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Showing posts with label spouse. Show all posts
Showing posts with label spouse. Show all posts

Sunday, August 8, 2021

Wiping Out An Inherited IRA


I came across an unfortunate tax situation this week.

It has to do with IRAs and trusts.

More specifically, naming a trust as a beneficiary of an IRA.

This carried a bit more punch before the tax law change of the SECURE Act, effective for 2020. Prior to the change, best planning for an inherited IRA frequently included a much younger beneficiary. This would reset the required distribution table, with the result that the monies could stay in the IRA for decades longer than if the original owner had lived. This was referred to as the “stretch” IRA. The SECURE Act changed that result for most beneficiaries, and now IRAs have to distribute – in general – over no longer than 10 years. 

Trusts created a problem for stretch IRAs, as trusts do not have an age or life expectancy like people do. This led to something called the “look-through” or “conduit” trust, allowing one to look-through the trust to its beneficiary in arriving at an age and life expectancy to make the stretch work.

The steam has gone out of the conduit trust.

One might still want to use a trust as an IRA beneficiary, though. Why? Here is an example:

The individual beneficiary has special needs. There may be income and/or asset restrictions in order to obtain government benefits.

What is the point, you ask? Doesn’t the IRA have to distribute to the individual over no more than 10 years?

Well … not quite. The IRA has to distribute to the trust (which is the IRA beneficiary) over no more than 10 years. The trust, in turn, does not have to distribute anything to its individual beneficiary.

This is referred to as an accumulation trust. Yes, it gets expensive because the trust tax rates are unreasonably compressed. Still, the nontax objectives may well outweigh the taxes involved in accumulating.

There is something about an inherited IRA that can go wrong, however. Do you remember something called a “60-day rollover?” This is when you receive a check from your IRA and put the money back within 60 days. I am not a fan, and I can think of very few cases where I would use or recommend it.

Why?

Because of Murphy’s Law, what I do and have done for over 35 years.

You know who can do a 60-day rollover?

Only a surviving spouse can use a 60-day rollover on an inherited IRA.  

You know who cannot do a 60-day rollover on an inherited IRA?

Anyone other than a surviving spouse.

It is pretty clear-cut.  

I am looking at someone who did not get the memo.

Here are the highlights:

·      Husband died.

·      The wife rolled the IRA into her own name (this is a special rule only for surviving spouses).

·      The wife died.

·      A trust for the kids inherited the IRA.

No harm, no foul so far.

·      The kids wanted to trade stocks within the IRA.

So it begins.

·      The IRA custodian told the kids that they would have to transfer the money someplace else if they wanted to trade.

No prob. The kids should have the IRA custodian transfer the money directly to the custodian of a new IRA that will let them trade to their heart’s content.

·      The kids had the IRA custodian transfer the money to a non-IRA account owned by the trust.

And so it ends.

The kids were hosed. They tried a Hail Mary by filing a private letter request with the IRS, asking for permission to put the money back in the IRA. The IRS looked at the tax law for a split second … and said “No.”

The IRS was right.

And, as usual, I wonder what happened with calling the tax advisor before moving around not-insignificant amounts of money.  

One can point out that taxes would have been payable as the kids withdrew money, and an inherited IRA has to distribute. If mom died in 2020 or later, the IRA would have to be distributed over no more than 10 years anyway.

Still, 10 years is 10 years. If nothing else, it would have given the kids the opportunity to avoid bunching all IRA income into one taxable year.

Not to mention paying for a private letter ruling, which is not cheap.

I hope they enjoy their stock trading.

The cite for the home gamers is PLR 202125007.

Sunday, November 8, 2020

A Puff Piece

 

Although we do not condone her inconsistency, we find it is merely puffery in an attempt to obtain new employment and of no significance here.”

There is a word one rarely sees in tax cases: puffery.

Puffery is an exaggeration. It approaches a lie but stops short, and presumably no “reasonable” person would believe what is being said or take it literally. The distinction matters if one’s puffery can be used against them as a statement of fact.

Let’s look at the Robinson case.

Mr Robinson had a lawn care business. Beverly Robinson had a job at Georgia Pacific, but in 2007 she started working at the lawn care business. She did the billing. She was also listed on the business checking account, but she never wrote checks.

She must have been the face of the business through, as for 2007 through 2009 most of the Forms 1099 to the business were sent in her name.

In 2010 the marriage went south. Mr Robinson moved out, and Beverly’s dad chipped-in to pay the mortgage on her house. Needless to say, she was not working at the company with all that going on.

In 2011 they filed a joint tax return for 2010. The return showed tax due of approximately $43 grand. She must have separated hard from the business, as no Forms 1099 were issued to her; all the Forms 1099 were issued to him.

COMMENT: I do not understand filing a joint tax return with someone you are likely to divorce. In Beverly’s defense, though, she did not realize that she had an option. They hired a tax preparer (likely because of the business), but the preparer never explained that the option to file separately existed.

In 2011 she was telling the IRS that they could not pay the 2010 tax debt. She also asked about innocent spouse status.

In 2012 they file a joint 2011 tax return. She was working again at another Georgia Pacific facility and had tax withholdings. The IRS took her withholdings and applied them to the 2010 tax year.

COMMENT: That is how it works.

In 2013 Beverly needed to find a new job. She uploaded her resume on a jobseeker website. She listed her Georgia Pacific gig. She also listed Robinson Lawn Care and embellished her duties, especially glossing over the fact that she no longer worked there.

In 2013 Mr Robinson somehow forced his way back into her house. She called the police and was told that they could not evict him since the two were still married.

In October, 2013 she filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.

About time. The year before Mr Robinson had fathered a child with another woman. In 2013 he started paying her child support.

The divorce became final in 2014. Mr Robinson agreed to assume the 2010 tax due.

Riiiight.

In 2015 she files for innocent spouse because of that 2010 tax debt and the IRS continuing to take her refunds.

The IRS turned down her request.

One of the requirements is that the tax liability for which the spouse is seeking relief belong to the “nonrequesting” spouse. In this case, the nonrequesting spouse was Mr Robinson.

He testified that he had moved out of the house in 2013. Oh, he also remembered Beverly working in the business in 2010.

Not good.

The IRS looked at certain Florida registrations that showed her name through 2014.

They also pointed out that she was a signatory on the business checking account.

Then they looked at her resume on that jobseeker website.

The Court was having none of it.

As for Mr Robinson:

Throughout the trial Mr. Robinson’s testimony was relatively inconsistent, and we give it little value.”

As for the registrations:

Although petitioner is listed as the registered owner of Robinson Lawn Care from December 1998 to December 2014, we find the reason for her filing the fictitious name--that her former husband worked during the day--is a sufficient explanation for why she is listed instead of Mr. Robinson. Moreover, she did not sign any State filings in 2010 or thereafter.

As for the checking account:

Similarly we find that petitioner’s name on the business account is not persuasive support for respondent’s position as Mr. Robinson had control of that account and she never wrote checks on it.

The Court pointed out that none of the 2010 Forms 1099 were made out to her, in clear contrast to prior tax years.

We saw above the Court’s comment on her puffery.

It was clear who the Court believed – and did not believe.

The Court decided that she was entitled to innocent spouse relief.

She cut it close, though.

Our case this time was Beverly Robinson v Commissioner of Internal Revenue T.C. Memo 2020-134.

Sunday, November 11, 2018

Can Creditors Reach The Retirement Account Of A Divorced Spouse?


Let’s say that you divorce. Let say that retirement savings are unequal between you and your ex-spouse. As part of the settlement you receive a portion of your spouse’s 401(k) under a “QDRO” order.
COMMENT: A QDRO is a way to get around the rule prohibiting alienation or assignment of benefits under a qualified retirement plan. I generally think of QDROs as arising from divorce, but they could also go to a child or other dependent of the plan participant.
Your QDRO has (almost) the same restrictions as any other retirement savings. As far as you or I are concerned, it IS a retirement account.

You file for bankruptcy.

Can your creditors reach the QDRO?

Sometimes I scratch my head over bankruptcy decisions. The reason is that bankruptcy – while having tax consequences – is its own area of law. If the law part pulls a bit more weight than the tax part, then the tax consequence may be nonintuitive.

Let’s segue to an inherited IRA for a moment. Someone passes away and his/her IRA goes to you. What happens to it in your bankruptcy?

The Supreme Court addressed this in Clark, where the Court had to address the definition of “retirement funds” otherwise protected from creditors in bankruptcy.

The Court said there were three critical differences between a plain-old IRA and an inherited IRA:

(1)  The holder of an inherited IRA can never add to the account.
(2)  The holder of an inherited IRA must draw money virtually immediately. There is no waiting until one reaches or nears retirement.
(3)  The holder of an inherited IRA can drain the account at any time – and without a penalty.

The Court observed that:
Nothing about the inherited IRA’s legal characteristics would prevent (or even discourage) the individual from using the entire balance of the account on a vacation home or sports car immediately after bankruptcy proceedings are complete.”
The Court continued that – to qualify under bankruptcy – it is not sufficient that monies be inside an IRA. Those monies must also rise to the level of “retirement funds,” and – since the inheritor could empty the account at a moment’s notice - the Court was simply not seeing that with inherited IRAs.

I get it.

Let’s switch out the inherited IRA and substitute a QDRO. With a QDRO, the alternate payee steps into the shoes of the plan participant.

The Eighth Circuit steps in and applies the 3-factor test of Clark to the QDRO. Let’s walk through it:

(1)  The alternate payee cannot add to a QDRO.
(2)  The alternate payee does not have to start immediate withdrawals – unless of required age.
(3)  The alternate payee cannot – unless of required age - immediately empty the account and buy that vacation home or sports car.

By my account, the QDRO fails the first test but passes the next two. Since there are three tests and the QDRO passes two, I expect the QDRO to be “retirement funds” as bankruptcy law uses the term.

And I would be wrong.

The Eighth Circuit notes that tests 2 and 3 do not apply to a QDRO. The Court then concludes that the QDRO has only one test, and the QDRO fails that.

The Eighth Circuit explains that Clark:
… clearly suggests that the exemption is limited to individuals who create and contribute funds into the retirement account.”
It is not clear to me, but there you have it – at least if you live in the Eighth Circuit.

No bankruptcy protection for you.

Our case this time for the home gamers was In re Lerbakken.


Friday, October 26, 2018

Rolling Over An Inherited IRA


I am not a fan of the 60-day IRA rollover.

I admit that my response is colored by being the tax guy cleaning-up when something goes awry. Unless the administrator just refuses a trustee-to-trustee rollover, I am hard pressed to come up with a persuasive reason why someone should receive a check during a rollover.

Let’s go over a case. I want you to guess whether the rollover did or did not work.

Taxpayer’s mom died in 2008.

Mom had two IRAs. She left them to her daughter, who received two checks: one for $2,828 and a second for $35,358.

The daughter rolled over $35,358 and kept the smaller check.

On her tax return, she reported gross IRA distributions of $38,194 (there is a small difference; I do not know why) and taxable distributions of $2,828.

She did not have an early distribution penalty, as that penalty does not apply to inherited accounts.

The IRS flagged her, saying that the full $38,194 was taxable.

What do you think?

Let’s go over it.

There is no question she was well within the 60-day period.

The money went into an IRA account. This is not a case where monies erroneously went into something other than an IRA.

This was the daughter’s only rollover, so we are not triggering the rule where one can only roll IRA monies in this manner once every twelve months.

The Court decided that the daughter was taxable on the full amount.

Why?

She ran face-first into a sub-rule: one cannot rollover an inherited account, with the exception of a surviving spouse.


The daughter argued that she intended to roll and also substantially complied with the rollover rules.

Here is the Tax Court:
The Code’s lines are arbitrary. Congress has concluded that some lines of this kind are appropriate. The judiciary is not authorized to redraw the boundaries.”
This is a polite way of saying that tax rules sometimes make no sense. They just are. The Tax Court, not being a court of equity, cannot decide a case just because a result might be viewed as unfair.

The Court did not address the point, but there is one more issue at play here.

There are penalties for overfunding an IRA.

Say that you can put away $6,500. You instead put away $10,000. You have overfunded by $3,500.

So what?

You have to get the excess money out of there, that’s what.

Normally I recommend that the $3,500 be moved as a contribution to the following year, nixing the penalty issue.

Let’s say that you do not do that. In fact, you do not even know to do that.

For whatever reason, the IRS examines your return five years later. Say they catch the issue. You now owe a 6% penalty on the overfunding.

That’s not bad, you think. You will pay $210 and move on.

Nope.

It is 6% a year.

And you still have to get the $3,500 out.

Except it is now not $3,500. It is $3,500 plus any earnings thereon for five years.

Say that amount is $5,500, including earnings.

You take out $5,500.

You have five years of 6% penalties. You also have tax on $2,000 (that is, $5,500 minus $3,500).

If you are under 59 ½ you probably have an early-distribution penalty on the $2,000.

Plus penalties and interest on top of that.

I like to think that the Tax Court cut the taxpayer a break by not spotlighting the overfunding penalty issue.

Our case this time was Beech v Commissioner.


Sunday, February 25, 2018

A Divorce Decree And Past Taxes


Let’s say that a couple divorces. The divorce decree stipulates that liability for previous federal taxes will be split 50:50. They had always filed jointly The IRS audits one or more of those earlier years and assesses additional taxes.

Question: what is each spouse’s liability?

Your first thought might be 50:50, as that is what the divorce decree says.

Our protagonists this time would find out.

Mae Asad and Sam Akel filed joint returns for 2008 and 2009. The IRS audited those years, looking at rental losses. They disallowed the losses and assessed over $30,000 in taxes and penalties.

Mae filed for innocent spouse.

Later Sam filed for innocent spouse.

NOTE: Filing for innocent spouse status means that a spouse (probably an ex-spouse, but I had a client who was still married) has been assessed taxes for which he/she does not believe he/she is responsible. The classic case is the stay-at-home spouse, the other self-employed spouse, and the stay-at-home has no participation in or knowledge of the other’s business. Think Carmela Soprano.

The IRS bounced both requests for innocent spouse.

Both ex-spouses filed with the Tax Court.

Before the hearing, the IRS conceded that Mae was responsible for 28% of the 2008 tax and 41% of the 2009 tax. Sam of course was responsible for the balance.

Seems to me that Sam might not like this deal.

I do not know how, but Mae agreed to a 50:50 split. She did not have to, mind you.

The courts have been consistent that a divorce decree is not binding on the IRS, as the IRS is not party to the divorce.  A joint return means that both spouses are liable, and the IRS can go after one … or both, to the extent the IRS desires. The decree may provide for a former spouse to seek restitution against the other, but it has no impact on the IRS.

The Court accepted the IRS previous concession to Mae of 28% and 41%. It did not have to observe the divorce decree and it did not.

Then the Court reviewed the penalties of over $5,000.

But there had been a fatal flaw,

You see, Mae and Sam had filed pro se with the Tax Court. Pro se means one is going in without professional representation (not exactly correct, but close enough). It happens with small tax cases. The paperwork to get to Court and the procedural rules once there are more lenient for small cases.

Sam and Mae had not included the penalty in their petition to the Court.

The Court did not have authority to review the penalties.

But it did provide us a clear example of the downside to representing oneself pro se.


Saturday, November 12, 2016

You Got Repossessed And The Bank Says You Have HOW MUCH Income?


I ran into a cancellation-of-debt issue recently.

You may know that – should the bank or finance company cancel or agree to reduce your debt – you will receive a Form 1099. The tax Code considers forgiveness of debt to be taxable income, as your “wealth” has increased - supposedly by an amount equal to the debt forgiven. There are exceptions to recognizing income if you are insolvent, file for bankruptcy and several other situations.

Let me give you a situation here at galactic headquarters:

Married couple. Husband is a doctor. Husband buys a boat. He puts both the boat and the promissory note in the wife’s name, presumably in case something happens and he gets sued. They divorce. It is understood that he will keep the boat and make the bank payment. He does not. The boat is repossessed and then sold for nickels on the dollar. Wife (who was never taken off the note) receives a Form 1099-C. She has cancellation-of-debt income, which is bad enough. To make it worse, income is inflated as the bank appears to have sold the boat at a fire-sale price.

Our client is – of course – the wife.

The person who signs on the note receives the 1099 and reports any cancellation-of-debt income. If the debt “belongs” to your spouse and not to you, you better have your name removed from the debt before you get out of divorce court. The IRS argues that – if you receive a 1099 that “belongs” to your ex-spouse - you should seek restitution by repetitioning the court. This makes it a divorce and not a tax issue. The IRS is not interested in a divorce issue.

It all sounds fine until real life.

The wife received a $100,000-plus Form 1099-C from that boat.

Let’s reflect on how she there:

(1)  The wife doesn’t have a boat and never did. Hubby wanted a boat. She signed on the note to keep hubby happy.
(2)  The wife’s divorce attorney forgot to get that note out of her name. Alternatively, the attorney could have seen to it that wife also wound up with the boat.
(3)  For whatever reason, husband let the boat be repossessed.
(4)  The bank issued a Form 1099-C to the wife. The income amount was simple math: the debt less whatever the bank received for the boat.

Let’s introduce real life:
  • What if the bank makes a mistake?
  • What if the bank virtually gives the boat away?

The IRS has traditionally been quite inflexible when it comes to these 1099s. If the bank reports a number, the IRS will run with it.

You can see the recipe for tragedy.

Fortunately, the IRS pressed too far with the 2009 Martin case.

In 1999 Martin bought a Toyota 4-Runner. He financed over $12 thousand, but stopped making payments when the loan amount was about $6,700. The Toyota was repossessed. He received a Form 1099-C for the $6,700.
… which meant that the bank received zero … zip… zilch… on the sale of the 4-Runner.
Doesn’t make sense, does it?

The IRS did not care. Go back to the lender and have them change the 1099, they said.
COMMENT: Sure. I am certain the lender will jump right on this.
Martin did care. He told the Court that the Toyota was worth roughly what he owed on it when repossessed, and that the 1099-C was incorrect.

Enter Code section 6201(d):
(d) Required reasonable verification of information returns In any court proceeding, if a taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect to any item of income reported on an information return filed with the Secretary under subpart B or C of part III of subchapter A of chapter 61 by a third party and the taxpayer has fully cooperated with the Secretary (including providing, within a reasonable period of time, access to and inspection of all witnesses, information, and documents within the control of the taxpayer as reasonably requested by the Secretary), the Secretary shall have the burden of producing reasonable and probative information concerning such deficiency in addition to such information return. 

Normally, the IRS has the advantage in a tax controversy and the taxpayer has the burden of proof. 

Code section 6201(d) provides that – if you can assert a reasonable dispute with respect to an item of income reported on an information return (such as a 1099-C), you can shift the burden of proof back to the IRS.

The Tax Court decided that Martin had shifted the burden of proof. The 4-Runner had to be worth something. The ball was back in the IRS’ court.

Granted, Martin was low-hanging fruit, as the bank reported no proceeds. The IRS should have known better than to take this case to court, but they did and we now have a way to challenge an erroneous 1099-C.  

In our wife’s case, I am thinking of getting a soft appraisal on the value of the boat when repossessed. If it is materially different from the bank’s calculation (which I expect), I am considering a Section 6201(d) challenge.

Why? Because my client should not have to report excess income if the bank gave the boat away. That was a bank decision, not hers. She had every reasonable expectation that the bank would demand and receive fair market value upon sale. Their failure to do so should not be my client’s problem. 

Which will be like poking the IRS bear.


But she has received a questionable $100,000-plus Form 1099-C. That bear is already chasing her.

Sunday, June 29, 2014

What Happens To Inherited IRAs in Bankruptcy?



Let us discuss IRAs.

You may be aware that there is bankruptcy protection for IRAs. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 exempts up to $1 million in IRAs created and funded by the debtor. Employer plans have even more favorable protection.

Why? The government has expressed interest that citizens be able to save for their retirement. This diminishes the odds of future government assistance and deemed in the public interest.

Fair enough. But I have one more question.

Let us say that you inherited the IRA. Does the above protection still apply to you?

Why wouldn’t it, you might ask. It is like an ice cream bar. It is still an ice cream bar whether you or I take it from the freezer, right?


This very question made it to the Supreme Court in the recent case of Clark v Rameker. While a bankruptcy case, it does have tax implications.

In 2001 Ruth Heffron established a traditional IRA and named her daughter as beneficiary.

NOTE:  “Traditional” means the classic IRA: contributions to it are deductible and withdrawals from it are taxable. Contrast this with a “nondeductible” IRA (contributions are nondeductible and withdrawals are taxable, according to a formula) and Roths (contributions are nondeductible and withdrawals are nontaxable).

Mrs Heffron passed away a year later – 2001 – and left approximately $400,000 to her daughter in the IRA account. Inherited IRAs have special rules on distributions, and one has to take distributions over a life expectancy or withdraw the entire balance within five years. Her daughter – Ms. Heffron-Clark - elected to use life expectancy with monthly distributions.

Fast forward to 2010 and Ms. Heffron-Clark and her husband file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The IRA has approximately $300,000 remaining, and you can bet that the couple considered the IRA to be an exempt asset. The unsecured creditors of the bankruptcy estate disagreed, thus beginning the litigation.

·       The Bankruptcy Court said that the IRA was not exempt and could be reached by creditors.
·       The District Court reversed, saying that the IRA was exempt and could not be reached by creditors.
·       The Appeals Court for the Seventh Circuit reversed, saying that the IRA was not exempt and could be reached by creditors.

This set up disagreement between the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, so the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

Believe it or not, the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “retirement funds,” resulting in the above courts drawing such different conclusions. The Supreme Court declared that the term must be defined in order to arrive at a correct conclusion. The Court looked a dictionary and saw that “retirement” is defined as …

       … withdrawal from one’s occupation, business or office.”

The Court wanted to look at the legal characteristics of funds set aside for the day one stops working. It focused on three:

(1)  One can put additional monies into a retirement account.

POINT: One cannot put additional monies into an inherited account. In fact, if one inherits again, one cannot mingle the two accounts. Each is to remain separate and unique.

COUNTERPOINT: One cannot put additional monies into an IRA after age 70 ½.

(2)  Holders of an inherited account are required to begin distributions in the year following the death.

POINT: There are no age 59 ½ or 70 ½ minimum distribution requirements here. It does not matter whether the beneficiary is three years old or ninety-three; distributions must begin in the year following death, unless one fully depletes the account over 5 years.

OBSERVATION: The Court asked obvious question: how does this distribution requirement tie-in to the beneficiary’s retirement in any way?

(3)  The beneficiary can withdraw the entire balance at any time, without penalty.

POINT: You and I cannot do that with our own IRA until we are age 59 ½. 

OBSERVATION”: The Court noted that there is a ‘stick” if one wants to access a traditional IRA early – the 10% penalty. That expresses Congress’ intent to discourage use of traditional IRA s for day-to-day non-retirement purposes. The inherited IRA has no such prohibition. What does that say about Congress’ intent with inherited IRAs?

Rest assured that Ms Heffron-Clark was arguing furiously that the funds in that inherited IRA are “retirement funds” because, at some point, they were set aside for retirement.

The Court looked at the three criteria above and said that the inherited IRA certainly constitutes “funds,” but it cannot see how they rise to the level of “retirement funds.” They simply do not have the characteristics of normal retirement funds.

The Supreme Court unanimously decided that an inherited IRA do not constitute “retirement funds” and are not exempt from bankruptcy claims. Ms. Heffron-Clark’s creditors could in fact reach that $300 grand.

Granted, this is a bankruptcy case, but I see two immediate tax consequences from this decision:
(1) First, a surviving spouse (that is, the widow or widower) has a tax  option offered no other IRA beneficiary.
The surviving spouse can take the IRA as an inherited IRA (and be subject to bankruptcy claims) or he/she can rollover the IRA to his/her own personal name.
In the past, this decision was sometimes made based on the survivor’s age. For example, if the surviving spouse thought he/she might need the money before age 59 ½, the tax planner would lean towards an inherited IRA. Why? Because there is no 10% penalty for early withdrawals from an inherited IRA. There would be penalties on early withdrawals from a rollover IRA.
This decision now gives planners another reason to consider a spousal rollover.
(2) Second, there may be increased attention to IRA accumulation trusts.
A trust is allowed to be an IRA beneficiary, but at the cost of some highly specific tax rules. There are two types of permitted trusts. The first is the conduit trust. The trust receives the annual minimum required distributions (MRDs) but is required to immediately pay them out to the beneficiary.  While you may wonder what purpose this trust serves, consider that the trust – while unable to protect the annual income – can still protect the principal of the trust.

The second type is the accumulation trust. It is eponymous: it accumulates. There are no required distributions to the beneficiaries. The tax cost for this can be enormous, however. A trust reaches the maximum federal tax rate at the insanely low threshold of approximately $12,000. Obviously, this strategy works best when the beneficiaries are themselves at the maximum tax bracket.

The other point that occurred to me is the future of stretch IRAs. There has been considerable discussion about imposing a five-year distribution requirement (with very limited exceptions) on inherited IRAs. This of course is in response to the popular tax strategy of “stretch” IRAs. The stretch is easy to explain: I leave my IRA to my granddaughter. The IRA resets its mandatory distributions, using her life expectancy rather than mine (which is swell, as I am dead). Say that she is age 11. Whereas there are mandatory distributions, those distributions are spread out over the life expectancy of an eleven-year-old girl. That is the purpose and use of the “stretch.”

Consider that the Court just decided that an inherited IRA does not constitute “retirement funds.” This may make it easier for Congress to eventually do away with stretch IRAs.