there is a condition precedent to the redemption of the fuel points: the purchase of gasoline. Test (1) of Sec 469(h) does not allow for any conditions subsequent to the liability in order to claim the tax deduction, and unfortunately Giant Eagle has a condition subsequent. No deduction for you!

Mind you the deduction is not lost forever. It is delayed until the following year, because (surely) by the following year all the facts are in to establish the liability. The effect is to put a one-year delay on the liability: in 2008 Giant Eagle would deduct the 12/31/2007 liability; in 2009 it would deduct the 12/31/2008 liability, and so on.

And the government gets its money a year early. It is a payday-lender mentality, but there you are.

BTW test (1) is not even the difficult part of Section 469(h). That honor is reserved for test (3): the economic performance test. Some day we will talk about it, but not today. That one does get bizarre.

When A Tax Shelter Blows Up

Can you image losing a tax case with the IRS and owing a billion dollars?

Who did this? We are talking about Dow Chemical Company (“Dow”). They lost in the District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. I suppose they have no choice but to appeal. It is a billion dollars, after all.

What got them in this mess? 

A couple of tax shelters, one marketed by Goldman Sachs and both implemented by the law firm of King & Spalding. The IRS sued for tax years 1993 to 2003. 

Let’s talk about the first of the shelters – called a SLIP – which lasted from 1993 to 1997. Dow was not the only one that tried to SLIP the IRS. Merck and International Paper tried also.

SLIP stands for “Special Limited Investment Partnership.”  Its claim to fame was taking low-basis assets and turning them into tax deductions.  How would you do this? Well you could contribute them to a partnership, but that low basis would carryover. You would get no increased tax deduction by putting it a partnership.

Hmmm.

What if you put low-basis assets into a partnership and then leased them back?  Wait, the partnership would then have taxable income. Who would own the partnership? If you owned it, then the whole effort would be circular. 

What if there are other partners? Problem: you do not want other partners. 

What if you limit the other partners to a fixed return? It would be the same as paying interest to a bank, right? In partnership taxation we call this a priority or preference distribution. 

Problem: most of that income would be coming back to you. How can we solve this puzzle?

We delink the income distribution from the cash distribution. We bring in partners who will accept 6 or 7 percent priority, and we allocate virtually all the income to them.

Now why would someone agree to this?

If someone doesn’t pay U.S. tax, that’s why. Someone like a foreign bank.

Eureka!

You offer a foreign bank the deal, now referred to as a “structured financial transaction.” This means that it is complicated, and you will be paying top dollar for investment, legal and accounting advice. You explain to the bank that it would:

·        Receive a significant premium over a corporate bond

·        Take on less credit risk than a corporate bond

·        Escape any U.S. tax

Sure enough, Dow and Goldman Sachs rounded up five foreign banks willing to contribute $200 million. Dow set up a maze of subsidiaries, into which it dumped 73 patents. The interesting fact about these patents is that Dow had amortized them virtually to zero, Dow still used them in current operations and retained enough of the processes to make it unlikely anyone would want to buy the patents, though.  The patents appraised at $867 million.

One of those Dow subs contributed the patents into a partnership called Chemtech I, taking back an 81 percent ownership.

Dow paid Chemtech I around $143 million for use of the patents.

Chemtech I paid the foreign banks 7 percent as their priority return. Since the banks had invested $200 million, this was a cool $14 million in their pockets. Chemtech I paid a couple of other things, took the remaining cash and put in a subsidiary. That subsidiary loaned the money back to Dow. How much cash did it loan back, you ask? About $136 million. For one year.

On its tax return Chemtech I reported approximately $122 million in income. It allocated $115 million of that to the banks. Only $28 million in income went back to Dow itself.

What we have just talked about is known in tax lingo as a “strip.”

And there is the SLIP. All Dow did was move money around. It paid the foreign banks $14 million in interest but called it a priority, thereby dragging over $115 million of income with it. As the banks did not pay U.S. tax, they did not care. Dow however did.

In 1997 there was a change in U.S. tax law, and Dow had to switch to another tax strategy. Dow wanted to cash out the banks and start something else.

The banks wanted their share of the market value of those patents on the way out. Seems fair, as they were “partners” and all. Dow said “no way”. The partnership agreement stipulated how the patents were to be valued and how to calculate the banks’ share. Dow paid the banks approximately $8 million. The banks complained, but to no avail. Dow controlled the calculation of value.

Once the banks were out of the way, Dow created a second tax shelter using a fully-depreciated chemical plant in Louisiana. This strategy did not require banks, but it did employ a very clever maneuver to pump-up the basis of the plant, thereby creating depreciation deductions that Dow could use to offset real income from other sources.

Oh, there was a formidable tax issue that Dow resolved by ripping up a piece of paper and replacing it with another.

OBSERVATION: And there you see the IRS’ frustration: Dow is not dealing with independent parties. In Chemtech I, it was dealing with banks acting as banks. Dow called them partners, but it may as well have called them peanut –butter sandwiches for the difference it made. In the second deal (called Chemtech II), Dow did not even leave the ranch. It replaced a deal between its subsidiaries with another deal between its subsidiaries. Really?  No wonder the IRS was hot around the ears.

So the IRS gets into Dow’s tax returns. In 2005 it issued a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment for tax years 1993 and 1994. Dow responds that the IRS did not give the notice to the properly designated person – the Tax Matters Partner – and the notice was therefore invalid.

OBSERVATION: The tax matters partner rule is to protect both the partnership and the IRS. It means something when you have big partnerships with hundreds if not thousands of partners. Dow however was setting up partnerships like they were jellybeans. I find it cheeky – to be polite – that Dow’s defense was “you sent the mail to the wrong cubicle.”

This thing goes back and forth like a tennis match. In the end, a court has to decide. The IRS had scooped up additional years – through 2003 – by the time this was resolved.

How would the IRS attack the shelters?

There are a couple of ways. The first is the “economic substance” doctrine. Think of it as the tax equivalent of “where’s the beef?” The court looks at the transactions and determines if there is any reality to what supposedly is going on. There are three prongs to this test:

(1) Does the transaction have economic substance compelled by business or regulatory realties;

(2) Does the transaction have tax-independent considerations; and

(3)  Is the transaction not designed in toto with tax avoidance intent?

The Court looks at the SLIPS and observes the obvious:

(1) The SLIPs did not change Dow’s financial position in any way. Chemtech I could not have licensed those patents to a third party if it wanted to, as it did not own all the rights. This means that Chemtech I could not produce independent revenue. That is a problem.

(2) The cash flow was circular. The little bit that left (to the banks) was the equivalent of interest. Big problem.

(3) Dow argued that it was preserving its credit rating and borrowing power, but it could not prove any increase in its credit rating or borrowing power. Dow also stumbled explaining why it structured the transaction this way rather than another way – like having domestic banks in Chemtech I.

The second way the IRS attacked was by arguing the partnership was a sham. This argument is slightly different from “economic substance,” as that argument looks at transactions. The sham partnership argument looks at the partnership itself and asks: is this a real partnership?

The Court notes the following:

·        The banks got a priority of 7%.

·        The only room left for the banks to profit was if the patents went up in value. The banks were only allocated 1% of that number, and Dow controlled how to calculate the number.

·        When the banks complained about their lousy 1%, a Dow executive called them “greedy.”

OBSERVATION: It was clear the Court was not impressed with this executive’s comment.

·        It was virtually impossible for the banks to lose money.

·        The one risk to the banks – IRS challenge – was indemnified by Dow.

The Court observed that true partners have the risk of loss and the hope of gain. The banks had virtually no risk of loss and sharply limited room for gain. There may have been a banking relationship, but there was no more a partnership here than in a Kardashian marriage.

The Court said the shelters were bogus and Dow owed the tax.

And a 20 percent penalty to boot.

MY TAKE:  Those who know me, or who follow this blog, know that I generally side with the taxpayer. After all, it is the taxpayer who sets an alarm clock, takes on a mortgage or builds a website that actually works, whereas the government is little more than weight in the trunk.

Still, at least pretend that there is some business reason for all the tax fireworks that are going off.

This court opinion is 74 pages long. While I am somewhat impressed with the tax wizardry that Dow brought to bear, I must admit that I am reading tax planning for its own sake. That may groove someone like me, but that is not enough to pass muster. There has to be a business purpose for moving all the pieces around the board, otherwise the IRS can challenge your best-laid plans.

The IRS challenged Dow. 

Dow lost.