P&G, Coty And A Unicorn Named Morris

You may know that P&G is streamlining, selling off non-core lines of business. It just concluded a deal to sell 43 beauty brands, including Clairol and Max Factor, to Coty, Inc. The deal appears to be good for Coty, as it will double sales and transform Coty into one of the largest cosmetic companies in the world. P&G in turn receives $12.5 billion.

What makes it interesting to the tax planners is the structure of the deal: P&G is using a “reverse-Morris” structure. It combines a carve-out of unwanted assets (unwanted, in this case, by P&G) with a prearranged merger. The carve-out is nontaxable, but if you err with the merger the carve-out becomes taxable. This is a high stakes game, and woe unto you if the IRS determines that the merger was prearranged. The reverse Morris is designed to directly address a prearranged merger.

Let’s walk through it.

First, what is a “regular” Morris?

Let’s say that you own a successful and publicly-traded company (say Jeb). You have a line of business, which we shall call Lindsey. Someone (“Donald”) wants to buy Lindsey. Jeb could flat-out sell Lindsey, but the corporate taxes might be outrageous. Jeb could alternatively spinoff Lindsey to you, and you in turn could sell to Donald. That would probably be preferable.

Why?

Front and center is the classic tax issue with C corporations: double taxation. If Jeb sells, then Jeb would have corporate taxes. Granted, Jeb would distribute the after-tax proceeds to you, but then you would have individual taxes. The government might wind up being the biggest winner on the deal.

Forget that. Let’s spinoff Lindsey tax-free to you, and you sell to Donald. There would be one tax hit (yours), which is a big improvement over where we were a moment ago.

But you cannot do that.

You see, under regular corporate tax rules a tax-free merger with Donald within two years of a spinoff would trigger BAD tax consequences. We are talking about the spinoff being retroactively taxable to Jeb. Jeb will have to amend its tax return and write a big check. That is BAD.

I suppose you could tell Donald to take a hike for a couple of years while you reset the clock. Good luck with that.

You talk to your accountant (“Hillary”). She recommends that you have Jeb borrow a lot of money. You then drop Lindsey into a new subsidiary and spinoff new Lindsey to you. You leave the debt in Jeb. You then sell Jeb to Donald. Donald takes over the debt. He doesn’t care. Donald just offsets whatever he was going to pay you by that debt.

This is a Morris deal and Congress did not like it. It looked very much like a payday.

• The cash is in Lindsey
• The debt is in Jeb
• You sell Jeb
• You keep Lindsey
• You keep the money that is in Lindsey
• The government doesn’t get any money from anybody

The government was not getting its vig. Congress in response wrote a new section into the tax Code (Section 355(e)) which triggers gain if more than 50% control of either the parent or subsidiary changes hands. 

Yep, that pretty much will shut down a Morris deal. Donald wants more than 50% control. Donald is like that.

Now, Section 355(e) presented a challenge to the tax attorneys and CPAs. Think of it as an epic confrontation between a chromatic Great Wyrm and your 28th level paladin at the weekly Saturday night D&D game. The players were not backing down. No way.

So someone said “the deal will work if the buyer will accept less than 50% control.”

Eureka!

Let’s take our example above and introduce a different buyer (let’s call him Bernie). Bernie wants to buy Lindsey. Bernie is willing to accept less than 50%, as contrasted to that meanie Donald. Same as before, let’s drop Lindsey into a new subsidiary. New Lindsey borrows a lot of money and ships it to Jeb. New Lindsey, now laden with debt, is sold to Bernie. Bernie takes over the debt as part of the deal. When the dust settles, Bernie will own less than 50% of new Lindsey, which gets us out of the Section 355(e) dilemma.

You in turn keep Jeb and the cash.

And that is the reverse Morris. We sidestep Section 355(e) by not allowing more than 50% of either Jeb or Lindsey to change hands.

Why do we not see reverse Morris deals more often? There are three key reasons:

1. It requires a buyer that is smaller than the target, but not so small that it cannot do the deal. 
2. There will be new debt, likely significant. This raises the business risk associated with the deal, as the bank is going to want its money back.
3. The new company’s management and board may be an issue. After all, the buyer BOUGHT the company. It is not unreasonable that Bernie wants to control what he just bought. I would want to drive the new car I just bought and paid for.

The Reimann family of Germany owns approximately two-thirds of Coty. Even though Coty is acquiring less than 50% of the P&G subsidiary, the Reimann’s will own a large enough block of stock to have effective control. That must have helped make the reverse Morris attractive to Coty.

Reverse Morris deals are not unicorns, but there have been less than 40 of them to-date. That makes them rare enough that the tax specialists look up from their shoes when one trots out. P&G by itself has had three of them over the last ten or so years. Someone at P&G likes this technique.

Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway Is Buying Duracell From Procter & Gamble

You may have read that Warren Buffett (through Berkshire Hathaway) is acquiring the Duracell battery line of business from Procter & Gamble in a deal worth approximately $4.7 billion. The transaction will be stock-for-stock, although P&G is stuffing approximately $1.7 billion of cash into Duracell before Berkshire takes over. Berkshire will exchange all its P&G stock in the deal. Even better, there should be minimal or no income tax, either to P&G or to Berkshire Hathaway.

Do you wonder how?

The tax technique being used is called a “cash rich split off.” Believe it or not, it is fairly well-trod ground, which may seem amazing given the dollars at play.

Let’s talk about it.

To start off, there is virtually no way for a corporation to distribute money to an individual shareholder and yet keep it from being taxable. This deal is between corporations, not individuals, albeit the corporations contain cash. Lots of cash.

How is Buffett going to get the money out? 

·        Buffet has no intention of “getting the money out.” The money will stay inside a corporation. Of course, it helps to be as wealthy as Warren Buffett, as he truly does not need the money.

·        What Buffett will do is use the money to operate and fund ongoing corporate activities. This likely means eventually buying another business.

Therefore we can restrict ourselves to corporate taxation when reviewing the tax consequences to P&G and Berkshire Hathaway.

How would P&G have a tax consequence?

P&G is distributing assets (the Duracell division) to a shareholder (Berkshire owns 1.9% of P&G stock). Duracell is worth a lot of money, much more money than P&G has invested in it. Another way of saying this is that Duracell has “appreciated,” the same way you would buy a stock and watch it go up (“appreciate”) in value.

And there is the trip wire. Since the repeal of General Utilities in 1986, a corporation recognizes gain when it distributes appreciated assets to a shareholder. P&G would have tax on its appreciation when it distributes Duracell. There are extremely few ways left to avoid this result.

But one way remaining is a corporate reorganization.

And the reorganization that P&G is using is a “split-off.” The idea is that a corporation distributes assets to a shareholder, who in turn returns corporate stock owned by that shareholder. After the deed, the shareholder owns no more stock in the corporation, hence the “split.” You go your way and I go mine.

Berkshire owns 1.9% of P&G. P&G is distributing Duracell, and Berkshire will in turn return all its stock in P&G. P&G has one less shareholder, and Berkshire walks away with Duracell under its arm.

When structured this way, P&G has no taxable gain on the transaction, although it transferred an appreciated asset – Duracell. The reason is that the Code sections addressing the corporate reorganization (Sections 368 and 355) trump the Code section (Section 311) that would otherwise force P&G to recognize gain.

P&G gets to buy back its stock (via the split-off) and divest itself of an asset/line of business that does not interest it anymore - without paying any tax.

What about Berkshire Hathaway?

The tax Code generally wants the shareholder to pay tax when it receives a redemption distribution from a corporation (Code section 302).  The shareholder will have gain to the extent that the distribution received exceeds his/her “basis” in the stock.

Berkshire receives Duracell, estimated to have a value of approximately $4.7 billion. Berkshire’s tax basis in P&G stock is approximately $336 million. Now, $336 million is a big number, but $4.7 billion is much bigger.  Can you imagine what the tax would be on that gain?

Which Berkshire has no intention of paying.

As long as the spin-off meets the necessary tax requirements, IRC Section 355 will override Section 302, shielding Berkshire from recognizing any gain.

Berkshire gets a successful business stuffed with cash – without paying any tax.

Buffett likes this type of deals. I believe he has made three of them over the last two or so years. I cannot blame him. I would too. Except I would take the cash. I would pay that tax with a smile.

There are limits to a cash-rich split off, by the way.

There can be only so much cash stuffed into a corporation and still get the tax magic to happen. How much? The cash and securities cannot equal or exceed two-thirds of the value of the company being distributed. In a $4.7 billion deal, that means a threshold of $3.1 billion. P&G and Berkshire are well within that limit.

Why two-thirds?

As happens with so much of tax law, somebody somewhere pushed the envelope too far, and Congress pushed back. That somebody is a well-known mutual fund company from Denver. You may even own some of their funds in your 401(k). They brought us IRC Section 355(g), also known as the two-thirds rule. We will talk about them in another blog.