Less-Than-10% Shareholders Responsible For Corporate Income Tax

I have a question for you:  if you and I work for a company and it goes bankrupt, might we have to pay back some of the money we were paid?

The answer – presumptively – is no, as long as we were employees and received payment as fair compensation for our services.

Let’s stir the pot a bit, though, and say that you and I are shareholders – albeit (very) minority shareholders. What if there were bonuses? What if we received dividends on our stock?

Let’s talk about Florida Engineered Construction Products Corp (FECP), also known as Cast Crete Corporation.

FECP had the luck of being a concrete company in Florida in the aughts when the housing market there was booming. FECP had four shareholders, but the two largest (John Stanton and Ralph Hughes) together owned over 90 percent. The balance was owned by William Kardash, who was an engineer, and Charles Robb, who headed sales.

FECP made madman-level money, although they reported no profits to the IRS.

CLUE: If one is thinking of scamming the IRS, one may want to leave a few dollars in the till. It does not take a fraud auditor to wonder how a company with revenues over $100 million uniformly fails to report a profit – any profit – year after year.

The numbers are impressive.  For example, FECP paid Messrs. Hughes and Stanton interest of the following amounts:

                                          Hughes                      Stanton

            2005                    $5,147,000              $4,250,000

            2006                    12,914,000             12,101,000

            2007                      6,468,000               9,046,000

FECP also paid hefty dividends, paying over $41 million from 2005 through 2007.

I am thinking this was a better investment than Apple stock when Steve Jobs came back.

What was their secret?

It started off by being in the right place at the right time. And then fraud. FECP had a loan with a bank, and the bank required an annual audit. FECP made big money quickly enough, however, that it repaid the bank.  Rest assured there were no further audits.

Mr. Stanton opened a bank account in FECP’s name. Problem is that the account did not appear on the company’s books. When the accountants asked what to do with the cash transfers, he told them to “mind their own business.” The accountants, having no recourse, booked them as loans. Eventually they just wrote the amounts off as an operating expense.

COMMENT:  Here is inside baseball: if you have questions about someone’s accounting, pay attention to the turnover in their accounting department, especially the higher-level personnel. If there is a different person every time you look, you may want to go skeptical.

Those massive interest payments to Messrs. Stanton and Hughes? There were no loans. That’s right: neither guy had loaned money to FECP.  I cannot help but wonder how the loans got on the books in the first place, but we are back to my COMMENT above.

Mind you, our two minority shareholders – Kardash and Robb – were making a couple of bucks also. They had nice salaries and bonuses, and they received a share of those dividends.

Proceed into the mid-aughts and there was a reversal in business fortune. The company was not doing so well. They cut back on the bonuses. The two principal owners however wanted to retain Kardash and Robb, so they decided to “loan” them money – to be paid out of future profits, of course. There were no loan papers signed, no interest was required, and Kardash and Robb were told they were not expected to ever “pay it back.” Other than that it was a routine loan.

Do you wonder where all this money was coming from?

FECP filed fraudulent tax returns for 2003 and 2004, reporting losses to Uncle Sam.

Ouch.

FECP tightened up its game in 2005, 2006 and 2007: they did not file tax returns at all.

Well, if you are going to commit tax fraud ….

But the IRS noticed.

After the mandatory audit, FECP owed the IRS more than $120 million. FECP agreed to pay back $70,000 per month. While impressive, it would still take a century-and-a-half to pay back the IRS.

Mr. Stanton went to jail. Mr. Hughes passed away. And the IRS wanted money from the two minority shareholders – Kardash and Robb. Not all of it, of course not. That would be draconian. The IRS only wanted $5 million or so from them.

There is no indication that Kardash and Robb knew what the other two shareholders were up to, but now they had to reach into their own wallets and give money back to the IRS.

On to Tax Court.  

And we are introduced to Code section 6901, which allows the IRS to assess taxes in the case of “transferee liability.”

NOTE: BTW if you wondered the difference between a tax attorney and a tax CPA, this Code section is an excellent example. We long ago left the land of accounting.

There is a hurdle, though: the IRS had to show fraud to get to transferee liability.

It is going to be challenging to show that Kardash and Robb knew what Stanton and Hughes were doing. They cashed the checks of course, but we would all do the same.

But the IRS could argue constructive fraud. In this context it meant that Kardash and Robb took from a bankrupt company without giving equal value in return.

The IRS argued that those “loans” were fraudulent, because they were, you know, “loans” and not “salary.” However the IRS had come in earlier and required both Kardash and Robb to report the loans as taxable income on their personal tax returns. Me thinketh the IRS was talking out of both sides of its mouth on this matter.

The Court decided that the “loans” were “compensation,” fair value was exchanged and Kardash and Robb did not have to repay any of it.

That left the dividends (only Stanton and Hughes had loans). Problem: almost by definition there is no “exchange” of fair value when it comes to dividends. FECP was not paying an employee, contractor or vendor. It was returning money to an owner, and that was a different matter.

The Court decided the dividends did rise to constructive fraud (that is, taking money from a bankrupt company) and had to be repaid. That cost Kardash and Robb about $4 million or so.

And thus the Court pierced the corporate veil.

But consider the extreme facts that it required. Stanton and Hughes drained the company so hard for so long that they bankrupted it. That might work if one left Duke Energy and the cleaning company behind as vendors, but it doesn’t work with Uncle Sam.  You knew the IRS was going to look in every corner for someone it could hold responsible.

Let's Talk Tax Inversions - Part Two

Last time we discussed the taxation of an inverting corporation.

There are three levels of tax severity to the corporation itself:

(1)   The IRS ignores the inversion completely and continues to tax the foreign company as if it were a U.S. company

(2)   The IRS will respect the foreign company as foreign, but woe to whoever tries to move certain assets out of the U.S. or otherwise use certain U.S. – based tax attributes for a period of 10 years.

(3)   The IRS will respect the transaction without reservation.

Then there is the toll-charge on the shareholders. If they own more than 50% of the new foreign company, the shareholders will pay tax on their shares AS IF they had sold them rather than exchanged them for stock in the new foreign parent.  The practical effect is that any inversion has to include cash to the U.S. shareholders, otherwise such shareholders would be reaching into their wallet to pay tax (and would likely vote to scuttle any inversion deal).

It was this toll charge that caught the attention of Congress. If you think about it, someone owning actual shares would be taxed, but someone having a future right to shares would not. Who would such a person be? How about corporate insiders: management and directors? Executives frequently receive stock options and other stock-based compensation. Congress felt that management and directors should also have “skin in the game,” thus the origin of Section 4985. 

One quickly realizes the parity Congress wanted:

(1)   First, Section 4985 applies only if gain is realized by any shareholder. If there is no toll charge on the shareholders, then there will be no toll charge on management and directors.

(2)   The Section 4985 tax will be the highest tax rate payable by the shareholders, which is the capital gains rate (15%)

There is some technical lingo in here. The tax Code dragnets all individuals “subject to the requirements of Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934” – in short, the officers, directors and 10% shareholders. It also includes their families.

So Congress wanted insiders to also pay tax. That’s great. I wanted to play in the NFL.

Let’s take a look at another Congressional attempt to “rope in” executive pay: the golden parachute limitations of Section 280G. This tax applies to “excess” compensation payments upon a change in corporate control. The insider is allowed a base amount (defined as average annual compensation for the five years preceding the year of change in control). The excess is subject to an additional 20% excise tax – in addition to the payroll and income taxes already paid.

How does it work away from the fever swamp of Washington?

It doesn’t. Corporations routinely “gross-up” the executive compensation until the tax is shifted back to the corporation.

I suspect that every tax accountant has run into a compensation “gross up” exercise. I have done enough over the years to make my eyes cross.

Let’s return to our inversion discussion. What do you think companies are doing when their executives are subjected to the 15% Section 4985 excise tax?

Yep, the gross-up.

The mathematics of a gross-up are terrible. Let’s take the example of someone who is subject to the maximum federal tax rate (39.6%), add in the ObamaCare Medicare tax (0.9%), the Section 4985 tax itself (15%) and a state tax (say 6%), and 61.5% of every dollar is going to tax (I am leaving out the deductibility of the state tax). If I am to gross-up a payroll, I am saying that only 38.5 cents of every dollar will be available to satisfy the original Section 4985 tax liability. This means that the gross-up will have to be $2.60 (that is, 1 divided by 38.5%) for every dollar of the original Section 4985 tax.

But Congress, never willing to leave a bigger mess undone, added yet another twist to Section 4985: the corporation is not allowed to deduct the gross-up. Let’s say that the excise tax was $1 million. The gross-up would be $2.6 million, none of which is deductible by the company.

Yipes!

Medtronic is a medical device maker based in Minneapolis. It operates in more than 120 countries and employs approximately 50,000 people worldwide. It has agreed to acquire Covidien, an Irish medical device company. Since we are talking about inversions, you can surmise that the new parent will be based in Ireland. For its part, Medtronic says it will be leaving its Minneapolis-based employees in Minneapolis, which makes sense when you consider that they have employees located throughout the planet.

Medtronic will of course continue to pay U.S. tax on its U.S. income. What it won’t do is pay U.S. tax on income earned outside the U.S. This is not an unreasonable position. Think about your response if California tried to tax you because you drank Napa Valley wine.

Medtronic triggered the Section 4985 excise tax on its executive officers and directors. This tax is estimated to be approximately $24 million.

Remember the loop-the-loop involved with a gross-up. How much will it cost Medtronic to gross-up its insiders for the $24 million?

Around $63 million.

None of which Medtronic can deduct on its tax return.

Can you explain to me how this can possibly be good for the shareholders of Medtronic? It isn’t, of course.

Way to play masters of the universe, Congress.

Let's Talk Tax Inversions - Part One

You may have read recently that Burger King is acquiring Tim Hortons Inc, a Canadian coffee and donut chain. What has attracted attention is the deal is structured as an inversion, which means that the American company (Burger King) will be moving its tax residency to Canada. I suppose it was hypothetically possible that the deal could have moved Tim Hortons Inc to the U.S. (think of it as a reverse inversion), but that would not have drawn the attention of the politicians.

The combined company will be the world’s third-largest fast-food company, right behind McDonalds and Yum! Brands (think KFC and Taco Bell). While the U.S. will have by far the largest number of locations, the majority of the revenue – again by far – will be from Canada.

An issue at play is that U.S. companies face a very harsh tax system, one in which they are to pay U.S. tax on all profits, even if those profits originated overseas and may never be returned to the U.S. Combine that with the world’s highest corporate tax rate, and it becomes fairly easy to understand why companies pursue inversions. In certain industries (such as pharmaceuticals), it is virtually imperative that the some part of the company be organized overseas, as the default tax consequences would be so prohibitive as to likely render the company uncompetitive.

Let’s talk a bit about inversions.

Inversions first received significant Congressional scrutiny in the 1980s, when McDermott Inc did the following:

·        McDermott organized a foreign subsidiary, treated as a controlled foreign corporation for U.S. tax;

·        The subsidiary issued stock in exchange for all the outstanding stock of McDermott itself; and          

·        Thus McDermott and its subsidiary traded places, with the subsidiary becoming the parent.

In response Congress passed IRC Sec 1248(i), requiring any future McDermott to report dividend income – and pay tax – on all of its subsidiary’s earnings and profits (that is, its undistributed profits).

In the 1990s, Helen of Troy Corp had its shareholders exchange their stock for stock of a new foreign parent company.

In response the IRS issued Reg 1.367(a)-3(c), requiring the U.S. shareholders to be taxable on the exchange because they owned more than 50% of the foreign company after the deal was done.

In the aughts, Valeant Pharmaceuticals paid a special dividend to its shareholders immediately before being acquired by Biovail, a Canadian corporation. Valeant paid out so much money - thereby reducing its own value - that the Valeant shareholders owned less than 50% of the foreign company.

Interesting enough, this did not (to the best of my knowledge) draw a government response. There is a “stuffing” rule, which prohibits making the foreign corporation larger. There is no “thinning” rule, however, prohibiting making the U.S. company thinner.

Then there was a new breed of inversions. Cooper Industries, Nabors Industries, Weatherford International and Seagate Technologies did what are called “naked” inversions. The new foreign parent incorporated in the Cayman Islands or Bermuda, and there was no effort to pretend that the parent was going to conduct significant business there. The tax reason for the transaction was stripped for all to see – that is, “naked.”

That was a bridge too far.

Congress passed IRC Sec 7874, truly one of the most misbegotten sections in the tax Code. Individually the words make sense, but combine them and one is speaking gibberish.

Let’s break down Section 7874 into something workable. We will split it into three pieces:

(1)  The foreign company has to acquire substantially all the assets of a domestic company. We can understand that requirement.

(2)  The U.S. shareholders (referred to “legacy” shareholders) own 60% or more of the foreign parent. There are three sub-tiers:

a.     If the legacy shareholders own at least 80%, the IRS will simply declare that nothing occurred and will tax the foreign company as if it were a U.S. company;

b.     If the legacy shareholders own at least 60% but less than 80%, the IRS would continue to tax the foreign company on its “inversion gain” for 10 years.

                                                              i.      What is an “inversion gain?” It involves using assets (think licenses, for example) to allow pre-inversion U.S. tax attributes to reduce post-inversion U.S. tax. The classic tax attribute is a net operating loss carryover.

c.      If the legacy shareholders own less than 60%, then Section 7874 does not apply. The new foreign parent will generally be respected for U.S. tax purposes.

But wait! There is a trump card.

(3)  The IRS will back off altogether if the foreign company has “substantial business presence” in the new parent’s country of incorporation.

There is something about a trump card, whether one is playing bridge or euchre or structuring a business transaction. The tax planners wanted a definition. Initially the IRS said that “substantial business presence” meant 10% of assets, sales and employees. It later changed its mind and said that 10% was not enough. It did not say what would be enough, however. It said it would decide such issues on “facts and circumstances.” This sounds acceptable, but to a tax planner it is not. It is the equivalent of saying that one need not stop at a stop sign, as long as one is not “interfering” with traffic. What does that mean, especially when one has family in the car and is wondering if the other driver has any intention of stopping?

After three years the IRS said that it thought 25% was just about right. Oh, and forget about any “facts and circumstances,” as the IRS did not want to hear about it.

The 25% test was a cynical threshold, figuring that no one country – other than the U.S. – could possibly reach 25% by itself. Even the E.U. market – which could rival the U.S. – is comprised of many individual countries, making it unlikely (barring Germany, I suppose) that any one country could reach 25%.

Until Pfizer attempted to acquire AstraZeneca, a U.K. based company. The White House then proposed reducing the 80% test to a greater-than-50% test and eliminating the 60% test altogether. It also wanted to eliminate any threshold test if the foreign corporation is primarily managed from the United States.

The Pfizer deal fell through, however, and there no expectation that this White House proposal will find any traction in Congress.

And there is our short walk through the minefield of tax inversions.

There is one more thing, though. You may be wondering if the corporate officers and directors are impacted by the tax Code. Surely you jest- of course they are! There is a 15% excise tax on their stock-based compensation. How does this work out in the real world? We will talk about this in our next blog, when we will discuss the Medtronic – Covidien merger.